Göran Backlund recently published a new book.

Göran Backlund:


After countless days of hard work the book is finally done. I’m very proud of it. I’ve written something that I would have wanted back in the days when I just started to pull the threads of the fabric.
This piece of philosophy will guide you through every step in dismantling the notion of the external world. It will ruthlessly and effectively reveal and dispel any wrong-thinking surrounding this idea upon which all else stands.
This isn’t the first book that tackles this subject. But others have left it at “we can’t really know whether there’s anything beyond our experience,” while I go all the way and say that we can know – and in this book I’ll show you exactly how and why this idea of an external world beyond our perceptions is nothing but a figment of our imagination.
But this is a book for serious people. You won’t find any ‘pointers’ in it. What you’ll find is stone cold logic hacking away at the very foundation of existence itself. And in it’s wake; when the dust settles; you’ll recognize that, not only were the words of the sages true all along, but they’ve gone from being a remote possibility to being the light and guiding principle of your life. What words?
Consciousness is all.
The book is called REFUTING THE EXTERNAL WORLD and is available NOW as a downloadable E-book.


4 Responses
  1. Anonymous Says:

    It is a fascinating book, but it doesn't deal with the central argument for an objective, external world: shared experience. The theory is that since our experience is shared and follows a structure we can describe by mathematical abstractions (science), there must be something external to it that modulates our shared experiences. Something quite independent of our minds.

    While I don't think this argument actually proves tbere is an external, mind-independent world, it deserves to be mentioned in a book that seeks to refute its existence.

  2. David Says:

    The shared modality is first person singular. The point being, there is nothing outside of that. Experience itself is first person, not to be misconstrued as third person posing as first person. An entity posing as one who experiences things is not the first person experience. First person, in essence, is non personal, non-dual.

  3. Anonymous Says:

    @David, I am not saying that the shared experience argument is irrefutable. But it is the one most commonly used in defence of an external world that modulates the experiences of individuals. And so I think it deserves attention in such a work. Having said that, I loved the book. It literally spoonfeeds the reader with very important points that most people miss.

  4. john Says:

    Hi Goran,

    I agree with much of what you’re saying, both in your intro and the four “old stuff” articles on your site. I just don’t think it merits a refutation. For instance, I agree that a mind-independent reality is inconceivable. Most who have given this issue some thought will grant that point. But to merit a refutation, you need to get to the point of saying that a mind-independent reality is impossible, and I don’t see that you’ve made it that far.

    What we mean when we say, “a mind-independent reality is inconceivable,” is that it is impossible to conceive of such, not that a mind-independent reality is impossible in the way a married bachelor is impossible. A married bachelor is impossible because we can’t (simultaneously) predicate a man with both terms, and we can’t predicate a man with both terms because the terms, as we define them, contradict each other; it’s like saying, “Bob is married and not married. The point being that a married bachelor is inconceivable because it is logically impossible; it is not logically impossible because we can’t conceive it. But the latter is what you seem to be arguing, i.e., that inconceivability entails impossibility. It doesn’t, (unless it is derived from a contradiction in terms as with a married bachelor or round square), because impossibility outpaces inconceivability. For example, if it’s true that inconceivability entails impossibility, then it’s true by virtue of contraposition that possibility entails conceivability. But the latter is just another way of saying that what is possible is conceivable, which is just another way of saying that possibility is exhausted by conceivability. It may be, and it would be nice if it is the case, but we have no grounds to assert that whatever is possible is conceivable, or ought to be.

    With all that said, though, I do think you’ve provided good reason for those who believe in a world “out there” to question that assumption, along with providing a refuter to any epistemological claims that one “knows” it exists.