by Jamgon Mipham
The four great logical arguments of
the Middle Way are:
- The investigation of the cause: the Diamond Splinters
- The investigation of the result: refuting existent or non-existent results
- The investigation of the essential identity: ‘neither one nor many’
- The investigation of all: the Great Interdependence
1. The Investigation of the Cause:
the Diamond Splinters
i. Refutation of Production from Four
Extremes
Production from Self
On a mere conventional level, it is indeed true that an
effect is produced from a cause, but, if investigated on the ultimate level,
production cannot be observed. If production capable of withstanding logical
analysis did exist, it must necessarily be a production by means of one of the
following four extremes: self, other, both or neither (or causeless). But these
are unreasonable.
As it is said in the Root Verses of the Middle Way:
Not from self, not from other,
Not from both and not from neither—
Not for any entity at all anywhere,
Is there ever any production.
Why? For a thing to be produced from itself is illogical,
because once something exists with its own particular identity, it is pointless
for it to arise once again. It is like a child that has already been born and
is not born again. If a seed, for example, were produced over again, it would
be produced again and again without end. There would be no opportunity for the
development of the other stages, such as the sprout, the stalk and so on.
According to the Saṃkhyas who assert self-production, in the
same way that different manifestations, such as vases, can be created from the
single nature of clay, seeds and so on are of a single nature, and abandon
their seed-like manifestation as they are transformed into the manifestation of
a sprout. If it is claimed that the various stages such as those of the seed
and sprout are one, in spite of the fact that they have distinctions in terms
of existing or not existing presently, colour, shape and so on, then that is
open to invalidation by consequential reasoning, since it would follow that
fire and water, or virtue and evil, must also be one.
You might think that a seed and sprout are not equivalent to
fire and water because they belong to the same continuum. Yet a “continuum” is
merely an imputation based on the uninterrupted resemblance of momentary
phenomena, and does not really exist.
As it says in the Introduction to the Middle Way:
If one supposes that what has already been produced is
re-produced,
Then the actual arising of a sprout and so on will never be
discovered.
The seed would go on reproducing itself until the end of the
world.
For you, there can be no difference between the seed as the
active cause
And the sprout in terms of shape, colour, flavour, capacity
or ripening.
If this seed of yours is no different from the sprout,
Then whilst the seed exists, there is nothing one might call
‘sprout’,
Or else, since they are identical, whilst the sprout exists
How could that [i.e. the seed] be apprehended? It is
untenable.
And:
Only once the cause has disappeared does one see the effect,
So the claim that they’re the same is rejected even by the
world.
It is not only according to treatises, but also the direct
experience of worldly beings that the effect follows the disappearance of the
cause, and so since even they would not accept the cause to be the same as the
effect, self-production does not exist on either of the two levels of truth.
Production from Other
You might agree that production from self is illogical, and
think that just as a child is born from its mother and a sprout is produced
from its seed, production can only occur from something ‘other.’ It is indeed
true that cause and effect are labelled as ‘other’, but this is not a
self-production that can be proven logically.
If the cause were proven to be inherently different from the
effect, then the effect would not need to depend on the cause, and both would
be equal in terms of their capacity. While something exists, it is unnecessary
for it to be produced from something else, just as two people who have already
been born are not dependent upon one another.
If one thing were to arise from another, it would follow
that anything could arise from anything else, like darkness arising from a
butter lamp and so on, given that there is no difference in terms of their
being other.
It is said [in the Introduction to the Middle Way]:
If things could arise on the basis of something ‘other’,
Well then, thick darkness should come from flames.
And:
For the cause and effect to be entirely ‘other’,
Is never feasible.
If the cause and effect were entirely other,
Causes would be just the same as non-causes.
Then you might say, “In the case of anything truly different
such as light and darkness and so on, cause and effect would be unpredictable.
But seeds and sprouts and so on have an uncommon acting causal relationship of
influencer and influenced, and so the preceding cause produces a subsequent
effect. And so there is no question of anything arising from anything else,
like darkness from flames and so on.”
