Also see: How should we understand Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra?
Andre shared in atr group:
John Tan:
I believe this is from khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche? But it is neither the view of Longchenpa nor Mipham nor the founder of Nyingma Nubchen Sangye Yeshe. I supposed u have read enough of Malcolm conversations in dharmawheel abt Shentong and Rangtong and difference between Shentong and Dzogchen 😜.
Soh:
yeah longchenpa doesn't agree with shentong but he accepts tathagatagarbha as definitive
Malcolm: It also explains why, for example, Longchenpa is not a gzhan stong pa. He considers tathāgatagarbha definitive, but places the teaching of the three natures within Yogacara and never uses them to explicate the meaning of the tathāgatagarba, since they are not necessary. There is no discussion of these in the Uttaratantra, per se. The Yogacara masters were not that interested in tathagatagarbha, quite frankly.
John Lane wrote in AtR group:
IN WHAT WAY DOES THE BOOK ALIGN ANATTA INSIGHT AND DZOGCHEN CLEARLY? (John Tan quote in the OP)
In
this book (The Philosophical Foundations ……................) all
mention of the words “anātma” and “no self” in the text, are in the
section titled “Klong chen pa's Hermeneutics of The 3 Turnings” (pages
266-268)
In
that section of the book, Longchenpa (Klong chen pa) regards “no self'
(anātma) and 'emptiness' (sūnyatā)” as “merely correctives to [the
beliefs in a] self and non-emptiness” and “are not of definitive
meaning.” and after they have been used to undermine the reification of
selves and things, they (themselves being reifications) must subside for
“spontaneously present unfabricated buddha nature (understood as
self-occurring primordial knowing replete with inborn qualities) to come
to the fore”
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
KLONG CHEN PA’S HERMENEUTICS OF THE 3 TURNINGS (pages 266-268)
Given
Klong chen pa's emphasis on the primacy of primordial knowing and his
construal of the path as the clearing of what obscures it, it is not
surprising that in his interpretation of the so-called three turnings of
the wheel of the dharma (dharmacakra), the meditative practices, of
de-identification formulated in second turning teachings, on emptiness
and no self are considered to be of merely provisional meaning (drang
don) or in need of further interpretation. On the other hand, those
third turning teachings that emphasize one's natural condition (yin
lugs), primordial knowing, buddha nature are taken as definitive (nges
don). In his Sems nyid ngal gso 'grel, Klong chen pa outlines his
position on the three turnings:
Those
who put on false airs and who are blind-folded by the golden veil of
wrong views tum their back on the intended meanings of sūtras and
tantras that are of definitive meaning. They declare that what is of
quintessential meaning is of provisional meaning and that the main
import [of the teachings] is that the 'effect' [goal-realization] occurs
only if one trains in its 'causes'. Hey handsome one, wearing your
lotus garland, you truly do not understand the intentions that were
conveyed in the three turnings of the buddha-word. You are certainly
attached to the extreme of emptiness! In this regard, the first turning
of the buddha-word was intended for those who were neophytes and who
were of lower capacity. Thus in order to have them tum away from samsāra
by taking the four truths in terms of things to be be abandoned
[suffering and its cause] and their antidotes [the cessation of
suffering and the path], [the first turning] was a skilful means for
them to gain complete liberation from what is to be abandoned.
The
middle [turning] was intended for those who had thoroughly cleared away
[these impediments] and who were of medium capacity. Thus it taught
sky-like emptiness together with the eight examples (used to illustrate
the emptiness of all phenomena: dream, magical illusion, reflected
image, mirage, moon's reflection on water, echo, Gandharva city and
apparition. Note 653) as skilful means to free them from the fetter of
becoming attached to these antidotes . The final [turning] for the sake
of those who had reached fulfilment and who were of sharpest capacity
taught the nature of all that is knowable, as it really is. As such, it
bears no similarity to the self (ātman) of the Hindu heretics because
(a) these people in their ignorance speak of a "self' that does not
actually exist, being a mere imputation superimposed on reality; (b)
they take it as something measurable; and (c) they do not accept it is a
quality of spiritual embodiment and primordial knowing (sku dang ye
shes). But even this preoccupation with 'no self' (anātma) and
'emptiness' (sūnyatā) [concerns what are] merely correctives to [the
beliefs in a] self and non-emptiness but which are not of definitive
meaning. –Sems nyid ngal gso 'grel vol.I 329 f.
Indian
and Tibetan theories of the three dharmacakras reflect varying attempts
to hierarchically distinguish stages of the Buddha's teachings in line
with corresponding levels of intellectual-spiritual acumen and
maturation in his audience. Klong chen pa's interpretation of the three
turnings regards the first two turnings as remedial steps intended to
clear the way for an undistorted understanding of one's natural
condition. On this account, the Buddhist emptiness and no self doctrines
were initially formulated within a religio-philosophical climate rife
with speculations concerning the existence of a creator God, permanent
true self or selves and an unknowable absolute reality. Against this
background, the Buddha's discourses concerning anātma (no self) and
sūnyatā (emptiness) were offered as corrective measures with the express
aim of invalidating and eliminating wrong views and extreme
conclusions, particularly those based on the proclivity to take things
as enduring and independently existing.
