There is no universal basis in Dzogchen. The view of Dzogchen is emptiness.
...
This translation is incorrect. It is from this passage:
- Samantabhadri is the unrestricted vast sphere.
Vast Samantabhadra is displayed to all.
Samantabhadra father and mother have a non-dual single form.
The state of Samantabhadri endowed with the meaning of realization
arises as every diversity since her unchanging bhaga is vast.
The whole universe is included in her bhaga.
The bhaga of the mother is the field of great emptiness.
The non-dual form of the father and mother totally pervade migrating beings.
...
The basis of the universe in Trika is Shiva, who really exists, and so
everything which comes from Shiva really exists. This point is made very
clear by Lakshmanijoo in his critique of Advaita Vedanta.
When I say there is no universal basis, I mean that there is no basis
taught in Dzogchen which is ontologically real, singular, and
overarching. The basis [gzhi, sthana] is one's own unfabricated mind
which is originally pure, i.e., empty. The all-basis (kun gzhi, ālaya)
in Dzogchen refers to the aspect of mind which gathers traces.
...
No, it is a different principle altogether.
...
- The third area of difference between
Kashmir Śaivism and Vedānta concerns the essence, the substance, the
basis of this universe. Vedānta holds that this universe is untrue,
unreal. It does not really exist. It is only a creation of illusion
(māyā). Concerning this point, Kashmir Śaivism argues that if Lord Śiva
is real, than how could an unreal substance come out from something that
is real? If Lord Śiva is real, then His creation is also real. Why
should it be said that Lord Śiva is real and Hs creation is an illusion
(māyā)? Kashmir Śaivism explains that the existence of this universe is
just as real as the existence of Lord Śiva. As such, it is real, pure,
and solid. This is nothing about it at all which is unreal."
-- pg. 104, Kashmir Shaivism, The Secret Supreme; 1st Books, 2000.
In Dzogchen it is held that the appearance of the universe is caused by
the imputing ignorance which is a result of the neutral awareness at the
time the basis arises from the basis not recognizing its own
appearances as being its own state. Needless, to say, that mind is also
empty, and lacks any nature or inherent existence. That mind is also
individual, which accounts for why Samantabhadra woke up at the time the
basis arose from the basis, and sentient beings did not.
In short, the foundation of Dzogchen teachings is the Buddha's teaching
of the five elements, five aggregates, emptiness, dependent
origination,etc.; while the foundation of Kashmir Shaivism is Samkhya,
with an added eleven principles on top of Samkhya's original 25, in
addition to asserting there is only one universal puruśa, Śiva, as
opposed to Samkhya's assertion that there are infinite individual
puruśas.
...
Because our mind is stirred by wind, it seeks outside its own state,
because it seeks outside its own state, it reifies the five elements;
because it reifies the five elements, it takes on bodies. Therefore, to
control the mind, control the wind, to control the wind, control the
body.
M
...
My friend, I can assure you that is indeed the case that rig pa becomes
ma rig pa. And why? Because vāyu stirred consciousness and that
consciousness that does not recognize its own display is ma rig pa. As
it states in my forthcoming translation (Wisdom, 12/16) of one of the
most seminal of all Dzogchen commentaries:
- As such, knowledge (vidyā, rig pa) itself becomes ignorance (ma rig pa, āvidyā) and nondelusion becomes delusion.
And how does this happen?
- The trio of the essence, nature, and
compassion of the original basis becomes the three ignorances. Since the
essence is made the cause of delusion, it is designated “the ignorance
of the same identity” and becomes so. Once the nature is made the
condition of delusion, since the vāyu of the impelling karma manifests
as color, it is designated “the connate ignorance” and becomes so.
Compassion is made the result of delusion. Since pristine consciousness
manifests as different names, that is designated as “the imputing
ignorance” and becomes so. As such, from not recognizing that knowledge
and ignorance have the same cause, like the front and back of one’s
hand, the ignorance of the same identical cause arises from not arriving
at ultimate nonduality. The connate ignorance (arising from the
preceding) is a term of duality, meaning as soon as the conceit “this is
originally pure” occurs, it is inseparable from that ignorance. Thus,
ignorance depends on knowledge and delusion depends on nondelusion.
And as Vimalamitra states:
- The vidyā that is moved and stirred by vāyu
is subtle; its stirring is difficult to understand.
You might wish to reconsider your point of view in this light.
...
Yes, of course I agree with his statement. If you want to understand
Dzogchen, than you have to understand that the basis is exactly what
Vimalamitra says it is, i.e., pristine consciousness, luminosity,
ordinary mind, etc. Otherwise, the basis is just a blank invert
voidness. How can emptiness along reify anything?
...
Each mind has its own basis [nature].
There is no such thing as a singular, transpersonal, universal basis in Dzogchen.
...