Then, it is said [in the Introduction to the Middle Way]:
You do not accept that barley, stamens, Kimshuka and
so on
Can produce a rice sprout, because they lack the capability,
They are not within the same continuum, and are not similar.
It is the same for the rice seed, we say, because of being
‘other’.
In the same way that barley and flowers, stones and so on
cannot be included within the same continuum as the cause of a rice sprout or
be said to be of ‘similar type’, so too, the barley seed and its sprout, if
they are established as truly ‘other’ from the perspective of ultimate
analysis, cannot ultimately belong to the same continuum.
Even though this does not affect the ultimate conclusion
that it is wholly unacceptable for a thing’s own producers to belong to its
same continuum, it is acceptable to classify a producer as belonging to the
same continuum on the conventional level, based on the ultimately
incontrovertible point that things are not inherently ‘other’, but arise in
interdependence.
Moreover, since at any given time, either the seed or the
sprout will be non-existent, having not yet arisen or already ceased, how could
it be feasible for them to be ‘influencer’ and ‘influenced’. These are mere
imputations.
“Although the seed and sprout do not exist at the same time,
there is no fault because they arise and cease like the up and down movements
of a pair of scales.” If this is your claim, then while the seed is ceasing, it
is approaching destruction and although it exists in the present, it does not
remain in the next instant. And the sprout, while it is in the process of
arising, is approaching production so it does not exist at the same time as the
seed. So there never could be any contact between the two, and the example of
the scales is meaningless.
The Introduction to the Middle Way says:
If the eye consciousness already exists as other than its
own simultaneous producers,
Such as the eye and the co-emergent perception and so on,
What need is there for it to be produced?
If it does not exist, then the faults of this were already
explained.
If eye consciousness already existed as something other than
its own producers such as the eye faculty and the visual object and so on, and
also it’s concurrent mental states such as sensation and perception, then there
would be no need for its production. If it did not exist already, then these
could not be something ‘other’.
Therefore, the mind and mental states and the four elements
that exist at the same time are merely labelled as causes and effects, whilst
if the mind and mental states and so on were produced inherently as something
truly ‘other’, that would entail the faults already described.
So, regarding production such as that of the sprout from the
seed, the Ācārya Nāgārjuna said:
From a seed that is destroyed or intact,
The sprout is not produced,
So you taught that all production
Is just like magical creation.
As it is said, the appearances of dependent origination
cannot withstand logical analysis, and when investigated using reasoning that
inquires into the ultimate, not even the slightest so-called ‘production’ may
be observed. Yet, when left unanalyzed, just like the appearances during a
dream, a sprout appears to be produced from a seed. This is simply the way in
which the conventional is presented.
Similarly, at a merely conventional level, the continuum of
similarity is said to remain and cease, but ultimately, since no arising is
observed in the beginning, there can be no true ceasing at the end nor any
abiding in the interim. Thus things are devoid of arising, dwelling and
ceasing.
Therefore, appearances—when viewed from the perspective of
the non-paradoxical unity of the two truths—are just like the examples of an
illusion, dream, city of gandharvas, reflection of the moon in water and so on.
When analyzing in this way, using ultimate reasoning,
because of the crucial point that all phenomena lack inherent existence, seeds
and sprouts and so on cannot be established as having any essential identity,
whether as truly identical, ‘other’ or whatever.
Others (the proponents of real entities within the Buddhist
tradition) may say: “Although the other three types of
production—self-production and so on—may be refuted, if we do not accept
production from other, won’t we be contradicting the normal conventions of the
world, such as the fact that sprouts arise from seeds and butter from curd?”
