Anatta: Not-Self or No-Self?
Did the Buddha teach No Self? There are articles that state that the Buddha did not teach No Self, but Not-Self (Anatta). Indeed, the term Anatta refers to non-self. Why non-self and not no-self? I think terming it non-self brings out the point that Anatta merely rejects the view of an existent self, but does not assert non-existence of self, which is another equally erroneous extreme. Actually, I have no problem with calling it No Self at all—as long as it is not taken to mean that a self becomes non-existent (rather, it should mean that no existent self within or apart from the five aggregates could be established to begin with that could become non-existent, both, or neither).
Cooran (moderator of Dhammawheel) pointed out that a note to Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation of this sutta is worth considering:
We should carefully heed the two reasons that the Buddha does not declare, “There is no self”: not because he recognizes a transcendent self of some kind (as some interpreters allege), or because he is concerned only with delineating “a strategy of perception” devoid of ontological implications (as others hold), but (i) because such a mode of expression was used by the annihilationists, and the Buddha wanted to avoid aligning his teaching with theirs; and (ii) because he wished to avoid causing confusion in those already attached to the idea of self. The Buddha declares that ‘all phenomena are nonself’ (sabbe dhamma anatta), which means that if one seeks a self anywhere one will not find one. Since ‘all phenomena’ includes both the conditioned and the unconditioned, this precludes an utterly transcendent, ineffable self.
Part of Note 385 on Page 1457 of The Connected Discourses of the Buddha (A New Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya by Bhikkhu Bodhi).
While it is true that Anatta is more like 'non-self' than 'non-existence of self', I do not agree with some of the articles' assertions that the question of the existence of self is simply a question to be put aside as something irrelevant to liberation. Although it is true that the four extremes are rejected by the Buddha, it is not so much because it is 'unrelated to liberation'; rather, it is that 'all the extreme views are false and relate to self-view in one form or another, and hence prevent liberation.' As such, all such false assertions/views must be abandoned through insight and realization in order for there to be liberation. Those articles, while explaining the rejection of the four extremes, fail to elucidate the realization of Anatta and the freedom from views (i.e., self-view) that result from such realization.
Furthermore, "Not-self" is not just a "strategy of letting go" or "strategy of perception devoid of any ontological implications" as certain articles may state, but rather it is a truth, and there must be experiential realization of this truth. The Buddha constantly talks about discerning the three characteristics as an insight into dharmas; that is, to "discern, as it actually is" all dharmas as inconstant, unsatisfactory, and non-self. In the Bhaddhekaratta Sutta, in reference to anatta, the Buddha instructs a practitioner, "that which is present he discerns — With insight as and when it comes." If not-self is merely treated as a strategy, what has it got to do with insight and clear discernment into the way things actually are? After realizing the truth, there is naturally letting go of I-making, but it is not due to 'taking not-self as a strategy to dissociate from things'. That would be far away from realizing the essence of anatta as described in Vajira Sutta (excerpt quoted below).
To understand what this realization of anatta entails, it is important first to understand exactly what this self-view is—the self-view that is relinquished permanently upon realization. The view of a self means believing or holding the view that there is an independent, unchanging, self-entity that persists from one moment to the next and one lifetime to another, and is the agent, controller or experiencer of stuff in life. "Self" thus has the quality of permanence, independence, separateness (separate from the flow of experiences), and agenthood (being the controller, perceiver, experiencer of things). If there is any such thing, it could qualify as Self. However, the realization of Anatta is that there is no such Self. It is the realization I described in my commentary on Bahiya Sutta: in seeing, there are no three things: the Seer, the seeing, and the seen. (Seer seeing seen) Instead, in the seeing, there is JUST the scene—that pure, vivid experience of scenery. That's it. No experiencer apart from the experience. This realization that "seer seeing seen" is a false view or perception of reality relinquishes the notion of a self or agent, but it does not establish a conceptual position such as "the self does not exist" because non-existence only pertains to an existent going into non-existence. This realization is not a new conceptual view to be held on to, but a complete freedom from self-view. In seeing JUST the seen, all notions pertaining to the existence or non-existence of self don't apply there.
If we look into the Buddha's discourses, the Buddha rejected views pertaining not only to the existence of self, but also to the non-existence of self, both the existence and non-existence of self, and neither the existence nor non-existence of self. These four extreme positions are utterly rejected by the Buddha.
In reality, self and dharma are neither existent nor non-existent (nor both, nor neither): since self and dharma have never arisen to begin with, they cannot be established or pinned down to begin with; therefore, self and dharma cannot go into non-existence, or be both or neither.
Here, the Buddha clarifies:
Buddha in Yamaka Sutta:
https://suttacentral.net/sn22.85/en/bodhi
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, is form permanent or impermanent?”—“Impermanent, friend.”…—“Therefore … Seeing thus … He understands: ‘… there is no more for this state of being.’
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form as the Tathagata?”—“No, friend.”—“Do you regard feeling … perception … volitional formations … consciousness as the Tathagata?”—“No, friend.”
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathagata as in form?”—“No, friend.”—“Do you regard the Tathagata as apart from form?”—“No, friend.”—“Do you regard the Tathagata as in feeling? As apart from feeling? As in perception? As apart from perception? As in volitional formations? As apart from volitional formations? As in consciousness? As apart from consciousness?”—“No, friend.”
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness taken together as the Tathagata?”—“No, friend.”
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathagata as one who is without form, without feeling, without perception, without volitional formations, without consciousness?”—“No, friend.”
“But, friend, when the Tathagata is not apprehended by you as real and actual here in this very life, is it fitting for you to declare: ‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death’?””
Buddha in Anuradha Sutta:
"Then, Anuraadha, since in this very life the Tathaagata is not to be regarded as really and truly existing, is it proper for you to declare of him: 'Friends, he who is a Tathaagata... can be described otherwise than in these four ways...'?"[5]
"No indeed, Lord."
"Good, good, Anuraadha. As before, so now I proclaim just suffering and the ceasing of suffering." - https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.086.wlsh.html
"A chariot is not asserted to be other than its parts,
Nor non-other. It also does not possess them.
It is not in the parts, nor are the parts in it.
It is not the mere collection [of its parts], nor is it their shape.
[The self and the aggregates are] similar."
"The mind that observes is also devoid of an ego or self-entity.
It is neither seen as something different from the aggregates
Nor as identical with these five aggregates.
If the first were true, there would exist some other substance.
This is not the case, so were the second true,
That would contradict a permanent self, since the aggregates are impermanent.
Therefore, based on the five aggregates,
The self is a mere imputation based on the power of the ego-clinging.
As to that which imputes, the past thought has vanished and is nonexistent.
The future thought has not occurred, and the present thought does not withstand scrutiny."
And Nagarjuna states:
“The Tathagata is not the aggregates; nor is he other
than the aggregates.
The aggregates are not in him nor is he in them.
The Tathagata does not possess the aggregates.
What Tathagata is there?”
And the Vajira Sutta states:
Then the bhikkhuni Vajira, having understood, "This is Mara the Evil One," replied to him in verses: "Why now do you assume 'a being'? Mara, have you grasped a view? This is a heap of sheer constructions: Here no being is found. Just as, with an assemblage of parts, The word 'chariot' is used, So, when the aggregates are present, There's the convention 'a being.' It's only suffering that comes to be, Suffering that stands and falls away. Nothing but suffering comes to be, Nothing but suffering ceases."
Notice that the Buddha said that you cannot find the self of the Tathagata within or apart from the five skandhas (aggregations): there is no Tathagata to be pinned down as a form-based or formless Truth or Reality. This means that the so-called 'self' actually cannot be found, located or pinned down as a reality just as the word 'weather' cannot be found or located as something inherently (independently, unchangingly) existing (apart from or within the conglomerate of ever-changing phenomena such as clouds, lightning, wind, rain, etc.)—the label 'self' is merely a convention for the five skandhas or the body-mind aggregates, which form a process of self-luminous (having the quality of luminous clarity, knowing, cognizance) but empty phenomenality, in which no truly existing 'self' can be found within or apart from them.
And if we cannot pin down an entity called 'self' to begin with, how can we assert the non-existence of a self, which would mean that an existent 'self' annihilates or goes into non-existence? To assert non-existence, you must have a base, an existent entity to begin with, that could become non-existent. If the convention 'self' is baseless to begin with, then existence, non-existence, both and neither become untenable positions.
"The great 11th Nyingma scholar Rongzom points out that only Madhyamaka accepts that its critical methodology "harms itself", meaning that Madhyamaka uses non-affirming negations to reject the positions of opponents, but does not resort to affirming negations to support a position of its own. Since Madhyamaka, as Buddhapalita states "does not propose the non-existence of existents, but instead rejects claims for the existence of existents", there is no true Madhyamaka position since there is no existent found about which a Madhyamaka position could be formulated; likewise there is no false Madhyamaka position since there is no existent found about which a Madhyamaka position could be rejected."
"Bhikkhus, as purified and bright as this view is, if you covet, cherish, treasure and take pride in it, do you understand this Dhamma as comparable to a raft, taught for the purpose of giving up [i.e. crossing over] and not for the purpose of grasping?" "No, venerable sir." "Bhikkhus, as purified and bright as this view is, if you do not covet, cherish, treasure and take pride in it, would you then know this Dhamma as comparable to a raft, taught for the purpose of giving up [i.e. crossing over] and not for the purpose of grasping?" "Yes, venerable sir."
Dependent Origination is too a raft; it is like the stick that stirs the fire and is eventually consumed by fire without leaving any trace.
