Update 2021: a nice quote from Ven Dhammanando (whose posts I enjoy reading):
"Ajahn Brahmali is a Norwegian monk and a close associate of Ajahn Brahmavamso.
I agree with him that "void of self" would be a good translation of anattā and certainly more in line with the Pali commentaries' privative understanding of the an- prefix. However, although translating it in this way would undermine the Vedantic interpretation of anattā that one sometimes encounters, I'm not sure that it would have much effect on Ajahn Thanissaro's." - https://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f=13&t=33622&p=501573&hilit=thanissaro#p501573
"You are not addressing my point. Let me give one oft-quoted specimen of Thanissaro's equivocation, from his article The Not-Self Strategy:
- The evidence for this reading [i.e. of the anattā teaching] of the Canon centers around four points:
[...]
3. Views that there is no self are ranked with views that that there is a self as a "fetter of views" which a person aiming at release from suffering would do well to avoid.
The Not-self Strategy
But this is simply false. What is ranked among the fetter of views in the Sabbāsava Sutta is not: "There is no self" but rather the ucchedadiṭṭhi: "There is no self for me." - https://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f=13&t=25102&p=361567&hilit=thanissaro#p361567
"But the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta is not really probative in this matter. Indeed followers of the Frauwallner/Thanissaro “strategic” interpretation, or of the various Vedantic or neo-Puggalavādin intepretations, are in the habit of citing this very same sutta in support of their heterodox views.
Better is the Alaggadūpama Sutta (MN. 22) and the passages cited above by Tilt." - https://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?f=13&t=25102&p=361314&hilit=thanissaro#p361314
Dhammanando:davidbrainerd wrote: ↑Fri Oct 06, 2017 3:01 amI've always assumed Buddhaghosa was a proponent of the silly modern no-self (as opposed to not-self) thing based on modern English translations of his Visuddhimagga. Also since we are told the Abhidhamma teaches this sillyness and I see the Suttas do not, I assumed it came from the Abhidhamma.
Surely what is "silly" here is that you would think the adjective "modern" could be aptly applied to something that was being propounded before the Common Era in the Abhidhamma and in the fifth century by Buddhaghosa.
In fact there is nothing modern about the interpretation of anattā that you reject: in India it was the understanding of every Indian Buddhist school except the Pudgalavādin ones. What is truly modern are the interpretations of anattā that reject this understanding: the Vedanta-like ones of Theosophists and Hindutva types, the "anattā strategy" of Erich Frauwallner and Ajahn Thanissaro, the consciousness mysticism of certain teachers in the Thai forest tradition, &c."
The question "Is there a self?" would be a pañha ekaṃsabyākaraṇīya if it were possible to truthfully answer it with either a straight yes or a straight no. Theravāda orthodoxy holds that it is indeed a question of this type and that the correct answer is no.
Thanissaro dissents from this orthodoxy and holds the question to be a pañha ṭhapanīya, or "question to be set aside".
" It isn't. To have answered in a qualified way would have meant treating the question as one that requires an analytical answer (vibhajjabyākaraṇīya pañha) and replying with something along the lines of: "There is a sense in which self exists and a sense in which it doesn't..." or "I affirm a self of this kind, but not of that kind..."
From Bhikkhu Bodhi's endnote to the sutta:
- We should carefully heed the two reasons the Buddha does not declare, “There is no self”: not because he recognizes a transcendent self of some kind (as some interpreters allege), or because he is concerned only with delineating “a strategy of perception” devoid of ontological implications (as others hold), but (i) because such a mode of expression was used by the annihilationists, and the Buddha wanted to avoid aligning his teaching with theirs; and (ii) because he wished to avoid causing confusion in those already attached to the idea of self. The Buddha declares that “all phenomena are nonself” (sabbe dhammā anattā), which means that if one seeks a self anywhere one will not find one. Since “all phenomena” includes both the conditioned and the unconditioned, this precludes an utterly transcendent, ineffable self."
