Mr. C:

“The transience itself rolls and knows”…that is awesome. It pulled me into a more clear state when I first read it and again just now. This was the right thing to resend:)

Soh:

yes and its always already so! like when we say.. fire is burning... its totally an illusion if you imagine fire is something 'behind' burning, or fire is the 'agent' or 'watcher' of burning. thats ridiculous isnt it?

and yet we imagine 'awareness' was something behind 'transience'

its the same

fire is just the burning, fire is not 'doing' the burning

lightning flash -- lightning is the flasher? no. lightning is just another word for flash. lightning is flashing is just another way of saying 'flashing is happening'.

thunder roars -- thunder is the agent of roaring? no. thunder is just roar. wind blows? wind is just blowing. seeing sees scenery? seeing is just colors, no seer. hearing hears sounds? actually, hearing is only ever sound, never been a hearer. always already so.

thats why realisation is so important, you must see through the delusion that it never was like that

 

its not that you merge fire and burning, its not that you are trying to merge lightning with the flash, its not that you are trying to merge wind with the blowing. it is not that we are trying to merge knower and known. its to realise both are never valid in themselves in the first place, both poles are non-arisen.

as i sent someone a few moments ago:

"like how krodha/kyle dixon described:

"'Self luminous' and 'self knowing' are concepts which are used to convey the absence of a subjective reference point which is mediating the manifestation of appearance. Instead of a subjective cognition or knower which is 'illuminating' objective appearances, it is realized that the sheer exertion of our cognition has always and only been the sheer exertion of appearance itself. Or rather that cognition and appearance are not valid as anything in themselves. Since both are merely fabricated qualities neither can be validated or found when sought. This is not a union of subject and object, but is the recognition that the subject and object never arose in the first place [advaya]. ", "The cognition is empty. That is what it means to recognize the nature of mind [sems nyid]. The clarity [cognition] of mind is recognized to be empty, which is sometimes parsed as the inseparability of clarity and emptiness, or nondual clarity and emptiness.""

 

 

 

 