"In other words, right view is the beginning of the noble path. It is certainly the case that dependent origination is "correct view"; when one analyzes a bit deeper, one discovers that in the case "view" means being free from views. The teaching of dependent origination is what permits this freedom from views."
Having said all these, I should also mention the pitfalls of calling Anatta not-self or non-self.
The contemplation of neti neti, or dissociation—the separation of the witness from the witnessed, Self from not-self, and so on—is done to 'support' a position of a true Self. So with regard to the phenomenal world of ever-changing things, I reject these as not me or mine, for I am the ultimate Witness that is perceiving all these.
This is the false View no. 4 described in Sabbasava Sutta:
"...As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self... or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine — the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions — is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will stay just as it is for eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress."
The commentary in Middle Length Discourses explains:
"of these six views, the first two represent the simple antinomy of eternalism and annihilationism; the view that ‘no self exists for me’ is not the non-self doctrine of the Buddha, but the materialist view that identifies the individual with the body and thus holds that there is no personal continuity beyond death. The next three views may be understood to arise out of the philosophically more sophisticated observation that experience has a built-in reflexive structure that allows for self-consciousness, the capacity of the mind to become cognizant of itself, its contents, and the body with which it is inter-connected. Engaged in a search for his 'true nature,' the untaught ordinary person will identify self either with both aspects of the experience (view 3), or with the observer alone (view 4), or with the observed alone (view 5). The last view is a full-blown version of eternalism in which all reservations have been discarded."
The eternalist view regarding consciousness was spelled out by the Buddha in DN1 and firmly rejected among dozens of other wrong views that he calls the net of views.
“In the fourth case, owing to what, with reference to what, are some honourable recluses and brahmins eternalists in regard to some things and non-eternalists in regard to other things, proclaiming the self and the world to be partly eternal and partly non-eternal?
“Herein, bhikkhus, recluse or a certain brahmin is a rationalist, an investigator. He declares his view—hammered out by reason, deduced from his investigations, following his own flight of thought—thus: ‘That which is called “the eye,” “the ear,” “the nose,” “the tongue,” and “the body”—that self is impermanent, unstable, non-eternal, subject to change. But that which is called “mind” (citta) or “mentality” (mano) or “consciousness” (viññāṇa)—that self is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and it will remain the same just like eternity itself.’
“This, bhikkhus, is the fourth case.
All these kinds of self-view end when one realizes anatta and dependent origination. The ending of all self-view is called stream entry in Theravada, and the stream entry of Mahayana is called first bhumi.
As we can see, contemplating and realizing the three characteristics has the effect of letting go of all attachments. This process does not in any way strengthen the subject-object dichotomy, the sense of an observer apart from the observed. Contemplating non-self in the Buddha's sense does NOT mean dissociation; it does not mean separating the observing self from the observed objects: it simply means contemplating non-self in the midst of directly experiencing pure sensations as they are, resulting in the insight into Anatta, and hence relinquishing ALL sense of self with regard to all sensations, including even the sense of an observer.
*Bahiya Sutta said, "Then, Bahiya, you should train yourself thus: In reference to the seen, there will be only the seen. In reference to the heard, only the heard. In reference to the sensed, only the sensed. In reference to the cognized, only the cognized. That is how you should train yourself. When for you there will be only the seen in reference to the seen, only the heard in reference to the heard, only the sensed in reference to the sensed, only the cognized in reference to the cognized, then, Bahiya, there is no you in terms of that. When there is no you in terms of that, there is no you there. When there is no you there, you are neither here nor yonder nor between the two. This, just this, is the end of stress."
Udana Sutta says, "Now, a well-instructed disciple of the noble ones — who has regard for noble ones, is well-versed & disciplined in their Dhamma; who has regard for men of integrity, is well-versed & disciplined in their Dhamma — does not assume form to be the self, or the self as possessing form, or form as in the self, or the self as in form. He does not assume feeling to be the self... does not assume perception to be the self ... does not assume fabrications to be the self... He does not assume consciousness to be the self, or the self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in the self, or the self as in consciousness.", "He discerns, as it actually is, not-self form as 'not-self form' ... not-self feeling as 'not-self feeling' ... not-self perception as 'not-self perception' ... not-self fabrications as 'not-self fabrications' ... not-self consciousness as 'not-self consciousness."
A lot of people think contemplating not-self means dissociation, and at first glance it may seem like a different set of instructions from the Bahiya Sutta, but actually it is exactly the same as the Bahiya Sutta. Many people think of not-self as meaning "does not assume form to be the self" (which means there could still be a person or witness dissociating himself from form), yet anatta is not only that, since it also negates “the self as possessing form, or form as in the self, or the self as in form” (no possibility of a witness or awareness which contains or observes form—form is just form without any referent of self—whether it is a self seen to be inside my body, or my body inside me as if I am a container-like awareness!), in other words, exactly as per Bahiya Sutta, “Then, Bahiya, you should train yourself thus: In reference to the seen, there will be only the seen.... only the cognized in reference to the cognized, then, Bahiya, there is no you in terms of that. When there is no you in terms of that, there is no you there. When there is no you there, you are neither here nor yonder nor between the two. This, just this, is the end of stress."
The Buddha also specifically rejected the notion of Self as infinite and formless (prevalent for those who hold the 'Ground of Being'/all-encompassing container of phenomena sort of Self-view) in Maha-nidana Sutta:
The one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as formless and infinite, either delineates it as formless and infinite in the present, or of such a nature that it will [naturally] become formless and infinite [in the future/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self formless and infinite obsesses him.
The Buddha is very clear that all sensations are without self in any form whatsoever—whether as an observer, a container, or something inhabiting forms like a soul in a body. He rejected all kinds of self-view and taught that the direct path to liberation is the practice of mindfulness as taught in Mahasatipatthana Sutta. His entire path of practice is in sync with his view and realization. He talked neither about Self nor about dissociation (he did talk about dispassion, which is important but an entirely different matter); he talked about the aggregates, the elements, the sensations and manifestations and their nature—empty of self, impermanent (dissolving, releasing, disjoint), unsatisfactory (ungraspable and passing—nothing is satisfying). He taught that by contemplating as such, you can gain insight, release, liberation.
So do not mistake anatta for neti-neti. The neti-neti (not this, not that) of Advaita self-inquiry is a process of dissociation; i.e., to reach or realize the fundamental true self, one must dissociate from all thoughts and concepts as being 'not self'. What remains in the absence of conceptual thoughts is the true self. In the absence of conceptual thoughts, a direct, non-conceptual realization of a palpable and undeniable presence-existence-consciousness arises, giving the feeling that one has touched the very core of one's existence itself. This experience should not, and in fact cannot, be denied. Nonetheless, the very framework of self-inquiry (“Who am I?” already presumes the purest identity) and the practice of dissociation are based on the existing framework of duality and inherency. The realization, experience, framework, and practice then all come together to strengthen that existing framework, in which it appears that there is a true Self behind and transcending all phenomena as the transcendental witnessing consciousness. One then fails to understand, until further investigation, that this realization and experience, while true, do not actually require the faulty framework that posits an inherent substantial reality. The pure presence discovered is simply another manifestation that does not convey anything 'ultimate', 'independent', or 'permanent'. In fact, all transient experiences turn out to have the same taste and intensity of luminosity and are all empty of self.
Anatta, on the other hand, is not a process of dissociation—it is first and foremost a dharma seal that is always and already so—always, in seeing, just the seen, never a seer; never was there a self. Secondly, the way of contemplating anatta is not via dissociation but via contemplative deconstruction. In other words, contemplating anatta as a truth doesn't set up opposites like true self vs not-self. There is no observer or Self that could dissociate from the observed. Instead, it is a process of deconstruction. Deconstruction means really challenging the idea of an inherent self, an inherent awareness, or a subject, by investigating experientially whether it holds up to reality. It deconstructs our idea of a 'seer-seeing-seen', or a 'self/Self', into its constituent components such that, in the end, we realize that there is no agent, no self/Self, and not even a super-Awareness transcending phenomena as an ultimate identity. Rather, the very notion of 'self/Self' or 'Awareness' is deconstructed into the impermanent constituents of experience (in seeing just the seen, in hearing just the heard, no seer/hearer). Thus, we realize that even what is known as 'Awareness' is also empty of any substantial self, being a mere convention for the flow of self-luminous phenomena. It is at this point that the Buddha says, "you can't pin down the Tathagata as a truth or reality even in the present life." He never said something like "the Tathagata is the truth and reality which is the pure consciousness transcending all forms" as his Advaita counterparts would put it.
Likewise, the dharma seal of Impermanence should be understood as a seal rather than as a method of dissociation (many people are doing dissociation via impermanence instead of realizing impermanence as a seal, a truth). As Thusness pointed out years ago, there is a difference between realizing impermanence (the attainment of stream entry is described as the opening of the dhamma eye which realizes that "Whatever is subject to arising is all subject to cessation.") and using it as a method of dis-identification and dissociation. Realizing impermanence as a seal leads to the perception of the disjointed, bubble-like and self-releasing aspect of phenomena and no-self. As Thusness said years ago, “With the right view, reality itself is [seen as] impermanence, and it has to bring about a new understanding and not enhance our dualistic and inherent tendencies. What is the use of teaching dis-identification and dissociation if the path leads to further inherent and dualistic thoughts?”