Cooran (moderator of Dhammawheel) pointed out that a note to Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation of this sutta is worth considering:
‘’We should carefully heed the two reasons that the Buddha does not declare, ‘’There is no self’’: not because he recognizes a transcendent self of some kind (as some interpreters allege), or because he is concerned only with delineating ‘’a strategy of perception’’ devoid of ontological implications (as others hold), but (i) because such a mode of expression was used by the annihilationists, and the Buddha wanted to avoid aligning his teaching with theirs; and (ii) because he wished to avoid causing confusion in those already attached to the idea of self. The Buddha declares that ‘all phenomena are nonself’’ (sabbe dhamma anatta), which means that if one seeks a self anywhere one will not find one. Since ‘’all phenomena’’ includes both the conditioned and the unconditioned, this precludes an utterly transcendent, ineffable self."
(Part of Note 385 on Page 1457 of The Connected Discourses of the Buddha (A New Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya by Bhikkhu Bodhi).)
Furthermore, "Not-self" is not just a "strategy of letting go" or "strategy of perception devoid of any ontological implications" as certain articles may state or simply, but rather it is a truth, and there must be experiential realization of this truth. The Buddha constantly talks about discerning the three characteristics as an insight into dharmas, that is to "discern, as it actually is" all dharmas as inconstant, unsatisfactory, and non-self. In Bhaddhekaratta Sutta, in reference to anatta, instructs a practitioner "that which is present he discerns — With insight as and when it comes". If not-self is merely treated as a strategy, what has it got to do with insight and clear discernment into the way things actually are? After realizing the truth, there is naturally letting go of I-making, but it is not due to 'taking not-self as a strategy to dissociate with things'. That would be far away from realizing the essence of anatta as described in Vajira Sutta (excerpt quoted below).
To understand what this realization of anatta entails, it is important to first understand what exactly is this self-view we are dealing with, the self-view that is relinquished permanently upon realization. The view of a self means believing or holding the view that there is an independent, unchanging, self-entity that persists from one moment to the next and one lifetime to another, and is the agent, controller or experiencer of stuff in life. "Self" thus has the quality of permanency, independence, separateness (separate from the flow of experiences), and agenthood (being the controller, perceiver, experiencer of things). If there is any such thing, it could qualify as Self. However, the realization of Anatta is that there is no such Self. It is the realization as I wrote in my commentary on Bahiya Sutta, the realization that in seeing, there is no three things: the Seer, that is doing the seeing of the seen. (Seer seeing seen) Instead, in the seeing, there is JUST the scene - that pure, vivid experience of scenery. That's it. No experiencer apart from the experience. This realization that "seer seeing seen" is a false view or perception of reality relinquishes the notion of a self or agent, but it does not establish a conceptual position such as "the self does not exist" because non-existence only pertains to an existent going into non-existence. This realization is not a new conceptual view to be held on to, but a complete freedom from self-view. In seeing JUST the seen, and all notions pertaining to existence or non-existence of self doesn't apply there.
In reality, both self and dharma is neither existent nor non-existent (nor both, nor neither): since self and dharma has never arisen to begin with, cannot be established to begin with, cannot be pinned down to begin with, therefore self and dharma cannot go into non-existence, or be both and neither.
Here, the Buddha clarifies:
Buddha in Yamaka Sutta:
https://suttacentral.net/sn22.85/en/bodhi
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, is form permanent or impermanent?”—“Impermanent, friend.”…—“Therefore … Seeing thus … He understands: ‘… there is no more for this state of being.’
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form as the Tathagata?”—“No, friend.”—“Do you regard feeling … perception … volitional formations … consciousness as the Tathagata?”—“No, friend.”
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathagata as in form?”—“No, friend.”—“Do you regard the Tathagata as apart from form?”—“No, friend.”—“Do you regard the Tathagata as in feeling? As apart from feeling? As in perception? As apart from perception? As in volitional formations? As apart from volitional formations? As in consciousness? As apart from consciousness?”—“No, friend.”
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness taken together as the Tathagata?”—“No, friend.”
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathagata as one who is without form, without feeling, without perception, without volitional formations, without consciousness?”—“No, friend.”
“But, friend, when the Tathagata is not apprehended by you as real and actual here in this very life, is it fitting for you to declare: ‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death’?””
Buddha in Anuradha Sutta:
"Then, Anuraadha, since in this very life the Tathaagata is not to be regarded as really and truly existing, is it proper for you to declare of him: 'Friends, he who is a Tathaagata... can be described otherwise than in these four ways...'?"[5]
"No indeed, Lord."
"Good, good, Anuraadha. As before, so now I proclaim just suffering and the ceasing of suffering." - https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.086.wlsh.html
"A chariot is not asserted to be other than its parts,
Nor non-other. It also does not possess them.