There is no contradiction. In reality, if we apply reasoning, then not only at
an ultimate level, but also conventionally speaking, arising is never really
observed. If production were observable and proven conventionally, then it
would follow that conventionally true phenomena such as the aggregates and
elements would become immune to ultimate analysis. It would also follow that
ultimate or truly existent arising would not be refuted. And it would follow
that the equipoise of noble beings would become a cause for destroying
previously existent conventional phenomena, which would lead to the extreme of
deprecating the existent by labelling it non-existent. In any case, what is
claimed is not possible.
In short, from the perspective of ultimate analysis, no
phenomena whatsoever may be observed that are established as genuinely
existent, whilst from the perspective of reasoning inquiring into the
conventional, things are observed. That these two points are consistent, and
established as a single reality is the assertion of the followers of the Middle
Way beyond extremes.
Yet those who speak of real entities disagree, for they
consider emptiness and dependently originating appearance to be mutually
opposed. They believe that whatever is refuted by ultimate analysis must be
completely non-existent even on a conventional level, just like the horns of a
rabbit. Or else, that whatever exists conventionally, such as pillars and
vases, could never be refuted by ultimate reasoning. They conceive of some
independent object of negation separate from the conventional phenomena that
are the basis of negation and they consider emptiness—which for them is the
refutation of a separate phenomenon called “true existence”—and appearances,
the basis for that refutation, to be directly opposed to one another, like the
total non-existence of the horns of rabbits and the real existence of the horns
of cattle. Asserting this to be a unity, by mentally ‘binding’ these two to an
entity such as a vase is tantamount to claiming that emptiness is an affirming
negation, and in the end it does not even go beyond the views of the proponents
of true entities. This point has already been well made by the great logicians
of the past.
Production from Both
The Saṃkhyas who speak of primal substance and an almighty
god assert production from both self and other, but this carries the faults
mentioned in both the earlier positions. As it is said [in the Introduction
to the Middle Way]:
Production from both is inherently unreasonable,
Because it would entail the problems already explained.
So, this position is unacceptable from the perspective of
either of the two truths.
Production without Cause
As for the assertion that there is no arising from self,
from other or from both, but that there could be production without any cause,
it is said [in the Introduction to the Middle Way]:
If the world were devoid of any cause, then it might be
apprehended
Like the fragrance and colour of a blue lotus in space,
Yet this world is apprehended in all its rich variety,
And so, just like one’s own mind, it should be known to
arise from causes.
This has already been refuted in more detail above, in the
context of the philosophical schools,[1] where it was shown
how it entails either permanent existence or non-existence.
In this way, when analyzing properly using the logical
arguments that refute production from the four extremes of self, other, both
and neither, no phenomenon whatsoever may be seen to arise in the beginning, and
therefore to possess the other features of remaining in the middle or ceasing
in the end. And so the conceptual elaborations of the eight extremes[2] such as ultimate
arising and so on are pacified with regard to these unceasing mere relative
appearances, and this should be understood as the unity of appearance and
emptiness. This is taught more elaborately in the Introduction to the Middle
Way.
ii. The Refutation of Production
from Four Alternatives
When analyzed, production can not be established as
occurring in any of these four possible ways:
- Several causes producing a single result
- Several causes producing several results
- A single cause producing several results
- A single cause producing a single result
You might think that it is only possible for several
distinct causes, such as the object of a visible form, the unimpaired sense
faculty, the immediately preceding mental attention, an unobstructed appearance
and accommodating space, to produce the result of a single visual
consciousness.
In which case, since several distinct causes produce only a
single result, the object, faculty and so on do produce the visual
consciousness, but it must follow that there can be no other cause for its
singularity. Similarly, as long as a single cause is incapable of producing a
single effect, there is no cause for singularity or plurality, one-ness or
many-ness. And since there is no knowable phenomenon that does not fall into
either category (of one or many), whatever is singular or plural must either
remain that way forever or never come into being at any time or place. This is
because there is no cause for being singular or plural.