It is important to note here that from I AM to One Mind to No Mind and Anatta (Also see: Experience, Realization, View, Practice and Fruition), the self-luminosity is still as intense and important—it is not denied at all. Anatta does not deny luminosity. We're not saying “The Pure Consciousness of Advaita is bullshit”—nothing of that sort! In fact, the realization of anatta makes this experience of non-dual luminosity all the more effortless and intense! Every transient experience is naturally luminosity-bliss in anatta. So Anatta does not deny anything but simply deconstructs the view of inherency and duality we form about it. In the same way, the process of deconstructing the notion of a solid car with its own independent car-ness entity into its constituents (such as windows, engine, steering wheel, pedals, cooling system, etc.), where no car-entity can be pinned down, does not at any point in its inquiry deny the appearance/experience of what appears to be a car. Nonetheless, the entire notion of a solid car gets deconstructed, while the appearance remains as vivid as ever—in fact, even 'clearer' because there is no longer a layer of false notions obscuring its true face. As the old masters said, "Keep the experience, refine the view." One Awareness is deconstructed into the pure-consciousness of each of the six sense doors without a perceiving subject. The pure-consciousness of sight, the pure-consciousness of sound, and the pure consciousness of non-conceptual thought (the "I AMness") are all of the same intensity, yet are disconnected and radically different in manifestation, arising under different conditions; all are equally pure and empty. Every arising is one whole and complete manifestation. Presence/Luminosity/Awareness is not denied, but simply realized to be empty of self or substantiality.
As a side-topic:
"Who, O Lord, feels?"
"The question is not correct," said the Exalted One. "I do not say that 'he feels.' Had I said so, then the question 'Who feels?' would be appropriate. But since I did not speak thus, the correct way to ask the question will be 'What is the condition of feeling?' And to that the correct reply is: 'sense-impression is the condition of feeling; and feeling is the condition of craving.'"
As we can see, Dependent Origination only truly makes sense when we are not obscured by self-view. Before the realization of Anatta, D.O. can be grasped intellectually, but not fully actualized due to a dualistic view, and therefore cannot be fully appreciated. Hence, to realize D.O., we have to realize Anatta; then, when all phenomena are seen as causal processes, the insight into Shunyata (the second aspect of twofold emptiness: the emptiness of phenomena) can arise with further contemplations and pointers.
One last thing: although it is the case that all phenomena are empty of self, one must not go to the extreme by denying or rejecting conventional self or doer, which creates the problem of rejecting karmic responsibilities and so forth. In one of the scriptures, the Buddha talked about self-doer—basically, the idea is that you reap what you sow in terms of karmic cause and effect. Does this contradict the teaching of anatta? It does not.
What we have to understand here is that whenever the Buddha talks about self (in many places in the suttas), he is speaking about it purely as a conventional self. As Thusness told me in 2012, “To me [the matter] is just, is ‘Soh’ an eternal being... that's all. No denial of Soh as a conventional self.” There is no denial of a conventional self or doer, only of an inherently existing, changeless self/agent/doer existing in and of itself.
For example, in the Araham Sutta, the Buddha states:
[Deva:]
He who's an Arahant, his work achieved, Free from taints, in final body clad, That monk still might use such words as "I." Still perchance might say: "They call this mine." ... Would such a monk be prone to vain conceits?
[The Blessed One:]
Bonds are gone for him without conceits, All delusion's chains are cast aside: Truly wise, he's gone beyond such thoughts.[1] That monk still might use such words as "I," Still perchance might say: "They call this mine." Well aware of common worldly speech, He would speak conforming to such use.[2]
In the Potthapada Sutta, the Buddha states:
"In the same way, when there is a gross acquisition of a self... it's classified just as a gross acquisition of a self. When there is a mind-made acquisition of a self... When there is a formless acquisition of a self, it's not classified either as a gross acquisition of a self or as a mind-made acquisition of a self. It's classified just as a formless acquisition of a self.
"Citta, these are the world's designations, the world's expressions, the world's ways of speaking, the world's descriptions, with which the Tathagata expresses himself but without grasping to them." [10]
In the Dighanakha Sutta, the Buddha states:
"A bhikkhu whose mind is liberated thus, Aggivessana, sides with none and disputes with none; he employs the speech currently used in the world without adhering to it."
However, the Neo-Advaitins would not be able to accept this because they are unable to distinguish between the conventional and the ultimate; therefore, they reject conventional self, karma, afflictions, path, cessation (nirvana) and so forth.
Nagarjuna says:
"The Buddha's teaching of the Dharma is based on two truths: a truth of worldly convention and an ultimate truth. Those who do not understand the distinction drawn between these two truths do not understand the Buddha's profound truth. Without a foundation in the conventional truth the significance of the ultimate cannot be taught. Without understanding the significance of the ultimate, liberation is not achieved."
For further elucidations on the two truths based on the Madhyamika teachings, see Dependent Arising and the Emptiness of Emptiness: Why did Nagarjuna start with causation?
Update: 2/11/2014 — Another quotation on how “infinite and formless Self” is rejected by the Buddha
"For example, with the first misinterpretation — that the Buddha is denying the cosmic self found in the Upanishads — it turns out that the Upanishads contain many different views of the self, and the Buddha himself gives an analysis of those different kinds [§11]. He finds four main varieties. One is that the self has a form and is finite — for example, that your self is your conscious body and will end when the body dies. The second type is that the self has a form and is infinite — for example, the view that the self is equal to the cosmos. The third type is that the self is formless and finite. This is similar to the Christian idea of the soul: It doesn't have a shape, and its range is limited. The fourth view is that the self is formless and infinite — for example, the belief that the self is the infinite spirit or energy that animates the cosmos.
The Buddha says that each of these four varieties of self-theory comes in three different modes as to when and how the self is that way. One is that the self already is that way. Another is that the self naturally changes to be that way — for example, when you fall asleep or when you die. The third is that the self is changeable through the will. In other words, through meditation and other practices you can change the nature of your self — for example, from being finite to being infinite."
— Ven. Thanissaro
Buddha:
§11. "To what extent, Ānanda, does one delineate when delineating a self? Either delineating a self possessed of form and finite, one delineates that 'My self is possessed of form and finite.' Or, delineating a self possessed of form and infinite, one delineates that 'My self is possessed of form and infinite.' Or, delineating a self formless and finite, one delineates that 'My self is formless and finite.' Or, delineating a self formless and infinite, one delineates that 'My self is formless and infinite.' "Now, the one who, when delineating a self, delineates it as possessed of form and finite, either delineates it as possessed of form and finite in the present, or of such a nature that it will become possessed of form and finite [when asleep/after death], or he believes that 'Although it is not yet that way, I will convert it into being that way.' This being the case, it is proper to say that a fixed view of a self possessed of form and finite obsesses him. [Similarly with each of the other views.] — DN 15
Someone asked
1) My confusion here is—the sutta starts off with the Buddha saying that whatever there is to be seen/heard/sensed etc., that the Buddha knows. Then he says when seeing what is to be seen, he doesn't construe a seen. What does that mean? What's the difference between seeing and knowing what is to be seen, yet not construing a seen? There is clearly a difference between directly knowing a seen and construing a seen. So if he doesn't even construe a seen, then of course he wouldn't construe a seer either. But not construing a seen apparently doesn't mean he doesn't know a seen, so not construing a seer also wouldn't necessarily mean he doesn't know a seer.
2) Since none of the skandhas are Self, then even if there is a Self that is the Absolute, I'm not sure it would even make sense for that Self to be a "seer"/"cognizer" etc.
I replied
1) If there is a knower, then the Bahiya Sutta's 'in the seen, just the seen,' with no 'you in reference to that' in any way (in here, there, or in between), could not be realized.
2) If the skandhas are not Self, then an Advaitin would say that the Self, the Absolute, is that which knows—the unseen light which shines upon objects. All objects owe their temporal existence to the Uncaused Cause, the Great Light of Self. They are supported by Self, but Self is not supported by them.
The Buddha would reject all such notions of Self as 1) being equated with the aggregates, 2) being completely separate from and impercipient of the aggregates, and 3) being completely separate from, yet being the Agent which feels or perceives the aggregates:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.15.0.than.html
Buddha — “Assumptions of a Self”
"To what extent, Ananda, does one assume when assuming a self? Assuming feeling to be the self, one assumes that 'Feeling is my self' [or] 'Feeling is not my self: My self is oblivious [to feeling]' [or] 'Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious to feeling, but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling.'
"Now, one who says, 'Feeling is my self,' should be addressed as follows: 'There are these three feelings, my friend — feelings of pleasure, feelings of pain, and feelings of neither pleasure nor pain. Which of these three feelings do you assume to be the self?' At a moment when a feeling of pleasure is sensed, no feeling of pain or of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed. Only a feeling of pleasure is sensed at that moment. At a moment when a feeling of pain is sensed, no feeling of pleasure or of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed. Only a feeling of pain is sensed at that moment. At a moment when a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed, no feeling of pleasure or of pain is sensed. Only a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain is sensed at that moment.
"Now, a feeling of pleasure is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. A feeling of pain is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. A feeling of neither pleasure nor pain is inconstant, fabricated, dependent on conditions, subject to passing away, dissolution, fading, and cessation. Having sensed a feeling of pleasure as 'my self,' then with the cessation of one's very own feeling of pleasure, 'my self' has perished. Having sensed a feeling of pain as 'my self,' then with the cessation of one's very own feeling of pain, 'my self' has perished. Having sensed a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain as 'my self,' then with the cessation of one's very own feeling of neither pleasure nor pain, 'my self' has perished.
"Thus he assumes, assuming in the immediate present a self inconstant, entangled in pleasure and pain, subject to arising and passing away, he who says, 'Feeling is my self.' Thus in this manner, Ananda, one does not see fit to assume feeling to be the self.
"As for the person who says, 'Feeling is not the self: My self is oblivious [to feeling],' he should be addressed as follows: 'My friend, where nothing whatsoever is sensed (experienced) at all, would there be the thought, "I am"?'"
