Yogachara / Mind Only, Non-Dual, and the Other

In this context, the primary difference is that the mind in Buddhism is taken as empty and not truly established or existent—as Vimalakirti says, “the base is baselessness”. In contrast, Brahman is generally taken as existent and tends to fall foul of Buddhism’s rejection of eternalism. But it is true that there is no multiplicity (or singularity) in the Mahayana view of ultimate reality.

In Tibetan discourse, it is basically said that if you take yogacara but hold mind as being ultimately existent, then it becomes difficult to distinguish from a view of Brahman.

Excellent explanation.

Yes, mind is still one of the clinging-aggregates in mind-only belief.

In Tibetan discourse, it is basically said that if you take yogacara but hold mind as being ultimately existent, then it becomes difficult to distinguish from a view of Brahman.

So is this meant in the sense that one should not take mind as ultimately existent? Only existent in relative truth? When we say mind here do we mean consciousness (process of thinking) or awareness?

Yeah, in Mahayana we wouldn’t take the mind as ultimately existent. In terms of “if you take it as ultimately existent, it becomes like Brahman” we are basically talking about the ālāya. In the context of yogācāra, all experience of awareness occurs within the set of consciousnesses supported by the ālāya (ie there is no awareness beyond the ālāya).

But there is also a view (not universal—basically trying to speak from how I understand a yogācāra POV) that the ālāya, once purified, basically becomes the dharmakāya of a Buddha, which is basically the Buddha’s mind. This is also empty and not ultimately existent… but it’s not non-existent either. It is beyond the concepts of existence, non-existence, both, and neither.

So there is an extent to which you could say that the difference between Advaita and Mahayana on this front is the difference between “eventually you reach something eternal and real” and “eventually you reach something beyond all concept, including those concepts of reality and eternality”. That is at least the philosophical/rhetorical position from the Buddhist POV.

Actually, all things are said to be of this same nature in Mahayana. This is kind of what is meant in the Heart Sutra where it says “form is not other than emptiness; emptiness is not other than form”. There is no emptiness or Truth etc beyond form (and the other aggregates) to be attained—emptiness is simply the nature of all phenomena. The dharmakaya is the realisation of this truth.

This contrasts, for instance, with a real Brahman beyond an illusory reality.

Sorry this ended up as a mad ramble, hopefully some of it is of use…

It is, thank you very much!

These are excellent explanations. I’ll just put out the thought that in the Tibetan tradition a lot of these characterizations were used for teaching the various Buddhist schools of thought (tenets) in monastic universities where actual proponents of the non-Buddhist positions were non-existent. Therefore what an actual Advaita proponent might say might be quite different from what a Buddhist text ascribes to said position. The Dalai Lama has pointed this out. In my experience with some present day Advaitists (?) I would expect at least some of them to say ultimate reality is beyond conceptuality and that clinging to the “reality” of (one’s concept of) atman/brahman is not beneficial.

From Vasubandhu:

Through the perception of mind-only
One achieves the nonperception of objects;
Through the nonperception of objects
There is also the nonperception of mind.

The next two stanzas, the last ones, are also interesting:

Through the nonduality of perception,
Arises the perception of the fundamental nature of reality.
Through the perception of the fundamental nature of reality
Arises the perception of the radiant.

Through the perception of the radiant,
And through achieving the three supreme Buddha-bodies,
And through possessing Bodhi:
Having achieved this, the sage will benefit him or herself and others.

/u/Corprustie, if you haven't seen this text

/u/animuseternal I think we've discussed this before but it seems relevant to your comment below also

This is a great piece about Nagarjuna's view on Yogacara, you might enjoy it.

I was wondering how this relates to Yogachara. If reality is non-dual, and if it is mind-only, then how is it not the same? I guess I don't understand how reality could be composed of multiple mind streams that are interconnected without that all just being activity in awareness.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have an interesting take on this. I'll just copy and paste Jha's translation here for you to read. I'm not sure how much I agree with it, but it certainly is intriguing. Śāntarakṣita's root text will be bolded and Kamalaśīla's commentary will not be.