There is no universal basis, as such. There is however a generic basis,
which has three characteristics: essence, nature and compassion. Just as
all instances of water are generically limpid, clear and moist,
likewise the basis for each and every sentient being is the trio of
essence, nature and compassion. Put in the simplest terms, all sentient
beings possess a consciousness which has the nature being empty and
clear. When examined from the point of view of reducing this to the most
essential point, the basis is just one's unfabricated mind, nothing
more, nothing less.
The all-basis is of course the imputing ignorance.
...
I never said that each individual consciousness was ultimate per se. The
point is that the ultimate (inseparable luminosity and emptiness) is a
generic attribute they all share, in the same way all fires share the
generic attribute of heat, and so on, or that each and every entity is
empty. As Candra points, all things have two natures, one relative, one
ultimate. In Madhyamaka, the ultimate nature of each and everything is
emptiness. This is true also in Dzogchen; but in Dzogchen, not only are
all minds ultimately empty, they are also ultimately luminous. This
inseparable luminosity and emptiness is given the name "one's
unfabricated mind" by Vimalamitra, or as Mipham puts it:
- That basis is originally pure from the
aspect of lacking any proliferation, and since it is not solely empty
like space, its impartial clarity is naturally perfect without being
delimited or falling into extremes. Since it is the source of the
appearances of all samsara and nirvana, compassion is said to pervade
everything. In the Dharma terminology of the Great Perfection, the
pristine consciousness that is said to be three-fold.
Likewise, in the sūtras and tantras, it called “the dhātu” and
“emptiness” from the aspect of the characteristic freedom from all kinds
of proliferation that cannot be perceived at all. [4/a] From the aspect
of intrinsically radiant (mdangs) clarity it is called “self-originated
pristine consciousness.” Since it does not change in aspect, it is
called “original mind (sems),” “original mind (yid),” “naturally
luminous mind,” “the vajra of mind,” “the vajra of space that pervades
space” and so on. Even though there is an explanation with many
different names, all of them are not different in meaning than dharmatā
of the mind, the nondual dhātu and vidyā, or bodhicitta, the ultimate
reality is like a vajra.
Therefore, since the so called “dharmadhātu” is not understood to be
only empty, it is the emptiness that possesses the supreme of all
aspects, whole and indivisible from luminosity. Though it is called
“self-originated pristine consciousness,” the subjective mind that
realizes the emptiness of the duality, and of subject and object, does
not know conditioned signs. It is also necessary to understand that such
natural clarity does not have an iota of a sign that can be designated
as conditioned.
The bodhicitta mentioned in the mind series of the Great Perfection, the
dharmadhātu mentioned in the space series, the self-originated pristine
consciousness mentioned in the intimate instruction series, the
dharmadhātu mentioned in the Prajñāpāramitā, the original mind mentioned
in most of the mantra tantras and so on may have different names by
virtue of their purposes, but since the meaning to understand is the
pristine consciousness of that meaning which illustrates the union of
knowing and emptiness, the reality of all phenomena, it is the original
connate pristine consciousness. Since it is naturally settled dharmatā
because it is not generated by the traces of transmigration’s three
appearances, it is called the great bliss that is free from all pain of
transmigration.
...
No, not multiple bases, no more than there are multiple heats.
The basis, as we saw above, is just the dharmatā of one's own mind, just
as heat is the dharmatā of fire. We don't say of emptiness for example,
that there multiple emptinesses for multiple entities, we don't need to
say that of the basis either when we understand that the basis is a
generic set of attributes for all minds, just as emptiness is a generic
attribute of phenomena. We speak of emptiness often without
distinguishing whether we mean one emptiness or many emptinesses,
because it is understood at the outset that there is no entity
"emptiness" that needs to spoken of in plural or singular terms.
Likewise, we don't need to speak about the basis in plural or singular
terms because we can understand at the outset the term "basis" refers to
the dharmatā of the mind, and not some entity out of which minds arise,
or in which they are somehow located. Likewise, we discuss fire in
terms of heat, we don't say that fires have heats, we merely generically
declare that all fires are hot.
...
The universe does not exist outside the minds that project it, and there
is no inseparable clarity and emptiness for us to discover apart from
the inseparable clarity and emptiness of our own minds. The fact that we
can discover the knowledge of our own state through the three
experiences proves that we are discovering the knowledge of the real
state of our own minds, and nothing else. As far as the reality of the
universe goes, well as Āryadeva put it, when one discovers the emptiness
of one thing, one discovers the emptiness of all things, and as the
Dzogchen tantras put it, knowing one thing liberates everything (gcig shes kun grol).
You should should also bear in mind that the experience of clarity,
which is connected with lhun grub, is just an example, the same goes
with the experience of emptiness, it is merely an example. This is why,
for example, we don't attain the first bhumi at direct introduction
(99.999 percent of us at any rate) —— that only happens if one happens
to be diligent enough to reach the third vision in this life.
...