The
doctrine of 'no self' was expounded both as 1) a sectarian critique of
various Hindu and Jain beliefs in a self - i.e. beliefs that there is a
permanent, singular, self-sufficient individuating principle that
underlies and anchors the swirling flux of experience and survives
death, and 2) as a psychological account of how the coarser elements of
our 'sense of self' - those rooted in the sense we have of being a
psychic unity that transcends actual experience - constitute
fabrications or superimpositions added to our most basic experience of
things and beings around us. The doctrinal belief in self can be seen to
depend on the psychological sense of self; and both are undermined by
realizing that things and persons lack any inherent independent nature.
Now
the target of Klong chen pa's critique of reificationism is not only
the first order reification of 'selves' (viz. identities of things and
persons) but also the second order reifications of those very means
(e.g. teachings on emptiness, no self) used to undermine first order
reifications. The point being that spontaneously present unfabricated
buddha nature – understood as self-occurring primordial knowing replete
with inborn qualities - comes to the fore only to the extent that all
such reifications have subsided. So, far from being comparable to the
ontologized self of Hindu and Jain speculations, buddha nature is
precisely what remains when dualistic superimpositions, especially the
habitual sense of a self anchoring our everyday experiences, subsides.
Buddha nature is the indivisibility of awareness and its expanse
(dbyings dang ye shes 'du bral med pa) and of clarity and emptiness
(snang stong dbyer med).
In
sum, the Sems ye dris lan 's clear and concise formulation of what
would become an increasingly central focus of the author's later works -
the distinction between conditioned and unconditioned modes of being
and awareness (sems versus ye shes) - and his attempt to show its
affiliation with major currents of Buddhist thought make this text an
indispensable source for understanding the development of this
distinction and its place in classical rNying ma thought.
—Klong chen pa's Hermeneutics of The 3 Turnings (Pages 266-268)
John Tan:
Tathagatagarbha has always been accepted as definitive, just the interpretation.
Soh: [pasting more]
Soh Wei YuAuthor
Admin
Longchenpa’s definition of buddha nature as the union of emptiness and clarity and rejection of non buddhist views is consistent with what I have said above about the provisional vs definitive meaning of buddha nature.
Also, Malcolm wrote before:
“In general, it (Soh: Mahaparinirvana Sutra) should be considered provisional even by Longchenpa since it contains the doctrine of the icchantika. It is also considered provisional because it uses intentional language to discuss a self, permanence, and so on.
What Longchenpa holds to be definitive is the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha, but there are some problems if we take the whole of those ten sūtras to be "definitive."
Then of course, there is the issue of whether the tathāgatagarbha doctrine is actually definitive. Arguably, the Uttaratantra itself holds the tathāgatagarbha doctrine to be provisional.”
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· 1w
Soh Wei YuAuthor
Admin
Malcolm also wrote:
“They are for Gorampa as well, providing tathāgatagarbha is properly understood. But if for example the nine examples are not correctly understood, he states the TTG sūtras are provisional.
Also, the reason Longchenpa claims the TTG sūtras are definitive has to do with how he understands them in relation to Dzogchen. He also defines Prasanga Madhyamaka as the definitive view.
In general, however, the Buddha himself declares the tathāgatagarbha doctrine provisional, that is interpretable, in the Lanka Sūtra.”
· Reply
· 1w
Soh Wei YuAuthor
Admin
Malcolm:
“Longchenpa had no problem reconciling Prasanga Madhyamaka, which he maintains is the definitive view, with tathāgatagarbha sūtras, which he maintains are the definitive sūtras. Likewise Gorampa asserts that properly understood the tathāgatagarbha doctrine is definitive and does not contradict Madhyamaka, but wrongly understood leads to a wrong view. Thus, these are not examples of squeezing tathāgatagarbha into Madhyamaka, if anyone is doing any squeezing, it is the gzhan stong pas who try to squeeze Madhyamaka, Yogacāra and tathātagatagarbha all into the same box, without much success, frankly.”
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· 1w
....
Acarya Malcolm Smith:
"The term bdag nyid, atman, just means, in this case, "nature", i.e. referring to the nature of reality free from extremes as being permanent, blissful, pure and self. The luminosity of the mind is understood to be this.
There are various ways to interpret the Uttaratantra and tathāgatagarbha doctrine, one way is definitive in meaning, the other is provisional, according to Gorampa Sonam Senge, thus the tathāgatagarbha sutras become definitive or provisional depending on how they are understood. He states:
In the context of showing the faults of a literal [interpretation] – it's equivalence with the Non-Buddhist Self is that the assertion of unique eternal all pervading cognizing awareness of the Saṃkhya, the unique eternal pristine clarity of the Pashupattis, the unique all pervading intellect of the Vaiśnavas, the impermanent condition, the measure of one’s body, in the permanent self-nature of the Jains, and the white, brilliant, shining pellet the size of an atom, existing in each individual’s heart of the Vedantins are the same.
The definitive interpretation he renders as follows:
Therefor, the Sugatagarbha is defined as the union of clarity and emptiness but not simply emptiness without clarity, because that [kind of emptiness] is not suitable to be a basis for bondage and liberation. Also it is not simple clarity without emptiness, that is the conditioned part, because the Sugatagarbha is taught as unconditioned.
