Posted as a response to a thread in Dharma Overground. https://www.dharmaoverground.org/discussion/-/message_boards/message/33490124
1. The Kālakārāma-sutta and Agencylessness in the Pāli Canon
a. Overview of the Kālakārāma-sutta
- Source:
Aṅguttara-nikāya (Connected Discourses), specifically A.N. 4.24. - Context:
The Kālakārāma-sutta addresses misconceptions about agency, perception, and the self. It emphasizes the absence of a permanent agent behind sensory experiences and cognitive processes, aligning with the core Buddhist doctrine of anattā (non-self).
b. Original Pāli Passage and Translation
Original Passage:
"Iti kho bhikkhave Tathāgato daṭṭhā [diṭṭhā in Burmese MSS] daṭṭhabbaṁ diṭṭhaṁ na maññati adiṭṭhāṁ na maññati daṭṭhabbaṁ na maññati daṭṭhāraṁ na maññati, sutvā sotabbaṁ sutaṁ na maññati asutaṁ na maññati sotabbaṁ na maññati sotāraṁ na maññati, mutvā motabbaṁ mutam [sic] na maññati amutaṁ na maññati mottabaṁ [sic] na maññati motāraṁ na maññati, viññātvā viññātabbaṁ viññātaṁ na maññati aviññātaṁ na maññati viññātabbaṁ na maññati viññātāraṁ na maññati."
Translation:
"Thus, O monks, the Tathāgata, having seen whatever is to be seen, does not conceive of what is seen; he does not conceive of what has not been seen; he does not conceive of that which must yet be seen; he does not conceive of anyone who sees. Having heard whatever is to be heard, he does not conceive of what is heard; he does not conceive of what has not been heard; he does not conceive of that which must yet be heard; he does not conceive of anyone who hears. Having felt whatever is to be felt, he does not conceive of what is felt; he does not conceive of what has not been felt; he does not conceive of that which must yet be felt; he does not conceive of anyone who feels. Having understood whatever is to be understood, he does not conceive of what is understood; he does not conceive of what has not been understood; he does not conceive of that which must yet be understood; he does not conceive of anyone who understands."
c. Key Pāli Terms in the Passage
The Kālakārāma-sutta systematically negates the conception of various agents involved in sensory and cognitive processes. The specific Pāli terms used for "anyone who feels," "anyone who hears," etc., are as follows:
English Phrase | Pāli Term | Breakdown | Translation |
---|---|---|---|
Anyone who sees | daṭṭhāraṁ | daṭṭha- (seen) + -āraṁ (agent suffix) | "one who sees" |
Anyone who hears | sotāraṁ | sota- (heard) + -āraṁ (agent suffix) | "one who hears" |
Anyone who feels | motāraṁ | mota- (felt) + -āraṁ (agent suffix) | "one who feels" |
Anyone who understands | viññātāraṁ | viññāta- (understood) + -āraṁ (agent suffix) | "one who understands" |
Understanding the Suffix "-āraṁ"
- Function:
The suffix -āraṁ in Pāli denotes an agent or doer related to the root verb. When attached to the root of a verb, it transforms the word to signify "one who performs" the action.
Detailed Breakdown of Terms
- daṭṭhāraṁ (one who sees)
- daṭṭha-: Seen
- -āraṁ: Agent/doer suffix
- Meaning: "one who sees"
- sotāraṁ (one who hears)
- sota-: Heard
- -āraṁ: Agent/doer suffix
- Meaning: "one who hears"
- motāraṁ (one who feels)
- mota-: Felt
- -āraṁ: Agent/doer suffix
- Meaning: "one who feels"
- viññātāraṁ (one who understands)
- viññāta-: Understood
- -āraṁ: Agent/doer suffix
- Meaning: "one who understands"
d. Interpretation and Implications
- No Conception of the Perceiver:
The Tathāgata (the Buddha) does not attribute sensory experiences or understanding to a permanent seer or agent. This aligns with the doctrine of anattā, emphasizing that what we perceive arises from interdependent conditions without a fixed self. - No Agent Behind Perception:
By denying the conception of an independent seer, the sutta underscores that perception and consciousness are processes devoid of a permanent agent. - Avoidance of Duality:
The sutta discourages dualistic thinking where a distinct "I" is separated from actions and perceptions, fostering a non-dual understanding of experience.
e. Integration with Broader Buddhist Concepts
- Dependent Origination (Pratītya-samutpāda):
All phenomena arise dependent on conditions and cease when those conditions cease. This interdependent nature negates the need for a permanent agent behind actions. - Five Aggregates (Khandhas):
The self is analyzed into five aggregates: form, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness. None of these aggregates constitute a permanent self.
f. Practical Implications in Buddhist Practicei. Mindfulness and Insight (Vipassanā)
- Observation of Processes:
Through mindfulness, practitioners observe how thoughts, sensations, and actions arise and cease without a permanent agent. This direct observation fosters insights into the impermanent and non-self nature of phenomena. - Dissolution of Attachment:
Recognizing the absence of a permanent self leads to the reduction of attachments and aversions, which are the root causes of suffering (dukkha).
ii. Reduction of Suffering (Dukkha)
- Understanding Impermanence:
Grasping anattā helps practitioners understand the transient nature of experiences, thereby reducing the clinging that leads to suffering. - Path to Liberation (Nibbāna):
By eliminating the illusion of a permanent self, one moves closer to nibbāna, the cessation of suffering.
g. Conclusion of Kālakārāma-sutta
Analysis
The Kālakārāma-sutta serves as a profound illustration of the anattā doctrine by negating the conception of a permanent agent behind sensory and cognitive processes. By employing specific Pāli terms—daṭṭhāraṁ, sotāraṁ, motāraṁ, and viññātāraṁ—the sutta emphasizes that actions and perceptions arise dependently without a fixed self, aligning with the core Buddhist teachings on non-self and dependent origination.
2. Conceptual Attachment of Agent to Action
a. Phrase Analysis
Phrase:
"yaṁ maññati taṁ mantar"
Breakdown:
- yaṁ: "that which"
- maññati: "he thinks" or "he believes"
- taṁ: "that"
- mantar: "thinker"
Translation:
"He considers that to be the thinker."