"No, lord."
"Thus in this manner, Ananda, one does not see fit to assume that 'Feeling is not my self: My self is oblivious [to feeling].'
"As for the person who says, 'Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious [to feeling], but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling,' he should be addressed as follows: 'My friend, should feelings altogether and every way stop without remainder, then with feeling completely not existing, owing to the cessation of feeling, would there be the thought, "I am"?'"
"No, lord."
"Thus in this manner, Ananda, one does not see fit to assume that 'Neither is feeling my self, nor is my self oblivious [to feeling], but rather my self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling.'
"Now, Ananda, in as far as a monk does not assume feeling to be the self, nor the self as oblivious, nor that 'My self feels, in that my self is subject to feeling,' then, not assuming in this way, he is not sustained by anything (does not cling to anything) in the world. Unsustained, he is not agitated. Unagitated, he is totally unbound right within. He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'
"If anyone were to say with regard to a monk whose mind is thus released that 'The Tathagata exists after death,' is his view, that would be mistaken; that 'The Tathagata does not exist after death'... that 'The Tathagata both exists and does not exist after death'... that 'The Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death' is his view, that would be mistaken. Why? Having directly known the extent of designation and the extent of the objects of designation, the extent of expression and the extent of the objects of expression, the extent of description and the extent of the objects of description, the extent of discernment and the extent of the objects of discernment, the extent to which the cycle revolves: Having directly known that, the monk is released. [To say that,] 'The monk released, having directly known that, does not see, does not know is his opinion,' that would be mistaken. [1]
— DN 15.
Venerable Dr. Walpola Rahula
"In the Dhammapada, there are three verses which are extremely important and essential in the Buddha’s Teaching. They are verses 277, 278, and 279 in Chapter 20:
277. All compound things are impermanent; those who realize this through insight-wisdom are freed from suffering. This is the path that leads to purity.
278. All compound things have suffering as their nature; those who realize this through insight-wisdom are freed from suffering. This is the path that leads to purity.
279. All states are without self; those who realize this through insight-wisdom are freed from suffering. This is the path that leads to purity.
The first two verses say: “All compound things (saṁkhārā) are impermanent” (sabbe saṁkhārā aniccā) and “All compound things have suffering as their nature” (sabbe saṁkhārā dukkhā). But the third verse says: “All states (dhammā) are without self” (sabbe dhammā anattā).
Here, it should be carefully observed that, in the first two verses, the word saṁkhārā “conditioned things, compound things” is used. But in its place in the third verse, the word dhammā “states” is used. Why does the third verse not use the word saṁkhārā “conditioned things, compound things” as in the previous two verses, and why does it use the term dhammā instead? Here lies the crux of the whole matter.
In the first two verses, the term saṁkhāra denotes the Five Aggregates, that is, all conditioned, interdependent, relative things and states, both physical and mental. If the third verse had said: “All saṁkhārā (“conditioned things, compound things”) are without self”, then, one might think that, although conditioned things are without Self, yet there may be a Self outside conditioned things, outside the Five Aggregates. It is in order to avoid misunderstanding that the term dhammā is used in the third verse.
The term “dhamma” is much wider than saṁkhāra. There is no term in Buddhist terminology wider than dhamma. It includes not only the conditioned things and states, but also the unconditioned, the Absolute, nibbāna. There is nothing in the universe or outside of it, good or bad, conditioned or unconditioned, relative or absolute, which is not included in this term. Therefore, it is quite clear that, according to this statement: “All states (dhammā) are without self”, there is no Self, no ātman, not only in the Five Aggregates, but nowhere else either outside them or apart from them.
This means, according to the Theravādin teaching, that there is no Self either in the individual (puggala) or in dhammas. The Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy maintains exactly the same position, without the slightest difference, on this point, putting emphasis on dharma-nairātmya as well as on pudgala-nairātmya."
— What the Buddha Taught by Walpola Rahula
Wrote to Christ Marti:
Actually, I would say it is more important to stress no-self than not-self. Not-self can be mistaken for Advaita's neti neti (rejecting everything as not-self in order to discover or assert a true self underneath or behind all the not-self). This is not the purpose of the Buddha's teachings, which are meant to elicit a realisation of the complete absence of an inherently existing self/Self, essence, substance, core, in or apart from the five aggregates.
The Vajira Sutta states:
Then the bhikkhuni Vajira, having understood, "This is Mara the Evil One," replied to him in verses: "Why now do you assume 'a being'? Mara, have you grasped a view? This is a heap of sheer constructions: Here no being is found. Just as, with an assemblage of parts, The word 'chariot' is used, So, when the aggregates are present, There's the convention 'a being.' It's only suffering that comes to be, Suffering that stands and falls away. Nothing but suffering comes to be, Nothing but suffering ceases."
Yin Ling
What do you think?
Question
If there's no self, what gets reborn?
Thanissaro Bhikkhu
The Buddha never said that there is no self. He never said that there is a self. The whole question of whether or not the self exists was one he put aside.
There's a common misconception that the Buddha started with the idea that there was no self and, in the context of no self, taught the doctrine of kamma, which makes no sense: If there's no self, nobody does the kamma and nobody receives the results, so actions and their results wouldn't matter, because there's no one choosing to act, and no one to suffer the results. But that's putting the context backwards.
Actually, the Buddha started with the reality of kamma, and then viewed ideas of "self" and "not-self" as types of kamma within that context. This means that he focused on seeing the way we define our sense of self as an action.
Then the question becomes, when is the act of identifying things as your self a skillful action, and when is it not? When is the act of identifying things as not-self a skillful action, and when is it not? When a healthy sense of self is needed to be responsible, self-reliant, and heedful of the future, it's a skillful action. When the perception of not-self helps you not to identify with desires that would lead to harm, it's a skillful action.
In other words, both "self" and "not-self" are strategies for achieving happiness. They should be used-and mastered-as needed for the sake of true happiness, and abandoned when no longer needed. So instead of getting involved in the tangle of trying to define what a self is and whether it exists, the Buddha advised treating "self" and "not-self" as processes to be mastered, as tools. Similarly with rebirth: He avoided talking about what gets reborn and instead focused on how it happens, as a process.
Because the process is a type of kamma, it's something you're responsible for, and it's also a skill you can master: either with relative skill, reaching a comfortable rebirth, or with consummate skill, learning how not to be reborn at all.
Source: Karma Q&A
By Thanissaro Bhikkhu
John Tan
I disagree and, to a certain extent, find it quite disappointing, IMO... lol. I do think that the refusal to look deeply into how our inherent linguistic structure works is what prevents genuine insights into anatta.
Going through a deconstruction process does allow us to have direct, real-time knowledge of how mental constructs affect the mind and to see that action does not require an agent as the initiator.
In MMK, although it is also taught that there is neither self nor no-self, it is taught from the standpoint of a “deconstruction” process (只破不立) to capture subtle traces of attachment to “inherentness”.
If we don't contemplate, we will be living in a hypnotic spell without knowing. If we contemplate, we can even see the difference between “I”, “mine” and “me” and experientially taste the difference in each phase of deconstructing “I”, “mine” and “me”, and witness the bliss and relief that come from freedom from them. We then slowly move on to other constructs like “body”, “production”, “physicality”, “causality”, etc.
To me, what is more difficult is how to express it “conventionally” using our clumsy subject-action-object framework. That is why I admire and am so amazed by those sincere scientists who always seek breakthroughs in their own “framework”.
Without disrespect, I think Alan Watts expressed it better and had a far clearer insight.
Soh Wei Yu
Kyle Dixon is always criticizing Thanissaro, and I also like his posts on this matter:
Krodha/Kyle Dixon:
The point is that anātman is not intended to be a sort of apophatic exercise as Thanissaro suggests. Rather it is the lack of a svabhāva or inherent self in the mind. The prevailing issue with Thanissaro’s approach is that you have people who wrongly assert that the Buddha never said there is no self, which is an absurd misconception. The Buddha clearly and routinely says there is no self to be found in any phenomena anywhere.
Now, does this negate the action of “taking out the trash” as you mention, no, because that is a conventional action performed by a conventional self. We as Buddhists, do not negate the validity of conventional activities and entities as these things appear, we simply state that all conventional designations are ultimately only nominal in nature. Nominal, meaning inferential in the sense that the associated imputation suggests the validity of an entity, however if we investigate the basis of said imputation, the entity cannot actually be found because it is merely an abstraction. A useful abstraction, but not actually established or real.
In this way you can be a conventional individual who takes out the trash and performs many activities, but like an image of a tiger in a dream, there is no actual tiger present. The same goes for the appearance of you as a conventional individual taking the trash out, there is not actually an individual there when the imputed self is keenly scrutinized.
I also like what Kyle Dixon said before:
I genuinely feel that while Thanissaro Bhikkhu’s contributions to dharma are great in terms of his translations, that he does a great disservice to people trying to understand this profound dharma by promulgating this “not-self” apophatic misinterpretation of anātman. The parroting of this view is so prevalent nowadays, I do indeed feel it is necessary to object when I see it expressed. Especially in the lazy way it is usually demonstrated in brief tag line comments with no unpacking of the alleged logic behind the claim, such as, “the Buddha never said there is no self,” or “anatta doesn’t mean no self.”
To me this is an expression of this degenerate yūga and is a poisoning of buddhadharma. So while sure, I can be more gentle and polite about it if we are concerned about the tone, I very much take issue with these views, and while I am being assertive rather than hostile, I’ll concede and find a better way to communicate my utter disagreement with said views if that is deemed necessary.