I never said the universe didn't exist. I did not insist that basis
inheres anywhere. I said the basis is a set of generic qualities of a
given consciousness, the realization of which results in Buddhahood. It
is really not hard to understand and is all perfectly consistent with
Dzogchen texts and teachings. Shabkar writes:
- Fortunate children of good families, listen without distraction:
although the discourses of the eighty-four thousand aggregates of Dharma and so on,
taught by all the victors of the three times,
are equal with space and immeasurable,
in reality, they were taught in order to realize one’s own mind;
apart from this, nothing else was taught by the victors.
And:
- All perceived appearances are the appearances of one’s mind.
The outer world that appears to be inert is the mind.
The sentient beings inhabiting it appearing in six classes are also the mind.
The appearance of the happiness of the higher realms of gods and men is the mind.
The appearance of the suffering of the three lower realms is also the mind.
Avidyā appearing as the five poisons is also the mind.
Vidyā appearing as self-originated pristine consciousness is also the mind. [106]
Negative thoughts appearing as the traces of samsara are also the mind.
Positive thoughts appearing as buddhafields are also the mind.
The appearance of obstacles of ghosts and demons is also the mind.
The appearances of gods and siddhis are also the mind.
The appearances of the variety of concepts are also the mind.
Non-conceptuality, appearing as one-pointed meditation, is also the mind.
The signs and colors of things are also the mind.
The absence of signs and non-existence of proliferation is also the mind.
Appearances without the duality of being one or many is also the mind.
Appearances that are not established as being either existent or non-existent are also the mind.
There are no appearances at all apart from the mind.
And:
- This relaxed unfabricated ordinary mind
is the vast space of the realization of the Jinas free from extremes.
Frankly, my friend, I think you are a little too hung up on words.
...
Dante, the term "basis" describes a state of nonrealization, nothing more.
We use the term to describe a set of qualities of what is termed
"pristine consciousness." The basis is a consciousness, term "pristine
consciousness, as the Six Dimensions states:
- Because pristine consciousness has three aspects,
the basis is explained in different words.
The
Sgra thal gyur states:
- The pristine consciousness dwelling in its own essence
is inseparable in three modalities.
Further, the
Illuminating Lamp commentary on
Sgra thal gyur states
- the pristine consciousness—subsumed by
the consciousness which apprehends primordial liberation and the abiding
basis as ultimate—is inseparable in all buddhas and sentient beings as a mere consciousness.
A rock in a garden is just a projection of a mind that does not
recognize its own state. This is very explicitly stated of inanimate
objects — they are reified out of the five lights from our
nonrecognition of the five lights. For example, the
Illuminating Lamp states:
- The luminous aspect of delusion
resulting from that is stirred by a subtle vāyu. Also, all the previous
lights are stirred and obscured, such that the light’s own appearance
grows dimmer and dimmer. After it becomes impure, the latent appearances
of earth, water, fire, and air emerge and appear as subtle particles.
Etc.
...
The passage means that if the basis isn't a consciousness, it would be inert, like the four elements.
What is the basis? Garab Dorje states in a commentary in the Vima Snying thig:
- "The fundamental basis is the trio of essence, nature and compassion of each individual's vidyā."
We saw already that essence, nature and compassion are aspects of what
is termed "pristine consciousness" aka ye shes or primordial wisdom.
I also want to point out, that though it may seem to some people that
Dzogchen is proposing some temporal beginning to samsara and nirvana,
this is really not the case. Dzogchen is not a cosmology. It is a
phenomenology of bondage and liberation.
...
gad rgyangs wrote:so luminosity is a primary substance?
Malcolm: If it were, it would not be empty. It is for this reason that it is an
error to say that the generic basis is only a naturally perfected (
lhun grub, anabhogana) nature (
rang bzhin, prakriti). If this were the case, Dzogchen would be Samkhya, basically.
...
gad rgyangs wrote:if luminosity is empty then it is a dependent arising. Upon what causes and conditions does it arise?
Malcolm No, this is not the case. Why are you introducing two truths through back into the conversation?
Emptiness is unconditioned, so is luminosity. Conditioned/unconditioned, this is just a mental reification.
In any case, all fires are hot, all water is wet, all minds are empty and luminous. This is not a problem.
"There is no mind in the mind, but the nature (prakṛiti) of the mind is luminousity."
...
gad rgyangs wrote:so luminosity is not the
basis, rather emptiness and luminosity are qualities of the basis,
which is itself empty of both those qualities, as well as all others,
including existence and non existence.
Malcolm: The basis is just your mind. Not your thoughts, not its content, etc. It has three qualities, essence, nature, and compassion.
There is no basis apart from your mind, in its unfabricated, unmodified
state. If this wasn't the case, your nonrecognition of the five lights
would not result in samsara, and your recognition of the five lights
would not result in buddhahood. But in any case, it is just your own
mind and its characteristics we are discussing. These five lights are
just the result of the stirring of vāyu which is the internal movement
of your own consciousness prior its self-recognition/nonrecognition.