It is not in the parts, nor are the parts in it.
It is not the mere collection [of its parts], nor is it their shape.
[The self and the aggregates are] similar."
It is neither seen as something different from the aggregates
Nor as identical with these five aggregates.
If the first were true, there would exist some other substance.
This is not the case, so were the second true,
That would contradict a permanent self, since the aggregates are impermanent.
Therefore, based on the five aggregates,
The self is a mere imputation based on the power of the ego-clinging.
As to that which imputes, the past thought has vanished and is nonexistent.
The future thought has not occurred, and the present thought does not withstand scrutiny."
And Nagarjuna states:
And the Vajira Sutta states:
Then the bhikkhuni Vajira, having understood, "This is Mara the Evil One," replied to him in verses: "Why now do you assume 'a being'? Mara, have you grasped a view? This is a heap of sheer constructions: Here no being is found. Just as, with an assemblage of parts, The word 'chariot' is used, So, when the aggregates are present, There's the convention 'a being.' It's only suffering that comes to be, Suffering that stands and falls away. Nothing but suffering comes to be, Nothing but suffering ceases."
Notice that the Buddha said that you cannot find the self of the Tathagatha inside nor apart from the five skandhas (aggregations): there is no Tathagata to be pinned down as a form-based or a formless Truth or Reality. This means that the so called 'self' actually cannot be found, located or pinned down as a reality just as the word 'weather' cannot be found or located as something inherently (independently, unchangingly) existing (apart or within the conglomerate of everchanging phenomena such as clouds, lightning, wind, rain, etc) - the label 'self' is merely a convention for the five skandhas or the body-mind aggregates, which is a process of self-luminous (having the quality of luminous clarity, knowing, cognizance) but empty phenomenality, in which no truly existing 'self' can be found within nor apart from them.
And if we cannot pin down an entity called 'self' to begin with, how can we assert the non-existence of a self: which means that an existent 'self' annihilates or goes into non-existence? To assert non-existence, you must have a base, an existent entity to begin with, that could become non-existent. If the convention 'self' is baseless to begin with, then existence, non-existence, both and neither become untenable positions.
"The great 11th Nyingma scholar Rongzom points out that only Madhyamaka accepts that its critical methodology "harms itself", meaning that Madhyamaka uses non-affirming negations to reject the positions of opponents, but does not resort to affirming negations to support a position of its own. Since Madhyamaka, as Buddhapalita states "does not propose the non-existence of existents, but instead rejects claims for the existence of existents", there is no true Madhyamaka position since there is no existent found about which a Madhyamaka position could be formulated; likewise there is no false Madhyamaka position since there is no existent found about which a Madhyamaka position could be rejected."
"In other words, right view is the beginning of the noble path. It is certainly the case that dependent origination is "correct view"; when one analyzes a bit deeper, one discovers that in the case "view" means being free from views. The teaching of dependent origination is what permits this freedom from views."
This is the false View no. 4 described in Sabbasava Sutta: "...As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self... or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine — the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions — is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will stay just as it is for eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress." - the commentary of 'Middle Length Discourses' book explains, "of these six views, the first two represent the simple antinomy of eternalism and annihilationism; the view that ‘no self exists for me’ is not the non-self doctrine of the Buddha, but the materialist view that identifies the individual with the body and thus holds that there is no personal continuity beyond death. The next three views may be understood to arise out of the philosophically more sophisticated observation that experience has a built-in reflexive structure that allows for self-consciousness, the capacity of the mind to become cognizant of itself, its contents, and the body with which it is inter-connected. Engaged in a search for his 'true nature,' the untaught ordinary person will identify self either with both aspects of the experience (view 3), or with the observer alone (view 4), or with the observed alone (view 5). The last view is a full-blown version of eternalism in which all reservations have been discarded."
The eternalism with regards to consciousness was spelt out by Buddha in DN1 which he firmly rejected among dozens other wrong views which he calls the net of views.
“In the fourth case, owing to what, with reference to what, are some honourable recluses and brahmins eternalists in regard to some things and non-eternalists in regard to other things, proclaiming the self and the world to be partly eternal and partly non-eternal?