Source:
This analysis is derived from Michael Everson's paper, "Some Remarks on Conceptualization and Transcendent Experience in the Theravāda Tradition," available at Evertype.
b. InterpretationThis phrase metaphorically represents how individuals conceptually attach a self or agent to their actions and thoughts. By considering an action as performed by a "thinker," one reinforces the illusion of a permanent self (attā), which contradicts the Buddhist understanding of anattā (non-self).
Everson elaborates:
"It is the conceptual attachment of agent to action (yaṁ maññati taṁ mantar), resulting from the initial separation of agent from action, which the Buddha attacks in the Kālakārāma-sutta"
This identification with the act of thinking exemplifies the common human tendency to attribute actions and experiences to a stable, enduring self, thereby perpetuating attachments and aversions that lead to suffering.
3. Nagarjuna and Madhyamaka
Philosophy: Agency and Agencylessness
a. Introduction to Nagarjuna and Madhyamaka
- Who is Nagarjuna?
Nagarjuna (circa 150–250 CE) is one of the most influential Buddhist philosophers, renowned for founding the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. His seminal work, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way), systematically deconstructs inherent existence and emphasizes the concept of śūnyatā (emptiness). - What is Madhyamaka?
Madhyamaka is a philosophical approach that navigates between the extremes of eternalism (belief in an eternal self) and nihilism (denial of all existence). It posits that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence (svabhāva) and arise dependently (pratītya-samutpāda).
b. Core Concepts: Agency and Agencylessness in Madhyamakai. Agency in Buddhist Philosophy
- Definition:
Agency refers to the capacity of individuals (agents) to act, make choices, and initiate actions. - In Earlier Teachings:
Particularly in Theravāda Buddhism, agency is discussed in terms of kāraka (doer) and karma (action).
ii. Agencylessness (Anākāra)
- Definition:
Agencylessness refers to the absence of a permanent, independent agent behind actions and processes. - Alignment with Śūnyatā:
In Madhyamaka, agencylessness aligns with śūnyatā, emphasizing that actions arise dependently without an inherent doer.
c. Specific Terms Used in Madhyamaka
Sanskrit Term | Pāli Equivalent | Translation | Role in Agency/Agencylessness |
---|---|---|---|
Kartā | Kāraka | Agent/Doer | Represents the conventional notion of an agent, deconstructed in Madhyamaka. |
Śūnyatā | Suññatā | Emptiness | Emphasizes the lack of inherent existence, including agency. |
Pratītya-samutpāda | Pratītya-samutpāda | Dependent Origination | Explains the interdependent arising of actions without a permanent agent. |
Anātman | Anattā | Non-Self | Denies a permanent self, supporting the concept of agencylessness. |
i. Kartā (कर्ता) – The Agent/Doer
- Meaning:
"Agent" or "doer" responsible for actions. - Usage in Madhyamaka:
Nagarjuna employs kartā to discuss the conventional notion of an agent but ultimately denies its inherent existence.
ii. Śūnyatā (शून्यता) – Emptiness
- Meaning:
"Emptiness" signifies the absence of inherent existence in all phenomena. - Role in Agencylessness:
Śūnyatā underpins the Madhyamaka assertion that there is no permanent agent behind actions; instead, actions arise dependently.
iii. Pratītya-samutpāda (प्रत्ययसमुत्पाद) – Dependent Origination
- Meaning:
"Dependent origination" describes the interdependent nature of all phenomena. - Implications for Agency:
Actions and experiences arise through a web of conditions without necessitating a permanent agent.
iv. Anātman (अनात्मन्) – Non-Self
- Meaning:
"Non-self" denotes the absence of an enduring, unchanging self. - Relation to Agencylessness:
Anātman complements śūnyatā by denying a permanent self that acts as an agent.
d. Madhyamaka's Approach to Agency and Agencylessness
i. Deconstruction of Inherent Agency
- Nagarjuna's Argument:
The notion of an inherent agent (kartā) is a conceptual construct without true existence. - Emphasis on Dependent Processes:
Madhyamaka emphasizes that actions are processes arising from dependent conditions, not orchestrated by a permanent "doer."
ii. Emphasis on Relational Agency
- Relational and Context-Dependent:
Instead of positing a permanent doer, Madhyamaka views agency as relational and context-dependent. - No Need for a Singular Agent:
Actions result from interdependent factors, eliminating the necessity for a singular, enduring agent.
iii. The Middle Way: Avoiding Dualism
- Navigating Between Extremes:
Madhyamaka rejects both eternalism (a permanent self as the agent) and nihilism (denial of any functional agency). - Dependent and Empty Nature:
It posits that while agency is conventionally acknowledged, it lacks inherent existence and is devoid of a permanent self.
e. Interpretation of Agencylessness in Madhyamaka
- No Inherent Agent:
Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy systematically deconstructs the inherent existence of agents, asserting that what we consider as an "agent" is merely a convenient label for interdependent processes. - Dependent Origination:
Actions and phenomena arise dependently, without an inherent doer, aligning with the broader Buddhist teachings on anattā (non-self).
f. Practical Implications in Madhyamaka
i. Emptiness (Śūnyatā)
- Understanding Emptiness:
Recognizing the emptiness of all phenomena, including the notion of agency, helps transcend dualistic perceptions and attachments.
ii. Middle Way Philosophy
- Avoiding Extremes:
Madhyamaka's Middle Way approach avoids the extremes of eternalism and nihilism, promoting a balanced understanding of reality as empty yet functionally interdependent.
g. Conclusion of Madhyamaka Analysis
Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy offers a profound examination of agency and agencylessness, fundamentally challenging the notion of a permanent agent behind actions. By employing terms like kartā (agent) and emphasizing śūnyatā (emptiness) and pratītya-samutpāda (dependent origination), Madhyamaka articulates a vision of reality where actions arise dependently without an inherent doer. This perspective aligns with the broader Buddhist teachings on anattā (non-self), fostering a deeper understanding that leads to the reduction of suffering and the pursuit of nibbāna (liberation).