Khyentse Wangpo, often cited as a gzhan stong pa, basically says that the treatises of Maitreya elucidate the luminosity of the mind, i.e. its purity, whereas Nāgarjuna's treatises illustrate the empty nature of the mind, and that these two together, luminosity and emptiness free from extremes are to be understood as noncontradictory, which we can understand from the famous Prajñāpāramita citation "There is no mind in the mind, the nature of the mind is luminosity"."
i think Tsongkhapa treats it as provisional
but most understand it to be either provisional or definitive depending on how it is understood
shentong also seems to have many interpreters.. when thrangu rinpoche explained shentong, he emphasized empty nature of luminosity although there are qualities. so i dont find his explanation any way veering into extremes. but when i look at the originator Dolpopa, i cant differentiate his teachings from advaita 😂
i havent read very indepth into tsultrim gyamptso writings but i dont think he holds substantialist view either
John Tan:
Tsongkhapa has different definition with regards to perception and therefore context is different. He doesn't accept pure perception of dharmakirti and dignaga and therefore all phenomena dependent originate. U see many like to say Tsongkhapa doesn't know freedom from all elaborations and started talking about this and that, do u think this is possible? Tsongkhapa is an accomplished yogi and scholar. His thoughts r very deep and profound so don't make comments that u don't understand and when u din read enough about him.
Soh:
oic.. yeah i think even malcolm has a more respectful tone about tsongkhapa these days
"
You seem to really get off on relating stories about teachers and their unconventional conduct.
I prefer stories about truly great beings like Sapan, Longchenpa, Ngorchen, Tsongkhapa, etc. "
"
Tsongkhapa is a wonderful teacher, but you should not imagine that his presentation is by any means the definitive one. It is not even the definitive one in Geluk, since there are many different trends in Geluk, and not even all famous Geluk scholars agree with everything Tsongkhapa wrote.
"
" Tsongkhapa was a nonsectarian master. And there are many others in the history of the Geluk schools. Indeed, in Geluk, rivalry amongst different colleges was far more intense than extra-sectarian impulses."
" Consciousness is a dependently arising dharma. So not, it does not ultimately exist.
..
Whatever is dependently originated, that is empty, that is dependently designated, and that is the middle way.
That which arises dependently is free from the extremes of permanence and annihilation. You might try reading Tsongkhapa's Praise to Dependent Origination. Many people consider it Tsongkhapa's final statement on his realization of emptiness. "
" Tsongkhapa’s approach to Madhyamaka is ok, it just has some holes, and one of those is the monopole negation. No Gelugpa has ever successfully rebutted Gorampa’s critique of Tsongkhapa’s novelties, but we’ve had this discussion before. And Tsongkhapa has even been challenged within his own school.
Mipham largely bases his arguments on Gorampa.
"
John Tan:
In Ocean of Reasoning, Tsongkhapa clearly talk about freedom of extremes and freedom from all elaborations.
Gorampa is very fierce in his criticisms about Tsongkhapa as if he was in the same period but they never met. Gorampa was borned like 20 years after Tsongkhapa's death.
For freedom from all elaborations, yes Mipham largely based his arguments on Gorampa. But Gorampa din mention abt appearances as far as I know that Mipham emphasized a lot, Mipham thought is very much influenced by Rongzom, in fact he self claimed as Rongzom disciple.🤣
Soh:
ic... yeah Rongzom sounds very resonating for those who go through anatta
John Tan:
Indeed. 👍
André A. PaisYes,
shentong comes in different flavors. Tsultrim Rinpoche seems to follow
the doxography of views held by Jamgön Kongtrul, which was seemingly a
shentongpa in the strong sense of the word. Rinpoche does not seem to
have reifying views, and even Dolpopa might have had something in mind
when he said what he said. He was presenting the description of the
meditative state, not stating a philosophical view.
Generally
(or at least sometimes) Longchenpa is considered a shentongpa, and even
Mipham has written a text proclaiming the lion's roar of extrinsic
emptiness (apparently because one of his teachers [Kongtrul?] has asked
him).
More than tenet systems, we should discuss tenets.
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Soh Wei YuI wonder on what basis is Longchenpa deemed as Shentongpa?
I am aware of this, and I find no solid backing for Kongtrul's views regarding Longchenpa in particular.
As
for Rangjung Dorje, he had an interesting approach to the three
natures, but I don't really see how his writings show the same approach
to the three natures as Dolbupa's and Tshan Khawoche. He also never uses
the term 'gzhan stong" himself. The fact that in a 16th century
commentary on the zab mo nang don one can read a defense of the Karmapa
III as being a gzhan stong pa merely shows that this appellation is
subject to doubt since it is not clear in his own writings.
No, it is not an affirming negation, since Longchenpa states:
...intrinsic awareness and everything that arises within it are free from all extremes
There cannot be something free from extremes.
Dolbupa's
great middle way avoids extremes precisely in reverse of the way
Tsongkhapa has it. For him freedom from extremes is arrived at in the
following way. He tries to avoid eternalism by asserting that relative
phenomena are never held to exist more than conventionally, being
intrinsically empty; and he tries to avoid nihilism by asserting that
ultimate phenomena are held to have always existed, being extrinsically
empty.
Here,
what Longchenpa is referring to is the standard four fold negation of
the extremes found every in sūtra on up to to the Dzogchen tantras, like
the Realms and Dimensions of Sound Tantra [sgra thal 'gyur]:
The amazing, miraculous pristine consciousness
did not exist before, does not exist later, has not existed from the start;
is at present beyond all conceptual objects,
having the nature of the emptiness that is free from extremes.
