Showing posts with label Dependent Origination. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Dependent Origination. Show all posts
Jul
03
Soh


The question posed by Mr. A—"How does your view treat reality outside of one's mind? Do you believe that everything is mind, or is there reality distinct from it that interacts with the mind?"—cuts to the heart of one of the most enduring dilemmas in philosophy and contemplative inquiry. It presents a binary choice that has defined much of Western and Eastern thought: are you an idealist, who posits that reality is fundamentally mental, or a realist, who holds that a physical world exists independently of our perception of it?

As John Tan commented, "Dependent arising is precisely to address these extreme views via emptiness."

John Tan also said in 2015: "External objects are only valid conventionally, not ultimately. What cannot be separated was mistaken as separated due to conventions, and then when we attempt to trace back using our existing paradigm, we logically deduce it must be either oneness in substance or as interactions between entities. However, one that has tasted anatta in real time sees that neither is true. It cannot be expressed either as one substance or as an interaction between separate entities. One further refines one's view through MMK (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā) and realizes the impossibility of manifestation in such views. The mind can then willingly release itself and rest in empty, non-arising appearances.

If we refuse to clearly see the two truths, the mind will never find its place; it cannot rest, as it is unable to release the paradigm that defines it. To be thoughtless and non-conceptual are not the right antidotes to free the mind from extremes, and experience that is empty, non-dual, and non-arisen will be distorted. This is just my opinion."


The perspective offered here, rooted in the Madhyamaka ("Middle Way") school of Mahāyāna Buddhism founded by the philosopher Nāgārjuna, is that this very dichotomy is a conceptual trap. The "answer" is not to choose a side but to deconstruct the premises upon which the question is built. The view is not that "everything is mind," nor is it that a solid, mind-independent reality exists "out there." By using the analytical tools of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), emptiness (śūnyatā), and non-arising (anutpāda), we can arrive at a more subtle, dynamic, and experientially verifiable understanding.

1. The Central Thesis: Appearances Are Not Mind, Nor Other-Than-Mind

A clear and concise entry point into this view is captured perfectly in the article from Awakening to Reality you provided. It states:

“…there is no mind apart from appearance and no appearance apart from mind.”

This statement is the cornerstone of the entire framework. It dissolves the perceived duality between an internal "subject" (mind) and an external "object" (appearance/reality), thereby avoiding both idealism and naïve realism from the outset. Let's unpack this in detail:

  • No appearance apart from mind: When we try to locate an appearance or an object—a tree, a sound, a feeling—entirely separate from the consciousness that cognizes it, we fail. An "unperceived object" is a pure abstraction. The very qualities that define an object (its color, shape, texture) are known only through the faculties of perception and cognition. Its "object-ness" is conferred upon it by a subject.
  • No mind apart from appearance: Conversely, when we turn our attention inward to find the "mind" or "consciousness" that is doing the perceiving, we cannot locate it as a standalone entity. What is mind without something to be mindful of? It has no color, no shape, no location. We only ever find the mind in action, seamlessly fused with the content of its experience—the seeing of sights, the hearing of sounds, the thinking of thoughts.

What we actually encounter in any given moment is a single, indivisible event of "experiencing" which we conceptually and retroactively split into a "perceiver" and a "perceived." The Madhyamaka view asserts that this split is a fabrication of thought, not a reflection of fundamental reality.

2. The Engine of Analysis: Dependent Origination (Pratītyasamutpāda)

How does Madhyamaka justify this radical claim? The primary analytical tool is the principle of Dependent Origination, which states that no phenomenon exists autonomously. Everything arises in dependence upon other factors. The classic Buddhist formula is: "When this is, that is. From the arising of this, that arises."

Nāgārjuna applies this principle relentlessly to the act of perception itself. He famously analyzes the triad of the Sense Organ, the Sense Object, and the Sense Consciousness. This interdependent relationship is made explicit in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), or "Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way."

MMK Verse

Point Made

Dependency Shown

26:4

“Dependent on the eye and on form, and on attention, consciousness arises.”

🧠 Consciousness ⇐ 👁️ Eye + 🎨 Form

26:5

“The conjunction of the three … is contact.” The event of seeing is the co-presence of all three.

Seeing = 👁️ + 🎨 + 🧠

3:6 (summary)

If you remove the “seer,” there can be no “seen” nor any “seeing.”