4. Comparative Insights and Integration
While the Kālakārāma-sutta and Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy emerge from different textual traditions (Theravāda and Mahayāna, respectively), they converge on the critical Buddhist doctrines of anattā (non-self) and pratītya-samutpāda (dependent origination). Both traditions emphasize the absence of a permanent self or agent behind actions, albeit through distinct terminologies and philosophical frameworks.
a. Shared Foundations
- Anattā (Non-Self):
Central to both the Pāli Canon and Madhyamaka, it denies the existence of a permanent, unchanging self. - Dependent Origination (Pratītya-samutpāda):
Both traditions uphold the principle that all phenomena arise dependently, negating the need for an inherent agent.
b. Distinct Philosophical Approaches
- Terminological Differences:
The Pāli Canon employs Pāli terms like kāraka and suññatā, while Madhyamaka uses Sanskrit terms like kartā and śūnyatā. - Philosophical Depth and Scope:
Madhyamaka delves deeper into the philosophical implications of śūnyatā, extending the concept to all phenomena, including relational aspects like agency. In contrast, the Pāli Canon maintains a practical approach, focusing on doctrinal teachings to guide practitioners toward liberation.
c. Practical Applications
Both traditions utilize these doctrines to guide practitioners in their path toward nibbāna (liberation):
- Theravāda (Pāli Canon):
Emphasizes mindfulness and insight practices to realize anattā, thereby reducing attachments and suffering. - Madhyamaka (Nagarjuna):
Encourages a profound philosophical understanding of śūnyatā to transcend dualistic perceptions and realize the emptiness of all phenomena, including agency.
5. Summary of Key Terms Related to Agency and Agencylessness
a. Kālakārāma-sutta (Pāli Canon)
Pāli Term | Translation | Role in Concept of Agent/No-Agent |
---|---|---|
daṭṭhāraṁ | One who sees | Represents the perceiver; the sutta negates the conception of a permanent seer. |
sotāraṁ | One who hears | Represents the hearer; the sutta negates the conception of a permanent hearer. |
motāraṁ | One who feels | Represents the feeler; the sutta negates the conception of a permanent feeler. |
viññātāraṁ | One who understands | Represents the understander; the sutta negates the conception of a permanent understander. |
b. Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka Philosophy
Sanskrit Term | Pāli Equivalent | Translation | Role in Agency/Agencylessness |
---|---|---|---|
Kartā | Kāraka | Agent/Doer | Represents the conventional notion of an agent, deconstructed in Madhyamaka. |
Śūnyatā | Suññatā | Emptiness | Emphasizes the lack of inherent existence, including agency. |
Pratītya-samutpāda | Pratītya-samutpāda | Dependent Origination | Explains the interdependent arising of actions without a permanent agent. |
Anātman | Anattā | Non-Self | Denies a permanent self, supporting the concept of agencylessness. |
6. Conclusion
Understanding the Buddhist concepts of agency and agencylessness is pivotal for comprehending the path to liberation (nibbāna). Both the Kālakārāma-sutta of the Pāli Canon and Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy articulate the absence of a permanent self or agent behind actions and experiences, albeit through different terminologies and philosophical lenses.
- Kālakārāma-sutta (Theravāda/Pāli Canon):
Utilizes specific Pāli terms—daṭṭhāraṁ, sotāraṁ, motāraṁ, and viññātāraṁ—to negate the conception of permanent agents in sensory and cognitive processes, reinforcing the anattā doctrine. - Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka (Mahayāna/Sanskrit):
Employs Sanskrit terms—kartā, śūnyatā, pratītya-samutpāda, and anātman—to delve deeper into the emptiness (śūnyatā) of all phenomena, including agency, thereby offering a more philosophically expansive exploration of agencylessness.
By integrating insights from both traditions, practitioners can cultivate a profound understanding of the impermanent, interdependent, and non-self nature of existence, paving the way for the reduction of suffering and the attainment of true liberation.
7. References
- Everson, Michael. Some Remarks on Conceptualization and Transcendent Experience in the Theravāda Tradition, with Two Notes on Translation. 1988. Available at: Evertype
- Aṅguttara-nikāya. 1888. Aṅguttara-nikāya. Vol. 2. Edited by Richard Morris. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. 6 vols. (1885-1910).
- Majjhima-nikāya. 1888. Majjhima-nikāya. Vol. 1. Edited by V. Trenckner. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. 4 vols. (1888-1925).
- Nagarjuna. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way).
- Rhys Davids, T. W., and William Stede, eds. 1979. The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English Dictionary. London: Pali Text Society. [Reprint of 1925 ed.]
- Ñāṇananda. 1974. The Magic of the Mind: An Exposition of the Kālakārāma-sutta. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society.
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https://www.awakeningtoreality.com/2014/07/some-remarks-on-conceptualization-and_14.html
Some Remarks on Conceptualization and Transcendent Experience
Soh
Also see: No Self, No Doer, Conditionality
Thusness commented: "It is a good article... ...In the article there is no obsession or singling out clarity as independent and existing by itself. "Being" here is understood within/from the context of anatta, process, verb, no locus and without agent. His term of "being" is not to single out from the ever dynamics of appearance but rather understood from the standpoint of non-action. Would be better if there is integration of total exertion (dependent origination) into it; makes the article more complete."