Now, you don't have to accept the Dzogchen account of the basis and the
arising of the basis, and that is just fine with me. But let's not
pretend that Dzogchen has some other kind basis in mind than the one I
have just described.
From the point of view of the potentiality of the basis, your own
consciousness, the basis is luminosity; from the point of the essence of
the basis, your own consciousness, the basis is emptiness free from
extremes. This emptiness and luminosity are inseparable, and are the
essence and nature of your own mind. This is all very clearly explained
in Dzogchen texts, I am not sure why you have a problem with this.་
Further, the basis is only called "the basis" because one has not realized this.
...
gad rgyangs wrote:"mind" is an imputation,
a conceptual proliferation. the basis is neither since it is beyond all
conceptual categories. seeing this directly is called rigpa.
Malcolm:
No, seeing that the display of the mind as your own state is called "rigpa."
For example, how do "sense organs rise up from the basis" in the following citation from the
sgra thal gyur?
- since the buddhas did not become deluded,
the sense organs that rose up out of the basis
recognized the self-appearances as natureless
For that matter, how would one account for this citation as well?
- In the basis, totally undifferentiated
and undefined,
consciousness is grasped as moving, vanishing,
and spreading out,
and holding taints through accumulation.
Moreover, we here have a citation from the commentary on the
sgra thal gyur would adds more understanding:
- In Ati, the pristine
consciousness—subsumed by the consciousness which apprehends primordial
liberation and the abiding basis as ultimate—is inseparable in all
buddhas and sentient beings as a mere consciousness. Since the ultimate
pervades them without any nature at all, it is contained within each
individual consciousness.
Again, the so called generic basis is set of qualities which all consciousnesses share.
Even when we get to defining sems, what does the
sgra thal gyur say?
- Sems enters the pure and impure
three realms, and also buddhahood.
The basis has an aspect of consciousness, as the
Six Dimensions clearly states:
- If that aspect of pristine consciousness did not exist,
it would not be any different than the physical matter of the four elements.
If it were the case that the basis was single entity, there could not be
separation of samsara and nirvana. How can delusion be accounted for,
which is the whole reason for describing the basis? As Vimalamitra
further states:
- [D]elusion arises from the difference between the basis and the conscious aspect of the basis.
If the basis is some unitary entity, this conscious aspect would have to
be unitary, etc., in the sense that it would there could be no
diversity. But when it is understood that the basis is generic set of
attributes of every consciousness, there are no contradictions which
remain.
In other words, Dzogchen is describing a phenomenology of liberation and
delusion, and the language around the so called "basis" is merely a
starting point for discussing that which we are deluded about. What we
are deluded about is the nature our own states, and apart from a stream
of empty consciousness, there is no other state that is under
discussion.
...
"Rigpa" is just a mind that is undeluded concerning its own state. Apart from that, there is no other "rigpa."
You can put scare quotes around "mind" and make all kinds of
distinctions in English around words you have not defined nor clarified;
but the basic reality is this: Dzogchen teachings describe how sentient
beings become deluded, and how to remedy that delusion with the path.
...
There is no need to remove "mind" from the sentence, since rig pa is knowledge that a mind has, apart from which, no rig pa
is possible. This is the reason why prajñā and vidyā are synonymous.
For example, Vimalamitra in the Vima sNying thig, among the five
definitions of vidyā, which are contextual, states first that vidyā is
"a clear nonconceptual consciousness contaminated by many
consciousnesses." The second type is the vidyā that appropriates the
basis (meaning the body) existing in the body, generates consciousness,
existing within its own clarity, also termed, "unripened vidyā." The
third type of vidyā is the one that exists in the basis, defined as
possessing three pristine consciousness of essence, nature and
compassion. The fourth is defined as the vidyā of insight, vipaśyāna,
having to do with the visions. The fifth is the vidyā of thögal, here
meaning vidyā at the conclusion of the fourth vision.
In the end, all five of these are just means of talking about one's own
mind and it's knowledge of its own state or lack thereof, since all five
of these vidyās, Vimalamitra points, are essentially the same.
M
...
Lopon Malcolm:
“In the basis (Tibetan: གཞི, Wylie: gzhi) there were neutral awarenesses
(sh shes pa lung ma bstan) that did not recognize themselves. (Dzogchen
texts actually do not distinguish whether this neutral awareness is one
or multiple.) This non-recognition was the innate ignorance. Due to
traces of action and affliction from a previous universe, the basis
became stirred and the Five Pure Lights shone out. When a neutral
awareness recognized the lights as its own display, that was
Samantabhadra (immediate liberation without the performance of virtue).
Other neutral awarenesses did not recognize the lights as their own
display, and thus imputed “other” onto the lights. This imputation of
“self” and “other” was the imputing ignorance. This ignorance started
sentient beings and samsara (even without non-virtue having been
committed). Yet everything is illusory, since the basis never displays
as anything other than the five lights.”
