A common reading of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) can feel like a semester-long philosophy course packed into a few dense verses. The critiques of motion (Chapter 2) and the sense faculties (Chapter 3) are particularly challenging, often leading to accusations of sophistry. However, a closer look reveals a consistent and rigorous dialectical method. Nāgārjuna’s goal is not to build a new theory, but to demonstrate how the realist opponent’s own foundational premises, when voiced and then pushed to their logical conclusions, inevitably self-destruct.

This article synthesizes and unpacks the core arguments surrounding these chapters. By first stating the opponent's prior position (pūrvapakṣa)—a standard practice in Indian debate—and then showing how Nāgārjuna deconstructs it, we can see that the perceived "flaws" in his logic are the very tools he uses to expose the contradictions inherent in realism.

1. The Realist Premise: The Doctrine of Intrinsic Nature (Svabhāva)

At the heart of Nāgārjuna's critique is the concept of svabhāva, or "intrinsic nature." His opponents, particularly the Abhidharma realists (e.g., Sarvāstivādins), posited that phenomena (dharmas) possess an inherent, self-sufficient existence that gives them their causal power.

• For the sense faculties (MMK 3): The eye possesses an intrinsic "seeing-power."
• For actions (MMK 2): A fire possesses an intrinsic power of "burning."

Nāgārjuna’s entire project is to first state this premise as the opponent's thesis and then reveal its absurd consequences. He has no burden to build a positive theory; his success lies in showing that the opponent's categories implode.

Note: Here 'realist' refers to Abhidharma accounts in which momentary dharmas are ultimately real by virtue of their intrinsic nature (svabhāva/svalakṣaṇa), which grounds their causal roles—not Platonic realism about universals.

2. First Criticism: "Vision Must See Itself to See Anything"

A frequent objection to Nāgārjuna's argument in MMK 3 is that it rests on the faulty premise that a faculty must first act upon itself.

The Realist Position

Early realists argued that a property must first permeate its own basis before it can act outwardly, using analogies like the scent of a jasmine flower or the heat of a fire. Following this logic, for vision to have the intrinsic power of seeing, it must first "see" itself. The famous Yogācāra analogy of a lamp illuminating itself was also used to support this kind of reflexive power.

Nāgārjuna’s Reductio ad Absurdum

Nāgārjuna weaponizes the realist's own principle. In MMK 3, he accepts the premise for the sake of argument: if vision were intrinsically "seeing," it should be able to see itself. But, he states, "Vision does not see itself." Therefore, if it fails to perform its intrinsic function on its own basis, it cannot logically perform it on others.

Candrakīrti later critiques the Yogācāra ‘lamp that illumines itself’ analogy:  Conventionally, we say a lamp lights itself. But at the ultimate level of analysis, there is no extra property of "self-illumination" over and above the singular event of lighting. The lamp is the illumination. To say it "lights itself" is a linguistic redundancy: it is merely a conventional shorthand, not an ultimate feature.

Why the Objection Misfires

Nāgārjuna's point is that "seeing" is always a relational event, arising from a convergence of conditions. When these are absent, there is no leftover "nugget" of seeing-power. His argument's goal is not to prove eyes are blind, but to show that the realist's concept of an intrinsic, self-acting power is incoherent by the realist's own standards.

3. Second Criticism: "Denying Real Time Denies the Function" & The Myth of the Agent

Another worry is that Nāgārjuna smuggles in a strange theory of time to deny that actions can happen. This critique misses the broader point: the deconstruction of the agent behind the action by granting the realist's premises.

The Realist Position

Realists posit that for an action to be real, it must be performed by a real agent existing in a real, discrete moment of time. This creates a duality between the "doer" and the "doing."

Nāgārjuna’s Reductio ad Absurdum

Nāgārjuna shows that, on realist assumptions about time, attempts to locate an action in past, present, or future collapse (MMK 19), reinforcing his dismantling of the agent–action pair (MMK 8). His analysis of motion in MMK 2 provides one template; together with MMK 8 (“Object and Agent”) it shows that separating a mover/agent from motion/action yields redundancy. The very idea of a "moving mover" is senseless. This logic applies universally: it is equally absurd to speak of a "seeing seer" or an "experiencing experiencer."