http://www.evertype.com/misc/vitakka.html
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Some remarks on conceptualization and transcendent experience in the Theravāda tradition, with two notes on translationMichael EversonThis paper, written originally in 1988, was an excursion into theology -- or perhaps “noetology”. It was an attempt at commentary proper, rather than at disinterested analysis. It is a basic tenet of Buddhism that suffering arises from false notions of self. Individuals perceive themselves as separate entities, autonomous yet dependent on their world, experiencing change and continuity. The uniqueness of each moment of existence is distorted by the filter of a self which categorizes and interprets those moments, judging them good or bad and fighting a useless battle to keep the good and shun the bad. The nexus for the introduction of false notions of self into experience is the point at which experience is conceptualized. Enlightened consciousness results when these false notions are no longer imposed upon the perceptual process. It cannot be said that the Buddhist description of conceptualization is without its difficulties. Indeed, a Buddhist description ofanything is much entangled in relationships: just as any event in the world depends on a nigh infinite series of causes, and engenders a nigh infinite series of effects, so does a light shone on any facet of Buddhist epistemology shine and reflect off of each other facet. It is difficult to pluck one string of the sitar without causing the sympathetic strings into resonance as well. Still, conceptualization, and its relation to conditioned and enlightened consciousness, is central to Buddhism -- both to its taxonomy of the problem of existence and to its soteriology. An investigation of that relation will suggest a reëvaluation of notions of action and being. Buddhism might be described as a kind of cure to the disease of dukkha, of ‘suffering’ or ‘unsatisfactoriness’. Existence (bhava) is an ongoing process of becoming, manifest in its constituents (aṅga). The natural (or ideal) condition for the mind is a calm flow (bhavaṅga-sota), through which (around which, in which) the constituents of becoming interact harmoniously in an “experiential stream” of what is as it is. Nyanatiloka remarks that bhavṣaṅga-sota is explained in the Abhidhamma commentaries as the foundation or condition (kaṁraṇa) of existence (bhava), as the sine qua non of life, having the nature of a process, lit. a flux or stream (sota). [Nyanatiloka 1980:38] Conceptualization impedes the harmonious flow of bhavaṅga-sota. It is a process for ordering stimuli to consciousness, convenient for interaction with the world, but, apparently, not essential once the world has been investigated. Bondage to concepts is considered to be an inevitable consequence of the process of conceptualization because of the fiction of the self, and that bondage to concepts leads to expectation and denial, the causes of dukkha. A review of the process leading up to conceptualization will be helpful here. The immediate precursors to conceptualization have been classified as a purely impersonal, causal process. In the Madhupiṇḍika-sutta, the venerable Kaccaṁna sums up his understanding of the Buddha’s teaching:
Conceptualization arises from perception. “Yaṁ sañjānāti taṁ vitakketi” ‘What one perceives, one reflects on’. This is indicative of the insidious nature of the ego to take the original subjective experience and “objectivize” it. Though each object, contact, and sensation be unique, the ego takes them only in relation to itself and its past, present, and future experience and needs. The concepts (vitakkā) which arise through perception tend toward proliferation, for the ego becomes attached to them. Conceptions become preconceptions, and the whole scheme is filled with error. The Buddha was concerned about the detrimental nature of attachment to speculative views of existence and of the Transcendent. The problem is not whether or not the views themselves have validity, for it is clear that they do, depending on, and with respect to, the particular point of view. “The fact that existence is a relative concept is often overlooked by the worldling.” [Ñāṇananda 1974:20] It is axiomatic that the frog knows what the tadpole cannot; but the question here is whether or not the tadpole’s point of view is wise, and the Buddhist approach would be to say that no point of view is worthwhile unless it is a view which encompasses reality as it is. That view is impersonal. From the Sutta-nipāta:
It should be noted that both E. M. Hare [Sutta-nipāta 1944:134] and Hammalava Saddhatissa [Sutta-nipāta 1985:107] have mistranslated mantā asmi as ‘all the thoughts “I am”’ and ‘all thought of “I am”’ respectively. A better reading would have mantā <mantar ‘thinker’ (< Sanskrit *mantṛ) and take the deictic ’ti as setting off the phrase mantā asmi as translated above. (Cf. Neumann’s translation “Ich bin’s, der denkt”, ‘I am the one who thinks’. [Sutta-nipāta 1911:299]) The Commentary to the Sutta-nipāta, however, explains this phrase by mantāya:
Here the dative mantāya would also prove difficult for Hare and Saddhatissa’s readings, where we should expect *manā asmi (formanāya asmi) ‘of the thought “I am”, since we have mano ‘thought’ opposed to mantā ‘wisdom’, as I think the Commentary has it, or even manta (< Sanskrit mantra) ‘charm, doctrine, Holy Scripture’. [Cf. Childers 1875:238-39, and Rhys Davids & Stede 1979:520-22] In any case, I find the present suggested reading more in keeping with the spirit and the sense of the intent of the text, and with the goals of the tradition generally.[2] It is the conceptual attachment of agent to action (yaṁ maññati taṁ mantar), resulting from the initial separation of agent from action, which the Buddha attacks in the Kālakārāma-sutta, not whether or not there exists a thinker at all. It is true that identification with (or even the ‘real’ existence of) the personal ego is denied elsewhere by the Buddha: ...sutavato ariyasāvakassa avijjā pahīyati vijjā uppajjati. Tassa avijjāvirāgā vijjuppādā “Asmī” ti pi ’ssa na hoti, “Ayam aham asmī” ti pi ’ssa na hoti, “Bhavissanti, na bhavissanti, rūpī, arūpī, saññī, asaññī, n’eva saññī nāsaññī bhavissan”
Yet there is no suggestion that a universal (albeit Vedāntist) ontological interpretation of aham asmi ‘I am’ would be rejected, though such a rejection could be inferred, I think, in the readings of Hare and Saddhatissa. J. G. Jennings has remarked that “[t]he an-attadoctrine so strongly emphasized by [Gotama] declares the transience of individuality, yet insists upon an ultimate or fundamental unity”. [1974:571] While the Pāli commentarial tradition would doubtless reject a Vedāntist claim of an essential unity to Reality, I see no reason to think that a radically non-attached, Liberated notion of “I am” is instrinsically inconsistent with Buddhist teachings. Pure being is neither conceived nor attached, It just Is, and if there is for “me” only “being”, then, it seems, “I am”.[3] The conceptual attachment of agent to action results from an initial (erroneous) separation of agent from action. The source of the delusion standing in the way of Liberation (papañcasaṁkhā) is the personal notion “I am a thinker” (mantā asmi). Mindfulness is the method by which one learns the process of letting go (vinaya); that process begins with the elimination of attachment to the things perceived (pleasure, pain, desire, dislike) and culminates in the elimination of attachment to the identification with the notion that there is in fact a perceiver apart from the perception. This process of detachment from ego is admittedly difficult to describe, and it may be fruitless to attempt to do so. What may be more fruitful is to investigate the effects precipitated by that process. By and large, they derive from a fundamental revision of the process leading up to conceptualization, and from the removal of the causes leading to conceptual proliferation and egoistic “ownership” of experience. The Sutta-nipātadescribes the one who has managed this: “Sa sabbadhammesu visenibhūto, yaṁ kiñci diṭṭhaṁ va sutaṁ mutaṁ vā, sa pannabhāro muni vippayutto na kappiyo nūparato na patthiyo” ti Bhagavā ti.
