Some quotes by Acarya Malcolm Smith from Dharmawheel on Conventional vs Ultimate Truth

Malcolm: 

"“Conventional” simply means “functional,” it does not mean arbitrary or subjective. For example, perceiving water as amṛta, pus, boiling metal, etc., is invalid in the human realm.

One can build many kinds of cars, but if they don’t function as cars, they are not cars, conventionally speaking."

"No, conventions are not subjective, they are conventions because one or more people have agreed to call a functional thing a given name. For example, a truck is called a lorry in England, but they both refer to a heavy vehicle that carries loads."

"Conventional truths are derived from observing functional appearances. Falsehoods are derived from observing nonfunctional appearances. Example, lake vs. mirage."

"No, it is not more correct to say consciousness arises or ceases than a labelled self, a since consciousness is also a conventional label, like the label "self." Prior to analysis there is both a self, akuppa, and a consciousness. After analysis one will find neither self nor consciousness, beyond the designations "akuppa" and "consciousness." For example, take a car as a metaphor for "self". A car cannot be found in any part, all of its parts, or separate from its parts. Likewise, as self cannot be found in any aggregates, all of the aggregates, or apart from the aggregates. Likewise, consciousness cannot be found in the sense organ nor the sense object, both, or separate from them. The mind is also made of parts, and cannot be found in one of them, all of them, or separate from them.

Functionally speaking, we can say there is a self, because when I say "akuppa go there!" You will respond to this directive by saying yes or no. This means that "self" is functional. It is efficient. Whatever is functional corresponds with relative truth. If I said to you, "Malcolm go there!" you would respond, "I am not Malcolm." So calling you "malcolm" is not functional and therefore cannot be considered to be relatively true. Consciousness is a relative truth, as long as it performs its functions, then we can say "there is a consciousness." But when we analyze consciousness, we cannot find it outside of the conventions we use for an appearance we label "mind.""

"Two truths are specified, seeing correctly and seeing falsely. That’s enough. No need to have the Buddha declare that aggregates and so on are ultimate, otherwise it would have been game over for Madhyamaka at the beginning."

"Which Sutra view did you have in mind, the one where in PP Sūtra it is stated that all phenomena are nonarising, pure from the beginning, and the state of dharmatā? The dependent origination of phenomena? Emptiness? In what way does Dzogchen refute these views? We do not reject conventional truth in Dzogchen. Longchenpa was utterly clear on this point.

ChNN understood what is stated in the Dzogchen tantras: we do not make a distinction between sharp and dull. If someone is sincerely interested in the teachings, they do not have to convert to Buddhism, but it is not because Buddhism contains any wrong views. It does not. There is no contradiction between Dzogchen and the four truths of nobles. There are serious contradictions however with Samkhya, etc."

"This is not correct. There is such as thing as mundane correct view. A correct view in this case is one that is functional. For example, believing in normative causes and effects. We have to distinguish wrong views about entities from wrong views about essences. Christians have wrong views about both essences and entities, since they believe salvation comes from believing in the divinity of a man executed by Romans somewhere between 30-33 CE.

Buddhists only hold wrong views about essences, i.e. that knowledge obscuration of the innate habit of I-making."