I
 was wondering how this relates to Yogachara. If reality is non-dual, 
and if it is mind-only, then how is it not the same? I guess I don't 
understand how reality could be composed of multiple mind streams that 
are interconnected without that all just being activity in awareness.
Śāntarakṣita
 and Kamalaśīla have an interesting take on this. I'll just copy and 
paste Jha's translation here for you to read. I'm not sure how much I 
agree with it, but it certainly is intriguing. Śāntarakṣita's root text 
will be bolded and Kamalaśīla's commentary will not be.
The
 error in the view of these philosophers is a slight one,—due only to 
the assertion of eternality (of cognition); as diversity is clearly 
perceived in the cognitions of colour, sound and other things.—If all 
these cognitions were one, then, colour, sound, taste and other things 
would be cognisable all at once; as in an eternal entity there can be no
 different states.—(330-331)
‘The error is a slight one’;—as they postulate only Cognition (Consciousness, as the only entity), which is quite reasonable.
“If that is so, then what is even the ‘slight error’ in their view?”
It is due to the assertion of ‘eternality’,
“But why should not the acceptance of ‘eternality’ be reasonable?”
Answer—Diversity is clearly perceived etc. etc.;—‘Eternality’ connotes remaining in the same state always, and ‘non-eternality’ connotes not remaining in the same state always; and as a matter of fact, the Cognition that manifests (apprehends) Colour, Sound and other things is not found to be in one and the same state always;—actually
 it appears at one time as manifesting Colour and at another time, as 
manifesting Sound and other things, in a certain order of sequence. 
Under the circumstances, if all these things, Sound and the rest, were 
manifested by a single Eternal Cognition, then all of them would appear 
(be Cognised) simultaneously, like the bedspread of variegated colours; 
as the Cognition manifesting them would (ex hypothesi) be always there.
It
 may be held that “the Cognition of Sound and other things are different
 ‘states’ of it appearing one after the other,—so that the apprehension 
of Sound etc. could not be simultaneous”.
The answer to this is—‘In an Eternal Entity there can be no different states’;—because
 the ‘states’ are not different from the Entity to which they belong; so
 that the Entity to which the states belong would be liable to 
‘production and destruction’,—appearance and disappearance,—in the same 
way as the States are liable; or, conversely, the states also would be eternal,
 like the Entity to which they belong.—If, on the other hand, the states
 are different from the entity to which they belong, then there can be 
no idea of the states belonging to this entity; as there is no benefit 
conferred by the one on the other; and this alternative (of the states 
being different from the Cognitions) would also be contrary to the 
doctrine that the eternal Cognition is the only one Entity.—(330-331)
Further,
 if the Eternal Cognition existed, it could be known either through 
Perception or through Inference; that it cannot be known through 
Perception is shown in the following—[see verse 332 next]
Cognition
 or consciousness is never apprehended as anything distinct from the 
cognitions of colour and other things; and inasmuch as these latter 
undergo variations every moment, what remains there that could be 
lasting (permanent, eternal)?—(332)
As
 a matter of fact, apart from the Cognitions of Colour etc., which 
appear one after the other, we do not apprehend, any lasting 
Consciousness, eternal and one,—whereby it could be held to be known 
through Perception.—Then, inasmuch as it is well known that the 
Cognitions of Colour and otherngs are apprehended one after the other, 
and are destroyed every moment—it has to be explained what remains there
 that is non-different from those Cognitions? Thus, inasmuch as there is
 no apprehension of any such Cognition, which would be apprehended if it
 were there,—it cannot but be regarded as ‘non-existent This is what the
 Text means.
Nor can it be held that the said Eternal Cognition is known through Inference.
 Because such an Inference would be based either upon the nature of the 
Cognition itself, or upon that of its effects. It cannot he the former, 
as there is nothing which can prove that such is the nature of the said Eternal Cognition; on the contrary, there is Perception itself which precludes any such notion.
Thus the doctrine that ‘the world is the illusory modification of the Eternal Consciousness’ is not right.—(332)
Then
 again, under this doctrine, the notions of ‘Bondage’ and ‘Liberation’ 
are not possible.—This is what is shown in the following—[see verse 333 
next]
There
 can be no distinction in cognition as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’—if the ‘soul’
 consists of a single (eternal) cognition; how then can there be any 
‘bondage’ and ‘liberation’?—(333)
For
 one who holds the view that—Cognition is in perpetual flux, different 
with different persons, undergoing variations in a series,—the notion of
 ‘Bondage and Liberation’ is quite reasonable, as being due to the 
coming about of a series of cognitions, wrong and right; and through the
 practice of yoga, gradually purer and purer Cognitions coming about, the series of impure
 cognitions cease and the final Aim (of Liberation) is attained; and 
thus the attempt at Liberation becomes fruitful.—For you, on the other 
hand, the ‘Soul’ is of the nature of one Eternal Cognition; how then can there be any ‘Bondage’ and ‘Liberation’ for such a Soul? Because if the one Cognition is eternally wrong,
 then, as there could be no other state for it, there could be no 
possibility of ‘Liberation’; on the other hand, if the one Cognition 
were eternally right, then as it
 would be always pure, there could be no ‘Bondage’.—As regards our 
doctrine, the Cognition is held to be defective (wrong) or pure (right),
 in accordance with the varying character of the Series (in which it 
appears), and hence the notion of ‘Bondage and Liberation’ is entirely 
reasonable. This has been thus declared—‘Cognition is defective and free
 from defects, beset with impurities and free from impurities; if it 
were never impure, then all embodied beings would be always liberated; if it were never pure, then the attempt to secure Liberation would be fruitless’.—(333)
What
 could the mystic set aside or accomplish by the practice of yoga? What 
too is there that could be rejected? As wrong cognition also is of the 
nature of the same (eternal cognition).—The knowledge of truth also 
cannot be something to be brought about; as, being of the nature of 
cognition, it is always there.—So that the entire practice of yoga also 
is entirely fruitless.—(334-335)
If it be held that ‘Bondage and Liberation are only assumed, not real’;—then it becomes necessary to explain the basis of this assumption.
 What this basis is under the doctrine of ‘Cognitions being non-eternal’
 has been shown above. Thus the Effort—in the form of the contemplation 
of Truth,—that you put forth for the attaining of the ‘Ultimate Aim’ and
 for passing beyond the cycle of Birth and Death, can only lead to 
futile fatigue.—This is shown in the following—[see verses 334-335 
above]
If, by the contemplation of
 Truth, the Mystic could set aside, or bring about, anything, then his 
Effort would be fruitful. As it is however, he can never set aside Wrong
 Cognition, because it is of the nature of the same,—i.e. of the nature of Eternal Cognition.—For the same reason it cannot be rejected; because what is eternal cannot be destructible and hence its rejection is impossible.—How can the Yogin accomplish—bring about—the Knowledge of Truth? Being of the nature of Eternal Cognition, the Knowledge of Truth would be always there.—Thus the doctrine in question cannot be right.—(334-335)
That is the section on the relationship between Yogācāra and the Advaitin view in Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā,
 composed by Śāntarakṣita and his student Kamalaśīla, a work generally 
taken to be written from a Yogācāra point of view (though both were 
actually followers of Madhyamaka in their final analysis, holding 
Yogācāra to have instrumental value).