You might think that several causes produce several effects,
the immediate intention of wishing to look producing the visual consciousness
of a mental nature, the support of the eye faculty producing the apprehension
of the object, and the apparent object such as a vase producing its own
particular mental features. In that case, since it would be produced by these
various causes, it would have the various features just described, such as
having a mental nature and so on, and so that eye consciousness would become
many, equal in number to its aspects described above. If that is accepted, then
the resultant visual consciousness is not produced by these causes such as the
intention and so on. The particular aspects such as the mental nature, the
endowment with the features of the object and so on are produced individually,
but the one who possesses these aspects, the visual consciousness itself, has
no cause and is therefore not produced by anything.
You might respond by saying that the apprehension of the
object and the other aspects are not separate, in the sense that they are
nothing other than consciousness. But then it would be meaningless to call this
“several causes producing several effects”. It becomes “several causes
producing a single effect”, and the problems involved in such an assertion,
i.e. because one and many are uncaused, things must be either permanently
existent or non-existent, have been explained above.
You may think that there is still no fault because the
aspects and the possessor of these aspects are of the same essential identity,
and only labelled as separate based on conceptual distinctions. In that case,
the causes such as attention, would perform their function for the conceptual
distinctions, the imputed phenomena such as the mental nature and so on, but
the substantially existent consciousness itself would not be produced by any
cause, and so consciousness would be causeless.
If you claim that the essential identity of the effect is
one, but its aspects are multiple, then this leads to the fault of the
qualities being separate from that which possesses them.
You might consider that the single cause of a blue flower
produces several effects, such as that flower’s own subsequent ‘similar type’
and the visual consciousness of sentient beings, for example. The question is:
does that cause, i.e., the flower, perform this production by itself
exclusively, without relying on any other factors, or is it done together with
other assisting factors, such as the faculties? In the first case of production
by itself alone, since it would not be able to produce a plurality, this
implies causeless production. Similarly, since one cause also can not perform
the function of producing one effect, then it follows that the single and the
multiple must both lack causes, and once again there is the fault of production
occurring without any cause, as explained above.
If the object, like the blue [flower], produces the visual
consciousness in dependence on other causes, such as the appearance, sense
faculty, attention and so on, and you say that it has been produced by other
causes as well, the result will cease to be singular, because it will possess
several features or qualities that have been produced by the various causes,
such as the object, faculty and attention.
Then, it might be said that a single cause only produces its
own single result. If that were the case, then since a cause such as the eye
faculty could only produce the result of its own subsequent ‘resemblance’, and
could never perform the function of producing anything else, such as a visual
consciousness directly apprehending an object, there would be no cause for
beings’ visual or audial consciousnesses and so on, and so these effects would
be impossible, with the absurd consequence that everyone would be deaf and
blind.
As it says in the Two Truths of the Middle Way [by
Jñānagarbha]:
Several things do not produce just one thing,
And many things do not create a multiplicity.
One thing is not produced by many things.
And from a single thing, a single thing is not produced.[3]
This was stated in accordance with such reasoning.
Moreover, other arguments might be given in response to one
who asserts that several causes, such as the appearance, faculty and attention,
give rise to a single result, such as visual cognition. [For example,] even if
it is granted that the resultant eye consciousness does not have several
qualities and is singular, it is impossible for any knowable phenomenon to be
truly singular, as in the case of a visual consciousness devoid of its
accompanying mental states, such as the ever-present states and so on.
You might think that many causes produce many effects, but
then since it would be impossible for several causes to produce only a single
effect, it would be quite meaningless to speak of a gathering of several
causes. When singular phenomena cannot be established, the ‘many’ that they go
together to produce will not be established either, and will not exist.
The assertion that one cause produces several effects is
also unsound, since it presupposes a single cause that cannot be divided into
parts, and this is impossible. It can be seen that a single cause such as a
seed would be incapable of producing its effect, the sprout, without relying
upon other conditions, such as earth, water, warmth, time and so on.
It is also not the case that a single cause gives rise to a
single effect, since this is contrary to direct experience, namely the
successive production of a variety of effects like the sprout, the flower, the
fruit and so on, from a variety of causes and conditions such as the seed,
water, fertilizer, heat, moisture and so on.