Kyle Dixon:
“I’m obviously preferable to the Dzogchen system because I started there and although branching out, my primary interest has remained there. But I do appreciate the run-down of avidyā or ignorance in the Dzogchen system because it is tiered and accounts for this disparity I am addressing.
There are two or three levels of ignorance which are more like aspects of our delusion regarding the nature of phenomena. The point of interest in that is the separation of what is called “innate” (or “connate”) ignorance, from what is called “imputing ignorance.”
The imputing ignorance is the designating of various entities, dimension of experience and so on. And one’s identity results from that activity.
The connate ignorance is the failure to correctly apprehend the nature of phenomena. The very non-recognition of the way things really are.
This is important because you can have the connate ignorance remain in tact without the presence of the imputing ignorance.
This separation is not even apparent through the stilling of imputation like in śamatha. But it can be made readily apparent in instances where you awaken from sleep, perhaps in a strange location, on vacation etc., or even just awakening from a deep sleep. There can be a period of moments where you do not realize where you are right yet, and then suddenly it all comes back, where you are, what you have planned for the day, where you need to be, etc.,
In those initial moments you are still conscious and perceiving appearances, and there is still an innate experience of the room being external and objects being something over-there, separate from oneself. That is because this fundamental error in recognition of the nature of phenomena is a deep conditioning that creates the artificial bifurcation of inner and outer experiential dimensions, even without the activity of imputation.”
...
Malcolm:
There are two ways be free of grasping: regarding all
things as impure and rejecting them as such (Hinayāna and common Mahāyāna), and
regarding all things as pure and accepting them as such. The latter method more
rapid, but requires special methods, so that it is not merely an intellectual
posture.
...
In sūtra there is no antidotal method of conceiving the
appearance of things as pure which are typically conceived by ordinary sentient
being as impure. Emptiness, in sutra, is provided as cure for this, in terms of
nature, but not in terms of appearance. Vajrayāna address both nature and
appearance; sūtra only addresses nature, not appearance.
...
In common Mahāyāna, like Hinayāna schools, relatively
speaking, phenomena, other than path dharmas, are still compounded, suffering,
and not-self, and hence impure. Their ultimate nature, emptiness, is pure.
In uncommon Mahāyāna Secret Mantra, phenomena are
rendered pure through special methods which change our attitude towards
phenomena.
...
Malcolm wrote:
It is pretty straightfoward according to Mipham:
"In the realization of the Great Perfection that the
three times are not time, there are no phenomena of the ten directions and
three times that are not perfect. Therefore, this is the dharmakāya at the time
of the basis, but because the temporary afflictions have not been purified it
has not ripened into the nature of the result.
While maintaining the position, “This purification of any
obscurations is the feature of the time of path. This total purification of
obscurations is the feature of the time of the result,” is in accord with the
mode of appearance of sentient beings, from the perspective of the mode of
existence of dharmatā, it is not possible to move even slightly away from
abiding in state of uniformity which lacks any divisions of dualistic phenomena
such as division by three times, division into pure and impure, sentient beings
and buddhas, and so on."
Thus, florin and krodha are both correct. Florin is
correct from the point of view of mode of reality [gnas tshul], kyle is correct
from the point of view of the mode of appearances [snang tshul] for sentient
beings.
...
Krodha (Kyle Dixon):
Thanks. Although I suppose my gripe is that I'm willing
to (and strive to) account for both sides of the equation (mode of reality and
appearances) whereas Florin is solely clinging to the mode of reality and
declaring that the mode of appearances is irrelevant and "not
Dzogchen", which is essentially nihilism.
...
Malcolm:
The so called "primordial state" aka the
original basis is called "the basis" because it has not been
realized. When that is realized, it is given the name, "the result."
"The path" is just the method of realizing that, which in the case of
the Great Perfection, is the intimate instructions of the direct introduction
and their application.
Florin's point of view is influenced very much by
"sems sde", which is primarily about the basis. Your point of view is
more influenced by man ngag sde, which is more concerned with the methods of
realizing that basis.
Another useful snippet from Mipham:
According to that principle, though from the perspective
of ultimate reality it is necessary to propose that the universe and beings are
primordial buddhahood and meditate in that way, from the perspective of the
conventions of the mode of appearances, the differentiation by wisdom into
three — the basis, the reasoning that buddhahood is valid; the path, the time
of practice; and the result, the culmination of purification — are asserted up
to the Great Perfection. Also the treatises of the Great Perfection purpose
buddhahood once the fives paths of trekchö and the four visions of thögal are
finished, but in terms of the mode of appearances, they never assert the
accomplishment of buddhahood without finishing the path. When these two are
differentiated, after the darkness of doubt about the topics that any of the
vehicles of the cause and result have difficulty realizing, since there arises
the appearance of confidence knowledge that cannot be diverted, this
differentiation is very important.
...
Florin:
I dont really understand this quote.
I think it needs some work.