The error in the view of these philosophers is a slight one,—due only to the assertion of eternality (of cognition); as diversity is clearly perceived in the cognitions of colour, sound and other things.—If all these cognitions were one, then, colour, sound, taste and other things would be cognisable all at once; as in an eternal entity there can be no different states.—(330-331)

‘The error is a slight one’;—as they postulate only Cognition (Consciousness, as the only entity), which is quite reasonable.

“If that is so, then what is even the ‘slight error’ in their view?”

It is due to the assertion of ‘eternality’,

“But why should not the acceptance of ‘eternality’ be reasonable?”

Answer—Diversity is clearly perceived etc. etc.;—‘Eternality’ connotes remaining in the same state always, and ‘non-eternality’ connotes not remaining in the same state always; and as a matter of fact, the Cognition that manifests (apprehends) Colour, Sound and other things is not found to be in one and the same state always;—actually it appears at one time as manifesting Colour and at another time, as manifesting Sound and other things, in a certain order of sequence. Under the circumstances, if all these things, Sound and the rest, were manifested by a single Eternal Cognition, then all of them would appear (be Cognised) simultaneously, like the bedspread of variegated colours; as the Cognition manifesting them would (ex hypothesi) be always there.

It may be held that “the Cognition of Sound and other things are different ‘states’ of it appearing one after the other,—so that the apprehension of Sound etc. could not be simultaneous”.

The answer to this is—‘In an Eternal Entity there can be no different states’;—because the ‘states’ are not different from the Entity to which they belong; so that the Entity to which the states belong would be liable to ‘production and destruction’,—appearance and disappearance,—in the same way as the States are liable; or, conversely, the states also would be eternal, like the Entity to which they belong.—If, on the other hand, the states are different from the entity to which they belong, then there can be no idea of the states belonging to this entity; as there is no benefit conferred by the one on the other; and this alternative (of the states being different from the Cognitions) would also be contrary to the doctrine that the eternal Cognition is the only one Entity.—(330-331)

Further, if the Eternal Cognition existed, it could be known either through Perception or through Inference; that it cannot be known through Perception is shown in the following—[see verse 332 next]

Cognition or consciousness is never apprehended as anything distinct from the cognitions of colour and other things; and inasmuch as these latter undergo variations every moment, what remains there that could be lasting (permanent, eternal)?—(332)

As a matter of fact, apart from the Cognitions of Colour etc., which appear one after the other, we do not apprehend, any lasting Consciousness, eternal and one,—whereby it could be held to be known through Perception.—Then, inasmuch as it is well known that the Cognitions of Colour and otherngs are apprehended one after the other, and are destroyed every moment—it has to be explained what remains there that is non-different from those Cognitions? Thus, inasmuch as there is no apprehension of any such Cognition, which would be apprehended if it were there,—it cannot but be regarded as ‘non-existent This is what the Text means.

Nor can it be held that the said Eternal Cognition is known through Inference. Because such an Inference would be based either upon the nature of the Cognition itself, or upon that of its effects. It cannot he the former, as there is nothing which can prove that such is the nature of the said Eternal Cognition; on the contrary, there is Perception itself which precludes any such notion.

Thus the doctrine that ‘the world is the illusory modification of the Eternal Consciousness’ is not right.—(332)

Then again, under this doctrine, the notions of ‘Bondage’ and ‘Liberation’ are not possible.—This is what is shown in the following—[see verse 333 next]

There can be no distinction in cognition as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’—if the ‘soul’ consists of a single (eternal) cognition; how then can there be any ‘bondage’ and ‘liberation’?—(333)