Yes,
this is indeed Kongtrul's opinion, no one disputed that this was his
opinion. What is under dispute is whether his opinion about Longchenpa
is correct. I don't think that it is, and I think there is ample
internal evidence in Longchenpa's writings that he was not a gzhan stong
pa. As we have already seen, he identifies Candrakirtī has the one who
holds the definitive view of Madhyamaka on page 798 of the grub mtha'
mdzod. He declares on pg. 821, in the section devoted to explicating
Candrakīrti's perspective:
This principle is the pinnacle of all views of the vehicle of causal characteristics.
It
is simply inconsistent to maintain that someone who clearly articulates
that the pinnacle of cause vehicles views is Prasangika belongs to the
gzhan stong persuasion. Longchenpa does state on page 900 that:
In
response to including the needs of those of lower intelligence, this
garbha is empty because it is empty of faults, conditioning and so on,
but it is not an emptiness that discards the phenomena of its qualities,
as already mentioned:
The characteristic of distinction is
is that the element is empty of the temporary [afflictions],
the characteristic of the absence of distinction
is not being empty of unsurpassed phenomena.
The
pure element that has the nature of the limit of reality is
unconditioned like space. The happiness and suffering of samsara
(supported on karma and affliction) appear like clouds. Moreover, the
suffering because of improper afflicted mental activity is like a cloud.
Since karma appears without any nature, it is like the aspect of a
dream. The aggregates generated by karma and affliction are explained to
be like illusions and clouds to remedy the grasping to one extreme of
clinging to self. After that, since there arise five faults of clinging
to the reifications of grasping to extremes in emptiness, in order to
remove that, the tathagātagarba is explained...."
But
frankly, the above statement by Longchenpa is simply not sufficient to
place him in the gzhan stong camp, especially with reference to his
declaration of the definitive Mahāyana view above, and in light of the
fact that he clearly indicates the purpose of the tathagatagarbha view
is to make the Mahāyāna path acceptable to those of lesser intelligence.
Soh Wei Yutreehuggingoctopus wrote:
Have
you read Stearns' book on Dolpopa, Malcolm? If Stearns is correct
(i.e., if his translations of Dolpopa are accurate), then Dolpopa's
version of gzhan-stong is indeed quite incompatible with Dzogchen -- but
for entirely different reasons that the supposed inherent existence of
intrinsic Buddha qualities:
Stearns' Dolpopa, in Buddha from Dolpo, 103 wrote:
Buddhahood
is stated to be the buddha-body of gnosis, and the incidental
impurities are stated to be the groups of consciousness. In that way
gnosis and consciousness are stated to be extremely different, like
light and dark, or nectar and poison. Nevertheless, the differentiation
of those two is very rare. These days the majority maintains that this
very mind-as-such is the buddha-body of reality, self-arisen gnosis, and
the Great Seal, and many maintain that concepts are the buddha-body of
reality, the afflicting emotions are gnosis, samsara and nirvana are
indivisible, these appearances and sounds are the three buddha-bodies or
the four buddha-bodies, and so forth.
Stearns' commentary is as follows:
Stearns, Buddha from Dolpo, 104 wrote:
For
Dolpopa appearances cannot be the manifestation or self-presencing of
gnosis (ye shes rang snang), or the buddha-body of reality, because
ordinary appearances are completely fictitious, imaginary (parikalpita)
and dependent (paratantra) phenomena, which are both actually
nonexistent. The fully established true nature (parinispanna), nondual
gnosis, the buddha-body of reality, and so forth, are real and existent.
That
would indeed make gzhan-stong starkly different from Dzogchen. But the
rest of the passage expresses the same understanding that Hookham
champions:
"The
fully established true nature (parinispanna), nondual gnosis, the
buddha-body of reality, and so forth, are real and existent."
Which means that the ten powers and so on are fully developed within sentient beings at present.
According
to Dolbupa. And it is for this reason that ChNN has explained many
times that gzhan stong view is not actually compatible with Dzogchen.
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Nafis RahmanI
thought Andre’s view was Prasangika rather than Shentong? I read the
book above a while back, he [KTGR] says Prasangika is nihilistic and
that Shentong is the ultimate view, although his presentation had a
subtle reification in my opinion. As Malcolm once shared: I once forced
Khenpo Tsultrim Gyatso to admit (I have a witness, incidentally) that
there was no substantial difference between Advaita Vedanta and Gzhan
stong in terms of how they presented their view. His only response was a
sectarian polemic "But there is no buddhahood in Vedanta!"
Even
among Kagyu’s, Shentong isn’t a universal position. From a review of
The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition by Karl
Brunnholzl (have to thank Andre for the recommendation, very
comprehensive book on Kagya Madhyamaka plus Karl Brunnholzl is also a
student of KTGR although he is intellectually honest and believes
Shentong is more similar to Yogacara rather than Madhyamaka):
Several
Kagyu figures disagree with the view that shentong is a form of
madhyamaka. According to Brunnholzl, Mikyö Dorje, 8th Karmapa Lama
(1507–1554) and Second Pawo Rinpoche Tsugla Trengwa see the term
"shentong madhyamaka" as a misnomer, for them the yogacara of Asanga and
Vasubandhu and the system of Nagarjuna are "two clearly distinguished
systems". They also refute the idea that there is "a permanent,
intrinsically existing Buddha nature".