Each pole collapses without the others.

First, in MMK 26:4, he establishes the dependency of consciousness:

Sanskrit: cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpaṃ ca ... vijñānaṃ saṃpravartate (MMK 26.4)

Siderits-Katsura translate: “Dependent on the eye and on form, and on attention, consciousness arises.” (GRETIL, 2010)

Second, in Chapter 3, Nāgārjuna generalizes this to the entire "seer-seeing-seen" complex. The lynchpin verse is MMK 3:6:

Sanskrit: draṣṭā nāsty atiraskṛtya tiraskṛtya ca darśanam | draṣṭavyaṃ darśanaṃ caiva draṣṭary asati te kutaḥ || (MMK 3.6)

Garfield translates: “If there is no seer apart from seeing, nor seeing apart from the seer, how could there be the seen (object) or the act of seeing when the seer is absent?” (Garfield, 1995)

These three elements are like three sticks propping one another up in a tripod. If you remove any one stick, the other two immediately fall. None of them is the independent "foundation"; their stability is their mutual, simultaneous dependence. It is crucial to note that Nāgārjuna is applying his analytical method to the Buddha's own teachings on the twelve links of dependent origination, found in foundational Pāli suttas like the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta ("The Honeyball Sutta," MN 18) and the Chachakka Sutta ("The Six Sets of Six," MN 148).

A modern analogy maps perfectly to this triad:

Smartphone Component

Madhyamaka Triad Counterpart

Camera Sensor

Eye (Sense Organ)

Scene/View

Visible Form (Sense Object)

Image Signal/Data

Eye-Consciousness (Sense Consciousness)

The "photo" as an event of consciousness only occurs when all three are functioning together. A dead battery ⚡ (no sensor), a lens cap 🏴 (no scene), or a processor crash 💥 (no signal generation) means the photo-event never appears. The image is not a thing that exists in the sensor, in the scene, or in the processor. It is nothing over and above that momentary, interdependent synergy.

3. The Result of Analysis: Emptiness (Śūnyatā) and Dependent Designation

This radical interdependence leads directly to the core Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā). This is arguably the most misunderstood concept in all of Buddhism. Emptiness does not mean non-existence or nihilism. It means the absence of svabhāva—intrinsic, independent, self-sufficient existence.

Because every part of the triad (organ, object, consciousness) depends on the others for its very existence and definition, no single part possesses its own inherent nature. It is "empty" of being a standalone thing. This logical progression is key: Dependent Origination reveals a lack of intrinsic existence, and this lack is what is termed emptiness.

This is where Nāgārjuna's most famous verse, MMK 24:18, becomes the lynchpin of the entire philosophy, tying all the concepts together:

"Whatever is dependently arisen, we declare that to be emptiness;

Being dependently designated, that itself is the Middle Way." (MMK 24:18)

The second line, "Being dependently designated" (prajn~aptirupādāya), means that our words—"eye," "form," "consciousness," "mind," "world"—are convenient labels or conventions we apply to this web of interdependent processes. The label is useful for communication (this is its conventional truth), but it doesn't point to a static, self-enclosed entity.

Crucially, this does not invalidate conventional reality. The Madhyamaka view is not a denial of the world but a denial of a specific, imaginary way of being (i.e., inherent existence). By seeing that phenomena are empty of a solid, independent core, we are not left with nothing. Rather, conventional functioning is seen more clearly for what it is: a dynamic, relational, and vibrant play of appearances. As some teachers put it, seeing emptiness doesn't destroy the world; it destroys the illusion of a solid, graspable world, allowing for a more fluid and less fraught engagement with it (Barre Center for Buddhist Studies).

4. The Ultimate Implication: Non-Arising (Anutpāda)

This leads to the most profound and subtle implication of the Madhyamaka view: non-arising (anutpāda). If a phenomenon lacks an independent essence (svabhāva) and can never be found to exist on its own, then from an ultimate perspective, it never truly "arose" as a self-contained entity in the first place.

This does not deny the vivid, functional reality of our experience. The denial is of a specific mode of existence. Things appear, function, and have effects—this is their conventional truth (saṃvṛti−satya). But their ultimate truth (paramārtha−satya) is their emptiness of inherent existence, their "non-arisen" nature.

