Anātman · Emptiness · Dependent Designation

How Could “This” Awareness Not Be Considered Self?

Krodha (Kyle Dixon), John Tan, and Soh on anātman: the collapse of the internal observer, the deconstruction of externality and physicality, and the implications of dependent designation.

Reddit discussion archived by Soh · Source: “Awareness as Not-Self” on r/Buddhism

Editorial note. This page brings together the Reddit exchange with Krodha (Kyle Dixon), related Reddit comments, and earlier conversations with John Tan and Soh. Krodha’s wording is preserved verbatim, including the wording and quotations contained in his Reddit comments. The other Reddit comments and the archived John Tan/Soh messages have been lightly edited for standard written English: chat abbreviations are expanded, obvious spelling and grammar issues are corrected, and punctuation is regularized, while the intended meaning and conversational sequence are preserved.

Source note. Krodha = Kyle Dixon. Reddit metadata such as “2 days ago,” comment levels, and score numbers is retained from the supplied archived snapshot rather than updated to the present. The original AtR post and Reddit thread remain linked for source comparison.

Reddit Discussion: Awareness as Not-Self

krodhaKrodha / Kyle Dixonlevel 1 · 2 days ago10

Question quoted by Krodha

"How could "this" awareness (which knows life, death, and the states in between, rather than ordinary vijnana) not be considered self? If it is the one irreducible constant that remains when bodies, minds, and objects pass, surely it would be considered one's true nature?"

Krodha:

When anātman is applied to the mind’s cognizance, the realization associated with that insight means we recognize, non-conceptually, that there is not a seer of sights, or a hearer of sounds, etc.

For deluded sentient beings who dwell in dualistic consciousness, or vijñāna, it experientially feels like there is an internal observer that is experiencing external phenomena that reside at a distance from the observing cognizance.

In realizing anātman, that internal observer collapses and the practitioner realizes that there has never actually been a subjective observer at any point in time. No seer of sights, no hearer of sounds, etc. That collapse of the internal substratum removes the basis for a self, and the mind awakens and realizes that the self is not real, and never has been. In that insight it can still seem like phenomena are “over there” or “out there” however the sights and sounds are just no longer mediated by an internal reference point.

But just like the feeling of an internal observer can collapse, the feeling of things being “out there” can also collapse, and that is the second fold of anātman which applies to phenomenal appearances, which is synonymous with emptiness or śūnyatā.

Rebirth only occurs because that internal observer remains in tact, because the fetters of I-making and mine-making persist. Buddhas have eliminated those obscurations and so rebirth does not occur for them.

In short anātman in the context of awareness concerns the bifurcation of experience into subject and object. The self is just this observing reference point and the identity based on that reference point. But when that reference point disappears in awakened insight then the self is completely gone for as long as that equipoise lasts. For Buddhas that equipoise is unfragmented, for āryas it is fragmented and for deluded sentient beings that equipoise is absent.

InfiniteQuestion5Original posterlevel 2 · Op · 2 days ago2

Hi Krodha, thank you for such a thorough response. With regard to nondual perception, however, what should one make of the apparent field of phenomena that continues to arise? Is it regarded simply as “what it is”—nameless “true reality,” arising as spontaneous activity?

krodhaKrodha / Kyle Dixonlevel 3 · 2 days ago · edited 2 days ago7

For Buddhas the field of phenomena does not appear as external but as their own display. Essentially meaning that knowing and what is known are not different. What is known is itself the activity of knowing.

Rongzom:

Buddhas and bodhisattvas are the knowers, and unmistakable true reality is the object of knowledge. Therefore, it is stated that there is no difference between knowledge and the object of knowledge.

Rongzom

Kūkai:

Although mind is distinguished from form, they share the same nature. Form is mind, mind is forms. They interfuse with one another without difficulty. Therefore, knowing is the objects of knowledge, and the objects, knowing. Knowing is reality, reality knowing.

Kūkai

xenobumlevel 4 · 2 days ago4

Can I just say, thank you for making these concepts much simpler to understand? You’ve helped me tremendously over the years.

InfiniteQuestion5Original posterlevel 4 · Op · 2 days ago · edited 2 days ago1

Thanks! So, in essence, are Buddhas manifesting spontaneous wisdom and purity? How does this fit with the Yogācāra idea of overlapping mindstreams, in which various sentient beings collaborate to form realms?

Edit: I reread the quotations a few times to wrap my head around them. On reflection, they seem to suggest that all Buddhas are simply instances of pure knowing. In that sense, whatever manifests would be the activity of knowing. Hard to fully grasp!

Original Reddit link: https://www.reddit.com/r/Buddhism/comments/rfo2m0/awareness_as_notself/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=ios_app&utm_name=iossmf

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John Tan’s Response to Krodha’s Answer

15 December 2021

John Tan 15 December 2021 · 9:51 PM

👍 Kyle’s answer is good and rightly points out that anatta initially only dissolves the internal reference to self; “externality,” as well as “physicality,” will still need to be deconstructed and exhausted.

