Soh replied

I think this analysis badly misunderstands cognitive obscurations, right view, the “viewless view,” and prajñā. It takes a profound Buddhist teaching about emptiness, non-arising, dependent origination, and the exhaustion of svabhāva-view, and flattens it into a psychological theory about “certainty,” “identity,” and “not knowing.” That is not subtle. It is a serious confusion.

The basic error is this: you are treating cognitive obscuration mainly as “the I that thinks it knows.” That may describe one coarse form of egoic view-attachment, but it does not reach the Buddhist meaning of cognitive obscuration. Cognitive obscuration is not merely psychological identity around an opinion. It is the deeper reification of phenomena: the assumption that there are real objects, real subjects, real essences, real characteristics, real standpoints, real knowers, real knowns, real views, and real extremes of existence and non-existence.

So the problem is not only “I am attached to this view.” The deeper problem is that phenomena appear as inherently established in the first place. Even without an obvious emotional identity such as “I am an atheist,” “I am pro-life,” “I am a Buddhist,” or “I know better than you,” the mind can still be cognitively obscured by the appearance of svabhāva, by subject-object structure, by subtle essence-view, and by the sense that things are truly established from their own side.

That is what prajñā cuts through.

Prajñā is not a state of “who really knows?” It is not mere humility, agnosticism, neutrality, epistemic hesitation, or the inability to make assertions. Prajñā is discerning wisdom. It directly sees emptiness, dependent origination, and the absence of inherent existence. It sees that all phenomena are empty of svabhāva and therefore free from the extremes of existence, non-existence, both, and neither. That is not ignorance. That is the cure for ignorance.

Plain “not knowing” is nothing profound. If someone does not know whether phenomena are empty or inherently existent, that is not wisdom. If someone does not know whether there is self or no-self, that is not wisdom. If someone does not know whether the aggregates arise and cease dependently, that is not wisdom. That is simply ignorance. Calling it “openness” does not magically turn it into prajñā.

There is an important distinction between egoic certainty and wisdom-certainty. Egoic certainty contracts around a position: “I know, this is mine, this proves me, this makes me superior.” That is bondage. But wisdom-certainty is not that. Wisdom-certainty is the certainty born of direct realization. It is the certainty that self cannot be found. It is the certainty that phenomena are dependently arisen and empty. It is the certainty that appearance and emptiness are inseparable. It is the certainty that the extremes of inherent existence and inherent non-existence do not withstand analysis.

To attack certainty as such is therefore completely wrong. It confuses dogmatism with realization. It throws out the certainty of prajñā because it cannot distinguish it from the certainty of ego.

The Buddha was liberated by seeing, not by “not knowing”

The Buddha was not liberated by “not knowing.” The Buddha was liberated by seeing.

MN 72 makes this point unmistakable. When Vacchagotta asks about speculative views, the Buddha does not say, “I have no view because who really knows?” The point is that speculative positions have been put away because the Tathāgata has seen form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness, together with their arising and disappearance. In other words, the Buddha is free from speculative views because he has directly seen the aggregates and their dependent arising and cessation. His freedom from views is grounded in realization, not theoretical neutrality.

As the traditional line puts it: “The Perfect One is free from any theory (ditthigata), for the Perfect One has seen what corporeality is, and how it arises and passes away. He has seen what feeling ... perception ... mental formations ... consciousness are, and how they arise and pass away. Therefore I say that the Perfect One has won complete deliverance through the extinction, fading away, disappearance, rejection and casting out of all imaginings and conjectures, of all inclination to the “vain-glory” of ‘I’ and ‘mine.’” (MN 72)

That is the decisive point. The Buddha is not hovering in a fog of “maybe this, maybe that.” He is free from speculative views because direct seeing has destroyed the basis for speculative views. He is not free from views because he lacks knowledge; he is free from views because the conceits, imaginings, and metaphysical fixations rooted in “I” and “mine” have been exhausted through seeing.

SN 12.15, the Kaccānagotta Sutta, makes the same point from another angle. The Buddha rejects the two extremes of “everything exists” and “everything does not exist” by teaching dependent origination. But again, this is not uncertainty. The sutta says that one with right view has no uncertainty or doubt that what arises is merely suffering arising and what ceases is merely suffering ceasing, and that this knowledge is independent of others. That is not “who really knows?” That is right view.