What is the character of the impersonal viewpoint? In the Kālakārāma-sutta, transcendent experience is characterized quite comprehensively: Iti kho bhikkhave Tathāgato daṭṭhā [diṭṭhā
Daṭṭhā daṭṭhabban
What is there, then? Just seeing, hearing, feeling, or understanding. There is no agent, no patient, no recipient, no locus: only the verb, the process, or rather, the proceeding. To be enlightened is not to be or to do any thing: it is only being, or doing. This is admittedly circular, and it is proverbial to any student of mysticism--and certainly recognized by the Buddhist tradition itself--that little can besaid which can give any real sense of what goes on in transformed consciousness. Buddhism offers nonetheless its own kind of description, always tending toward the practical, toward the causes which will bring about the Liberation itself: that is, toward the empiric. The path to Liberation is twofold: moving away from deluded action, and moving toward wise action. It is all the more significant for its corollary that the entire process [of cause and effect] could be made to cease progressively by applying the proper means. Negatively put, the spiritual endeavor to end all suffering, is a process of ‘starving’ the conditions of their respective ‘nutriments’ (āhārā), as indicated by the latter half of the formula of Dependent Arising. However, there are enough instances in the Pāli Canon to show that it is quite legitimate to conceive this receding process too, positively as a progress in terms of wholesome mental states. [Ñāṇananda 1974:46-47] The eradication of conceptualization and the cultivation of a dispassionate, impersonal observation is the key to Liberation. “Ever-becoming and ever-ceasing-to-be are endless action.... Ceaseless action is the Universe.” [Merrell-Wolff 1973:247] Since the being embodied must be a part of such action, his hope must be to loose himself from the bounds of causal action: he must seek Liberation. Perhaps it is not so ironic that in order to do so, he must realize that there is nothing but action; for then he is, so says the Buddha, free.Notes[1] I prefer here the reading of papañca as ‘obstruction’ or ‘hinderance’ to the commonly met with ‘obsession’. Here I follow Rhys Davies’ suggestion that papañca is at least semantically related to *papadya ‘what is in front of the feet’, where he compares Latinimpedimentum (though Sanskrit prapadya should give Pāli papajja). [Rhys Davies 1979:412] An obsession is an obstruction, but not all obstructions are obsessions. Cf. also above, in the passage taken from the Madhupiṇḍika-sutta, where papañceti is taken in its sense as derived from Sanskrit prapañcayati ‘to describe at length’, from prapañca ‘diversity’. Back to text. [2] Robert Buswell has pointed out to me that Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda has arrived at the same conclusion. [Ñāṇananda 1971:31] Back to text. [3] Without really trying to second-guess the Tathāgata, the argument here is simply that he might recognize a distinction in the semantics of aham asmi with respect to his own description of the Enlightenment, and that of the Vedāntists. (He would almost certainly reject the use of such metaphor for paedagogical purposes, however.) Jennings is right to point out that the Vedāntist schools and their concepts of, for example, māyā, contributed to the Buddha’s own teachings. [Jennings 1974:cix-cx] Certainly, it can be said that useful comparison can be made between the Buddhist and Vedāntist traditions if such semantic differences are reconciled. Fundamental unities are realized in the Buddhist tradition at least insofar as the alienation of attāand anattā are concerned (Cf. the remarks on bhavaṅga-sota above.). Back to text.ReferencesAṅguttara-nikāya. 1888. Aṅguttara-nikāya. Vol. 2. Edited by Richard Morris. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. 6 vols. (1885-1910). Aṅguttara-nikāya. 1933. The book of the Gradual Sayings. Vol. 2: The book of the Fours. Translated by F.L. Woodward. London: Oxford University Press for the Pali Text Society. Buddhaghosa. 1936. Manorathapūraṇī: commentary on the Aṅguttara-nikāya. Vol. 3. Edited by Hermann Kopp. London: Oxford University Press for the Pali Text Society. 5 vols. (1924-1956). Childers, Robert Cæsar. 1875. A dictionary of the Pali language. London: Trübner & Co. Jennings, J. G. 1974. The Vedāntic Buddhism of the Buddha: a collection of historical texts translated [and edited] from the original Pāli. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. [Reprint of 1947 ed.] Majjhima-nikāya.. 1888. Majjhima-nikāya. Vol. 1. Edited by V. Trenckner. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. 4 vols. (1888-1925). Mayrhofer, Manfred. 1951. Handbuch des Pāli, mit Texten und Glossar: eine Einführung in das sprachwissenschaftliche Studium des Mittelindischen. 1. Teil: Grammatik. Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag. Merrell-Wolff, Franklin. 1973 The philosophy of consciousness-without-an-object: reflections on the nature of transcendental consciousness. New York: Julian Press. Ñāṇananda. 1971. Concept and reality in early Buddhist thought. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society. Ñāṇananda. 1974. The magic of the mind: an exposition of the Kālakārāma-sutta. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society. Nyanatiloka. 1980. Buddhist dictionary: manual of Buddhist terms and doctrines. 4th edition, revised by Nyanaponika. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society. Paramatthajotikā. 1917. Sutta-nipāta commentary: being Paramatthajotikā II. Vol. 2. Edited by Helmer Smith. London: Humphrey Milford for the Pali Text Society. 3 vols. (1916-1917). Rhys Davies, T. W., and William Stede, eds. 1979. The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English dictionary. London: Pali Text Society. [Reprint of 1925 ed.] Saṁyutta-nikāya. 1890. Saṁyutta-nikāya. Edited by Leon Feer. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. 3 vols. (1888-1890). Sutta-nipāta. 1911. Die Reden Gotamo Buddhos aus der Sammlung der Bruchstücke Suttanipāto des Pāli-Kanons. Translated by Karl Eugen Neumann. München: R. Piper & Co. Sutta-nipāta. 1913. Sutta-nipāta. Edited by Dines Andersen and Helmer Smith. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. Sutta-nipāta. 1944. Woven cadences of early Buddhists. Translated by E. M. Hare. London: Humphrey Milford for the Pali Text Society. Sutta-nipāta. 1985. The Sutta-nipāta. Translated by Hammalava Saddhatissa. London: Curzon Press. |
HTML Michael Everson, Evertype, Cnoc na Sceiche, Leac an Anfa, Cathair na Mart, Co. Mhaigh Eo, 2002-10-20Copyright © 1993-2006 Evertype. All Rights Reserved |
Labels: Action, Anatta, Buddha, Michael Everson, Non Dual, Proliferation 0 comments | |
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Great Resource of Buddha's Teachings
Soh
Also see:
The Meaning of Nirvana
The Deathless in Buddhadharma?