Therefore, when thoroughly examining, a truly singular
phenomenon that lacks a plurality of features or qualities cannot be
established at all, whether as a causal or resultant entity. And without any
such singular phenomenon, then the plural too, which must necessarily be
composed of the singular, must also be non-existent.
Nevertheless, in the case of a thing such as a sprout, even
though it consists of several parts such as its colour and shape and so on,
they are still labelled as one thing, i.e. a sprout, based on their similarity
of type and so forth. And also in the case of a single phenomenon such as a
particle, when dividing it according to its features, such as substance and
direction, it is labelled as multiple. Yet it is simply through the power of
dependent origination or ‘dependent definition’, that these are conventionally
designated as causes and effects. When analyzing with ultimate reasoning, they
cannot be established according to any of these four alternatives of single,
multiple, etc., and therefore since these conventional entities do not
withstand investigation, they should be understood to be just like the
appearances during a dream.
Although this reasoning is sometimes called “the
investigation of both the cause and the effect: refuting production according
to the four alternatives” thus giving a total of five great logical
arguments—and ultimately there is no real contradiction in explaining it that
way—it seems reasonable to include it within the category of investigation of
the cause, so that there are a total of four great logical arguments.
There are also other arguments which investigate the cause,
effect and identity, such as, for example, the division into the three times of
past, present and future, i.e., the result that was produced in the past has
already arisen and has now ceased, so it is not produced. The result of the
future has not yet arisen in the present, and so it is not produced. And
finally, the present result has already been established as its own identity
and so it would be meaningless for it to be produced again.
2. The Investigation of the Result:
Refutation of Existent or Non-Existent Production
This is divided into an actual explanation and elimination
of doubts.
i. Actual Explanation
Regarding the effect that is produced, if one examines
whether it is an existent effect that arises or a non-existent one, or one that
is both or neither, the Introduction to the Middle Way says:
If it is something existent, what need is there for its
production? But if it does not exist, what could be done to it?
If it is both [existent and non-existent], what can be done?
And if neither, what can be done?
If you consider that the result to be produced is something
existent which develops, this is unreasonable. Why? If it is existent, then it
must exist having already established to its own identity as a sprout and so
on, and being existent, it would be unnecessary for it to be produced anew. It
is just like a grain of barley, which, having ripened once, does not need to
ripen all over again. If something already existent still needed to be produced
then that would lead to the fault of production continuing ad infinitum.
“Well then,” you might think, “It is something non-existent
that is produced.” But in that case, it would be impossible to produce. For
example, even if someone were to go to great lengths to assemble hundreds of
causes and conditions, they would still never be able to produce the
non-existent horns on the head of a rabbit.
You might think that the effect, such as the sprout, was
formerly non-existent, but is made anew into something existent by the causes
such as the seed. It is not so. Since existent and non-existent are mutually
contradictory, they could never combine on the basis of a single entity. In
terms of actual entities, there are no phenomena whatsoever that were formerly
non-existent, and later changed into something existent. Causes and conditions
could not transform unconditioned space, for example, into the identity of a
conditioned, existent phenomenon.
Thus, simply on a conventional level, effects appear based
on causes. Formerly, prior to the gathering of their causes and conditions,
they did not appear, and now, when the causes and conditions are assembled,
they do. The mind relates these two stages to one another, and then there is
the merely conceptual statement, “This did not exist before, but now it is
arising!”
Similarly, one mentally relates earlier and later occasions
and, in relation to a given phenomenon, thinks, “This existed previously, and
then it did not exist.”
Thus, the phenomena that are conventional entities simply
appear by the force of dependent origination, and in reality there are no
existent phenomena whatsoever that transform into non-existent ones, and there
are no non-existent phenomena that transform into existent ones.