This is also why the statement that “a view by itself is neutral” is too simplistic. A conventional perspective can be used flexibly, yes. A scientific model, a philosophical distinction, a pedagogical lens, or a provisional conceptual framework can be picked up and set down. But Buddhist “view” is not merely “one lens among many.” Wrong view is not neutral. Self-view is not neutral. Eternalism is not neutral. Nihilism is not neutral. The view that awareness is an ultimate root source is not neutral. The view that phenomena truly exist is not neutral. The view that phenomena truly do not exist is not neutral. These views bind because they structure perception and grasping.

Right view is not just another opinion. Right view is medicine. It is the corrective principle that deconstructs the delusion of self and phenomena. It is a raft, yes, but it is a raft that must actually cross the river. To say “all views are just lenses” before seeing emptiness is not wisdom; it is a relativistic bypass.

In my article “Experience, Realization, View, Practice, and Fruition (Revised),” I emphasized that practice requires the simultaneous advancement of view, realization, and conduct. It is not enough to “just practice hard,” because one can practice very hard and still remain trapped in wrong view. Correct view means understanding no-self, seeing that all things arise through causes and conditions, and seeing that phenomena are devoid of any substantial reality. Wrong views include eternalism, nihilism, self-view, and the various deluded views that lead to clinging. Every clinging arises from deluded view because ignorance imagines “things” and “self” in terms of existence or non-existence.

In that article I also said that awakening to no-self dissolves doubts about “I,” “mind,” “body,” “existence,” and “nonexistence,” and realizes with certainty that no real “I” can be found. This is the opposite of the idea that awakening is a cultivated inability to know. Awakening is the direct resolution of ignorance. It removes doubt because the basis of doubt — the imagined self, the imagined knower, the imagined essence, the imagined existence or non-existence of things — has been seen through.

Madhyamaka is not “I have no view”

This is where Ācārya Malcolm Smith’s point is crucial. Madhyamaka is not the simple-minded proposition “I have no view.” Malcolm’s point is more precise than that: when Nāgārjuna says in the Vigrahavyāvartanī that he has no thesis, this means he has no thesis concerning svabhāva as defined by his opponents. It does not mean Nāgārjuna has no views at all. Malcolm gives examples: Nāgārjuna “prefers the Sammitya view of karma” in the MMK, and Candrakīrti uses syllogisms even though some people mistakenly claim he never does. The issue is not “no reasoning, no assertion, no view, no knowledge.” The issue is not reifying svabhāva, and not treating emptiness itself as a substantially established position.

More carefully stated: Malcolm says that in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, Nāgārjuna does not hold a thesis about svabhāva in the way his opponents define svabhāva, but he also does not thereby become someone with no view at all. In that same context, Malcolm says Nāgārjuna states that there is no svabhāva in phenomena, and that Madhyamaka is not a simple-minded “I have no view” proposition. When the MMK ends by praising the Buddha for teaching the abandonment of all views, Malcolm explains that “all views” are summarized as the two extremes: substantial existence and non-existence. That is the point. “Abandoning all views” means abandoning the extreme views rooted in svabhāva. It does not mean refusing to know anything, refusing right view, or collapsing into epistemic fog. This is not to turn Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka into a positive metaphysical theory; it is to avoid the opposite mistake of turning Madhyamaka into a vague refusal to know or say anything.

This demolishes the idea that “certainty is the giveaway.” No. Reification is the giveaway. Selfing is the giveaway. Clinging is the giveaway. Treating svabhāva as findable is the giveaway. The inability to see dependent origination is the giveaway. But certainty itself is not the giveaway. It is perfectly possible to have decisive prajñā that svabhāva is untenable without turning that insight into a reified metaphysical identity. The Buddha can be certain about dependent origination without being a metaphysical dogmatist. A practitioner can be certain of anatta without creating a new ego around that certainty.

The pacification of views means realizing emptiness

Kyle Dixon’s explanation of the “absence of views” is also directly relevant. He says that absence of view does not mean refusing to engage concepts, remaining indifferent, or taking no position so that one can claim to have “no views.” The abandonment of all views means entering the middle way and seeing all dharmas as equal. This equality of dharmas is connected with the absence of characteristics, which is revealed through the realization of emptiness. When entities are realized to be non-arisen, the basis for imputing existence and non-existence collapses. Then views are pacified because their referent has been exhausted.