The rainbow is the perfect analogy:

  • Conventional Truth: A rainbow vividly appears in the sky. We can see it, point to it, and describe its colors. It is functionally present.
  • Ultimate Truth: If we try to find the "rainbow-entity," we fail. We only find a specific, temporary conjunction of conditions: sunlight, water droplets, and a particular angle of an observer. There is no solid "thing" there. The rainbow is a vivid appearance that is simultaneously empty of being a self-existing object. It is "non-arisen."

In the same way, the world of experience—including mind and matter—is like a magical display: vividly apparent yet ultimately unfindable as a collection of solid, independent things. This is powerfully stated in MMK 25:22-24, which concludes with the "pacification of all proliferation" (prapan~ca−upaśama), where the conceptual fabrication that projects inherent existence onto this fluid display ceases.

5. Transcending the Extremes: A Practical Summary

With this framework in place, we can now directly address the initial dichotomy of idealism and realism and see how the Middle Way avoids both. The entire argument refutes these two extreme views.

Extreme View

Claim Made

The Madhyamaka Refutation

Idealism

"Only mind is real; objects are mere projections of mind."

"Mind" itself is conditional and dependently arisen. It requires an organ and an object to function as mind in any given moment. Thus, it cannot be the ultimate, foundational substance.

Naïve Realism

"Objects exist 'out there' with their own inherent properties, independent of any mind."

An "object" only functions as such within the perceptual triad. Its "object-ness" is a relational quality, a dependent designation, not an intrinsic, mind-independent property.

The Middle Way

Reality is a co-arising nexus of interdependent factors, empty of essence yet functionally effective.

The identity of Dependent Origination and Emptiness (MMK 24:18) provides the path that cuts between the extremes of eternalism (inherent existence) and nihilism (total non-existence).

Even more subtle philosophical positions, like the Yogācāra school's concept of a "storehouse consciousness" (ālaya−vijn~āna), are subjected to the same analysis by Madhyamaka thinkers. From a strict Madhyamaka standpoint, even if one posits such a foundational consciousness, that foundation itself must be analyzed. Upon analysis, it too would be found to be dependent on conditions for its arising and therefore empty of being an ultimate, self-sufficient ground.

Summary of Key Verses for Reference

  • MMK 3:6: Establishes the mutual collapse of the seer/seeing/seen triad.
  • MMK 26:4: Shows that consciousness is dependent on sense organ, object, and attention.
  • MMK 24:18: Equates dependent origination with emptiness and dependent designation, defining the Middle Way.
  • MMK 25:22-24: Points to the ultimate truth of non-arising and the pacification of conceptual proliferation.
  • MN 18 & MN 148: Key suttas from the early Pāli canon that describe the triad of perception, forming the doctrinal basis for Nāgārjuna's analysis.

Conclusion: A Self-Luminous, Ungraspable Display

To return to Mr. A's question: the view presented here does not posit that everything is mind, nor that there is a reality distinct from it. It points to the immediate, lived fact that "mind" and "reality" are inseparable concepts that co-arise and co-define one another in every single moment of experience.

The practical and experiential import of this understanding is profound. When the deep-seated habit of solidifying a "self" or "mind" on the inside and a "world" or "matter" on the outside begins to relax, experience reveals itself for what it is: a fluid, seamless, self-luminous display. There is no gap between knower and known to be bridged. There is nothing to grasp onto as "real" and nothing to push away as "non-existent".

What is conventionally called an external world continues to manifest (appear) but as an illusory display of radiant appearances and conventionalities, no longer reified.

Nagarjuna: 

Verse 59.

Starting with ignorance and ending with aging

All processes that arise from

The twelve links of dependent origination

We accept them to be like a dream and an illusion.

Verse 60.

This wheel with twelve links

Rolls along the road of cyclic existence

Outside this, there cannot be sentient beings

Experiencing the fruits of their deeds.

Verse 61.

Just as in dependence upon a mirror

A full image of one's face appears

The face did not move onto the mirror

Yet without it, there is no image [of the face].

Verse 62.

Likewise, aggregates recompose in a new existence

Yet the wise always understand

That no one is born in another existence

Nor does someone transfer to such existence.

Verse 63.

In brief, from empty phenomena

Empty phenomena arise

Agent, karma, fruits, and their enjoyer –

The conqueror taught these to be [only] conventional.

Verse 64.

Just as the sound of a drum as well as a shoot

Are produced from a collection [of factors]

We accept the external world of dependent origination

To be like a dream and an illusion.