“Herein, bhikkhus, recluse or a certain brahmin is a rationalist, an investigator. He declares his view—hammered out by reason, deduced from his investigations, following his own flight of thought—thus: ‘That which is called “the eye,” “the ear,” “the nose,” “the tongue,” and “the body”—that self is impermanent, unstable, non-eternal, subject to change. But that which is called “mind” (citta) or “mentality” (mano) or “consciousness” (viññāṇa)—that self is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and it will remain the same just like eternity itself.’
“This, bhikkhus, is the fourth case.
All these sort of self-views end when one realizes anatta and dependent origination. The ending of all self-view is called stream entry in Theravada, and the stream entry of Mahayana is called first bhumi.
The Buddha also specifically rejected the notion of Self as infinite and formless (prevalent for those who hold the 'Ground of Being'/all-encompassing container of phenomena sort of Self-view) in Maha-nidana Sutta: "The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as formless and infinite, either delineates it as formless and infinite in the present, or of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and infinite [in the future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and infinite obsesses him."
So do not mistaken anatta with neti-neti. The neti-neti (not this, not that) of Advaita self-inquiry is a process of dissociation, i.e. to get to/realize the fundamental true self, one must dissociate from all thoughts and concepts as being 'not self'. What remains in the absence of conceptual thoughts is the true self. While in the absence of conceptual thoughts, arises a direct non-conceptual realization of a palpable and undeniable presence-existence-consciousness is discovered and feels as if one has touched the very core of one's existence itself, and this experience should not, and in fact cannot be denied, nonetheless the very framework of self-inquiry (Who am I? already presumes a purest identity) and the practice of dissociation based on the existing framework of duality and inherency... the realization, experience, framework and practice all come together to strengthen the existing framework of duality and inherency where it appears there is a true Self behind and transcending all phenomena as the transcendental witnessing consciousness. One then fails to understand, until further investigation, that this realization and experience while true, does not actually require the faulty framework that posits an inherent substantial reality. That the pure presence discovered is simply another manifestation that does not convey anything 'ultimate', 'independent', or 'permanent'... in fact all transience turns out to have the same taste and intensity of luminosity, and are all empty of self.
Anatta on the other hand is not a process of dissociation - it is first and foremost a dharma seal that is always and already so - always in seeing just the seen never a seer, never was there a self. Secondly, the way of contemplating anatta is not via dissociation but via contemplative *deconstruction*. In other words, contemplating on anatta or anatta as a truth doesn't set up opposites like true self vs not-self. There is no observer or Self that could dissociate from the observed. Instead, it is a process of deconstruction. Deconstruction means really challenging the idea of an inherent self, an inherent awareness, or a subject, by investigating experientially if it it holds up to reality. It deconstructs our idea of a 'seer-seeing-seen', or a 'self/Self' into its constituent components such that at the end, we realize that there is no agent, no self/Self, not even a super-Awareness transcending phenomena as an ultimate identity, but rather the very notion of 'self/Self' or 'Awareness' is being deconstructed into its impermanent constituents of experiences, (in seeing just the seen, in hearing just the heard, no seer/hearer) thus we realize that even what is known as 'Awareness' is also empty of any substantial self, being a mere convention for the flow of self-luminous phenomena. It is at this point where the Buddha says, "you can't pin down the Tathagata as a truth or reality even in the present life". He never said something like "the Tathagata is the truth and reality which is the pure consciousness transcending all forms" as his Advaita counterparts would put it.
Likewise, the dharma seal of Impermanence should also be understood likewise – as a seal rather than as a method of dissociation (many people are doing dissociation via impermanence instead of realizing impermanence as a seal, a truth). As Thusness pointed out years ago, there is a difference between realizing impermanence (the attainment of stream entry is described as the opening of the dhamma eye which realizes that "Whatever is subject to arising is all subject to cessation.") and using it as a method of dis-identification and dissociation. Realizing impermanence as a seal leads to the perception of the disjointed, bubble-like and self-releasing aspect of phenomena and no-self. As Thusness said years ago, “With the right view, reality itself is [seen as] impermanence, and it has to bring about a new understanding and and not enhance our dualistic and inherent tendencies. What is the use of teaching dis-identification and dissociation if the path leads to further inherent and dualistic thoughts?”