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Stian Gudmundsen Høiland
This isn’t dependent arising AFAIK.
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Soh Wei Yu
Stian Gudmundsen Høiland It's related to this part:
https://www.awakeningtoreality.com/2020/06/choosing.html
Malcolm Smith
Malcolm Smith [Participant 1] "The argument from chap 2 depends on natural functions (movement, burning of fire, seeing of the eye, etc.) being predicated on the moment of time which it takes place, and when the non obtaining of time is established it leads to the non happening of the function. This is not justified."
Why?
Nāgārjuna shows two things in chapter two, one, he says that if there is a moving mover, this separates the agent from the action, and either the mover is not necessary or the moving is not necessary. It is redundant.
In common language we oftren saying things like "There is a burning fire." But since that is what a fire is (burning) there is no separate agent which is doing the burning, fire is burning.
On the other hand, when an action is not performed, no agent of that action can be said to exist. This is why he says "apart from something which has moved and has not moved, there is no moving mover." There is no mover with moving, etc.
This can be applied to all present tense gerundial agentive constructions, such as I am walking to town, the fire is burning, etc.
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Choosing
Choosing
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Stian Gudmundsen Høiland
Like I said, this isn't dependent arising. The nature Nagarjuna is pointing out is not just applicable "to all present tense gerundial agentive constructions"--it's applicable to all causal relations, conceptions of arising, conceptualizations and thought-forms. When the domain of applicability is different like this (from "all present tense gerundial agentive constructions" to "all causal relations, conceptions of arising, conceptualizations and thought-forms"), the understanding must be different, too. Hence why I say, what's being demonstrated here is not dependent arising.
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Soh Wei Yu
Yes anatta is not the same as the realization of D.O. and non-arising.
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Stian Gudmundsen Høiland
Although the fuel is not what is doing the burning of the fire, fire and fuel are dependent arisings, just like a supposed agent of the action of burning.
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Stian Gudmundsen Høiland
Does that make sense to you?
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Stian Gudmundsen Høiland
Like Malcolm is saying in that comment, the understanding demonstrated here is something dependent on that the constructs under investigation are "agentive constructions". That is a limited understanding, and not a proper understanding of dependent arising.
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Stian Gudmundsen Høiland
Because: "Although the fuel is not what is doing the burning of the fire [i.e. that is not an "agentive construction"], fire and fuel are dependent arisings, just like a supposed agent of the action of burning [which is an agentive construction. Hence the understanding at display here does not comprehend fuel and fire as dependent arising, since these are not agentive constructions, but are instead a different form of conceptualization.]"
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Stian Gudmundsen Høiland
> fire is just the burning, fire is not 'doing' the burning
> lightning flash -- lightning is the flasher? no. lightning is just another word for flash. lightning is flashing is just another way of saying 'flashing is happening'.
> thunder roars -- thunder is the agent of roaring? no. thunder is just roar. wind blows? wind is just blowing. seeing sees scenery? seeing is just colors, no seer. hearing hears sounds? actually, hearing is only ever sound, never been a hearer. always already so.
The terms of conceptualization must be retained, not removed, if one is to see the dependent arising. Otherwise it's called over-negating. I would never eliminate the agent of roaring or blowing, nor its object, not its action. This would violate the terms of the everyday, and eliminate the possibility of ever grasping emptiness.
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Stian Gudmundsen Høiland
It is *BECAUSE* these are dependently designated that they are empty. If there would be thunder without an agent, there would be fruit of action without any action done. This is how Nagarjuna explains it.
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Stian Gudmundsen Høiland
From elsewhere (link below):
***
So, in these texts I see Nagarjuna & Chandrakirti doing something over and over again. Andrè mentioned it:
> Also mutual dependency - the desirous one requires desire, and vice-versa.
So on one hand we have things figuring in the texts, like mover and movement, agent and action, seeing and eye, etc. Chandrakirti gives a list:
> Hypostatizing thought springs from the manifold of named things (prapanca), ie., from the beginninglessly recurring cycle of birth and death, which consists of knowledge and objects of knowledge, words and their meanings, agents and action, means and act, pot and cloth, diadem and chariots, objects and feelings, female and male, gain and loss, happiness and misery, beauty and ugliness, blame and praise.
There are more than these, and these are not necessarily strict dualities of two; there are also for example trinities, like eye form seeing, mover moved movement, etc.
On one hand we have these things. They are mentioned in the texts. And I see something happening in the texts: So on one hand we have these things, but then on the other hand it is being "dredged up", explored, exposed, _that these things appear almost as if under the guise of certain mental models or relations_.
These *relations* are sort of "hidden" and yet they are also in plain sight in the texts. These relations almost aren't really emphasized or made much of, except the whole text is about them.
The texts explore how, not only are these things (like form, eye, appropriator, agent, etc.) defined by their (let’s call it:) "common characteristics/qualities" (like color, capabilities, and other concepts), _but they are also defined by very important models/modes/relations_. In fact, outside of these relations, _we can't define those things._
So, for example, not only is a seed something brown, small, round-ish, hard, breakable, etc.,—these are its "common characteristics”…
… a seed is also dependent on "sprout”—and first of all, a sprout is not precisely the same nor precisely different from a "seed".
So, the definition of a seed does not only come from ascribing common characteristics like size and hardness and color, but the definition also unavoidably contains some kind of model or relation to something else.
These models or relations are almost "meta-cognitions”. For example, we have seed and sprout. And when it comes to common characteristics, seed and sprout seem to be independent.
_But seed and sprout also have a meta-definition as cause and effect._
Now "cause and effect" is a kind of "abstract relation"—a meta-model almost. We take the cause-and-effect relation and apply it to many things, not just seeds and sprout. This relationship is sort of abstracted or, better yet, "general". I.e., we use this relation not just for seed and sprout, but for all kinds of things.
And it is *these* relations or meta-models or meta-cognitions, upon which our definitions depend (!), that are as if being dredged up from our mind and investigated in the texts.
First there is mention of things like seed and sprout. And these have common characteristics, like size, solidity, color, etc.
But then it is revealed that a definition of something is *in no way* complete or sufficient _without these meta-models_. If we did not cast these things in the relations of these meta-models, then we simply _do not_ get a sufficient definition at all. We *must* account for these meta-models—they are completely required—, but they are at first subconscious.
Nagarjuna blows through one meta-model or “relational schema” after another, and points out that what characterizes all of these meta-models or relations, is that at least *some* aspect of them always has *reciprocity* or mutuality (or, even, "duality"—but understood in a different way than usual, more as "complementarity”).
A little side note is that our definitions of things also "interface" or "reflect" with the meta-model that it is placed in.
For example, an eye can be defined by its characteristics, but at some point we *have* to say that at least *something* that irreducibly, unavoidably makes an eye an eye is that it sees (form). So we have some kind of meta-model or relation *in* the definition of an eye: It acts upon or appropriates an acted-upon or appropriated. And if we took away this *type of relationship* (and it is these various “relationship types” that are being investigated in the texts), we can't define an eye (or form, or self, or...). Some meta-model is actually part of what an eye is; it supplies some necessary section of its definition.
Nagarjuna and Chandrakirti *extremely strongly* insist on this fact: That we *muuuust* have these relations to define and make sense of things. But after that has been established (that we *must* have/infer/model these relations to define and make sense of things)—and they do this over, and over, and over again; they don't just establish it once, say, at the beginning of the text; instead they insist on it every single time they do any specific reasoning—after it has been established that we must have these relations, they show that *since we need these relations* and *since the relations have an aspect of reciprocity*, therefore things, as defined—and there are no things outside of what they are (ie. outside of definition)—first of all do not have svabhava—does not self-exist—and then therefore are not things to which arising or ceasing, existing or not, nor indeed any other character, is ascribable.
There are "loose definitions", but the imputation of (independent) existence makes no sense. And the crux is that that sort of reclassifies everything: To be something independently existing is such a *massively* different thing or condition than what it turns out that those things really are—which is peaceful—which we see when we understand the reciprocal aspect of dependent co-arising.
https://www.facebook.com/.../posts/3607254276040008/...
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Joel Taylor
Wow, this really turns Krishnamurti's phrase: "The observer is the observed" inside out. I don't know how to describe the experience of that. Maybe "There's no observer and no observed, only observing." but that feels too much.
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  Soh Wei Yu
  Joel Taylor
  Excerpt from https://www.awakeningtoreality.com/.../on-anatta...
  There is only sound
  Geovani Geo wrote:
  We hear a sound. The immediate deeply inbuilt conditioning says, "hearing ". But there is a fallacy there. There is only sound. Ultimately, no hearer and no hearing. The same with all other senses. A centralized, or expanded, or zero-dimensional inherent perceiver or aware-er is an illusion.
  Thusness/John Tan:
  Very good.
  Means both stanza is clear.
  In hearing, no hearer.
  In hearing, only sound. No hearing.
  