Verse 65.

That phenomena are born from causes

Can never be inconsistent [with facts]

Since the cause is empty of cause

We understand it to be empty of origination.

Verse 66.

The non-origination of all phenomena

Is clearly taught to be emptiness

In brief, the five aggregates are denoted

By [the expression] “all phenomena.”

Verse 67.

When the [ultimate] truth is explained as it is

The conventional is not obstructed

Independent of the conventional

No [ultimate] truth can be found.

Verse 68.

The conventional is taught to be emptiness

The emptiness itself is the conventional

One does not occur without the other

Just as [being] produced and impermanent.


John Tan wrote in 2020:

John Tan: That is, he [Mr. J] doesn't know how beautiful Prasangika nominalism is... ...focus on total exertion and dependent designations; it gels so perfectly and beautifully, and it has an entire view, world, or universe of its own. It integrates all without dispelling or affirming both the internal and external world (Middle Way) and thoroughly bases its entire world as names only. That is extremely beautiful, especially when you can integrate anatta, total exertion, and emptiness together. I only began to appreciate it recently when I contemplated Tsongkhapa's semantic nominalism seriously. I appreciate the two truths more and more, especially the conventional world, when seen together with the experiential insight of total exertion.

Soh Wei Yu: I see. Where can I read about Tsongkhapa's semantic nominalism?

John Tan: Actually, you can't just read about it. You must integrate it with the insight of total exertion and emptiness without resorting to non-conceptuality—just the linguistic beauty with all the constructs. Your current experiences and insights are sufficient to integrate them. The +A and -A are perfectly blended. All tastes of anatta, emptiness, and total exertion remain and gel so beautifully. The internal world and external world are bridged by being names only. No wonder Tsongkhapa doesn't need to reject the external world and doesn't need a reflexive awareness.


To sit with one final, summarizing thought for contemplation:

Seeing is just the fleeting, interdependent meeting of eye, form, and knowing—perfectly vivid, perfectly ungraspable.

References

  • Garfield, J. L. (1995). The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Oxford University Press. (Cited via Internet Archive).
  • Göttingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages (GRETIL). (2010). Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, based on the edition by J.W. de Jong. Retrieved from gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de.
  • SuttaCentral. (n.d.). MN 18: Madhupiṇḍika Sutta and MN 148: Chachakka Sutta. Retrieved from suttacentral.net.
  • Various authors and sources cited parenthetically, including Study Buddhism, Barre Center for Buddhist Studies, and Awakening to Reality.


Update:

 

Anarchist Chossid wrote:
I think all that is true at the moment of perception. The mind objects that arise are a result of an interaction between the environment and the sense organs and the brain -> mind. (It's unclear to me whether Nagarjuna was aware of the role the brain plays in the generation of the mind and, conversely, modern concerns with pure physicalism expressed in Hard Problem of Consciousness.)

The problem is that we can deduce that the environment exists outside of the mind and independent of it. Look at your watch. Note the time. Now look away. Don't think about the watch for a few minutes. Now look back at it. The time advanced. It did so in synchrony with the rest of the watch. How? Whatever happened, did so outside of your consciousness. You weren't aware of the time advancing. So there is reality that functions outside of your mind. 

My concerns is that all nonduality that Eastern philosophy and religion reports is confined to within the mind or at the moment of the mind's working together with the environment. 
Jul 28, 2025, 2:35:06 AM
Soh replied:

Thank you for this excellent and thoughtful comment. The watch analogy is a perfect, modern formulation of a classic philosophical challenge, and it gets right to the heart of the matter. You've pinpointed the exact place where the Madhyamaka view often seems counter-intuitive, and your concern is entirely valid from a conventional standpoint. To address it fully requires a deep dive into how different Buddhist philosophical schools approach this.

The core of your argument is that by inferring a process (the watch's movement) that occurs outside of your direct perception, you can prove the existence of a mind-independent reality. From a Madhyamaka viewpoint, the flaw in this conclusion is that it mistakes a conceptual inference for an independently existing reality. Let's analyze the components of your deduction using the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka method.