It is important to take note here that from I AM to One Mind to No Mind and Anatta (Also see: Experience, Realization, View, Practice and Fruition), the self-luminosity is still as intense and important - it is not denied at all. Anatta does not deny luminosity. We're not saying 'The Pure Consciousness of Advaita is bullshit', nothing of that sort! In fact, the realization of anatta makes this experience of non-dual luminosity all the more effortless and intense! Every transient experience is naturally luminosity-bliss in anatta. So Anatta does not deny anything but simply deconstructs the view of inherency and duality we form about it. In the same way the process of deconstructing the notion of a solid car with its own independent car-ness entity into its constituents (such as windows, engine, steering wheel, pedals, cooling system, etc etc) where no car-entity can be pinned down does not in any part of its inquiry ever deny the appearance/experience of what appears to be a car, but nonetheless the entire notion of a solid car gets deconstructed at the end yet the appearance is still as vivid as ever, in fact even 'clearer' because now there is no longer the layer of false notions obscuring the true face of it. As the old masters said, "Keep the experience, refine the view." One Awareness is deconstructed into the pure-consciousness of each of the six sense doors without a perceiving subject, pure-consciousness of sight and pure-consciousness of sound and the pure consciousness of non-conceptual thought (the "I AMness") are all of the same intensity, yet disconnected and radically different in manifestation and arising in different conditions, all equally pure and empty. Every arising is one whole and complete manifestation. Presence/Luminosity/Awareness is not denied, but simply realized to be empty of self or substantiality.
"Who, O Lord, feels?"
"The question is not correct," said the Exalted One. "I do not say that 'he feels.' Had I said so, then the question 'Who feels?' would be appropriate. But since I did not speak thus, the correct way to ask the question will be 'What is the condition of feeling?' And to that the correct reply is: 'sense-impression is the condition of feeling; and feeling is the condition of craving.'"
One last thing: although it is the case that all phenomena are empty of self, one must not go to the extreme by denying or rejecting conventional self or doer, which brings in the problem of rejecting karmic responsibilities and so forth. In one of the scriptures, the Buddha talked about self-doer -- basically the idea is that you get what you sow in terms of karmic cause and effect. Does this contradict the teaching of anatta? It does not.
What we have to understand here is that whenever the Buddha talks about self (in many places in the suttas), he is speaking about it purely as a conventional self. As Thusness told me in 2012, "To me [the matter] is just, is "Soh" an eternal being... that's all. No denial of Soh as a conventional self". There is no denial of a conventional self or doer, only an inherently existing, changeless self/agent/doer existing in and of itself.
For example in the Araham Sutta, the Buddha states,
In the Potthapada Sutta, the Buddha is stated,
"In the same way, when there is a gross acquisition of a self... it's classified just as a gross acquisition of a self. When there is a mind-made acquisition of a self... When there is a formless acquisition of a self, it's not classified either as a gross acquisition of a self or as a mind-made acquisition of a self. It's classified just as a formless acquisition of a self.
"Citta, these are the world's designations, the world's expressions, the world's ways of speaking, the world's descriptions, with which the Tathagata expresses himself but without grasping to them." [10]
In the Dighanakha Sutta, the Buddha states, "A bhikkhu whose mind is liberated thus, Aggivessana, sides with none and disputes with none; he employs the speech currently used in the world without ahdering to it."
However the Neo-Advaitins however would not be able to accept this as they are unable to distinguish the conventional and the ultimate, therefore they reject conventional self, karma, afflictions, path, cessation (nirvana) and so forth. Nagarjuna says, "The Buddha's teaching of the Dharma is based on two truths: a truth of worldly convention and an ultimate truth. Those who do not understand the distinction drawn between these two truths do not understand the Buddha's profound truth. Without a foundation in the conventional truth the significance of the ultimate cannot be taught. Without understanding the significance of the ultimate, liberation is not achieved."
For further elucidations on the two truths based on the Madhyamika teachings, see Dependent Arising and the Emptiness of Emptiness: Why did Nagarjuana start with causation?
......
Another quotation on how ‘infinite and formless Self’ is rejected by Buddha:
Someone asked: 1) My confusion here is - the sutta starts off by Buddha saying that whatever there is to be seen/heard/sensed etc., that the Buddha knows. Then he says when seeing what is to be seen, he doesn't construe a seen. What does that mean? What's the difference between seeing and knowing what is to be seen, yet not construing a seen? Clearly a difference between directly knowing a seen, and construing a seen. So if he doesn't even construe a seen, then of course he wouldn't construe a seer either. But not construing a seen apparently doesn't mean he doesn't know a seen, so not construing a seer also wouldn't necessarily mean he doesn't know a seer.