For one who holds the view that—Cognition is in perpetual flux, different with different persons, undergoing variations in a series,—the notion of ‘Bondage and Liberation’ is quite reasonable, as being due to the coming about of a series of cognitions, wrong and right; and through the practice of yoga, gradually purer and purer Cognitions coming about, the series of impure cognitions cease and the final Aim (of Liberation) is attained; and thus the attempt at Liberation becomes fruitful.—For you, on the other hand, the ‘Soul’ is of the nature of one Eternal Cognition; how then can there be any ‘Bondage’ and ‘Liberation’ for such a Soul? Because if the one Cognition is eternally wrong, then, as there could be no other state for it, there could be no possibility of ‘Liberation’; on the other hand, if the one Cognition were eternally right, then as it would be always pure, there could be no ‘Bondage’.—As regards our doctrine, the Cognition is held to be defective (wrong) or pure (right), in accordance with the varying character of the Series (in which it appears), and hence the notion of ‘Bondage and Liberation’ is entirely reasonable. This has been thus declared—‘Cognition is defective and free from defects, beset with impurities and free from impurities; if it were never impure, then all embodied beings would be always liberated; if it were never pure, then the attempt to secure Liberation would be fruitless’.—(333)

What could the mystic set aside or accomplish by the practice of yoga? What too is there that could be rejected? As wrong cognition also is of the nature of the same (eternal cognition).—The knowledge of truth also cannot be something to be brought about; as, being of the nature of cognition, it is always there.—So that the entire practice of yoga also is entirely fruitless.—(334-335)

If it be held that ‘Bondage and Liberation are only assumed, not real’;—then it becomes necessary to explain the basis of this assumption. What this basis is under the doctrine of ‘Cognitions being non-eternal’ has been shown above. Thus the Effort—in the form of the contemplation of Truth,—that you put forth for the attaining of the ‘Ultimate Aim’ and for passing beyond the cycle of Birth and Death, can only lead to futile fatigue.—This is shown in the following—[see verses 334-335 above]

If, by the contemplation of Truth, the Mystic could set aside, or bring about, anything, then his Effort would be fruitful. As it is however, he can never set aside Wrong Cognition, because it is of the nature of the same,—i.e. of the nature of Eternal Cognition.—For the same reason it cannot be rejected; because what is eternal cannot be destructible and hence its rejection is impossible.—How can the Yogin accomplish—bring about—the Knowledge of Truth? Being of the nature of Eternal Cognition, the Knowledge of Truth would be always there.—Thus the doctrine in question cannot be right.—(334-335)

That is the section on the relationship between Yogācāra and the Advaitin view in Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā, composed by Śāntarakṣita and his student Kamalaśīla, a work generally taken to be written from a Yogācāra point of view (though both were actually followers of Madhyamaka in their final analysis, holding Yogācāra to have instrumental value).

Thanks for that. I don’t think I agree, but it is interesting. I think it conflates consciousness with awareness. Isn’t it like the grasping mind and the true mind? I guess I see the idea of an eternal awareness as complementary to Buddhist texts like the Heart Sutra. “There is no suffering, no cause, no extinction, no path.” Seems to me to be pointing to the same thing, that in reality—which cannot be reached by logic alone—there was never suffering to begin with. So I don’t think it makes sense to say that liberation would be impossible if this was an activity of an eternal awareness. And really from an Advaita perspective saying it is an activity is not correct, it is simply unreal; I just phrase it that way for simplicity of expression.

I think it conflates consciousness with awareness. Isn’t it like the grasping mind and the true mind?

All mind is relative and empty, dependent on conditions and the basis for error

I guess I see the idea of an eternal awareness as complementary to Buddhist texts like the Heart Sutra. “There is no suffering, no cause, no extinction, no path.” Seems to me to be pointing to the same thing, that in reality—which cannot be reached by logic alone—there was never suffering to begin with.

No, because the Heart Sutra also negates that consciousness or awareness (vijñana), and prajña (wisdom) have some kind of real existence. All things are empty/illusory in Buddhism. In Advaita, the world is illusory, but not Brahman, which is truly real. Meanwhile, in Kashmir Shaivism, the world is truly real / essentially existent and so is Brahman.

So I don’t think it makes sense to say that liberation would be impossible if this was an activity of an eternal awareness. And really from an Advaita perspective saying it is an activity is not correct, it is simply unreal; I just phrase it that way for simplicity of expression.