First, we analyze the "watch" itself. What is this "watch" that you deduce exists when unobserved? Our concept of it—its mechanics, its purpose, its continuity—is built entirely from prior perceptions and learning. The very idea of a "watch that functions independently" is a concept that is itself dependently arisen. Then, we analyze the "unobserved process." You posit a continuous mechanical movement happening while you weren't looking. But this "continuous movement" is a mental model, an inference that bridges two discrete moments of perception. We don't experience the unobserved process; we conceptualize it. From a Prāsaṅgika perspective, this conceptual bridge is a dependent designation (prajñapti), not an ultimate truth. It's a conventionally useful story we tell ourselves, but it has no inherent, findable reality.

This leads to the crucial question of how a philosophy can accept an external world conventionally while insisting it's ultimately empty. The answer lies in the precise definition of the two truths. For something to be accepted as "conventionally valid," it isn't just a fantasy. It must be functional (the watch keeps time) and part of our shared, everyday experience. This is why Prāsaṅgika thinkers do not deny the functional reality of the world.


This point is central to the perspective of the Tibetan master Tsongkhapa, who was a brilliant systematizer of the Prāsaṅgika view. It is important to nuance the status of this view across Tibetan Buddhism. While the Gelug school, founded by Tsongkhapa, holds Prāsaṅgika as systematically definitive, other major schools have a more varied approach. To be precise, certain Kagyu and Sakya lineages also teach shentong (gzhan-stong, or "other-empty") readings alongside rangtong (Prāsaṅgika, or "self-empty") presentations. The Nyingma school often balances Madhyamaka analysis with the direct experiential teachings of Dzogchen.

Nonetheless, Tsongkhapa's clarification of Prāsaṅgika is profoundly influential. While he is a key figure, he was not alone in defending conventional reality; earlier Indian masters like Bhāviveka and Śāntarakṣita also emphasized the necessity of a robust conventional world. Tsongkhapa's particular genius was in his forceful and detailed systematization. In what is known as his "eight great difficult points" of Madhyamaka (as detailed in texts like his Illumination of the Thought), he specifically includes the non-negation of external objects as a core tenet of the true Prāsaṅgika view. He argued that without a functioning conventional world, the ultimate truth of emptiness becomes a meaningless, nihilistic void. The watch is conventionally valid and functions. The error is only in believing it functions from its own side, with an intrinsic nature (svabhāva) independent of parts, causes, and a designating mind.

This approach of deconstructing experience extends to all phenomena. The Madhyamaka "Middle Way" states that the world isn’t a projection of our minds, but it isn’t totally independent of our minds, either, because it makes no sense to speak of a particular, fixed reality independent of any concept, mental process, or observer. Rather, there is interdependence. An object is seen by a hundred different people like a hundred reflections in a hundred mirrors. But is it the same object? As a first approximation, it is, but it can be perceived in completely different ways by different beings.

Colors, sounds, smells, flavors, and textures aren’t attributes that are inherent to the objective world, existing independently of our senses. The objects we perceive seem completely ‘external’ to us, but do they have intrinsic characteristics that define their true nature? We have no way of knowing, because our only way of apprehending them is via our own mental process. To take an example, what is a white object? Is it a wavelength, a ‘color temperature’, or moving particles? Are those particles energy, mass, or what? None of those attributes are intrinsic to the object; they’re only the result of our particular ways of investigating it.

A classic Buddhist story tells of two blind men trying to understand the color white. One was told it is the color of snow and concluded white was "cold." The other was told it is the color of swans and concluded white went "swish swish." The point is that the world cannot be determined by itself. If it could be, we’d all perceive it in the same way. This isn't to deny reality as we observe it, but simply that no ‘reality in itself’ is conventionally valid. Phenomena are only conventionally valid in dependence on other phenomena.

To appreciate the precision of this view, it's helpful to contrast it with others. Even within Madhyamaka, the earlier Svātantrika school differed. They also accepted a conventional external world, but believed that for a label to be valid, there had to be something findable on the side of the object that justified it—a sort of "barcode" or own-characteristic (svalakṣaṇa). The Prāsaṅgika view, as interpreted by Candrakīrti and Tsongkhapa, rejected this, arguing for a more radical emptiness where valid mental labelling alone is sufficient. 