2) Since none the skhandas are Self, then even if there is a Self that is the Absolute, I'm not sure it would even make sense for that Self to be a "seer"/"cognizer" etc.
===
1) If there is a knower, then Bahiya Sutta 'in the seen just the seen' with no 'you in reference to that' in any way (in here, there, in between) could not be realized.
2) If the skandhas are not Self, then the Advaita would say that the Self, the Absolute, is that which knows -- the unseen light which shines upon objects. All objects owe their temporal existence to the Uncaused Cause, the Great Light of Self. They are supported by Self, but Self is not supported by them.
Buddha would rejected all such notions of Self as 1) being equatable to the aggregates, 2) being completely separate from and impercipient of the aggregates, and 3) being completely separate from, yet being the Agent which feels or perceives the aggregates:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.15.0.than.html
(Buddha:)
Assumptions of a Self
Venerable Dr. Walpola Rahula
"In the Dhammapada, there are three verses which are
extremely important and essential in the Buddha’s Teaching. They are verses
277, 278, and 279 in Chapter 20:
277. All compound things are impermanent; those who
realize this through insight- wisdom are freed from suffering. This is the path
that leads to purity.
278. All compound things have suffering as their nature;
those who realize this through insight-wisdom are freed from suffering. This is
the path that leads to purity.
279. All states are without self; those who realize this
through insight-wisdom are freed from suffering. This is the path that leads to
purity.
The first two verses say: “All compound things (saṁkhārā)
are impermanent” (sabbe saṁkhārā aniccā) and “All compound things have suffering
as their nature” (sabbe saṁkhārā dukkhā). But the third verse says: “All states
(dhammā) are without self” (sabbe dhammā anattā).
Here, it should be carefully observed that, in the first
two verses, the word saṁkhārā “conditioned things, compound things” is used.
But in its place in the third verse, the word dhammā “states” is used. Why does
the third verse not use the word saṁkhārā “conditioned things, compound things”
as in the previous two verses, and why does it use the term dhammā instead?
Here lies the crux of the whole matter.
In the first two verses, the term saṁkhāra denotes the
Five Aggregates, that is, all conditioned, interdependent, relative things and
states, both physical and mental. If the third verse had said: “All saṁkhārā
(“conditioned things, compound things”) are without self”, then, one might
think that, although conditioned things are without Self, yet there may be a
Self outside conditioned things, outside the Five Aggregates. It is in order to
avoid misunderstanding that the term dhammā is used in the third verse.
The term “dhamma” is much wider than saṁkhāra. There is
no term in Buddhist terminology wider than dhamma. It includes not only the
conditioned things and states, but also the unconditioned, the Absolute,
nibbāna. There is nothing in the universe or outside of it, good or bad,
conditioned or unconditioned, relative or absolute, which is not included in
this term. Therefore, it is quite clear that, according to this statement: “All
states (dhammā) are without self”, there is no Self, no ātman, not only in the
Five Aggregates, but nowhere else either outside them or apart from them.
This means, according to the Theravādin teaching, that
there is no Self either in the individual (puggala) or in dhammas. The Mahāyāna
Buddhist philosophy maintains exactly the same position, without the slightest
difference, on this point, putting emphasis on dharma-nairātmya as well as on
pudgala-nairātmya."
- What the Buddha Taught by Walpola Rahula
Wrote to Christ Marti:
Actually I would say it is more important to stress on no-self than not-self. Not self can be mistaken as Advaita's neti neti (rejecting everything as not-self in order to discover or assert a true self underneath or behind all the not-self). This is not the purpose of Buddha's teachings, which is meant to elicit a realisation into the complete absence of an inherently existing self/Self, essence, substance, core, in or apart from the five aggregates.
The Vajira Sutta states:
Then the bhikkhuni Vajira, having understood, "This is Mara the Evil One," replied to him in verses: "Why now do you assume 'a being'? Mara, have you grasped a view? This is a heap of sheer constructions: Here no being is found. Just as, with an assemblage of parts, The word 'chariot' is used, So, when the aggregates are present, There's the convention 'a being.' It's only suffering that comes to be, Suffering that stands and falls away. Nothing but suffering comes to be, Nothing but suffering ceases."