It is similar in the case of conditioned formations arising
anew and finally ceasing, or the continua of ‘similar type’ remaining and not
remaining, the perception of an existent self of the individual or phenomena
and the perception of no-self. The explanation is similar to that given in the
case of existent and non-existent phenomena. They are all merely appearances on
the conventional, relative level, and ultimately, they are empty of their own
essential identity. At the level of the genuine nature of things, there is no
observation of any features such as the transformation of something existent
into something non-existent or non-existent into existent, of any going or
coming, arising or ceasing, increasing or decreasing.
ii. Eliminating Doubts
You might wonder how it is that production of results should
be asserted, given that neither existent nor non-existent effects are produced,
and that, aside from these two, no third mode of production is possible. It is
asserted that the arising of effects is nothing other than the undeceiving
appearance of dependent origination, and when analyzed as to whether it is
existent or non-existent, it is not established in any way whatsoever, but is
just like the example of a magical illusion and so on.
It is impossible for a knowable phenomenon to be both
existent and non-existent since these two are directly opposed to one another.
And it is also impossible for a phenomenon to be neither existent nor non-existent,
because it is impossible for there to be some third option in between these two
directly opposed positions.
“Well then,” you might think, “just as it is impossible here
to have the option of neither, there can not be this option of ‘neither’ in the
context of freedom from conceptual elaboration of the four extremes, such as
existing, not existing and so on.” And, you might think, “Just as in the
assertion made without specifying ‘not existent and not non-existent’, it is
impossible for there to be a third option between direct opposites, so the
natural state can be understood through the two negations, and there is nothing
meaningful in defining what ‘nothing whatsoever’ means. Thus, apart from the
rather deceitful position of asserting nothing at all, our own tradition does
not make any kind of definite statement about how things are.” This might be
how spiritually immature beginners think it is, but it is not like that at all.
As long as one still maintains a basis for conceptual
reference, there can not possibly be an apprehension that does away with the
four extremes altogether. Therefore, whatever assertions are made by applying
particular distinctions—like saying, “There is no snake in this house, but
there is a vase”—they are conceptual references involving particular conceptual
ideas, and so they are not beyond the realms of ordinary conceptual thought. In
the actual state of simplicity, in which all conceptual focus has subsided,
there are no assertions or conceptual references whatsoever with regard to the
four extremes. Even so, it is quite unlike the dull confusion of not having
realized ultimate reality, or a state of unconsciousness. It is a state
difficult to express by words or through examples, that is—as it says in
Rāhula’s _Praise to the Great Mother Prajñāpāramitā_—beyond words, beyond
thought and beyond description. It is simplicity that is discerned by means of
one’s own individual awareness, in which all doubts have been cut through: a
non-conceptual primordial awareness free from dualistic perceptions, but
naturally luminous like the shining sun.
3. Investigation of the Essential
Identity: ‘Neither One Nor Many’
To begin with, there is an analysis of the essential
identity of all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena to determine whether or
not there is true singularity. In the case of those conditioned phenomena of
the five aggregates possessing physical form, there is a division into above,
below, the cardinal and intermediate directions and the centre. Through this,
it can be seen that, for something such as a vase, singularity is simply a
conceptual notion applied to the various features that are the basis for such
an imputation. True singularity is not established, and the same applies in the
case of its component parts. The body and the limbs are also divided into parts
in the same way.
In short, all that possesses physical form and is composed
of material particles may be broken down to its basis, which is the infinitely
small particle. And, according to the logic explained before, for that most
subtle particle to be surrounded by particles in the various directions, it
must have sides, which means it must have parts, and so on, in an infinite
regression. If not, then however many subtle particles are gathered together,
they could never grow any larger. Thus, all phenomena with material form lack
true singularity.
In addition, the eight or the six collections of
consciousness can not be established as truly singular since they consist of
various cognitive acts and mental states, take various features as their focus,
and arise in different forms from the gathering of the four conditions, and
then cease.