This also clarifies how Tsongkhapa’s Prāsaṅgika diverges from Yogācāra. Unlike Yogācāra, which in many formulations treats all external appearance as projections of mind, Tsongkhapa insists that functioning external objects are required for any valid cognition: they serve as causal conditions, are witnessed by public consensus, and pass empirical tests. What makes them only conventionally real, he says, is that their existence is established "merely by correct designation" and not by any discoverable essence on the object’s side. However, it is a common oversimplification to equate all of Yogācāra with idealism. Early epistemic Yogācārins such as Dharmakīrti still allowed externals insofar as they exercise causal efficacy (arthakriyā)—real is what produces effects—yet their focus remains the mental image as the direct object of awareness. Later false-aspectarian Yogācāra (Ratnākaraśānti) drops externals altogether, calling the shared world a karmic hallucination. Tsong-khapa rejects both extremes: • a strict physicalist nihilism (uccheda-dṛṣṭi) that treats all mind and karma as nothing more than brain-chemistry, and • a reifying stance — whether naive realism that endows matter with intrinsic substance or an idealism that grants mind or mental images intrinsic substance (śaśvata-dṛṣṭi). His Middle Way lets the watch keep ticking, but only as a dependently-arisen, empty phenomenon: conventionally valid, never self-powered. 

The Dzogchen tradition, while distinct in its direct, experiential methodology, arrives at a philosophical conclusion that is highly compatible with Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. It fully accepts the conventional world of appearances. As the great Dzogchen master Longchenpa famously quipped, when we stop looking at a mountain, it does not just disappear. However, Longchenpa then provides a detailed ultimate analysis of these conventionally valid appearances, showing them to be empty and illusory. He explains that all appearances, while appearing, have no inherent existence, like a reflection in a mirror. They are unreal, like the eight examples of illusion (a dream, a magical display, a mirage, etc.). Crucially, he states that these appearances are not the mind, because their characteristics (color, size) are different from the mind's, but they are also not other than the mind, because no external object can ever be established as separate from the delusory perceptions of the mind. When analyzed, the external apprehended object is found to be emptiness, as it dissolves into partless atoms which are themselves non-existent. Likewise, the internal apprehending consciousness, when analyzed, is found to have no foundation and no root; it is a self-clarity that is ultimately baseless. Dzogchen reframes this union of the two truths through the lens of rigpa—a term often translated as "knowledge" or vidyā—seeing it as the "spontaneous presence" (lhun grub) that naturally arises from the empty ground of "primordial purity" (kadag). This spontaneous presence is the entire universe of conventional reality. In essence, lhun grub is the Dzogchen term for what Madhyamaka calls dependent arising. 

Regarding the brain and the Hard Problem of Consciousness, the Madhyamaka analysis would be applied to the brain itself. How do we know of the brain? Through diagrams, scans, and scientific explanations. In every case, the "brain" as an object of knowledge is part of the same perceptual triad: an organ, an object, and a consciousness. Therefore, the brain cannot be the ultimate, independent, physical substrate for mind. Rather than "sidestepping" the Hard Problem, the Madhyamaka approach shows that the problem itself evaporates. Because "brain," "mind," and "causation" are all seen as equally dependently designated constructs, the dualistic framework that creates the Hard Problem is shown to be a conceptual error from the start.

It is also crucial to note that classical Buddhism—including Nāgārjuna—does not treat consciousness as a late-stage product of grey matter. In Abhidharma and Madhyamaka alike, each moment of mind is said to arise from the immediately preceding moment of mind, not from physical substance; matter is merely one of many cooperative conditions. This continuity of the mind-stream (saṃtāna) across death underpins the standard Buddhist teaching of rebirth (see example) —a cycle Nāgārjuna takes for granted when he speaks of karma’s “non-ceasing” causal efficacy. Because mind is neither a permanent soul nor a neuronal epiphenomenon, strict physicalism counts as one of the “annihilationist extremes” (uccheda-dṛṣṭi) already rejected in the early suttas and reiterated by Nāgārjuna. Conversely, positing an eternal, self-contained consciousness would fall into the opposite extreme of eternalism. His Middle Way avoids both by analysing the mind-brain-world nexus exactly as he analyses the watch: conventionally valid and functional, dependently originated, and empty of intrinsic essence. So when you see a watch ticking after you look away, Buddhism happily says: yes, causally efficient processes continue outside your present cognitive frame—but neither those processes, nor the mind that later cognises them, are reducible to a self-standing physical substrate.

Finally, you raise the most important concern: that this nonduality is just a subjective experience, "confined to within the mind." From the Prāsaṅgika perspective, the nonduality being pointed to is not the merging of a subject (mind) with an object (the world).