What is Nirvana?
Update: The site has been taken down. But a copy of it is available on Box.com or Scribd here: https://app.box.com/s/nxby5606lbaei9oudiz6xsyrdasacqph / https://www.scribd.com/document/274168728/Measureless-Mind
When I discovered the site Measureless Mind, I thought, wow, what a great resource of Buddha's teachings! It is a very valuable resource for all practitioners. Very well formatted, well presented, all-rounded, well commented resource of Buddha's original teachings in the Pali canon by Geoff (online nick: jnana in dharmawheel, or nana in dhammawheel). Like Loppon Namdrol/Malcolm who I often quoted from, Geoff (whose practice background is more of Mahamudra and Theravada) is also a very knowledgeable Buddhist scholar-practitioner and I often read his posts with much interest.
I sent Thusness two of the many articles (I spent time to read the entire website from beginning to end and highly recommend others to do so) and Thusness also commented, "Both the articles are very well written. Put in the blog." and "that site is a great resource."
http://measurelessmind.ca/anattasanna.html
The Recognition of Selflessness (Anattasaññā)
Look at the world and see its emptiness Mogharāja, always mindful,
Eliminating the view of self, one goes beyond death.
One who views the world this way is not seen by the king of death.
— Sutta Nipāta 5.15, Mogharājamāṇavapucchā
The contemplation of selflessness is given in AN 10.60 Girimānanda Sutta:
Now what, Ānanda, is the recognition of selflessness? Here, Ānanda, a monk, gone to the wilderness, to the root of a tree, or to an empty place, discriminates thus: ‘The eye is not-self, forms are not-self; the ear is not-self, sounds are not-self; the nose is not-self, odors are not-self; the tongue is not-self, flavors are not-self; the body is not-self, tactual objects are not-self; the mind is not-self, phenomena are not-self.’ Thus he abides contemplating selflessness with regard to the six internal and external sensory spheres. This, Ānanda, is called the recognition of selflessness.
In practice, we need to be able to recognize this absence of self in our immediate experience: When seeing, there is the coming together of visible form, the eye, and visual consciousness. When hearing, there is the coming together of sound, the ear, and auditory consciousness. When touching, there is the coming together of tactual sensation, the body, and tactile consciousness. When thinking, there is the thought, the mind, and mental consciousness. These processes arise simply through ‘contact.’ When a sense faculty and a sensory object make contact, the corresponding sensory consciousness arises. This entire process occurs through specific conditionality (idappaccayatā). There is no independent, fully autonomous agent or self controlling any of this.
An independent, autonomous self would, by definition, be:
- permanent
- satisfactory
- not prone to dis-ease
- fully self-determining (be in complete autonomous control of itself)
Thus, what is being negated is a permanent, satisfactory self which is not prone to old age, sickness, and death. As SN 22.59 Pañcavaggiya Sutta (abridged) states:
Monks, form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, and consciousness are not-self. Were form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, or consciousness self, then this form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, and consciousness would not lead to dis-ease.
This criterion of dis-ease is the context for the following statement that:
None can have it of form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, or consciousness: ‘Let my form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, or consciousness be thus, let my form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, or consciousness be not thus.’
By engaging in sustained, dedicated contemplation we find only impermanent processes, conditionally arisen, and not fully self-determining. First we clearly see that all conditioned phenomena of body and mind are impermanent. Next we come to see that whatever is impermanent is unsatisfactory in that it can provide no lasting happiness. Then we realize that all impermanent, unsatisfactory phenomena of body and mind are not-self — they can’t be the basis for a self, which by definition would be permanent and (one would hope) satisfactory. This relationship between the recognition of impermanence, the recognition of unsatisfactoriness, and the recognition of selflessness is illustrated in the following diagram.
With the recognition of selflessness there is an emptying out of both the “subject” and “object” aspects of experience. We come to understand that “I-making” and “mine-making” with regard to the mind and body as well as all external representations is deluded. When the recognition of selflessness is fully developed there is no longer any reification of substantial referents to be experienced in relation to subjective grasping. Whatever is seen is merely the seen (diṭṭhamatta). Whatever is heard or sensed is merely the heard (sutamatta) and merely the sensed (mutamatta). Whatever is known is merely the known (viññātamatta). This is explained in Ud 1.10 Bāhiya Sutta:
‘The seen will be merely the seen, the heard will be merely the heard, the sensed will be merely the sensed, the known will be merely the known.’ This is how you should train, Bāhiya.
When, Bāhiya, for you the seen will be merely the seen, the heard will be merely the heard, the sensed will be merely the sensed, the known will be merely the known, then Bāhiya, you will not be that. When, Bāhiya, you are not that, then Bāhiya, you will not be there. When, Bāhiya, you are not there, then Bāhiya, you will be neither here nor beyond nor between-the-two. Just this is the end of unsatisfactoriness.
When there is no self to be found one’s experience becomes very simple, direct, and uncluttered. When seeing, there is the coming together of visible form, the eye, and visual consciousness, that’s all. There is no separate “seer.” The seer is entirely dependent upon the seen. There can be no seer independent of the seen. There is no separate, independent subject or self.