I’ve also been writing against Thanissaro’s stuff since 2011, lol: https://www.awakeningtoreality.com/2011/10/anatta-not-self-or-no-self_1.html
Someone wrote
Anatta means Not-self. It does not mean no-self. This is a common misunderstanding many Buddhists of both East and West have, especially Western ones.
It is saying that defilements are not self.
A story from Pali Canon:
[Vacchagotta:] “How is it, Master Gotama, is there a self?”
The Buddha remained silent. [Vacchagotta:] “Then how is it, Master Gotama, is there no self?”
The Buddha again remained silent.
Vacchagotta got up from his seat and went away.
The Buddha turned to his attendant Ananda and said: “If I had answered, ‘there is a self,’ this would have been siding with those who are eternalists ...
and if I had answered, ‘there is no self,’ that would have been siding with those who are nihilists...” [S. 44:10, pp. 1393-4]
Krodha/Kyle Dixon replied
According to Bhante Sujato and Bhikkhu Bodhi, the above sutta is the Buddha remaining silent in order to prevent Vacchagotta from adopting an annihilationist view where a self that previously existed ceases to exist. The Buddha was not being silent about the status of a self. Thanissaro misconstrues this text as the Buddha being neutral or refusing to take a position on the self, but that is a novel view of his own, and inaccurate.
Update: More posts by Kyle Dixon in 2024
You are citing an excerpt that is cautioning against intellectual identification with a “view,” meaning a conceptual conclusion divorced from experiential realization. Akin to merely identifying with the idea that sugar is “sweet” and attaching to that mere view without having actually tasted sugar experientially.
This is not a rejection that there ultimately is no self. It is obvious from the Buddha’s teachings on the skandhas, āyatanas and dhātus that there is no self as a core entity within that nexus. Further, the Buddha is very clear that there is no self in any conditioned or unconditioned phenomena, which exhausts the gamut of possibilities in which a self could reside.
“Non self” and “no self” are identical views. u/optimistically_eyed (since you’re involved in this discussion).
To add, I think monkey_sage’s comments about “no self” damaging the presentation of the Buddha’s teaching in the West are absurd and frankly abhorrent.
The definition of anātman is very clear; the Bodhisattvayogacaryācatuḥśatakaṭikā states:
Ātman is an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is an intrinsic nature (svabhāva). The non-existence of that is selflessness (anātman).
The entire “no self” versus “not self” thing is total nonsense, they are identical in meaning. There is only one domain of anātman, and it is the absence of a self as a core essence that is the owner of characteristics or an agent of actions.
Here’s an old post I made:
There is a group of individuals who interpret anatta in an apophatic way based on SN 44:10, and Thanissaro Bhikkhu’s insistence on “not self,” but the conclusion drawn is illogical, given that the consequence of “not self” would still be absence of a self. They assert there is no outright negation of a self, even though the Pāli suttas state sabbe dhamma anatta repeatedly, these individuals sometimes even believe the prospect of some sort of self that is exempt from “all dhammas” is somehow plausible.
This idea from Thanissaro is not an official position given that other Theravadins like Bhante Sujato disagree. Bhante Sujato says this idea that the Buddha refused to answer is false and that Thanissaro’s assertion to that end is flawed or incomplete. Sujato cites Bhikkhu Bodhi for clarification, and explains that the silence in that one particular instance was to keep Vacchagotta from adopting a view of annihilationism where a self currently exists and then ceases to exist.
But Thanissaro is very popular so people consider his view authoritative. Arguably, as I’ve witnessed, adopting this “not-self” view as a process that does not make an ultimate claim regarding the impossibility of a substantial self results in an indifferent, indiscriminate no-man’s land of a position on anatta that injures the import and intention of the view.
The real meaning of anātman is selflessness, lack of self, without self, no self, absence of self and so on. The realization of anātman, which is the absence of the background substrate which the self or entity is imputed onto, is the insight that brings about the species of awakening that the buddhadharma champions.
If the consequence of “not self” is not “no self,” as in an absence of a substantial selfhood, then “not-self” as a gloss and principle is an inadequate exercise in apophatic theology which will not go the distance. Still, the logical consequence of “not-self” is the same if the import of anātman in both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas is properly understood. Thus even if not-self is the exercise one chooses, then all phenomena and non-phenomena should be understood to be “not self” and then there is no self to be found anywhere, and the same consequence is made apparent.
A lack of an inherent self is not annihilation, but the doorway to actualizing our true modality of cognition as gnosis [jñāna]. As Śākyamuni Buddha states in the Śatasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra:
If it asked what is the samadhi known as the lamp of gnosis [jñāna], abiding in that samadhi is clearly explained as the absence of self in phenomena and persons.
September 2026 update: Krodha on “no self” and “not self”
You’re describing a non-Buddhist view similar to Advaita Vedānta.
Misinterpreting it can get very close to an affirmation of non-existence, which is a form of annihilationism - which the Buddha rejected.
Annihilationism is the view that something previously existent ceases to exist. However if the self or observing aspect was never actually there to begin with, this avoids the error of annihilationism (ucceda).
Like he says in the video, Anatta is like a "screwdriver". A tool for practice.
Anattā is not a tool or method, it is a dharma seal that is meant to be realized nonconceptually.
"The victorious ones have declared that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. Those who take emptiness as a view are said to be incurable." Perhaps taking Anatta as a view carries the same prognosis.
Views are not an issue if one understands they are merely conceptual and inferential. This issue of views can be compared to descriptions of the taste of sugar. Grasping to any conceptual descriptions or “views” about the taste of sugar is not the actual, nonconceptual and experiential taste of sugar. If someone mistakenly grasped at a description of the taste of sugar without having actually tasted sugar then we could reasonably say they are caught in a “thicket of views,” and have missed the mark in terms of aiming to obtain the direct and nonconceptual taste. Hence the teachings related to this point state "the view arises in him as true and established,” rather than the experiential insight arising in him as true and established. This is the point of contention and the point that the Buddha is clarifying.
The same goes for these topics that are potentially left as mere "views." The experiential domain of these principles is something experience and taste. It cannot be relegated to a mere conceptual “view.” Nevertheless, there are conventional views that are more accurate than others, just as describing sugar as “sweet” is more accurate than “sour,” yet neither are THE taste.
This is why the Buddha states in the beginning of the sutta:
Monks, the ending of the fermentations is for one who knows and sees, I tell you, not for one who does not know and does not see.
The ending of fermentations is for those adepts who have tasted the domain of realization that reveals the nonconceptual nature of these truths. Those who know nonconceptually and see experientially. It is not for intellectuals who merely conceptualize and cling to views.
The tangle appears to come from identifying an experiencing subject as something the mind can grasp as a concept, thereby turning it in to an experienced object, albeit a purely mental one. It's like firing an arrow at a target that is impossible to hit, and then declaring either "wherever the arrow hit must be an extension of the self" – Brahman, The Advaita Vēdanta position – or "there is no self because it cannot be hit" – the radical no self interpretation. Obviously both of those conclusions are absurd.
The presence of the subject that anattā addresses isn’t completely conceptual, it is also nonconceptual in certain ways. One has a visceral experience of being a seer of sights, or a hearer of sound, this substratum is rooted in conceptual grasping but itself becomes nonconceptual.
Conversely, when that inner aspect collapses that too is nonconceptual, it isn’t a conceptual conclusion. Ordinary sentient beings experience an internal domain of experience, yet those who awaken to anattā do not, it is realized that it was never there to begin with.
The act of trying to experience the self via concepts, to hit the impossible target with the arrow, therefore breeds either eternalism, or annihilationism: everything is the target, or the target is an illusion. The radical shift to no-self seems to me to be in that latter camp.
If this involved a conceptual conclusion then sure, that would be an issue. The actual realization however is not a conceptual conclusion.
This kind of view is what a strictly not-self interpretation argues against. It addresses the radical no-self view as a misconception in the following way.
Sure, but the "no self" view is not a misconception, the "not-self" interpretation that is promulgated by teachers such as Ṭhānissaro and Amaro is novel and idiosyncratic. The actual Pāḷi teachings support what you are coining as the "radical no-self view," because they communicate that anattā is the absence of the subjective domain of experience. The Mahāyāna teachings also substantiate this understanding. Thus Ṭhānissaro et al., are the outliers in this respect, and their interpretation of anattā as a "tool" or "method" is not accurate.
Anatta is a concept, a tool to be used, and applied to experience.
It is not. Anattā is a dharma seal that is intended to be realized nonconceptually.
It doesn't address the presence of a subject
It certainly does, for example: Regarding anattā as the absence of the observer, the Buddha speaks of this in the Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā:
"Lord, this perfection of wisdom (prajñāpāramitā) is a perfection without a knower,” said Subhūti. “Because a knower is unfindable,” replied the Lord.
and,
Subhūti, because of the nonexistence of self, in the state of the absolute purity of the self a basis does not exist, up to because of the nonexistence of one who knows and one who sees, in the state of the absolute purity of one who knows and one who sees a basis does not exist. [...] Furthermore, Subhūti, you should know that a sentient being is nonexistent, up to one who knows and one who sees is nonexistent because a self is nonexistent.
In the awakened gnosis (jñāna) of a buddha, "one who knows" (jānaka) and "one who sees" (paśyaka) are both "nonexistent."
Also the Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā states:
Since a knower absolutely does not exist and cannot be apprehended, how could it be possible that it comes into being?
The Dharmasaṅgīti says:
All phenomena, because they are merely knowable and devoid of a knower, cannot be accepted. Phenomena cannot be taken seriously, but because they can at least be conceived of, ordinary foolish beings perceive a self in them when there is no self.