Mikyö
Dorje also argues that the language of other emptiness does not appear
in any of the sutras or the treatises of the Indian masters. He attacks
the view of Dolpopa as being against the sutras of ultimate meaning
which state that all phenomena are emptiness as well as being against
the treatises of the Indian masters. Mikyö Dorje rejects both
perspectives of rangtong and shentong as true descriptions of ultimate
reality, which he sees as being "the utter peace of all discursiveness
regarding being empty and not being empty" (me: basically freedom from
extremes).
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Nafis RahmanIs There Such a Thing as Shentong-Madhyamaka?
MOST
PEOPLE THINK that, in terms of its Madhyamaka alignment, the Kagyu
school is a monolithic bloc of staunch supporters of Shentong-Madhyamaka
("other-empty Madhyamaka"). However, as should be clear by now, there
are quite a number of masters in this school who do not follow what is
known as Shentong. Even Milarepa sometimes adopts a typical Rangtong
("self-empty") approach in his enlightened songs. Still, the reader may
be wondering why a book on Madhyamaka in the Kagyu lineage has thus far
barely mentioned the term "Shentong," much less presented the system it
refers to. The answer is simple and may be shocking to some: There is no
Shentong-Madhyamaka nor any need to make one up. The subdivision of
Madhyamaka into "self-empty" and "other-empty" is obsolete.
Before
I am excommunicated from the Kagyu lineage for making this statement,
let me say that I am just going by what the Eighth Karmapa and Pawo
Rinpoche say in The Chariot of the Tagbo Siddhas and The Commentary on
The Entrance to the Bodhisattvas Way of Life. I also want to make it
clear from the outset that the reason for such a statement is not at all
to deprecate the contents or the value of the teachings that came to
bear the name Shentong in Tibet. Rather, the reason is quite the
contrary, since what is called Shentong is nothing other than the
Yogacara (Yoga Practice) system of Maitreya, Asanga, and Vasubandhu,
also called "the lineage of vast activity." Just like Centrism, in its
rich entirety, this system is a distinct, well-established, and-at least
in India unequivocally renowned system of presenting the teachings of
the Buddha. It can stand very well on its own and has no need to be
included under Centrism or even to be promoted as the better brand of
Centrism. It is all the more inappropriate to wrongly subsume it-as many
Tibetan doxographies do-under the questionable category of "Mere
Mentalism" and thus regard it as inferior to Centrism. It would
definitely contribute to the appreciation of this Yogacara system for
what it is if it were called neither Mere Mentalism nor Shentong but
simply "the Yogacara System of Maitreya/Asanga" or "the lineage of vast
activity." The following presentation will provide sufficient evidence
for this by high lighting some essential points of Yogacara in the
original texts, consulting the main Kagya sources on both Centrism and
Yogacara, and comparing the relationship between these two systems.'"
As
for the question of whether there is a Shentong-Madhyamaka, both the
Eighth Karmapa and Pawo Rinpoche give a very clear answer: "No!" They
not only refute any realistic interpretation of what the word shentong
might refer to, such as the notion of a permanent, intrinsically
existing Buddha nature;"- they simply consider this term a misnomer
altogether. At the same time, the two systems of Nagarjuna-the lineage
of profound view-and Asanga-the lineage of vast activity (to which the
term "Shentong" usually refers) are clearly distinguished. When
questioned, The Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche confirmed that it is indeed
better to make a distinction in terms of the lineages of profound view
and vast conduct than between some lineages of "Rangtong" and
"Shentong," since the former two are the clear lineages of transmission
that can be traced back to India. Pawo Rinpoche explicitly explains that
the final intention of these two systems is identical, while the Eighth
Karmapa in his Chariot ofthe Tagbo Siddhas does so implicitly."
Moreover, Pawo Rinpoche emphasizes that what Tibetans call "Mind Only"
or "Mere Mentalism" is not the lineage of vast activity.
In
his Chariot commentary, the Eighth Karmapa says that, in general, there
is no difference between Buddha Sakyamuni and Maitreya in that they are
both Buddhas. However, the sole teacher of this realm of Buddha
activity who appears as the Supreme Emanation Body of a perfect Buddha
is Buddha Sakyamuni, and there is no dispute that he prophesied
Nagarjuna and Asanga as the founders of Centrism and Yogacara. Thus,
whoever is a Centrist in the setting of the teachings of this realm must
definitely be in accord with the Centrism of Nagarjuna and his
spiritual heirs. Imputations of different kinds of Centrism (such as one
specific to Maitreya) that do not correspond to Nagarjuna's system are
rejected by the Eighth Karmapa. He says that if there were a Centrism of
Maitreya, then it would be equally fine to present innumerable forms of
Centrism, such as the eight kinds of Centrism that were asserted by the
eight close bodhisattva sons of the Buddha and the thousand different
kinds of Centrism that are asserted by the thousand Buddhas of this
fortunate eon. Some people might object that if this newly named
Centrism of Maitreya does not fulfill the function of actual Centrism,
then the Centrism of Nagarjuna also would not fulfill this function,
because both system founders are equal in being noble bodhisattvas.