This is also the case for the sensory object. The “seen” is entirely dependent upon the eye faculty and visual consciousness. There can be no object seen independent of the eye faculty and cognition. This is the case for all possible sensory objects. There is no separate, independent sensory object.
The same holds true for sensory consciousness as well. “Seeing” is entirely dependent upon the eye and visible form. There can be no seeing independent of the eye and cognition. This is the case for all possible sensory cognitions. There is no separate, independent sensory consciousness.
It’s important to understand this experientially. Let’s take the straightforward empirical experience of you looking at this screen right now as an example. Conventionally speaking, you could describe the experience as “I see the computer screen.” Another way of describing this is that there’s a “seer” who “sees” the “seen.” But look at the screen: are there really three independent and separate parts to your experience? Or are “seer,” “sees,” and “seen,” just three conceptual labels applied to this experience in which the three parts are entirely interdependent?
The “seer,” “seen,” and “seeing” are all empty and insubstantial. The eye faculty, visible form, and visual consciousness are all interdependent aspects of the same experience. You can’t peel one away and still have a sensory experience — there is no separation. AN 4.24 Kāḷakārāma Sutta:
Thus, monks, the Tathāgata does not conceive an [object] seen when seeing what is to be seen. He does not conceive an unseen. He does not conceive a to-be-seen. He does not conceive a seer.
He does not conceive an [object] heard when hearing what is to be heard. He does not conceive an unheard. He does not conceive a to-be-heard. He does not conceive a hearer.
He does not conceive an [object] sensed when sensing what is to be sensed. He does not conceive an unsensed. He does not conceive a to-be-sensed. He does not conceive a senser.
He does not conceive an [object] known when knowing what is to be known. He does not conceive an unknown. He does not conceive a to-be-known. He does not conceive a knower.
Sensory consciousness can’t be isolated as separate and independent. Nor can any of these other interdependent phenomena. Even the designations that we apply to these various phenomena are entirely conventional, dependent designations. But this doesn’t mean that we should now interpret our experience as being some sort of cosmic oneness or unity consciousness or whatever one may want to call it. That's just another empty, dependent label isn’t it? The whole point of this analysis is to see the emptiness of all referents, and thereby stop constructing and defining a “self.”
The purpose of correctly engaging in the contemplation of selflessness is stated in AN 7.49 Dutiyasaññā Sutta:
‘The recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, monks, when developed and cultivated, is of great fruit and benefit; it merges with the death-free, has the death-free as its end.’ Thus it was said. In reference to what was it said?
Monks, when a monk’s mind frequently remains acquainted with the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, his mind is rid of “I-making” and “mine-making” with regard to this conscious body and externally with regard to all representations, and has transcended conceit, is at peace, and is well liberated.
If, monks, when a monk’s mind frequently remains acquainted with the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, his mind is not rid of “I-making” and “mine-making” with regard to this conscious body and externally with regard to all representations, and has not transcended conceit, is not at peace, and is not well liberated, then he should know, ‘I have not developed the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, there is no stepwise distinction in me, I have not obtained the strength of development.’ In that way he is fully aware there. But if, monks, when a monk’s mind frequently remains acquainted with the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, his mind is rid of “I-making” and “mine-making” with regard to this conscious body and externally with regard to all representations, and has transcended conceit, is at peace, and is well liberated, then he should know, ‘I have developed the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, there is stepwise distinction in me, I have obtained the strength of development.’ In that way he is fully aware there.
‘The recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, monks, when developed and cultivated, is of great fruit and benefit; it merges with the death-free, has the death-free as its end.’ Thus it was said. And in reference to this it was said.
Here we get to the heart of the matter, which is one of the most subtle aspects of the Buddhadhamma. Simply stated: when ignorance ceases, belief in self simultaneously ceases. And when there is no self to be found, then there is no self to die or take birth. This right here is “death-free.” And it is precisely this that the Buddha is declaring when he says to Mogharāja:
Look at the world and see its emptiness Mogharāja, always mindful,
Eliminating the view of self, one goes beyond death.
One who views the world this way is not seen by the king of death.
When one completely abandons the underlying tendencies which give rise to mistaken apprehensions of a self — any and all notions of “I am” — then there is no self to die. This stilling of the “currents of conceiving” over one’s imagined self, and the resulting peace that is empty of birth, aging, and death, is straightforwardly presented in MN 140 Dhātuvibhaṅga Sutta:
‘He has been stilled where the currents of conceiving do not flow. And when the currents of conceiving do not flow, he is said to be a sage at peace.’ Thus was it said. With reference to what was it said?
Monk, “I am” is a conceiving. “I am this” is a conceiving. “I shall be” is a conceiving. “I shall not be” ... “I shall be possessed of form” ... “I shall be formless” ... “I shall be percipient” ... “I shall be non-percipient” ... “I shall be neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient” is a conceiving. Conceiving is a disease, conceiving is a cancer, conceiving is an arrow. By going beyond all conceiving, monk, he is said to be a sage at peace.
Furthermore, a sage at peace is not born, does not age, does not die. He is unagitated, and is free from longing. He has nothing whereby he would be born. Not being born, how could he age? Not aging, how could he die? Not dying, how could he be agitated? Not being agitated, for what will he long?
So it was in reference to this that it was said, ‘He has been stilled where the currents of conceiving do not flow. And when the currents of conceiving do not flow, he is said to be a sage at peace.’
Truly, “a sage at peace is not born, does not age, does not die.” In this way, when ignorance ceases, the entire complex of conditioned arising bound up with dissatisfaction also ceases. When all traces of “I-making” and “mine-making” are abandoned through the fully integrated threefold training of ethical conduct, meditation, and discernment, just this is dispassion (virāga). Just this is cessation (nirodha). Just this is extinguishment (nibbāna). Just this is without outflows (anāsava). Just this is not-born (ajāta), not-become (abhūta), not-made (akata), not-fabricated (asaṅkhata), endless (ananta), indestructible (apalokita), and yes, death-free (amata). It is freedom (mutti).