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John Tan
Stian Gudmundsen Høiland I agree with what u said but the following point needs to be clearer:
----->
"It is *BECAUSE* these are dependently designated that they are empty. If there would be thunder without an agent, there would be fruit of action without any action done. This is how Nagarjuna explains it."
<-----
Nagarjuna IS NOT communicating "anatta nor non-inherent understanding" to his opponents. If he is doing that, he would be communicating with his opponents using different language like using japanese language to talk to Indians. Instead, Nagarjuna is using consequential syllogistic reasoning.
What does this mean? It means he is using inherent pattern of reasoning to demonstrate to his opponents that their inherent logic is untenable and leads to absurd consequences like "cause and effect" can never meet so how do they work (according to opponent's logic and premise)?
In other words, he is saying to his opponents, if ACCORDING to their inherent pattern of reasoning, "effect happens when cause is not there, then thunder can happen without an agent and fruit of action can be without bearer" -- which is unacceptable to his opponents because their model is based on "agency-action" construction.
This SHOULDN'T be taken to mean that Nagarjuna is promoting or refuting action without agency. He is simply allowing the opponent to see the consequences of their own logic. From chapter 1-23 of mmk, Nagarjuna is not presenting any view except on chapter 24 onwards.
Do take not that the above demonstrated consequences is perfectly fine for anyone with anatta insights. If Nagarjuna wants to talk to ppl that base their understandings on anatta and non-inherent existence, then autonomous syllogistic reasoning will be more appropriate.
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