https://www.reddit.com/r/Dzogchen/s/ylP5OSD55l
Krodha (Kyle Dixon) wrote:
Advaita Vedanta is rooted in a Sāṃkhya worldview, which differs from the Abhidharma framework that Dzogchen is based on, that right there creates a firm distinction in the overall way these two systems function and view the world.
However beyond the fact that Advaita Vedanta is a sanatanadharmic view as opposed to buddhadharma, according to Dzogchen, Advaita is a false view that is incapable of producing liberation as defined by Dzogchen and buddhadharma in general. The Rigpa Rangshar for example lists Advaita Vedanta under various wrong views, and even mentions Ādi Śaṅkarācārya by name in addressing Advaita.
For other refutations of Advaita Vedanta you can read Śāntarakṣita‘s Tattvasaṃgraha, or Bhāviveka’s Tarkajvālā, which are two main sūtrayāna level writings which dedicate some attention to contrasting these systems. One might object and say during the time of Buddha Śākyamuni there was no Advaita Vedanta so the Buddha never addressed Advaita directly, however Sāṃkhya yoga was around during the Buddha’s time, and given the Buddha separated and distinguished his dharma from these other views such as Sāṃkhya, and Sāṃkhya is the underlying worldview that Advaita is based on, we can know (or confidently infer) that the Buddha would have also objected to Advaita Vedanta.
As for specific differences, Advaita Vedanta posits a transpersonal, ultimate nature, their puruṣa, which is singular in nature as an established ontological essence. Dzogchen, by contrast, is based on buddhadharma, and so śūnyatā, or emptiness, is held to be the ultimate nature of phenomena. Emptiness, unlike brahman, is not a transpersonal nature that is truly established, even nominally. Instead, emptiness is a generic characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) and this is true even in Dzogchen as is demonstrated in the four samāyas of the basis (gzhi), the principle of gcig pu in particular. Emptiness is actually the antithesis of that which the puruṣa of Advaita represents; it is the absence of a svabhāva, or an essence, whereas puruṣa is actually an essence. Unlike the puruṣa of Advaita, emptiness is a non-reductive and non-affirming negation (prasajya-pratiṣedha) of all phenomena both compounded and uncompounded. Such a view is not shared by Advaita, which despite its attempts to classify its puruṣa as a subtle nature, even free of characteristics in the case of nirguṇabrahman, posits that brahman is still an essence that possesses the quality of being free of characteristics (nirguṇa), and this is the critique that Bhāviveka levels at Advaita:
“If it is asked what is difference between this dharmakāya and the paramātma (bdag pa dam pa —synonymous with Brahman) asserted in such ways as nonconceptual, permanent and unchanging, that [paramātma] they explain as subtle because it possesses the quality of subtlety, is explained as gross because it possesses the quality of grossness, as unique because it possess the quality of uniqueness and as pervading near and far because it goes everywhere. The dharmakāya on the other hand is neither subtle nor gross, is not unique, is not near and is not far because it is not a possessor of said qualities and because it does not exist in a place.”
Dzogpachenpo would agree with this assessment, as it also upholds that in jñāna (tib. ye shes), at the time of the path of seeing, we are ascertaining a nonarising in phenomena that is a non-affirming negation.
Sometimes people balk at these comparisons and say this is too much of a generalization, Advaita Vedanta is a variegated system, there is Sṛīṣṭīdṛīṣṭivāda, Dṛīṣṭisṛīṣṭīvāda, Māyāvāda or Vivartavāda and Ajātivāda, and of course that is fair, Dzogchen is the same way, however ultimately, just as it is the case with Dzogchen, despite these diverse subsystems, the underlying framework is in essence ubiquitous and uniform. We do not deviate from that framework despite the presence of varying methodologies or views within the system, and Advaita is no different. Even the much vaunted Ajātivāda which essentially an Advaita rendition of nonarising which cribs the Buddhist notion of nonarising, anutpāda, shared by Dzogchen, does not escape the consequences and implications of Advaita’s eternalist view. And for this reason Dzogchen would also state that Ajātivāda is incompatible with its view.
We can look to the Madhyamakālaṃkāra for the buddhist refutation of Advaita’s Ajātivāda:
“Therefore, the tathāgatas have said "all phenomena do not arise" because this conforms with the ultimate. This "ultimate" in reality, is free from all proliferation. Because there is no arising and so on, nonarising and so on isn't possible, because its entity has been negated.”
This is also how Dzogchen would refute Advaita Vedanta in this context. The above excerpt also exemplifies why emptiness is itself empty, and why emptiness is non-reductive. Advaita Vedanta cannot justifiably make the same claim about its puruṣa.
Are they similar in some ways? Sure. Is there benefit to be derived from understanding Advaita Vedanta on its own terms? Certainly. Can a practitioner of Dzogchen potentially understand Dzogchen better by understanding the views and nuances of Advaita Vedanta? Absolutely. My own teacher studied Advaita Vedanta systematically for this express purpose. But at the end of the day they are two different systems, with different bases, paths and results.
Also, to answer your question, Dzogchen is superior to Advaita Vedanta because we atiyogins, postulate that the puruṣa of Advaita is actually what buddhadharma calls the ālayavijñāna, which is a saṃsāric aspect of consciousness. All non-budddhist (tīrthika) systems fail to transcend saṃsāric states of consciousness according to Dzogchen and buddhadharma.
Thrangu Rinpoche explains:
“When Buddha Shakyamuni introduced the Buddhist teachings he taught extensively on the subject of the mind. In the context of the lesser vehicle (hinayāna), when explaining the five aggregates, the twelve sense sources, and the eighteen elements, the Buddha explained the mind in terms of six collections of consciousnesses; eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousness (i.e., the five sense consciousnesses), and the mind consciousness.
In the context of the great vehicle (mahāyāna), however, Buddha Shakyamuni explained the mind in terms of the eight collections of consciousness: the seventh consciousness is the klesha-mind and the eighth the all-base consciousness (ālayavijñāna). The reason why these two types of consciousness were not taught in the lesser vehicle is explained in the sutras. There it says “the absorbing consciousness is profound and subtle. If it were taken to be the self, that would not be appropriate.” The all-base consciousness functions uninterruptedly, like a flow of a river, by absorbing imprints and seeds. In many non-Buddhist philosophies - for example, that of the Indian Tirthikas - the true existence of a self is postulated. It could happen that the followers of such philosophies take the all-base consciousness to be the truly existent self; this is a mistake. In the great vehicle, however, there is no entity as such that could be viewed as the self: indeed, there is no valid cognition that could prove the true existence of such a self. Since sometimes the body is taken to be the self and sometimes also the mind, there is no definite focal point for the self. It obviously follows that the self cannot be construed as being the all-base consciousness either.”
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the praxis of atiyoga is based on a special type of pratyakṣa, or nonconceptual direct perception. For this reason ati is considered to be superior to every system even in the nine yānas of buddhadharma, and therefore clearly it would be considered superior to all tīrthika or non-buddhist dharmas. Every other system is rooted in mind, concepts and causal effort.
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