However, by using the same kind of argument, it would then also follow
that the vehicles of the hearers and solitary realizers that were taught
by the Buddha are the great vehicle, because they are equal in being
vehicles and being spoken by the Buddha.
The
Karmapa corrects another misunderstanding regarding what is called
"selfemptiness" and "other-emptiness." He says that some Tibetans assert
the absence of a nature of their own in phenomena as being the meaning
of "self-emptiness" and the absence of other phenomena as being the
meaning of "other-emptiness." This is not justified, because such an
explanation or terminology does not exist in the topics of the sutras on
emptiness. Nor is it found anywhere in the treatises of the two system
founders Nagarjuna and Asanga, whose authority in this matter rests at
least in part on the fact that they were prophesied by the Buddha as the
ones to comment on the intentions of the topics of these very sutras in
terms of Centrism and Yogacara respectively.
In
particular, the Eighth Karmapa takes issue with the position of Dolpopa
Sherab Gyaltsen, which he reports as follows: "On the level of seeming
reality, phenomena are empty of a nature of their own. Therefore, they
are self-empty. In ultimate reality, the supreme other consciousness
that is not empty of its own nature-the permanent entity of the Heart of
the Blissfully Gone Ones-is empty of all other seeming phenomena. This
is explained as `other-empty.' The Centrists who propound
other-emptiness are the Great Centrists, and the Centrists who propound
self-emptiness turn the Centrist view into something like poison.
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Nafis RahmanThe
Karmapa regards such an explanation as a deprecation of the meaning of
Prajnaparamita for several reasons. To start with, if one claims an
ultimate phenomenon that is really established and not empty of its own
nature, this contradicts the Buddha's determination of the definitive
meaning, which is that all phenomena are emptiness. In particular, this
explanation is also contradictory to all commentaries on the intention
of this definitive meaning that were given by Centrists, including
Aryavimuktisena and Haribhadra, the two main Indian commentators on the
hidden meaning of the Prajnaparamita sutras. With regard to the
emptiness of other-entity ,""'." the sutras clearly negate this
"other-emptiness" by saying, "Since it lacks any solid abiding and
ceasing, it is empty of itself." Following this, Aryavimuktisena,
Ratnakarasanti, and others say, "Since it is an emptiness that is not
produced by others, it is the emptiness of other-entity" and "Since it
is the entity that is not produced by others, it is the other-entity."
Thus, they take solely the emptiness that is natural emptiness (and not
any nonempry entity) as the basis of being empty of something other. On
the other hand, in the scriptures, there never appear any reifying
explanations in the sense that, by taking the supreme and permanent
other-entity-the Heart of the Blissfully Gone Ones-as the basis for
emptiness, this Heart is empty of all other seeming phenomena and that
this is the meaning of other-emptiness.
Before
Dolpopa, the Karmapa says, nobody in India or Tibet had ever stated
that there are these two systems of "self-emptiness" and
"other-emptiness" within the philosophical system of Centrism. If one
follows Centrism, it is impossible to assert an ultimate phenomenon that
is really established and to say at the same time that the seeming is
without reality in that it is empty in the sense of selfemptiness. If
one were to propound something like this, one would just be a realist.
It is obvious that one cannot be a realist and at the same time speak
about the center free from all reference points.
In
his commentary on The Ornament of Clear Realization, the Eighth Karmapa
identifies the correct referent of using the term "other-empty" in an
expedient, functional way (if one wants to use this term, that is).
However, he emphasizes that the nature of phenomena is neither
self-empty nor other-empty anyway, let alone really existent:
The
name "other-empty" is applied to emptiness [in the sense] that the
other features within this basis [emptiness] are empty of their own
respective natures. Therefore, the other-empty's own nature does not
become nonempty. The reason for this is that the name "other-empty" is
[only] applied to the compound meaning that this basis [ emptiness] is
empty of such and such [and not to this basis being otherempty in
itself].'"' However, it is not asserted that this basis-the nature of
phenomena-is empty of its own nature. [Likewise, as was just said,] this
[basis itself] is not other-empty either. Therefore, if it is not
other-empty, forget about it being self-empty [since these two are just
mutually dependent]...
This
basis-the nature of phenomena-is neither other-empty nor self-empty,
because [let alone being other-empty or self-empty,] it is not even
suitable as a mere emptiness that is not specified as being empty or not
empty of itself or something other. The reason for this is that it has
the essential character of being the utter peace of all discursiveness
regarding being empty and not being empty. Thus, from the perspective of
the [actual] freedom from discursiveness, no characteristics whatsoever
of being empty of itself or something other transpire within the basis
that is the nature of phenomena.
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André A. PaisFor what is worth, here's this quote...
"Mind itself and the true nature of
objects have no reality whatsoever
and are beyond intellect and
inexpressible. This one point could
well be the synopsis of all teachings."
- Jamgon Kongtrul Lodro Thaye
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André A. PaisSoh Wei Yu
Malcolm seems to distinguish between "weak" yogacarins (like
Shantarakshita) and "strong" yogacarins, and it seems the difference
lies in the use of the 3-nature scheme or lack thereof. Can you comment
on that?
I
can't see what's the problem with the 3-nature template. Garfield says
it's just a way of explicating how things are empty, not a way of
reifying anything. For example, the flowing quote feels rather
unproblematic to me:
The Buddha states in the Samdhinirmochana Sutra:
[The
imputational character of phenomena] is that which is imputed as a name
or symbol in terms of the own-being or attributes of phenomena in order
to subsequently designate any convention whatsoever.