Malcolm:
All Mipham is saying is that there are two perspectives,
how things are and how things appear. From the perspective of how things are,
"it is necessary to propose that the universe and beings are primordial
buddhahood and meditate in that way."
From the point of view of how things appear, the basis,
path and result are divvied up by wisdom according their features: the basis
concerns proving the validity of buddhahood. This is why, for example, we have
the account of Samantabhadra's buddhahood and the account of the delusion of
sentient beings. There is also a practice, and also the culmination of the
purification of the delusion which gave rise to sentient beings in the first
place. Since only deluded people are concerned with liberation, the path of Dzogchen
is very much concerned with correcting the delusion that arises from ignorance
[ma rig pa] by remaining in the knowledge [rig pa] of how things actually are,
i.e. that the universe and beings are primordial buddhahood.
We are not approaching practice from the point of view of
accepting something that is not true, i.e., that the universe and beings are
impure, etc. But we must acquiesce that this is indeed how things appear to us,
and that as long as things appear in this way to us, we are under the influence
of the two obscurations, which while temporary and not innate, conceal from us
our actual state.
M
...
The
problem with shentong, which CHNN has addressed many times, is that in
Dzogchen the result exists as a potentiality of the basis; but in
Shenton it is fully formed at all times. For this reason, in several
retreats ChNN has declared that shentong is incompatible with Dzogchen.
...
BuddhaFollower wrote:
Brahman is not pristine consciousness?
Malcolm:
Nope. Pristine consciousness (ye shes, jñāna) is not transpersonal.
BuddhaFollower:
Okay, then this is the same as the Upanishads.
Remember there is a difference between the Upanishads and Advaita Vedanta formulated by Adi Shankara etc.
Malcolm:
It is not the same as the Upanishads, since jñāna in the Upanishads is not empty.
Also:
Malcolm wrote:
The
view is self-originated pristine consciousness, free from the extreme
of the dualism of an apprehended object and an apprehending subject.
— Self-Liberated Vidyā Tantra
srivijaya wrote:
Brilliant quote.
Not unlike Viññanam anidassanam from the Kevatta sutta:
Consciousness without feature, without end, luminous all around
Malcolm wrote:
It has precisely the same meaning.
Malcolm:
Yes, just as emptiness is a quality: that is what the generic basis is, a set of qualities which inhere to all sentient beings.
It is not really that complicated. We say that minds are empty and luminous. When we analyze a given mind (for example, our own, since we cannot examine the minds of others), all we can discover is emptiness and luminosity. These are the irreducible facts that pertain to minds. The fact that minds are empty means they are free from extremes and not monadic, or even plural entities. The fact that they are luminous means that they are not inert, like rocks, etc. We don't need to discuss these things in terms of the two truths, because there is no separation between the two truths anyway.
.....
Well, given that Shankara is one of the
60 teachers identified as promulgating wrong view in the Self-Arisen
VIdyā Tantra, it would be very surprising to learn of any so called
khenpo of Dzogchen claiming that Atman was just a Hindu name for the
mind essence. You yourself admit the idea does not even exist in their
system.
.....
There is no substratum, minds do not "overlap." The reason why Buddhas
and high bodhisattvas can know the minds of others, know past lives,
etc. is because the nature of everything is emptiness and therefore
while there is no universal substratum there is also no impediments
because everything is empty. And since everything is empty, Buddha's
wisdom is unimpeded in all directions and times.
...
The Śrī Maladevi sutra states:
- In that respect, the dharmakāya of the
tathāgatagarbha is definitely released from the sheath of afflictions.
Bhagavān, the so called "tathāgatagarbha" is tathāgata's wisdom of
emptiness that cannot be seen by śravakas and pratyekabuddhas.
Dharmakāya is just the total realization of emptiness. Nothing more.
Further, The Trikāya Sūtra states:
Kṣitigarbha, tathāgatas are endowed
with the three kāyas: the dharmakāya, the sambhogkāya and the
nirmanakāya…In that regard, the dharmakāya is visible to the tathagātas.
The sambhogakāya is visible to bodhisattvas. The nirmanakāya is visible
to ordinary persons on the stage of devotional practice.
Kṣitigarbha, for example, clouds are produced on the basis of an empty
sky; rain is produced on the basis of clouds. Likewise, the sambhogakaȳa
appears on the basis of the dharmakāya, and the nirmanakāya appears on
the basis of the sambhogakāya.
[10:51 PM, 10/17/2019] Soh Wei Yu: malcolm
(Arcaya Malcolm Smith) wrote:
https://dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=77&t=30365&p=479718&hilit=AGENT#p479718
There is no typing typer, no learning learner, no digesting digester, thinking tinker, or driving driver.
...
No, a falling faller does not make any sense. As Nāgārjuna would put it,
apart from snow that has fallen or has not fallen, presently there is
no falling.
...
It is best if you consult the investigation into movement in the MMK,
chapter two. This is where it is shown that agents are mere conventions.