The issue is that in Advaita, you supposedly have a single thing which is real, but you also have multiplicity which is unreal. But if something is really singular, then it can't give off illusory effects, or it can't have the qualities of ignorance and illusion (maya) and knowledge and liberation. If you double down and say that there really is only one thing, then you're conflicting with conventional sense perception and everyday common sense (we know that we suffer, we know that there are other sentient beings sharing the world with us etc).

Other schools of Vedanta (like Ramanuja's tradition) also attacked Advaita for this irrational position btw, not just Buddhists.

Advaita's view also conflicts with all possible moral theories, for if Brahman is one and is everything, then everything has an equal status as Brahman - Hitler and Buddha are the same ethically in this case. But this is morally repulsive.

In Yogacara, all experience is made of mind, and mind is the underlying reality of convention. The parikalpita is the world that we experience; the paratantra is the underlying causal relationships that ultimately result in the arising of the parikalpita. The parinispanna is the perfected nature of reality, the true way of seeing, without causal imputation. It is the ground of ultimate emptiness.

It is tempting to think that this asserts an ontological Mind that is "real", because what is asserted is the parinispanna is Mind, and it is real. And a lot of scholars seem to have gone with this and posit that Yogacara is realist or substantialist, saying that Mind is the only thing that exists and that it is a real thing. I do not believe that's necessarily what's going on, because I don't believe that Yogacara makes any ontological claims, only epistemological ones.

Vasubandhu writes:

The eternal non-existence of the appearance as it is appears: That is known to be the perfected nature, because of being always the same.

What appears there? The unreal fabrication. How does it appear? As a dual self. What is its nonexistence? That by which the nondual reality is there.

So mind is "real", but ultimately non-existent. Asanga has similar assertions, which I can dig up later when I have more time.

Given this, I'm honestly not sure where the notion comes from that Yogacara believes that Mind is literally existent substrate of some kind.

The soteriological path outlined in the Yogacarabhumi, as well, talks about a process of effectively subverting each of the eight consciousnesses, and when the alaya-vijnana is finally subverted, overturned, and purified, it is then annihilated and sarva-jnana remains.

Also, the Samdhinirmocana Sutra--maybe the most important sutra text in Yogacara--states quite explicitly:

In cessation with remainder, all sensations not yet brought to term as result have already been destroyed, for there is generally present the experiencing of sensations born from wisdom-contact, which counteract the experiencing both of those sensations not yet brought to term as result, and of those sensations already brought to term as result. Those two kinds of sensation are already destroyed, and one experiences only that sensation born of wisdom contact.

But in cessation without remainder, at the time of final cessation, even this kind of wisdom sensation is eternally destroyed. Thus it is said that in the realm of cessation without remainder, all sensations are destroyed without remainder.

So a Buddha, who has attained to the dharmadhatu, does not cognize phenomena, as cognition is a defilement. Reality is emptiness. It is Mind, and Mind is non-existent.

I guess I don't understand how reality could be composed of multiple mind streams that are interconnected without that all just being activity in awareness.

That is not what reality is. That is what illusion is. Mindstreams only appear when there are defiled outflows.

Those who criticize Yogacara as substantialist may forget that the three svabhavas of Yogacara have a corresponding triple emptiness.

Edit: Also, as Vasubandhu says in his Twenty Verses:

Verse 21: Awareness of other minds is illusory. How? Just like one’s awareness of one’s own mind.

[Opponent:] Why is the latter illusory?

[Proponent:]

Verse 21 continued: Because one’s own mind is unknown to one in the manner in which it is known to the Buddhas.

Since one isn’t acquainted with the ineffable manner in which the mind [both another’s and one’s own] is known to the Buddhas, one’s awareness of both another’s and one’s own minds turns out to be illusory; for [in such awareness] the misleading appearance of a distinction between the graspable object and the grasping awareness isn’t dispelled.

The brahman in Advaita Vedanta is also transpersonal. Which is a major difference.