---------[17/11/23, 4:54:26 PM] Yin Ling: What do you think?
"QUESTION : If there's no self, what gets reborn?
THANISSARO BHIKKU : The Buddha never said that there is no self. He never said that there is a self. The whole question of whether or not the self exists was one he put aside. There's a common misconception that the Buddha started with the idea that there was no self and, in the context of no self, taught the doctrine of kamma, which makes no sense: If there's no self, nobody does the kamma and nobody receives the results, so actions and their results wouldn't matter, because there's no one choosing to act, and no one to suffer the results. But that's putting the context backwards. Actually, the Buddha started with the reality of kamma, and then viewed ideas of "self" and "not-self" as types of kamma within that context. This means that he focused on seeing the way we define our sense of self as an action. Then the question becomes, when is the act of identifying things as your self a skillful action, and when is it not? When is the act of identifying things as not-self a skillful action, and when is it not? When a healthy sense of self is needed to be responsible, self-reliant, and heedful of the future, it's a skillful action. When the perception of not-self helps you not to identify with desires that would lead to harm, it's a skillful action. In other words, both "self" and "not-self" are strategies for achieving happiness. They should be used-and mastered-as needed for the sake of true happiness, and abandoned when no longer needed. So instead of getting involved in the tangle of trying to define what a self is and whether it exists, the Buddha advised treating "self" and "not-self" as processes to be mastered, as tools. Similarly with rebirth: He avoided talking about what gets reborn and instead focused on how it happens, as a process. Because the process is a type of kamma, it's something you're responsible for, and it's also a skill you can master: either with relative skill, reaching a comfortable rebirth, or with consummate skill, learning how not to be reborn at all.
SOURCE: Karma Q&A
By Thanissaro Bhikku"
[18/11/23, 8:40:42 AM] John Tan: I disagree and to certain extent quite disappointing imo...lol. I do think that the refusal to look deeply how our inherent linguistic structure that runs deep is what that prevents genuine insights of anatta.
Going through de-construction process do allow us to have direct and real-time knowledge of how mental-constructs affect the mind from seeing action does not require an agent as initiator.
In mmk although it is also taught there is neither self nor no-self, it is taught from the standpoint of "de-construction" process (只破不立) to capture subtle trace of attachment to "inherentness".
[18/11/23, 8:56:46 AM] John Tan: If we don't contemplate, we will be living in a hypnotic spell without knowing. If we contemplate we can even see the difference between "I", "mine" and "me" and experientially taste the difference in each phase of de-constructing "I", "mine" and "me" and witness the bliss and relief from the freedom of them. We then slowly move on to other constructs like "body", "production", "physicality", "causuality"...etc.
To me what is more difficult is how to express it "conventionally" using our clumsy subject-action-object framework. That is y I admire and is so amazed by those sincere scientists that always seek breakthroughs of their own "framework".
[18/11/23, 9:00:24 AM] John Tan: Without disrespect, I think Alan Watts expressed better and have a far clearer insight.
[18/11/23, 9:43:19 AM] Soh Wei Yu: Kyle dixon is always criticizing thanissaro and i also like his posts on this matter:
Krodha/Kyle Dixon:
"The point is that anātman is not intended to be a sort of apophatic exercise as Thanissaro suggests. Rather it is the lack of a svabhāva or inherent self in the mind. The prevailing issue with Thanissaro’s approach is that you have people who wrongly assert that the Buddha never said there is no self, which is an absurd misconception. The Buddha clearly and routinely says there is no self to be found in any phenomena anywhere.
Now, does this negate the action of “taking out the trash” as you mention, no, because that is a conventional action performed by a conventional self. We as Buddhists, do not negate the validity of conventional activities and entities as these things appear, we simply state that all conventional designations are ultimately only nominal in nature. Nominal, meaning inferential in the sense that the associated imputation suggests the validity of an entity, however if we investigate the basis of said imputation, the entity cannot actually be found because it is merely an abstraction. A useful abstraction, but not actually established or real.
In this way you can be a conventional individual who takes out the trash and performs many activities, but like an image of a tiger in a dream, there is no actual tiger present. The same goes for the appearance of you as a conventional individual taking the trash out, there is not actually an individual there when the imputed self is keenly scrutinized."