It is the realization that the very concepts of "subject" and "object" are themselves empty, dependently arisen imputations. The goal is not to dissolve the world into the mind (idealism) or to see the mind as a product of the world (physicalism). The goal is to see that the very boundary we draw between "in the mind" and "outside the mind" is a conceptual fabrication. Only one who has attained enlightenment recognizes an object’s ultimate nature – that it appears, but is devoid of any intrinsic existence – as the direct contemplation of absolute truth transcends any intellectual concept or duality. It's also important to add one subtle but critical Madhyamaka point: even that state of enlightened gnosis is itself seen as empty of inherent existence, thus avoiding any final lapse into positing a new absolute.

So, the nonduality Nāgārjuna points to is not a state within the mind; it is the collapse of the conceptual framework that creates the illusion of an "inner mind" and an "outer world" in the first place. The "problem" of the watch's independent functioning only exists if you first grant the watch and the mind an independent, inherent existence that they do not actually possess.

Thank you again for a fantastic question that gets to the very core of the issue.

Jul
02
Soh


A common reading of Nāgārjuna’s
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) can feel like a semester-long philosophy course packed into a few dense verses. The critiques of motion (Chapter 2) and the sense faculties (Chapter 3) are particularly challenging, often leading to accusations of sophistry. However, a closer look reveals a consistent and rigorous dialectical method. Nāgārjuna’s goal is not to build a new theory, but to demonstrate how the realist opponent’s own foundational premises, when voiced and then pushed to their logical conclusions, inevitably self-destruct.

This article synthesizes and unpacks the core arguments surrounding these chapters. By first stating the opponent's prior position (pūrvapakṣa)—a standard practice in Indian debate—and then showing how Nāgārjuna deconstructs it, we can see that the perceived "flaws" in his logic are the very tools he uses to expose the contradictions inherent in realism.

1. The Realist Premise: The Doctrine of Intrinsic Nature (Svabhāva)

At the heart of Nāgārjuna's critique is the concept of svabhāva, or "intrinsic nature." His opponents, particularly the Abhidharma realists (e.g., Sarvāstivādins), posited that phenomena (dharmas) possess an inherent, self-sufficient existence that gives them their causal power.

  • For the sense faculties (MMK 3): The eye possesses an intrinsic "seeing-power."
  • For actions (MMK 2): A fire possesses an intrinsic power of "burning."

Nāgārjuna’s entire project is to first state this premise as the opponent's thesis and then reveal its absurd consequences. He has no burden to build a positive theory; his success lies in showing that the opponent's categories implode.

Note: In this context, 'realist' refers to Platonic realism, which is the belief that universals have an objective or absolute existence.

2. First Criticism: "Vision Must See Itself to See Anything"

A frequent objection to Nāgārjuna's argument in MMK 3 is that it rests on the faulty premise that a faculty must first act upon itself.

The Realist Position

Early realists argued that a property must first permeate its own basis before it can act outwardly, using analogies like the scent of a jasmine flower or the heat of a fire. Following this logic, for vision to have the intrinsic power of seeing, it must first "see" itself. The famous Yogācāra analogy of a lamp illuminating itself was also used to support this kind of reflexive power.

Nāgārjuna’s Reductio ad Absurdum

Nāgārjuna weaponizes the realist's own principle. In MMK 3, he accepts the premise for the sake of argument: if vision were intrinsically "seeing," it should be able to see itself. But, he states, "Vision does not see itself." Therefore, if it fails to perform its intrinsic function on its own basis, it cannot logically perform it on others.

The later commentator Candrakīrti clarifies the lamp analogy. Conventionally, we say a lamp lights itself. But at the ultimate level of analysis, there is no extra property of "self-illumination" over and above the singular event of lighting. The lamp is the illumination. To say it "lights itself" is a linguistic redundancy.

Why the Objection Misfires

Nāgārjuna's point is that "seeing" is always a relational event, arising from a convergence of conditions. When these are absent, there is no leftover "nugget" of seeing-power. His argument's goal is not to prove eyes are blind, but to show that the realist's concept of an intrinsic, self-acting power is incoherent by the realist's own standards.