Even in the Pāḷi literature, the Buddha states in the Kāḷakārāmasutta:
He (a realized one) knows what is to be known, but does not conceive what is known, does not conceive what is unknown, does not conceive what is to be known, and does not conceive a knower.
With the recognition of selflessness there is an emptying out of both the “subject” and “object” aspects of experience. We come to understand that “I-making” and “mine-making” with regard to the mind and body as well as all external representations is deluded. When the recognition of selflessness is fully developed there is no longer any reification of substantial referents to be experienced in relation to subjective grasping. Whatever is seen is merely the seen (diṭṭhamatta). Whatever is heard or sensed is merely the heard (sutamatta) and merely the sensed (mutamatta). Whatever is known is merely the known (viññātamatta).
This is explained in Ud 1.10 Bāhiyasutta:
‘The seen will be merely the seen, the heard will be merely the heard, the sensed will be merely the sensed, the known will be merely the known.’ This is how you should train, Bāhiya.
When, Bāhiya, for you the seen will be merely the seen, the heard will be merely the heard, the sensed will be merely the sensed, the known will be merely the known, then Bāhiya, you will not be that. When, Bāhiya, you are not that, then Bāhiya, you will not be there. When, Bāhiya, you are not there, then Bāhiya, you will be neither here nor beyond nor between-the-two. Just this is the end of suffering
When there is no self to be found one’s experience becomes very simple, direct, and uncluttered. When seeing, there is only the seen, that’s all. There is no separate “seer.” The seer is entirely dependent upon or more accurately, extrapolated from the seen via delusion, conceptual imputation and subsequent grasping. There can be no seer independent of the seen. There is no separate, independent subject or self.
An internal observer of externally observed phenomena is the format of dualistic consciousness (vijñāna), this is how the cognition of ordinary beings is structured, due to the afflictive influences of ignorance (avidyā) and grasping. This error in cognition is the root of saṃsāra, and all proliferation that occurs due to that cause is precisely the nature of saṃsāra. Again, the Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā:
These phenomena do not exist in the way that foolish ordinary people have settled down on them. These beings, having themselves constructed unreal phenomena and apprehended them, have the perception of a being where there is no being, the perception of form where there is no form, the perception of feeling…, perception…, volitional factors…, and consciousness (subject-object duality) where there is no consciousness, up to the perception of compounded and uncompounded dharmas where there are no compounded and uncompounded dharmas. With their minds distorted because of the error of constructing the unreal, they accumulate physical, verbal, and mental karma and are not freed from the five forms of life in saṃsāra.
Realized beings, such as āryas and buddhas, do not have dualistic consciousness, but instead have gnosis (jñāna). Gnosis (jñāna) is essentially, the emptiness of dualistic consciousness (vijñāna), but also the natural state of one's consciousness, the luminosity (prabhāsvara) or "purity" of the mind. This is what anattā (anātman) is referring to.
The Akṣayamatinirdeśa defines vijñāna and jñāna:
The arising of consciousness from observation, the arising of consciousness from mental application, and the arising of consciousness from conceptual thinking are "consciousness (vijñāna)."
That which is without apprehension, without reflection, without observation, without cognition, and without thought is "gnosis (jñāna).”
The self and so on, appears in vijñāna because of the subject-object duality, the self is the subject, the internal observer of allegedly external objects. In gnosis (jñāna) there is no self, no internal, subjective knower and likewise, there is no externally known objects.
Ordinary sentient beings are unrealized because they perceive subject-object duality and as a result, conceive of a self. Again, the Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā:
Someone who perceives an apprehended object has no attainment, has no clear realization, and has no unsurpassed, perfect, complete awakening [...] Subhūti, just the absence of an apprehended object is attainment, the attainment of just the absence of an apprehended object is clear realization, and just the absence of an apprehended object is unsurpassed, perfect, complete awakening.
The Sarvapuṇyasamuccayasamādhi states that awakened beings, āryabodhisattvas, do not conceive of a knower apart from what is known:
They [āryabodhisattvas] do not truly see any knowing apart from what is known.
The Saṃpūṭināmamahātantra states:
Natural luminosity is free from all concepts, free from being covered by the taints of desire and so on, [free from being covered] with subject and object, the supreme being has said that is supreme nirvāṇa. All phenomena are naturally luminous, because all phenomena do not arise from the start, it is termed “nonarising” by the mind.
This polarity of subject and object which manifests in the cognitive experience of ordinary deluded beings (pṛthagjanas) is what anattā is addressing.
and states that non of it can possibly be the self.
Instead of "the self" in a monolithic sense, it would be better to say none of it can possibly be "a self." None of these things you have listed are a self, and when all of these factors are accounted for and have been rendered unfit to serve as the basis for a self, then there is no basis for a self.
Anatta points out that they cannot be the self, because they are being experienced, they are objects of experience.
Sure, but this assumes there is a subject of experience that objects manifest in relation to, when there isn't in actuality.
When one then applies the concept of Anatta to the subject one is trading the horse for the cart, mistaking a tool for a view, a sign for a meaning.
The tool is a view, until it isn't. Just as the taste of sugar can be described as "sweet" yet that description is not the actual, experiential and nonconceptual taste. This is all the notion of a "view" is addressing. To not mistake the map for the territory.
It's a tangle, and it leads to annihilationsim.
Again, annihilationism is predicated on the idea that something that was one established ceases to exist and hence becomes nonexistent.
The difference here with anattā is that one realizes that there never was a self or an internal substratum that said self is imputed upon from the very beginning. The self lacks production from the start (ādyanutpannatvād) and therefore its absence is not annihilation (ucceda) just as someone cannot steal money from a bank account that has been empty from the start.
Anatta is not something to be realised
Anatta 100% is without any doubt something to be realized. Anyone who says otherwise does not understand the principle.
Anatta is a concept that can be illuminated through discussion.
This is simply false. The idea of anattā surely can be communicated in discussion, as we are doing now, but the actual domain of anattā cannot be "illuminated through discussion," anymore than the actual taste of sugar can be apprehended through discussing what "sweetness" is.
It's not something that requires Bhavana to realise
Anattā may not require bhāvanā to realize, but those who awaken to anattā without bhāvanā and samādhi are exceptionally rare. For the vast majority of practitioners, bhāvanā of some sort is an essential prerequisite for obtaining realization.
It is a barebones simple concept that applies to all experience.
The realization of anattā is to go beyond birth and death my friend, it is not just a simple concept that one can ascertain through discussion.
The profundity of it applies when it is used as a tool to traverse the subtle experiences of Samadhi so that someone doesn't fall in to a trap of misinterpretation, taking an object of experience as subject.
This is not what anattā is.
The purified mind is that which has freed itself from all such traps, in deep Samadhi, using Anatta as a tool. Without it one gets in a tangle.
The purified mind is the gnosis of selflessness that is ascertained through direct, experiential and nonconceptual realization.
What you are proposing is a caricature of anattā.
How does an inherently non-existent subject realise Anatta?
The one who realizes is always only conventional in nature. In reality there is no realizer, an agent or subject is always a secondary imputation.
The Dharmadhātuprakṛtyasambhedanirdeśa:
The mind that practices the path has no intrinsic existence, is not real, and does not occur. And that which is nonexistent, unreal, and non-occurring knows neither arising, disintegration, nor remaining. That which neither arises, disintegrates, nor remains cannot be bound and cannot be liberated. It knows neither attainment nor realization. Venerable ones, it was with this in mind that youthful Mañjuśrī said, "Within the nature of the dharmadhātu there is neither affliction nor purification. Nobody ever attains anything; there is no realization and no liberation."
The premise for how this realization functions is that the mind is innately free of subject-object duality, however through ignorance and grasping the deluded framework of a subject which abides in relation to objective phenomena manifests. In realization, there is simply a cessation of the cause of that afflicted framework. What is the cause? Ignorance (avidyā). So-called “realization” is just a cessation of avidyā.
When that cessation is communicated we say realization happened, but in reality this event simply exposes the reality of the mind that has been free of a self from the very start.
If I place faith in the idea that I just don't understand, and that not-self, an inherent lack of subject can indeed be realised, then how is that different from placing faith in annihilationism?
Annihilationism (ucceda) is an existent becoming a nonexistent. The realization of anattā is like a mirage mistaken to be an oasis. When one recognizes that the oasis has always been a mirage from the very start, does an existent oasis cease and become a nonexistent? No. The oasis was never there from the start, all that ceases is one’s own ignorance about that appearance.
There is nothing in the Suttas where the Buddha denies the self,
“Sabbe dhamma anatta” isn’t enough for you?
The relevant Pali term is anattasañña. "The perception of anatta". That is a mental fabrication,
Some argue that anattasañña is intended to indicate a domain of experiential realization.
I've been taught that sañña indicates "recognition." For example, AN 10.60 Girimānanda Sutta:
Now what, Ānanda, is the recognition of selflessness? Here, Ānanda, a monk, gone to the wilderness, to the root of a tree, or to an empty place, discriminates thus: ‘The eye is not-self, forms are not-self; the ear is not-self, sounds are not-self; the nose is not-self, odors are not-self; the tongue is not-self, flavors are not-self; the body is not-self, tactual objects are not-self; the mind is not-self, phenomena are not-self.’ Thus he abides contemplating selflessness with regard to the six internal and external sensory spheres. This, Ānanda, is called the recognition of selflessness.
Uprooting the conceit "I am" and thereby achieving unbinding is something to be realized. Abiding in the perception of not-self is a means of making that realization happen.
The conceit of "I am" and the self are the same thing, thus in uprooting "I am" along with I-making and mine-making, one realizes selflessness.