If one claims there is agent with agency, one is claiming the agent and
the agency are separate. But if you claim that agency is merely a
characteristic of an agent, when agent does not exercise agency, it
isn't an agent since an agent that is not exercising agency is in fact a
non-agent. Therefore, rather than agency being dependent on an agent,
an agent is predicated upon exercising agency. For example, take
movement. If there is an agent there has to be a moving mover. But there
is no mover when there is no moving. Apart from moving, how could there
be a mover? But when there is moving, there isn't a mover which is
separate from moving. Even movement itself cannot be ascertained until
there has been a movement. When there is no movement, there is no agent
of movement. When there is moving, there is no agent of moving that can
be ascertained to be separate from the moving. And since even moving
cannot be ascertained without there either having been movement or not,
moving itself cannot be established. Since moving cannot be established,
a moving mover cannot be established. If a moving mover cannot be
established, an agent cannot be established.
...
Hi Wayfarer:
The key to understanding everything is the term "dependent designation."
We don't question the statement "I am going to town." In this there are
three appearances, for convenience's sake, a person, a road, and a
destination.
A person is designated on the basis of the aggregates, but there is no
person in the aggregates, in one of the aggregates, or separate from the
aggregates. Agreed? A road is designated in dependence on its parts,
agreed? A town s designated upon its parts. Agreed?
If you agree to this, then you should have no problem with the following teaching of the Buddha in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra:
This body arises from various conditions, but lacks a self. This body is
like the earth, lacking an agent. This body is like water, lacking a
self. This body is like fire, lacking a living being. This body is like
the wind, lacking a person. This body is like space, lacking a nature.
This body is the place of the four elements, but is not real. This body
that is not a self nor pertains to a self is empty.
In other words, when it comes to the conventional use of language,
Buddha never rejected statements like "When I was a so and so in a past
life, I did so and so, and served such and such a Buddha." Etc. But when
it comes to what one can discern on analysis, if there is no person, no
self, etc., that exists as more than a mere designation, the fact that
agents cannot be discerned on analysis should cause no one any concern.
It is merely a question of distinguishing between conventional use of
language versus the insight into the nature of phenomena that results
from ultimate analysis.
-------
[11:36 PM, 10/17/2019] John Tan: Yes should put in blog together with
Alan watt article about language causing confusion.
-------
From other threads:
https://dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=39&t=26272&p=401986&hilit=agent#p401986
There is no "experiencer" since there is no
agent. There is merely experience, and all experience is empty.
https://dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=102&t=24265&start=540
Why should there be someone upon whom karma ripens? To paraphrase the
Visuddhimagga, there is no agent of karma, nor is there a person to
experience its ripening, there is merely a flow of dharmas.
...
There are no agents. There are only actions. This is covered in the refutation of moving movers in chapter two of the MMK.
...
https://dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=116&t=26495&p=406369&hilit=agent#p406369
The point is that there is no point to eternalism if there is no eternal agent or object.
...
https://dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=52&t=16306&p=277352&hilit=mover+movement+agent#p277352
Things have no natures, conventionally or otherwise. Look, we can say
water is wet, but actually, there no water that possesses a wet nature.
Water is wet, that is all. There is no wetness apart from water and not
water apart from wetness. If you say a given thing has a separate
nature, you are making the exact mistaken Nāgārajuna points out in the
analysis of movement, i.e., it is senseless to say there is a "moving
mover." Your arguments are exactly the same, you are basically saying
there is an "existing existence."
...
This is precisely because of the above point I referenced. Nagārjuna clearly shows that characteristics/natures are untenable.
Candrakīrti points out that the possessor does not exist at all, but for
the mere purpose of discourse, we allow conventionally the idea that
there is a possessor of parts even though no possessor of parts exists.
This mistake that we indulge in can act as an agent, for example a car,
we can use it as such, but it is empty of being a car — an agent is as
empty of being an agent as its actions are empty of being actions.
...
Malcolm Smith
Malcolm Smith Lamps do not illuminate themselves. Candrakirti shows this.
2
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· Reply · 1w
Malcolm Smith
Malcolm
Smith Nāgārjuna is addressing the realist proposition, "the six senses
perceive their objects because those sense and their objects
intrinsically exist ." It is not his unstated premise, that is the
purvapakṣa, the premise of the opponent. The opponent, in verse 1 of
this chapter asserts the essential existence of the six āyatanas. The
opponent is arguing that perception occurs because the objects of
perception actually exist.
6
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· Reply · 1w · Edited
Malcolm Smith
Malcolm
Smith [Participant 1] "The argument from chap 2 depends on natural
functions (movement, burning of fire, seeing of the eye, etc.) being
predicated on the moment of time which it takes place, and when the non
obtaining of time is established it leads to the non happening of the
function. This is not justified."
Why?
Nāgārjuna
shows two things in chapter two, one, he says that if there is a moving
mover, this separates the agent from the action, and either the mover
is not necessary or the moving is not necessary. It is redundant.