3. Second Criticism: "Denying Real Time Denies the Function" & The Myth of the Agent

Another worry is that Nāgārjuna smuggles in a strange theory of time to deny that actions can happen. This critique misses the broader point: the deconstruction of the agent behind the action by granting the realist's premises.

The Realist Position

Realists posit that for an action to be real, it must be performed by a real agent existing in a real, discrete moment of time. This creates a duality between the "doer" and the "doing."

Nāgārjuna’s Reductio ad Absurdum

Nāgārjuna grants the realist's model of discrete time-atoms for the sake of argument and then shows its flaws. His analysis of motion in MMK 2 is a template for dismantling any such agent-action pair. He first shows that if you separate an agent from its action (a "mover" from "moving"), you create a redundancy. The very idea of a "moving mover" is senseless. This logic applies universally: it is equally absurd to speak of a "seeing seer" or an "experiencing experiencer."

Crucially, the agent is actually predicated on the action, not the other way around. An "agent" that is not exercising its agency is a non-agent. Therefore, rather than an agent existing first and then acting, the appearance of an action is what leads us to conventionally designate an "agent." This is compounded by the temporal problem: where does this action occur?

  • In the past? Then it is finished.
  • In the future? Then it has not begun.
  • In the present? The "present" is unfindable, instantly dissolving into past and future.

Since the action itself cannot be located within the realist's time-scheme, the agent of that action certainly cannot be established as an independent entity.

Why the Objection Misfires

The key to understanding this is dependent designation. Nāgārjuna is not denying that we conventionally say "I am walking to town." He is showing that upon analysis, the "I" (the agent) is merely a designation dependent on the aggregates, just as the "town" is a designation dependent on its parts. As the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra states: "This body is like the earth, lacking an agent."

4. Third Criticism: "He Only Refutes a View Nobody Holds"

Finally, some argue that Nāgārjuna attacks a straw man, as no serious philosopher would claim that seeing is completely unconditional.

The Realist Position

This is where precision is key. Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma does not claim seeing is "unconditional" in the sense of requiring no object. It asserts, however, that the eye possesses an intrinsic power of sight (svabhāva) which, though conditionally manifest, is the ultimate ground of perception. This power exists within the eye faculty itself, and when the other conditions (e.g., a visible form and eye-consciousness) are met, sight automatically occurs.

Nāgārjuna’s Dismantling

Nāgārjuna’s critique targets this very notion of an intrinsic power. In MMK 3, he systematically eliminates each candidate for the title of "the seer":

  1. The Eye: Cannot see without an object and consciousness.
  2. The Form (Object): Cannot see itself.
  3. Eye-Consciousness: Is derivative, arising only when the other two are present.

If you strip away the other conditions, no single component retains the power of sight. This demonstrates that no intrinsic seeing-power can be located. What we call "sight" is the dependently arisen event, empty of any grounding essence.

Why the Objection Misfires

Far from being a straw man, the idea of an intrinsic (though conditionally manifest) power is the very core of the Abhidharma realist project. By showing that this supposed power cannot be found in any of the components, Nāgārjuna empties the entire perceptual triad of its essentialist foundation.

Conclusion: The Takeaway

The perceived "unstated premises" in Nāgārjuna's arguments are the opponent's own premises, which he skillfully voices and then turns back on them. His method is a consistent negative dialectic:

  1. State the realist's premise (pūrvapakṣa): The belief in svabhāva—an intrinsic, self-powered agent or essence.
  2. Expose the contradictions: Show that this premise, when granted for the sake of argument, leads to absurdities like logical duplication ("a moving mover") and temporal paradoxes.
  3. Conclude conventional reality: Phenomena function only as relational, dependently arisen events (pratītyasamutpāda). There are no agents, only actions; no experiencers, only experiences. These are all dependently designated.

After the deconstructive dust settles, our everyday world remains intact. Lamps light rooms and eyes see objects. These statements work perfectly well as conventional truths (saṃvṛti-satya). What has been eliminated is the extra metaphysical baggage—the belief in an intrinsic essence behind the function—that generated the philosophical contradictions in the first place.

Further Reading

  • Garfield, Jay L., and Graham Priest. “Nāgārjuna and the Limits of Thought.” Philosophy East & West, vol. 53, no. 1, 2003, pp. 1-21.
  • Siderits, Mark, and Shōryū Katsura, trans. Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way: The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Wisdom Publications, 2013.
  • Westerhoff, Jan. Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2009.