By analyzing everything that has the nature of arising and
ceasing deriving from its own causes, even the subtlemost indivisible moment
can not be established, and so all phenomena included within mind and matter
lack any true singularity. As for non-concurrent formations, they are simply
imputations made upon the ‘occasion’ of mind and matter, and so they lack any
essential identity. Unconditioned phenomena are imputations made with regard to
the eliminated aspects of objects of negation, and are also lacking in any
essential identity.
In short, all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena can
not be shown to have any true singularity, and since this is not established,
plurality that is made up of what is singular must also remain unestablished.
And so, since there is no mode of true existence aside from being truly
singular or plural, it must follow that individuals and phenomena are proven to
be without inherent identity, just as it is explained more elaborately in The
Ornament of the Middle Way.
4. Analysis of All: The Logical
Argument of Great Interdependence
All phenomena do not come into being through their own
inherent identity, but as a result of the coming together of causes and
conditions, and when there are no conditions they do not arise. Even at the time
when they appear, they appear whilst lacking any inherent existence, since they
are like reflections, brought about by causes and conditions. Free from any
conceptual elaborations such as being permanent or non-existent, going or
coming, arising or ceasing or being one or many, they appear whilst lacking
true reality.
When evaluating in this way, using reasoning investigating
the ultimate in accordance with the actual nature of things, they are found to
be mere unfailing dependent arising. Otherwise, if they were truly established
in any way, such as arising according to the four extremes or four
alternatives, or being existent or non-existent, or permanent or impermanent
etc., then that would be inappropriate as an explanation for the conventional,
and would result in a deprecation of all conventions.
According to the Middle Way tradition, for whom the unreal
illusory appearances of dependent origination and emptiness arise in the same
reality, all the conventions of mere appearance are extremely reasonable. This
being so, the conventions of the world, as well as the supermundane conventions
of the Four Truths, Three Jewels and so on, are all perfectly established.
This king of reasonings, the Great Interdependence, includes
all the other types of ultimate logic, such as the Diamond Splinter and so on,
because they are all concerned with the seemingly real, unexamined appearances
of dependent origination. When analyzed, no causes, effects or essential
identities whatsoever can be established. The extensive variations of this
logic that investigates the meaning of dependent origination are to be found in
The Root Verses of the Middle Way and elsewhere.
Conclusion
Therefore, at the relative level, cause, effect and inherent
identity appear in that way, and are labelled with such conventions.
Ultimately, causes, effects and inherent identities lack any true nature, being
emptiness with the identity of the three doors of liberation. The emptiness in
which the two truths are inseparably united like this is the dharmadhātu, the
object to be realized through the path of the Middle Way. It is the supreme of
all that might be realized, the ‘mother’ of the victorious buddhas and their
heirs.
This point concerning equalness in which the truths of
appearance and emptiness are indivisible is just like the sphere of space, and
is beyond the realm of conceptual thought, unimaginable and inexpressible, yet
with non-conceptual wisdom, it can be meditated in the manner of pure
self-knowing awareness. During the post-meditation phase, one has the confident
certainty that all things appear yet lack true reality, just like the examples
of a magical illusion, dream, reflection, magical creations and so on. And,
with the wisdom that thoroughly discerns the two truths, one is brought to an
undeluded realization concerning all the categories of the ground, path and
fruition.
Through comprehending the meaning of emptiness in this way,
all the enlightened qualities of the path and fruition of the Great Vehicle
will arise.
Taken from Mipham Rinpoche’s Gateway to Learning (mKhas
'jug), with supplementary material from Khenpo Nüden’s commentary.
| Translated and edited by Adam Pearcey, 2005.
- i.e., earlier in the text of the mKhas 'jug. See Gateway to Knowledge, Vol I, Rangjung Yeshe Publications, 1997, pp. 64-5. ↩
- The eight extremes are: arising, ceasing, permanence, non-existence, coming, going, plurality and singularity. ↩
- This is verse 14 of the text. Khenpo Nüden gives the quote with the lines in a slightly different order, but I have followed the original. ↩