This is why Jamgon Mipham said:

“Others (the proponents of real entities within the Buddhist tradition) may say: “Although the other three types of production—self-production and so on—may be refuted, if we do not accept production from other, won’t we be contradicting the normal conventions of the world, such as the fact that sprouts arise from seeds and butter from curd?” There is no contradiction. In reality, if we apply reasoning, then not only at an ultimate level, but also conventionally speaking, arising is never really observed. If production were observable and proven conventionally, then it would follow that conventionally true phenomena such as the aggregates and elements would become immune to ultimate analysis. It would also follow that ultimate or truly existent arising would not be refuted. And it would follow that the equipoise of noble beings would become a cause for destroying previously existent conventional phenomena, which would lead to the extreme of deprecating the existent by labelling it non-existent. In any case, what is claimed is not possible.

In short, from the perspective of ultimate analysis, no phenomena whatsoever may be observed that are established as genuinely existent, whilst from the perspective of reasoning inquiring into the conventional, things are observed. That these two points are consistent, and established as a single reality is the assertion of the followers of the Middle Way beyond extremes.

Yet those who speak of real entities disagree, for they consider emptiness and dependently originating appearance to be mutually opposed. They believe that whatever is refuted by ultimate analysis must be completely non-existent even on a conventional level, just like the horns of a rabbit. Or else, that whatever exists conventionally, such as pillars and vases, could never be refuted by ultimate reasoning. They conceive of some independent object of negation separate from the conventional phenomena that are the basis of negation and they consider emptiness—which for them is the refutation of a separate phenomenon called “true existence”—and appearances, the basis for that refutation, to be directly opposed to one another, like the total non-existence of the horns of rabbits and the real existence of the horns of cattle. Asserting this to be a unity, by mentally ‘binding’ these two to an entity such as a vase is tantamount to claiming that emptiness is an affirming negation, and in the end it does not even go beyond the views of the proponents of true entities. This point has already been well made by the great logicians of the past.”

- from a good article on this topic https://www.lotsawahouse.org/.../four-great-logical...

“Yes, the perspective you presented is in line with the **Madhyamaka (Middle Way)** view, particularly as articulated by scholars like Jamgon Mipham. This view is widely accepted within certain schools of Tibetan Buddhism, such as the **Nyingma** and **Gelug** schools, as well as by other proponents of Madhyamaka philosophy. However, it's important to note that it’s not universally accepted across all Buddhist traditions. Here's a breakdown of why:

### 1. **Dependent Origination, Not Inherent Production**:

- Madhyamaka asserts that all phenomena, including the production of sprouts from seeds or butter from curd, occur through **dependent origination**. This means that things arise due to causes and conditions, but they lack inherent, independent existence.

- **Inherent production**—the idea that something can arise by its own power or essence—is explicitly refuted in Madhyamaka, both on the ultimate and even on the conventional level when analyzed carefully.

### 2. **Jamgon Mipham's View**:

- Mipham is addressing a common objection raised by **proponents of real entities** (those who believe in some form of inherent existence, like some schools within Buddhism or other philosophical systems). They argue that if we deny inherent production, we are going against the normal conventions of everyday experience (like sprouts growing from seeds).

- Mipham’s response is that **even conventionally**, production is not ultimately real. Things appear to arise through causes and conditions, but when we apply ultimate reasoning, **no real arising is observed**. This doesn't contradict conventional experience but shows that our everyday experience is based on relative, dependent relationships, not inherent existence.

### 3. **Two Truths (Conventional and Ultimate)**:

- Mipham explains the key Madhyamaka point: that the **two truths** (conventional and ultimate) are not opposed, but complementary. Things **appear** to exist and function conventionally, but on the ultimate level, they are empty of inherent existence.

- Those who hold to the reality of entities (realists) mistakenly think that if something is refuted on the ultimate level, it must be completely non-existent on the conventional level. Madhyamaka, however, allows for things to appear and function conventionally while being empty of inherent essence.

### 4. **Different Views Across Traditions**:

- **Madhyamaka**: The view you presented aligns closely with **Prasangika Madhyamaka**, which is the most widely accepted school of thought within Tibetan Buddhism. In this school, it is understood that things arise dependently and lack inherent existence, and this is seen as the ultimate truth.

- **Svatantrika Madhyamaka**: Another school of Madhyamaka, while agreeing that things lack inherent existence, sometimes allows for more subtle degrees of relative existence in conventional reality.

- **Other Buddhist Schools**: Some schools, like the **Cittamatra (Yogacara)** school, may have slightly different interpretations of how dependent origination and emptiness work. Cittamatra, for example, emphasizes that the mind is the primary source of phenomena, while Madhyamaka refutes even the inherent existence of mind.

### 5. **Not Universally Accepted**:

- **Non-Madhyamaka Buddhist traditions**: In traditions outside of Madhyamaka, such as some forms of **Theravada Buddhism**, the emphasis on emptiness may be less radical. These schools might still accept some kind of conventional production without the extensive refutation of inherent existence found in Madhyamaka.

- **Other Philosophical Systems**: Outside of Buddhism, various philosophical systems (including realist schools) would reject the idea that production or arising can be refuted. They maintain that things exist more solidly or inherently, even if only conventionally.

### Conclusion:

While the view expressed by Mipham and the broader Madhyamaka tradition is highly respected and accepted by many within Tibetan Buddhism, especially those who follow the Middle Way philosophy, it is not **universally accepted** across all Buddhist or philosophical traditions. Some Buddhist schools and non-Buddhist traditions maintain alternative views on production, arising, and the nature of existence. However, within the context of Madhyamaka, particularly **Prasangika**, this approach is considered the most consistent way to understand dependent origination and emptiness.”

But seriously, I think Chat AI, with its ability to analyze, synthesize and summarize knowledge, is a game changer... especially in forwarding, clarifying and modernisizng spiritual wisdom