I also like what Kyle Dixon said before,
“I genuinely feel that while Thanissaro Bikkhu’s contributions to dharma are great in terms of his translations, that he does a great disservice to people trying to understand this profound dharma by promulgating this “not-self” apophatic misinterpretation of anātman. The parroting of this view is so prevalent nowadays, I do indeed feel it is necessary to object when I see it expressed. Especially in the lazy way it is usually demonstrated in brief tag line comments with no unpacking of the alleged logic behind the claim, such as, “the Buddha never said there is no self,” or “anatta doesn’t mean no self.”
To me this is an expression of this degenerate yūga and is a poisoning of buddhadharma. So while sure, I can be more gentle and polite about it if we are concerned about the tone, I very much take issue with these views, and while I am being assertive rather then hostile, I’ll concede and find a better way to communicate my utter disagreement with said views if that is deemed necessary.”
[18/11/23, 9:43:52 AM] Soh Wei Yu: I also have been writing against thanissaro stuff since 2011 lol https://www.awakeningtoreality.com/2011/10/anatta-not-self-or-no-self_1.html
This is not a rejection that there ultimately is no self. It is obvious from the Buddha’s teachings on the skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus that there is no self as a core entity within that nexus. Further, the Buddha is very clear that there is no self in any conditioned or unconditioned phenomena, which exhausts the gamut of possibilities in which a self could reside.
“Non self” and “no self” are identical views. u/optimistically_eyed (since you’re involved in this discussion).
To add, I think monkey_sage’s comments about “no self” damaging the presentation of the Buddha’s teaching in the West are absurd and frankly abhorrent.
The definition of anātman is very clear, the Bodhisattvayogacaryācatuḥśatakaṭikā:
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Ātman is an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is an intrinsic nature (svabhāva). The non-existence of that is selflessness (anātman).
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The entire “no self” versus “not self” thing is total nonsense, they are identical in meaning. There is only one domain of anātman, and it is the absence of a self as a core essence that is the owner of characteristics or an agent of actions.
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Here’s an old post I made:
There is a group of individuals who interpret anatta in an apophatic way based on SN 44:10, and Thanissaro Bikkhu’s insistence on “not self,” but the conclusion drawn is illogical, given that the consequence of “not self” would still be absence of a self. They assert there is no outright negation of a self, even though the Pāli suttas state sabbe dhamma anatta repeatedly, these individuals sometimes even believe the prospect of some sort of self that is exempt from “all dhammas” is somehow plausible.
This idea from Thanissaro is not an official position given that other Theravadins like Bhante Sujato disagree. Bhante Sujato says this idea that the Buddha refused to answer is false and that Thanissaro’s assertion to that end is flawed or incomplete. Sujato cites Bikkhu Bodhi for clarification, and explains that the silence in that one particular instance was to keep Vacchagotta from adopting a view of annihilationism where a self currently exists and then ceases to exist.
But Thanissaro is very popular so people consider his view authoritative. Arguably, as I’ve witnessed, adopting this “not-self” view as a process that does not make an ultimate claim regarding the impossibility of a substantial self results in an indifferent, indiscriminate no-man’s land of a position on anatta that injures the import and intention of the view.
The real meaning of anātman is selflessness, lack of self, without self, no self, absence of self and so on. The realization of anātman, which is the absence of the background substrate which the self or entity is imputed onto is the insight that brings about the species of awakening that the buddhadharma champions.
If the consequence of “not self” is not “no self,” as in an absence of a substantial selfhood, then “not-self” as a gloss and principle is an inadequate exercise in apophatic theology which will not go the distance. Still, the logical consequence of “not-self” is the same if the import of anātman in both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas is properly understood. Thus even if not-self is the exercise one chooses, then all phenomena and non-phenomena should be understood to be “not self” and then there is then no self to be found anywhere, and the same consequence is made apparent.
A lack of an inherent self is not annihilation, but the doorway to actualizing our true modality of cognition as gnosis [jñāna]. As Śākyamuni Buddha states in the Śatasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra:
If it asked what is the samadhi known as the lamp of gnosis [jñāna], abiding in that samadhi is clearly explained as the absence of self in phenomena and persons.
For further reading, see Thusness's article Realization and Experience and Non-Dual Experience from Different Perspectives