Is there a reason why you’re ignoring the work done by Mahayana and Vajrayana vehicles
They're a Pali Canon purist, i.e., a fundamentalist.
For most of the slog, it's about use the perception of not-self as a tool for disidentifying with various hindrances, obstacles, defilements.
The only people I see promoting this idea of "selflessness as a tool" are those who follow Ṭhānissaro. Of course they base this view on their interpretation of the Pali literature, but I don't really agree as to the veracity of that interpretation.
For example, in Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna, selflessness is never related to as a tool, it is simply treated as axiomatic. Everything is innately selfless from the very start, but we are unable to see this because of our delusion. Therefore, we endeavor to eliminate that delusion, and that in turn uproots the affliction of the self.
This is never done by leveraging selflessness as a "tool" in the sense of taking inventory of our experience piece by piece and applying selflessness to it. One can do that of course if they wish, and it seems like Ṭhānissaro's teachings involve this type of contemplation, but whether that is efficacious I can't say - its emphasis is idiosyncratic in my opinion, essentially limited to Ṭhānissaro and his cohorts.
Recognizing something or someone involves perception, labeling, ascribing meaning to, designating: "That's grandpa"
Right, the mind is able to recognize.
So in the translation you supplied "the recognition of selflessness" means recognizing/perceiving that none of the the six sense spheres are self. You look at them in turn and understand that they aren't me or mine.
The writeup on this topic that I find to be a compelling analysis of the Pali literature comes from a forummer who went by nana/jnana, he writes:
The Recognition of Selflessness (Anattasaññā) PART 1:
Look at the world and see its emptiness Mogharāja, always mindful,
Eliminating the view of self, one goes beyond death.
One who views the world this way is not seen by the king of death.
— Sutta Nipāta 5.15, Mogharājamāṇavapucchā
The contemplation of selflessness is given in AN 10.60 Girimānanda Sutta:
Now what, Ānanda, is the recognition of selflessness? Here, Ānanda, a monk, gone to the wilderness, to the root of a tree, or to an empty place, discriminates thus: ‘The eye is not-self, forms are not-self; the ear is not-self, sounds are not-self; the nose is not-self, odors are not-self; the tongue is not-self, flavors are not-self; the body is not-self, tactual objects are not-self; the mind is not-self, phenomena are not-self.’ Thus he abides contemplating selflessness with regard to the six internal and external sensory spheres. This, Ānanda, is called the recognition of selflessness.
In practice, we need to be able to recognize this absence of self in our immediate experience: When seeing, there is the coming together of visible form, the eye, and visual consciousness. When hearing, there is the coming together of sound, the ear, and auditory consciousness. When touching, there is the coming together of tactual sensation, the body, and tactile consciousness. When thinking, there is the thought, the mind, and mental consciousness. These processes arise simply through ‘contact.’ When a sense faculty and a sensory object make contact, the corresponding sensory consciousness arises. This entire process occurs through specific conditionality (idappaccayatā). There is no independent, fully autonomous agent or self controlling any of this.
An independent, autonomous self would, by definition, be:
- permanent
- satisfactory
- not prone to dis-ease
- fully self-determining (be in complete autonomous control of itself)
Thus, what is being negated is a permanent, satisfactory self which is not prone to old age, sickness, and death. As SN 22.59 Pañcavaggiya Sutta (abridged) states:
Monks, form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, and consciousness are not-self. Were form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, or consciousness self, then this form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, and consciousness would not lead to dis-ease.
This criterion of dis-ease is the context for the following statement that:
None can have it of form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, or consciousness: ‘Let my form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, or consciousness be thus, let my form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, or consciousness be not thus.’
By engaging in sustained, dedicated contemplation we find only impermanent processes, conditionally arisen, and not fully self-determining. First we clearly see that all conditioned phenomena of body and mind are impermanent. Next we come to see that whatever is impermanent is unsatisfactory in that it can provide no lasting happiness. Then we realize that all impermanent, unsatisfactory phenomena of body and mind are not-self — they can’t be the basis for a self, which by definition would be permanent and (one would hope) satisfactory.
This relationship between the recognition of impermanence, the recognition of unsatisfactoriness, and the recognition of selflessness is illustrated in the following diagram.
With the recognition of selflessness there is an emptying out of both the “subject” and “object” aspects of experience. We come to understand that “I-making” and “mine-making” with regard to the mind and body as well as all external representations is deluded. When the recognition of selflessness is fully developed there is no longer any reification of substantial referents to be experienced in relation to subjective grasping. Whatever is seen is merely the seen (diṭṭhamatta). Whatever is heard or sensed is merely the heard (sutamatta) and merely the sensed (mutamatta). Whatever is known is merely the known (viññātamatta).
This is explained in Ud 1.10 Bāhiya Sutta:
‘The seen will be merely the seen, the heard will be merely the heard, the sensed will be merely the sensed, the known will be merely the known.’ This is how you should train, Bāhiya.
When, Bāhiya, for you the seen will be merely the seen, the heard will be merely the heard, the sensed will be merely the sensed, the known will be merely the known, then Bāhiya, you will not be that. When, Bāhiya, you are not that, then Bāhiya, you will not be there. When, Bāhiya, you are not there, then Bāhiya, you will be neither here nor beyond nor between-the-two. Just this is the end of unsatisfactoriness.
When there is no self to be found one’s experience becomes very simple, direct, and uncluttered. When seeing, there is the coming together of visible form, the eye, and visual consciousness, that’s all. There is no separate “seer.” The seer is entirely dependent upon the seen. There can be no seer independent of the seen. There is no separate, independent subject or self.
The Recognition of Selflessness (Anattasaññā) PART 2:
This is also the case for the sensory object. The “seen” is entirely dependent upon the eye faculty and visual consciousness. There can be no object seen independent of the eye faculty and cognition. This is the case for all possible sensory objects. There is no separate, independent sensory object.
The same holds true for sensory consciousness as well. “Seeing” is entirely dependent upon the eye and visible form. There can be no seeing independent of the eye and cognition. This is the case for all possible sensory cognitions. There is no separate, independent sensory consciousness.
It’s important to understand this experientially. Let’s take the straightforward empirical experience of you looking at this screen right now as an example. Conventionally speaking, you could describe the experience as “I see the computer screen.” Another way of describing this is that there’s a “seer” who “sees” the “seen.” But look at the screen: are there really three independent and separate parts to your experience? Or are “seer,” “sees,” and “seen,” just three conceptual labels applied to this experience in which the three parts are entirely interdependent?
The “seer,” “seen,” and “seeing” are all empty and insubstantial. The eye faculty, visible form, and visual consciousness are all interdependent aspects of the same experience. You can’t peel one away and still have a sensory experience — there is no separation. AN 4.24 Kāḷakārāma Sutta:
Thus, monks, the Tathāgata does not conceive an [object] seen when seeing what is to be seen. He does not conceive an unseen. He does not conceive a to-be-seen. He does not conceive a seer.
He does not conceive an [object] heard when hearing what is to be heard. He does not conceive an unheard. He does not conceive a to-be-heard. He does not conceive a hearer.
He does not conceive an [object] sensed when sensing what is to be sensed. He does not conceive an unsensed. He does not conceive a to-be-sensed. He does not conceive a senser.
He does not conceive an [object] known when knowing what is to be known. He does not conceive an unknown. He does not conceive a to-be-known. He does not conceive a knower.
Sensory consciousness can’t be isolated as separate and independent. Nor can any of these other interdependent phenomena. Even the designations that we apply to these various phenomena are entirely conventional, dependent designations. But this doesn’t mean that we should now interpret our experience as being some sort of cosmic oneness or unity consciousness or whatever one may want to call it. That's just another empty, dependent label isn’t it? The whole point of this analysis is to see the emptiness of all referents, and thereby stop constructing and defining a “self.”
The purpose of correctly engaging in the contemplation of selflessness is stated in AN 7.49 Dutiyasaññā Sutta:
‘The recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, monks, when developed and cultivated, is of great fruit and benefit; it merges with the death-free, has the death-free as its end.’ Thus it was said. In reference to what was it said?
Monks, when a monk’s mind frequently remains acquainted with the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, his mind is rid of “I-making” and “mine-making” with regard to this conscious body and externally with regard to all representations, and has transcended conceit, is at peace, and is well liberated.
If, monks, when a monk’s mind frequently remains acquainted with the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, his mind is not rid of “I-making” and “mine-making” with regard to this conscious body and externally with regard to all representations, and has not transcended conceit, is not at peace, and is not well liberated, then he should know, ‘I have not developed the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, there is no stepwise distinction in me, I have not obtained the strength of development.’ In that way he is fully aware there.
But if, monks, when a monk’s mind frequently remains acquainted with the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, his mind is rid of “I-making” and “mine-making” with regard to this conscious body and externally with regard to all representations, and has transcended conceit, is at peace, and is well liberated, then he should know, ‘I have developed the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, there is stepwise distinction in me, I have obtained the strength of development.’ In that way he is fully aware there.
‘The recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, monks, when developed and cultivated, is of great fruit and benefit; it merges with the death-free, has the death-free as its end.’ Thus it was said. And in reference to this it was said.
Here we get to the heart of the matter, which is one of the most subtle aspects of the Buddhadhamma. Simply stated: when ignorance ceases, belief in self simultaneously ceases. And when there is no self to be found, then there is no self to die or take birth. This right here is “death-free.” And it is precisely this that the Buddha is declaring when he says to Mogharāja:
Look at the world and see its emptiness Mogharāja, always mindful,
Eliminating the view of self, one goes beyond death.
One who views the world this way is not seen by the king of death.
When one completely abandons the underlying tendencies which give rise to mistaken apprehensions of a self — any and all notions of “I am” — then there is no self to die.