Crucially, the agent is actually predicated on the action, not the other way around. An "agent" that is not exercising its agency is a non-agent. Therefore, rather than an agent existing first and then acting, the appearance of an action is what leads us to conventionally designate an "agent." This is compounded by the temporal problem (MMK 19): where does this action occur

• In the past? Then it is finished.
• In the future? Then it has not begun.
• In the present? The "present" is unfindable, instantly dissolving into past and future.

Since the action itself cannot be located within the realist's time-scheme, the agent of that action certainly cannot be established as an independent entity.

Why the Objection Misfires

The key to understanding this is dependent designation. Nāgārjuna is not denying that we conventionally say "I am walking to town." He is showing that upon analysis, the "I" (the agent) is merely a designation dependent on the aggregates, just as the "town" is a designation dependent on its parts. As the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra puts it: “The body is the issue of the four great elements; in these elements there is no owner and no agent.”

4. Third Criticism: "He Only Refutes a View Nobody Holds"

Finally, some argue that Nāgārjuna attacks a straw man, as no serious philosopher would claim that seeing is completely unconditional.

The Realist Position

This is where precision is key. Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma does not claim seeing is "unconditional" in the sense of requiring no object. It asserts, however, that dharmas—including the eye faculty—have intrinsic natures (svabhāva/svalakṣaṇa) that ground their causal efficacy; sight occurs when the appropriate conditions (object and consciousness) obtain. This power exists within the eye faculty itself, and when the other conditions (e.g., a visible form and eye-consciousness) are met, sight automatically occurs.

Nāgārjuna’s Dismantling

Nāgārjuna’s critique targets this very notion of an intrinsic power. In MMK 3, he systematically eliminates each candidate for the title of "the seer":

1. The Eye: Cannot see without an object and consciousness.
2. The Form (Object): Cannot see itself.
3. Eye-Consciousness: Is derivative, arising only when the other two are present.

If you strip away the other conditions, no single component retains the power of sight. This demonstrates that no intrinsic seeing-power can be located. What we call "sight" is the dependently arisen event, empty of any grounding essence.

Why the Objection Misfires

Far from being a straw man, the idea of an intrinsic (though conditionally manifest) power is the very core of the Abhidharma realist project. By showing that this supposed power cannot be found in any of the components, Nāgārjuna empties the entire perceptual triad of its essentialist foundation.

Conclusion: The Takeaway

The perceived "unstated premises" in Nāgārjuna's arguments are the opponent's own premises, which he skillfully voices and then turns back on them. His method is a consistent negative dialectic:

1. State the realist's premise (pūrvapakṣa): The belief in svabhāva—an intrinsic, self-powered agent or essence.
2. Expose the contradictions: Show that this premise, when granted for the sake of argument, leads to absurdities like logical duplication ("a moving mover") and temporal paradoxes.
3. Conclude conventional reality: Phenomena function only as relational, dependently arisen events (pratītyasamutpāda). Neither agents nor actions (neither experiencers nor experiences) stand on their own; both are dependently designated (saṃvṛti) and empty of svabhāva.

After the deconstructive dust settles, our everyday world remains intact. Lamps light rooms and eyes see objects. These statements work perfectly well as conventional truths (saṃvṛti-satya). What has been eliminated is the extra metaphysical baggage—the belief in an intrinsic essence behind the function—that generated the philosophical contradictions in the first place.

Further Reading

• Garfield, Jay L., and Graham Priest. “Nāgārjuna and the Limits of Thought.” Philosophy East & West, vol. 53, no. 1, 2003, pp. 1-21.
• Siderits, Mark, and Shōryū Katsura, trans. Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way: The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Wisdom Publications, 2013.
• Westerhoff, Jan. Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2009.