In
common language we oftren saying things like "There is a burning fire."
But since that is what a fire is (burning) there is no separate agent
which is doing the burning, fire is burning.
On the
other hand, when an action is not performed, no agent of that action can
be said to exist. This is why he says "apart from something which has
moved and has not moved, there is no moving mover." There is no mover
with moving, etc.
This can be applied to all present
tense gerundial agentive constructions, such as I am walking to town,
the fire is burning, etc.
8
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[Participant 2] Malcolm Smith these are not agentive constructions,
they are unaccusative (cf. "byed med") verbs, so of course no separate
agent can be established. So what?
The example
of the fire and the eye are likewise not convincing, because they just
happen to describe natural functions, but this is not all that
unaccusative verbs do. When you say "the cat falls down", you cannot say
that "falling down" is what a cat "is", the same way you can with fire
burning.
Like
· Reply · 1w
Malcolm Smith
Malcolm
Smith [Participant 2] the point is aimed at the notion that there has
to be a falling faller, a seeing seer, etc. it is fine to say there is a
falling cat, but stupid to say the cat is a falling faller. The
argument is aimed at that sort of naive premise.
For example, if eyes could see forms by nature, they should be
able to forms in absence of an object of form, and so on.
But if the sight of forms cannot be found in the eyes, and not in
the object, nor the eye consciousness, then none of them are sufficient
to explain the act of seeing. Because of this, statements like the eyes
are seers is just a convention, but isn’t really factual.
And it still applies in this way, apart from what has been seen and not been seen, there is no present seeing.
1
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· Reply · 1w · Edited
....
Rigpa (Sanskrit:
vidyā, "knowledge") is a central concept in Dzogchen. According to Ācārya Malcolm Smith
Ācārya Malcolm Smith:
A text from the Heart Essence of Vimalamitra called the Lamp Summarizing Vidyā (Rig pa bsdus pa’i sgronma)
defines vidyā in the following way: “...vidyā is knowing, clear, and
unchanging” In Sanskrit, the term vidyā and all its cognates imply
consciousness, knowing, knowledge, science, intelligence, and so on.
Simply put, vidyā means unconfused knowledge of the basis that is its
own state.[78]
....
Lukeinaz
wrote: ↑Mon Apr 30, 2018 8:39 pm
"In non dual contemplation there is
neither experience or experiencer. This itself is real experience."
Malcolm:
Yes, and this
is just the message of the Prajñapāramitā Sūtras, since of course, the meaning
of the Great Perfection is exactly the same as the Prajñapāramitā Sūtras, the
only difference is the method of arriving at that meaning.
.... A Brief History of the Dzogchen Teachings by Ācārya Malcolm Smith
Garab
Dorje was a Buddha, therefore he had all three kāyas: Samantabhadra is a
name for his mind, just as Vajrasattva is a name for his speech. As for
the 6.4 million slokas of Dzogchen tantras, these were written down by
Mañjuśṛīmitra and divided into the three series, according to the lo
rgyus chen mo, and then divided into the four cycles by Sṛī Simha, which
were then given to Jñānasūtra and Vimalamitra, etc. The transmission
for these texts however was given in symbols, rather than extensive
discourses, hence the symbolic vidyādhara lineage. Finally, Vimalamitra,
according the lo rgyus chen mo, translated these texts and gave them to
Tingzin Zangpo (who hid them in Zhva Gonpa), initiating the so called
aural lineage of esteemed persons. However, this aural lineage was
accompanied by texts from the beginning, since according to tradition,
Vimalamitra translated many Dzogchen tantras into Tibetan, some where
hidden as treasures, and others, like the thirteen later lungs, were
part of the bka' ma tradition. Naturally, the historical accounts given
in the so called sems sde histories and klong sde histories are
represent an earlier tradition of Dzogchen teachings than the lo rgyus
chen mo, and are significantly different form the lo rgyus chen mo in
terms of the details they present. We have independent confirmation of
the existence of Sṛī Simha, etc., in the form of an Indian polemical
treatise, which dates from the late 10th century and was authored by
Mañjuśṛīkīrti, that refutes the views of Sṛī Simha by name and the
movement he presented. So one thing we can be quite confident about is
that there was a guy name Sṛī Simha, he was a student of Mañjuśṛīmitra,
he taught a radical doctrine whereby he asserted only the completion
stage was necessary. Finally, we can also be certain that there was a
Tibetan named Bagor Vairocana, who was the first person to translated
Dzogchen texts in Tibetan, and we can also be certain that Sṛī Simha was
a contemporary of Trisong Detsen. Before this period, it is extremely
unlikely there was anything remotely like the teaching of the Great
Perfection in Tibet. Dzogchen is wholly an Indian-inspired Vajrayāna
movement. There is really no evidence that suggests otherwise.
— Ācārya Malcolm Smith
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