John Tan 15 December 2021 · 9:53 PM

By the way, I remember writing something to you about dependent designation: when the seer depends on the seen, there is no seer; when the seen depends on the seer, there is nothing seen. Do you know when it was?

John then recalled an earlier discussion with Soh about dependent designation and the relation between seer, seeing, and seen. The exchanges below retain their original sequence, while chat shorthand and obvious language errors have been normalized for readability.

Earlier Exchange — 22 March 2015

Soh:

John Tan 22 March 2015 · 7:34 AM (UTC+8)

When we talk about illusion, there is a difference between the water-moon and a rabbit’s horn. Appearances are like the water-moon: dependently originated, without substance or basis, yet not nonexistent. Inherent existence, by contrast, is like a rabbit’s horn: it is nonexistent and does not exist even conventionally.

John Tan 22 March 2015 · 7:30 AM (UTC+8)

Therefore, when the seer depends on seeing and the seen, there is no seer. When the seen depends on the seer and seeing, there is nothing seen.

Soh Wei Yu 22 March 2015 · 7:30 AM (UTC+8)

Should I post this?

John Tan 22 March 2015 · 7:28 AM (UTC+8)

When we see dependencies, we must also see the absence of phenomena. That is, although phenomena appear, by their very dependencies they are absent—absent when sought through Madhyamaka analysis.

John Tan

Yes

Earlier Exchange — 23 December 2014

The messages are shown in the same reverse-chronological order as in the supplied archive.

Soh:

John Tan 23 December 2014 · 10:33 PM (UTC+8)

You have direct insight into anatta; why are you not able to understand that when the seer depends on seeing and the seen, there is no seer? Because you are comparing direct insight into anatta (a nonconceptual experience) with conceptuality.

John Tan 23 December 2014 · 10:28 PM (UTC+8)

“Ultimate analysis” is simply a way of analyzing the validity of true existence. Therefore, dependently arising phenomena are not within the scope of ultimate analysis. It is not used to negate conditioned existence that arises dependently.

Soh Wei Yu 23 December 2014 · 10:28 PM (UTC+8)

When the seen depends on seeing and the seer, there is nothing seen. That makes sense. Can you expand on what you mean by saying that the way of the conventional is different from the nonconceptual mode?

John Tan 23 December 2014 · 10:24 PM (UTC+8)

What it means is that when Madhyamikas employ “ultimate analysis”—a systematic approach to analyzing the validity of an ultimate or absolute mode of being—causality is impossible. That is, if phenomena inherently existed, causality would be impossible. Therefore, it is not denying causality; on the contrary, it is affirming causality by seeing the emptiness of phenomena.

Soh Wei Yu 23 December 2014 · 10:18 PM (UTC+8)

When the fan and the blowing are separated through dependent designation, can causality no longer be established? For example, does that mean the fan has no inherent causal power to produce wind?

John Tan 23 December 2014 · 10:17 PM (UTC+8)

For example, “causality is impossible in ultimate analysis.” What does that mean?

John Tan 23 December 2014 · 10:13 PM (UTC+8)

Mipham’s two models of the two truths suit you better because they emphasize meditative experience. As for the Gelug, you must be very careful with the way they use their terminology.

Soh Wei Yu 23 December 2014 · 10:06 PM (UTC+8)

Oh, so the fact that designations do not refer to an objective object is what makes them “mere”? A designation does not refer to an object but is designated in dependence on parts, conditions, and imputing consciousness—like music, which is designated in dependence on the whole series of notes yet does not refer to anything in particular.

John Tan 23 December 2014 · 10:06 PM (UTC+8)

What you expressed is quite good. Similarly, you must understand that when the “seen” depends on “seeing” and the “seer,” there is nothing seen. To taste the emptiness of conceptuality, you must see that the way of the conventional is different from the nonconceptual mode, just as you should not look for shapes and colors in sound.

John Tan 23 December 2014 · 9:59 PM (UTC+8)

So, to experience the “interconnectedness” of total exertion is to see the web of designations. There are two points you are missing: 1. Prasangika’s “mere designation” is special; it is not a designation that refers to an objective object. 2. The other part you are missing is the dream within a dream that makes these designations alive.

John Tan 23 December 2014 · 9:55 PM (UTC+8)

So, to experience the “interconnectedness” of total exertion is to see the web of designations. The part you are missing is the dream within a dream that makes these designations alive.

Soh Wei Yu 23 December 2014 · 8:44 PM (UTC+8)

To see things as conventions is liberating, since we no longer see them in terms of intrinsic existence. So emptiness leads to seeing things as mere conventions.

Soh Wei Yu 23 December 2014 · 8:10 PM (UTC+8)

And to see the emptiness of conventions is not to negate conventions. It is to let you see conventions not from the standpoint of intrinsic existence, but as dependently designated. The two truths are one.

Soh Wei Yu 23 December 2014 · 7:04 PM (UTC+8)

Now I see why you told me that a seer dependent on seeing and the seen is the same thing as no seer: what is dependently designated has no existence of its own.

Soh

I think you wrote something even earlier than that, but I don’t know where.

John Tan

Yeah

End of the archived discussion.