This stilling of the “currents of conceiving” over one’s imagined self, and the resulting peace that is empty of birth, aging, and death, is straightforwardly presented in MN 140 Dhātuvibhaṅga Sutta:
‘He has been stilled where the currents of conceiving do not flow. And when the currents of conceiving do not flow, he is said to be a sage at peace.’ Thus was it said. With reference to what was it said?
Monk, “I am” is a conceiving. “I am this” is a conceiving. “I shall be” is a conceiving. “I shall not be” ... “I shall be possessed of form” ... “I shall be formless” ... “I shall be percipient” ... “I shall be non-percipient” ... “I shall be neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient” is a conceiving. Conceiving is a disease, conceiving is a cancer, conceiving is an arrow. By going beyond all conceiving, monk, he is said to be a sage at peace.
Furthermore, a sage at peace is not born, does not age, does not die. He is unagitated, and is free from longing. He has nothing whereby he would be born. Not being born, how could he age? Not aging, how could he die? Not dying, how could he be agitated? Not being agitated, for what will he long?
So it was in reference to this that it was said, ‘He has been stilled where the currents of conceiving do not flow. And when the currents of conceiving do not flow, he is said to be a sage at peace.’
Truly, “a sage at peace is not born, does not age, does not die.” In this way, when ignorance ceases, the entire complex of conditioned arising bound up with dissatisfaction also ceases. When all traces of “I-making” and “mine-making” are abandoned through the fully integrated threefold training of ethical conduct, meditation, and discernment, just this is dispassion (virāga). Just this is cessation (nirodha). Just this is extinguishment (nibbāna). Just this is without outflows (anāsava). Just this is not-born (ajāta), not-become (abhūta), not-made (akata), not-fabricated (asaṅkhata), endless (ananta), indestructible (apalokita), and yes, death-free (amata). It is freedom (mutti).
CONCLUDING PART 3, which wouldn't fit on the last post:
The Recognition of Selflessness and the Seven Factors of Awakening (Satta Bojjhaṅgā):
Sustained, dedicated practice of the recognition of selflessness will gradually create the optimal conditions for the arising of all seven factors of awakening. SN 46.73 Anatta Sutta (abridged):
Here monks, a monk develops the awakening factor of mindfulness accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of dhamma-investigation accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of energy accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of joy accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of tranquility accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of meditative composure accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of equanimity accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go.
It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that it is of great fruit and benefit. It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that one of two fruits is to be expected: either final gnosis in this very life or, if there is a residue of clinging, the state of nonreturning. It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that it leads to great good. It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that it leads to great security from bondage. It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that it leads to a great sense of urgency. It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that it leads to dwelling in great comfort.
His point is that anatta is in actuality, a state or realization that is attained. The actual recognition is the absence of a subject in the sensory faculties, no seer of seen, no hearer of sounds, no feeler of tactile sensations, no thinker of thoughts, etc.
Relegating anatta to a method or "tool" is an incomplete or at worst, incorrect definition of what the term intends.
There are many passages in the Canon where the Buddha or another disciple guides someone in doing exactly that. Going through the six senses for example, one by one, and applying selflessness to them. As just one example.
Sure, but that isn't what anatta is. That is just one method to approach the realization of anatta.
I'm not denying that in Buddhism there is a common adherence to the concept of no self. However, and this will sound radical and I'm sure some won't like it, I am saying that that may be a misinterpretation of the Dhamma.
Like u/dummetsz said, one can look to Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna to expand on this point, which is made quite clear. If one is unwilling to do that, I would say this indicates they are creating unnecessary obstacles for themselves, but some people seem to be fond of doing that for whatever reason. Not my business ultimately.
For example, in the Mahāyāna, the Buddha did teach that there is ultimately no self and that all phenomena are selfless.
The Dharmasaṅgīti says:
Ordinary foolish beings perceive a self in them when there is no self. […] Thus, emptiness should be understood through the absence of self. […] All phenomena, including all things sentient and insentient, are devoid of a self. […] All phenomena lack a self; they are naturally nondual.
The Lalitavistara:
Although all of this is without a self and is repulsive, beings perceive it as having a self and as beautiful.
The Brahmaviśeṣacintiparipṛcchā:
Immature, ordinary beings create duality by grasping at a self in their stream of being.
The Ajātaśatrukaukṛtyavinodana says:
Belief in the transitory collection [of aggregates] as a real self grows from the root of ignorance.
The Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra states:
Nirvāṇa means that the tathāgatas know that there is no self in the individual and no self in phenomena.
The Samādhirāja:
Those who have the conception of a self, they are unwise beings who are in error. You know that phenomena have no self, and so you are free of any error. […] You see the beings who are suffering because they maintain the view of a self. You teach the Dharma of no-self in which there is neither like nor dislike. […] Whoever holds to the concept of a self, they will remain in suffering. They do not know selflessness, within which there is no suffering. […] Those who perceive selflessness have no afflictions (kleśas). They know that all phenomena are like space.
The Ajātaśatrukaukṛtyavinodana:
Great King, to accept clothing, alms bowls, and food served and offered in a grand manner for the well-spoken Dharma-Vinaya is not an act of kindness. However, Great King, when you no longer have any doubt and uncertainty about the profound and sacred truth of the lack of self—then I will have been kind to you.
The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka states:
The one who knows emptiness and that phenomena are without self truly knows the enlightenment of the bhagavāns, of the buddhas.
The Drumakinnararājaparipṛcchā:
The nature of all phenomena and the self are the same— the self is selfless and intrinsically empty. Emptiness has the essential nature of space, and awakening always has the nature of space.
The Sāgaranāgarājaparipṛcchā:
All phenomena are without self and without creator. This is the reality of phenomena. However, childish ordinary beings who are mistaken, who are fixated in clinging to me and mine, develop the notion that there is a being where there is none. […] Phenomena have no self because they arise from causes and conditions.
The Samyagācāravṛttagaganavarṇavinayakṣānti:
All phenomena are free from a cognitive basis and lack a self. All phenomena are devoid of self and inexpressible. […] All phenomena lack a self. All phenomena are not apprehended. […] When one achieves consciousness that is devoid of a self and is free from the two views of the nature of the self, when the sense fields are undefiled, and when one is free from ownership and possession, this is the entrance to the gateway to the Dharma of nonduality.
The Dharmadhātuprakṛtyasambhedanirdeśa:
Leading sentient beings to the absence of self, it [the mind of omniscience] knows the self to be without self.
The Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā:
The māra of the Lord of Death is defeated by realizing phenomena to be selfless.
The Sūryagarbha:
Because you adhere to the perception of a self, your mind entertains mistaken views, you are thoroughly confused within the swamp of saṃsāra […] although phenomena are selfless, immature beings mistakenly pursue a sense of self.
The Rājadeśa:
The thought that perceives a self is the great enemy. While it is immaterial and without substance, it has dwelt with you since beginningless time. […] Brandish the whip of perseverance, draw the bow of concentration, and slay the perception of a self with the arrow of nonself and emptiness. […]This ‘I’ and ‘self’ do not exist. Imputed upon the aggregates, they are delusion. […] Thus, O King, if you meditate on nonself, saṃsāra and perceiving a self will be cut at the root.
My point is that this type of analysis is merely one method amongst countless, and that method is not what "anatta" is.
Anatta is the underlying dharma seal that one seeks to discover through whatever method is employed.
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Comments
Here's one familiar example of the verb, to be found in every Indian logic textbook:
vañjhāya putto na upalabbhati.
"A son of a barren woman is not to be found."
(Or as western philosophers would phrase it, " 'Son of a barren woman' does not obtain."). Elsewhere the same will be predicated of "horns of a hare", "flowers in the sky", etc.
And here arises the first point of controversy among translators and interpreters of this sutta: does the phrase "not to be obtained" mean the same as "not exist"? Ñāṇamoli, Bodhi and myself would answer yes. A mystically-inclined monk like Thanissaro would answer no. Unsurprisingly Thanissaro has chosen a rendering ("not pinned down") that stresses the epistemic or cognitive, and would tend to imply that a self does (or at least might) exist, but one that is too inscrutable to say anything about.
To continue, when the verb na upalabbhati is made into a present participle, the meaning would be "non-obtaining" (or more precisely, a "not-being-obtained-ness"). When this present participle is inflected in the locative case, then various meanings are possible, and here arises the second point of controversy. What function does the locative have in this context? There are three possibilities:
Spatial or situational stipulative: "Where there is a non-obtaining of self..."
Temporal stipulative: "When there is a non-obtaining of self...."
Causative: "Because there is a non-obtaining of self..."
Ñāṇamoli, Bodhi and I of course favour the causative, for the other two would leave a loophole that there might be some time or place where self does obtain. Thanissaro of course favours a reading that will leave his mysticism intact. So here too it's a case of our prior assumptions determining how we translate.
Now for "saccato thetato". Sacca means true or a truth; theta means sure, firm, or reliable, or something that has these features. Adding the suffix -to turns these words into adverbs. Here I'm not really sure about the relative merits of the above translations, or even if there is a difference between "X does not obtain as a truth" or "X does not in truth obtain." Not that this matters greatly; the crux of the matter is obviously the word anupalabbhamāne. The difference between my old rendering and the Ñāṇamoli/Bodhi one is that I had taken saccato thetato to be an adverbial qualification of anupalabbhamāne, whereas Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi make it more like an adjectival qualification of "self and what belongs to self." I now think that their rendering is more likely to be correct. At least it seems to accord better with the Ṭīkā to this sutta.
Best wishes,
Dhammanando Bhikkhu