The Recognition of Selflessness and the Seven Factors of Awakening (Satta Bojjhaṅgā)Sustained, dedicated practice of the recognition of selflessness will gradually create the optimal conditions for the arising of all seven factors of awakening. SN 46.73 Anatta Sutta (abridged):
Here monks, a monk develops the awakening factor of mindfulness accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of dhamma-investigation accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of energy accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of joy accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of tranquility accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of meditative composure accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of equanimity accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go.
It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that it is of great fruit and benefit. It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that one of two fruits is to be expected: either final gnosis in this very life or, if there is a residue of clinging, the state of nonreturning. It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that it leads to great good. It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that it leads to great security from bondage. It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that it leads to a great sense of urgency. It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that it leads to dwelling in great comfort.
http://measurelessmind.ca/nirodhasanna.html
The Recognition of Cessation (Nirodhasaññā)
For whom there is neither a far shore,
Nor a near shore, nor both,
Who is free from distress, without ties,
Him I call a brāhmaṇa.
— Dhammapada 385
When the recognition of dispassion is fully developed and realized, and with no self to be found, nothing to be identified with, one realizes the gnosis and vision of liberation (vimuttiñāṇadassana). This is non-referential inner peace (ajjhattasanti). This is the full recognition of cessation. AN 10.60 Girimānanda Sutta:
Now what, Ānanda, is the recognition of cessation? Here, Ānanda, a monk, gone to the wilderness, to the root of a tree, or to an empty place, discriminates thus: ‘This is peace, this is excellent, that is: the calming of all fabrications, the release of all acquisitions, the elimination of craving, cessation, nibbāna.’ This, Ānanda, is called the recognition of cessation.
This is the complete absence of agitation (calita natthi). Ud 8.4 Nibbāna Sutta:
There being no agitation, there is tranquility. There being tranquility, there is no inclination. There being no inclination, there is no coming or going. There being no coming or going, there is no passing away or arising. There being no passing away or arising, there is neither a here nor a beyond nor a between-the-two. Just this is the end of unsatisfactoriness.
This is the calming of all specific fabrication and volitional intention. MN 140 Dhātuvibhaṅga Sutta:
One does not form any specific fabrication or volitional intention towards either existence or non-existence. Not forming any specific fabrication or volitional intention towards either existence or non-existence, he does not cling to anything in this world. Not clinging, he is not excited. Unexcited, he personally attains complete nibbāna. He discerns that, ‘Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, done is what had to be done, there is nothing further here.’
This is the freedom of absence which is revealed through the complete recognition of selflessness. Ud 1.10 Bāhiya Sutta:
‘The seen will be merely the seen, the heard will be merely the heard, the sensed will be merely the sensed, the known will be merely the known.’ This is how you should train, Bāhiya.
When, Bāhiya, for you the seen will be merely the seen, the heard will be merely the heard, the sensed will be merely the sensed, the known will be merely the known, then Bāhiya, you will not be that. When, Bāhiya, you are not that, then Bāhiya, you will not be there. When, Bāhiya, you are not there, then Bāhiya, you will be neither here nor beyond nor between-the-two. Just this is the end of unsatisfactoriness.
This is noble liberation which is the elimination of craving and clinging. MN 106 Āneñjasappāya Sutta:
This is death-free, namely, the liberation of mind through not clinging.
This is the effortless clarity of consciousness which is non-abiding and not established (appatiṭṭha viññāṇa). SN 22.53 Upaya Sutta:
When that consciousness is not established, not increasing, not concocting, it is liberated. Being liberated, it is steady. Being steady, it is content. Being content, he is not excited. Unexcited, he personally attains complete nibbāna. He discerns that, ‘Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, done is what had to be done, there is nothing further here.’
There is no more seeking of any kind. There is no more personal agenda. There is no identifying with any phenomena or turning anything into a fixed reference point. There is no “here” nor “beyond” nor “between-the-two.”
The awakened mind is measureless (appamāṇacetasa), free from any sort of measuring (pamāṇa). In evocative terms, an awakened one is deep (gambhīra), boundless (appameyya), and fathomless (duppariyogāḷha). Utterly free from any reference to specifically fabricated consciousness (viññāṇasaṅkhayavimutta). “Gone” (atthaṅgata), the measureless mind is untraceable (ananuvejja) even here and now. It doesn’t abide in the head, or in the body, or anywhere else for that matter. It doesn’t have size or shape. It’s not an object or a subject.
Just as the sky is formless and non-illustrative, the measureless mind is non-illustrative and non-indicative (anidassana). This effortless clarity is unmediated by any specific fabrication or volitional intention. It is unaffected knowing: The seen is merely the seen (diṭṭhamatta). The heard is merely the heard (sutamatta). The sensed is merely the sensed (mutamatta). The known is merely the known (viññātamatta). But there is no you there. Of course, this liberating gnosis and vision can’t adequately be pointed out or indicated by words alone. It is to be individually experienced (paccatta veditabba).
The Recognition of Cessation and the Seven Factors of Awakening (Satta Bojjhaṅgā)Sustained, dedicated practice of the recognition of cessation will gradually create the optimal conditions for the arising of all seven factors of awakening. SN 46.76 Nirodha Sutta (abridged):
Here monks, a monk develops the awakening factor of mindfulness accompanied by the recognition of cessation, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of dhamma-investigation accompanied by the recognition of cessation, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of energy accompanied by the recognition of cessation, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of joy accompanied by the recognition of cessation, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of tranquility accompanied by the recognition of cessation, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of meditative composure accompanied by the recognition of cessation, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of equanimity accompanied by the recognition of cessation, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go.
It is in this way that the recognition of cessation is developed and cultivated so that it is of great fruit and benefit. It is in this way that the recognition of cessation is developed and cultivated so that one of two fruits is to be expected: either final gnosis in this very life or, if there is a residue of clinging, the state of nonreturning. It is in this way that the recognition of cessation is developed and cultivated so that it leads to great good. It is in this way that the recognition of cessation is developed and cultivated so that it leads to great security from bondage. It is in this way that the recognition of cessation is developed and cultivated so that it leads to a great sense of urgency. It is in this way that the recognition of cessation is developed and cultivated so that it leads to dwelling in great comfort.
Labels: Anatta, Buddha, Dropping, Theravada |