[The
other-dependent character of phenomena] is simply the dependent
origination of phenomena. It is like this: Because this exists, that
arises; because this is produced, that is produced. It ranges from: 'Due
to the condition of ignorance, compositional factors [arise],' up to:
'In this way, the whole great assemblage of suffering arises.'
[The
thoroughly established character of phenomena] is the suchness of
phenomena. Through diligence and through proper mental application,
bodhisattvas establish realization and cultivate realization of [the
thoroughly established character]. Thus it is what establishes [all the
stages] up to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment.
Andy Karr writes:
One
way to summarize [the three natures] would be to say that what is
imagined by names, thoughts, and so on is the imaginary nature. What is
not imagined by names and thoughts but appears due to causes and
conditions is the dependent nature. The dependent nature’s emptiness of
the imaginary nature is the perfectly existent nature. This is a basic
Chittamatra presentation.
Whatever
is dependently arisen (dependent nature) that is said to be emptiness
(the perfected nature) - which does not necessarily save it from being
deludedly conceptualized by sentient beings (imagined nature).
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Soh Wei YuI have no problem with three natures if the dependent and the ultimate are not treated as real.
" In brief, MAV merely state that the absence of the imagined in the dependent is the perfected.
gZhan
stong pas by contrast try to map the three natures onto the two truths,
thereby distorting both doctrines, claiming that perfected nature
[ultimate] is empty of both the imagined and the dependent [relative]. "
"If
you accept the perfected nature, your view is not Madhyamaka. This is
why Candrakirti in detail refutes the three natures scheme."
"
What
I actully said that was "relative truth is the object of a mistaken
cognition", "ultimate truth is the object of an unmistaken cognition".
These are Candrakirti's definitions and not mine.
Further, Candra devotes a number of verses to refuting the dependent nature -- read them.
Yes, and this is why gzhan stong does not really go beyond the false
aspectarian yogacara of Ratnakaraśanti. The main difference between the
two is that the former avoids the error of the latter, who assert that
the non-existence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature is the
perfected nature, thus setting up an internal contradiction that the
dependent nature becomes unconditioned. Charitably, we can say that
gzhan stong is an intermediate view between Yogacara and Madhyamaka.
The
main error of the gzhan stong pas however, as I have written elsewhere,
is the attempt to map the two truths onto the three natures, where they
consider the perfected nature the ultimate and the imagined and the
dependent natures relative. In doing, so, they basically do violence to
the Yogacara school's own formulation of these three natures. The reason
they do this is that there has been a compelling exegetical need of
Tibetan scholars to rectify the treatises of Maitreya as a whole with
the six texts of reasoning by Nāgārjuna. In the end, both systems lose
since neither is accurately represented. Basically, gzhan stong
represents an attempt to reconcile all the main lines of Indian Mahāyāna
thought as I have noted elsewhere.
Further,
by mixing the tathātagarbha doctrine into the mix, they also ruin that.
The odd thing is is that Asanga was not fond of the tathāgatagarbha
school.
Sherlock wrote:
OK, I see, thanks.
So how are the 2 truths presented in gzhan stong? Is it similar to Nyingma 9-yana system?
The three own natures are mapped onto the two truths in the following way:
Ultimate truth = the perfected nature (parinispanna)
Correct relative truth = the dependent nature (paratantra)
False relative truth = the imagined nature (parikalpita)
Ultimate
truth, parinispanna, is held to be empty of the dependent and the
relative. According to this system in general, whatever is held to be
ultimate is unconditioned, permanent and so on, and is empty of the
conditioned, impermanent and so on.
So,
it is a very dualistic perspective in many regards, positing all kinds
of dualisms such as empty/not-empty; impermanent/permanent;
conditioned/unconditioned; and so on.
In
reality, according to the Maitreya, Asanga and Vasubandhu's treatises,
the perfected nature is merely the absence of the imagined in the
dependent nature. So, the two truths theory does not really work well if
you try to map it to the three own natures as they are explained by the
three great Yogacara masters.
If
you understand the dependent nature as the union of the two truths — in
this case the imagined is the relative truth; the perfected, the
ultimate truth; which corresponds to Candrakirti's observation that all
things bear two natures, one relative, one ultimate. However, there is
no classical presentation like this anywhere, AFAIK, and definitely not
within gzhan stong.
Mariusz wrote:
I also thank you. So it supports my investigation based only on
english translation here in my previous posts. Good to see it finally as
not the Mind only (Cittamatara), but as Yogacara compatible with
Madhyamaka as I wrote earlier :smile:
That
is not what Tom is saying. Tom is saying that imagination of the unreal
exists. That is precisely the cittamatra POV. If one reads the MV
objectively, there is no way to read it as Madhyamaka text. If you read
it according to tortured late Tibetan exegesis [Mipham or Shakya
Chogden], then you can try, but in doing so you have to basically assert
that the perfected nature is never the dependent nature. But in fact in
the MV it is made extremely clear that the perfected nature simple is
the non-existence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature, and
that non-existence exists. In summary, there really is no way to
reconcile Maitreyanath's Madhyāntavibhanga and Dharmadharmatāvibhanga
with Madhyamaka. They are all Yogacara (cittamatra) treatises meant to
explicate the Yogacara tradition sutras such the Samdhinirmocana, the
Lanka and so on. This applies also to the the Sutra-alaṃkara. This also
applies to the Uttaratantra. Why? Because the Cittamatras also present a
presentation of freedom from reference points i.e. the wisdom exists
but it is free from reference points. The Abhisamaya-alaṃkara is also
not free from fault in this respect because it really only discusses the
structure of the path. The reason why the Yogacara commentaries of the
AA are not widely studied in Tibet is because they are not compatible
Madhyamaka view. Primarily Aryavimuktisena and Haribhadra are studied,
both Madhyamaka scholars critical of the Yogacara point of view.
"The
whole point of the term "gzhan stong" is to prove, via the (incorrect)
use of the three natures that the ultimate truth is empty of the
relative truth, but not empty of itself through the assertion that the
perfected nature [yongs grub] is empty of the dependent [gzhan dbang]
and the imagined natures [kun brtags].
"It
is quite trivial to say that tathāgatagarbha is not empty of qualities
but is empty of faults, because tathāgatagarbha is nothing other than
natural luminosity of one's mind, which is to say that one's mind has
always been innately pure from the start. This however does not mean
that those famous qualities are real, established, ultimately exist and
so on. Even Buddhas are not ultimately real, so how can their qualities
be ultimately real?"
" Umm, no, that is not what gzhan stong is. This is how it is defined:
Dharmatā, the thoroughly established, the ultimate truth, is not
empty of its own nature, but because it is empty of imputed and
other-dependent entities, relative entities, conditioned phenomena, it
is empty of other entities. That is the true unperverted emptiness,
ultimate truth, dharmakāya, [3/b] the limit of the real, suchness, and
emptiness endowed with the supreme of all aspects. The powers, major and
minor marks and so on are the unconditioned qualities that abide in
that from the beginning. "
"
Your quote does not support Dolbupa's entire theory, which has much
more to do with his treatment of three own natures, his interpretation
of the idea of the three turnings, and so on that it does
tathāgatagarbha.
We all accept tathāgatagarbha theory, we just don't accept Dolbupas interpretation of it, because it is eternalist."
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Edited
André A. PaisThe
nature of mind is utter openness and complete relaxation. Thus, any
fixation on existence or non-existence works as a point of closedness
and tension. Keeping that in mind, we should exercise some plasticity
when it comes to means of expression and linguistic conventions; they
will always be dualistic and context-dependent. Rangtong can be seen as a
methodology; shentong as a celebratory description. If handled
carelessly, both are prone to strayings into non-existence and
existence, respectively. Skillfully utilized, I think both can tread on
the tightrope that is the Middle Way free from extremes.
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André A. PaisThe aspiration to realize the wisdom mind of the unity that defies the intellect
Inconceivable and free of all superimposition, one-sided fixation
On things being either existent or non-existent completely dissolves.
The full import of this turns back even the tongue of the victors.
Without beginning, middle, or end, it is a great expanse of deep clarity.
May all realize this Great Perfection, the true nature of the ground!
To
the conceptual mind, with its characteristic mind and mental states,
the precise nature of this ground is inconceivable. The object, the
sphere of reality, is free of all conceptual projections. Although the
conventions "primordial purity" and "spontaneous presence" are used in
order to communicate, if one latches onto the existence or non-existence
of the sphere of reality, the mind will fall prey to superimposition
and its basic nature will not be seen.
The
same holds for the subject as well, meaning wisdom, since this causes
all one-sided fixation on things being either existent or non-existent
to completely dissolve into the expanse of reality. This realization, in
which subject and object are of one taste, can be put into conventional
terms, yet its full import defies such expressions; it turns back even
the tongue of the victors, who reign supreme when it comes to using
positive affirmations to describe the true nature of things.
This
inherent pure awareness is without birth in the beginning, abiding in
the middle, or cessation in the end; it is a great and spontaneously
present expanse of deep, radiant clarity. May all realize the unified
Great Perfection, the true nature of the ground—an inconceivable reality
that defies the intellect!
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p.s. found a post by Kyle Dixon from 5 years ago:
level 1Gzhan
stong (Shentong) simply says that buddha qualities are innate and fully
formed from the very beginning. For instance they hold the three kāyas
to be fully formed at all times, something that no other system
believes.
Their view consists of
mapping the three nature scheme of Yogācāra over the two truths of
Madhyamaka, some argue that this view doesn't really work.
The
adept who started gzhan stong, named Dolbupa, belonged to the Jonang
school of Tibetan Buddhism and is widely considered to have a very
extreme view (in terms of being quite eternalistic). Nowadays there are
more moderate forms of gzhan stong such as that of Shakya Chögden and
Jamgon Köngtrul, who are both considered to be much more agreeable.
Gzhan stong is found in most every school of Tibetan Buddhism, but only moderately. It is not found in the Gelug school at all.
The
three major Tibetan views are (i) gzhan stong, (ii) spros bral, (iii)
gelug. The Kagyu, Nyingma and Sakya schools contain a mixture of spros
bral and gzhan stong. The Jonang is mainly Dolbupa's gzhan stong, and
the Gelug practice Tsongkhapa's Prasanga Madhyamaka.
5
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