This is far more precise than “the I that thinks it knows.” Cognitive obscuration is not solved by becoming unsure. It is solved by realizing emptiness. It is solved by seeing the non-arising of entities. It is solved by seeing that the supposed basis of the view — the entity, self, object, essence, characteristic, standpoint — cannot be found. When there is no inherently established entity, “exists” and “does not exist” lose their footing. That is the pacification of views.

Kyle also makes the point that if one has not realized emptiness, one has no business talking about “lack of view,” because one still perceives conditioned phenomena through views. Those views are pacified by directly realizing non-arising. This is the opposite of turning “who really knows?” into a spiritual conclusion. “Who really knows?” may simply be someone who has not realized emptiness and is mistaking indecision for transcendence.

John Tan: seeing through self is wisdom, not not-knowing

John Tan’s remarks are also important here. He says there are two sides: any view is ultimately empty, yes, but freeing oneself from constructs and conceptualization is not the same as merely having no view. When self is seen through, there is the realization of anatta. It is not merely “freeing” in the sense of becoming blank or viewless; it must also involve the arising of insight and wisdom. John explicitly says he is not into “without view.” Seeing through self is not “not knowing”; it is deep wisdom that allows one to understand one’s nature directly.

John also says the purpose of the view is to open the mind fully without background, duality, and inherency, so that experience is fully open, direct, immediate, and without boundaries. This is a very important formulation. View is not there to create another dogma. View is there to undo the hidden background, the dualistic structure, and the reification of inherent existence. Right view is used to free experience from the false architecture of self, subject-object, essence, and svabhāva.

It is also important to clarify that emptiness and freedom from elaborations do not mean “anything goes.” This is another common mistake. People hear that phenomena are empty and that ultimate truth is free from conceptual elaboration, then they conclude that dependent origination is merely conventional, merely conceptual, and therefore ultimately irrelevant. That quickly slides into a pseudo-profound vagueness: reality is indescribable, so every view is just a lens, no view is better than another, and the only wisdom is not knowing. That is wrong.

John Tan’s point on this is precise: empty ultimately does not mean conventionally arbitrary. Nominal constructs are of two kinds: valid and invalid. “Rabbit horns” are invalid; they do not function as conventionally valid appearances. But ordinary appearances do not manifest randomly or haphazardly. They manifest through valid modes of arising, and that valid mode is dependent arising. Therefore, there remains a right, acceptable, valid way to express things conventionally. “Freedom from all elaborations” does not mean blankness, and it does not mean “anything goes.” Similarly, the right understanding of arising conventionally is dependent origination.

This matters because emptiness is not non-existence. If one says, “Ultimately things are empty, so dependent origination is only provisional, and ultimately nothing can be said,” one has already slipped toward nihilism. Malcolm Smith’s point, cited in the AtR discussions, is that the MMK does not reject dependent origination. The MMK rejects production from self, from other, from both, and from no cause, but not dependent origination. In fact, the MMK is a defense of the proper understanding of dependent origination. It is through dependent origination that emptiness is correctly discerned. If one’s understanding of relative truth is flawed, ultimate truth cannot be understood or realized.

This is crucial for the present issue. The “viewless view” is not a license for epistemic looseness. It is not the idea that all descriptions are equally valid lenses. It is not a blank refusal to distinguish valid conventional designations from invalid ones. Conventional truth still has validity. Causes and conditions still function. Karma still functions. Practice still functions. Delusion still binds. Wisdom still liberates. None of these are ultimately findable entities, but they are conventionally valid dependent arisings. Emptiness is precisely why dependent arising works; it is not a denial of dependent arising.

Why the naturalistic reduction is inadequate

This is why the “naturalistic reading” is inadequate. It reduces obscurations to psychological mechanisms: ownership, identity, contraction, rigidity, attachment to opinions. That may describe some surface dynamics of afflictive clinging, but it does not reach the Dharma’s deeper diagnosis. The Dharma is not merely saying, “Do not identify with your opinions.” It is saying: see through the inherent existence of self and phenomena. See through the subject-object split. See through the imagined knower. See through the imagined essence. See through the extremes of existence and non-existence. See dependent origination. See emptiness.

If this is turned into “all views are just lenses, and the only problem is the I that thinks it knows,” then Madhyamaka has been psychologized and trivialized. Prajñā has been replaced by a therapeutic theory of cognitive flexibility. That is not the same thing.

The disease of non-conceptuality

The “Disease of Non-Conceptuality” article is relevant for exactly this reason. Many people think that if they can rest without thoughts, without conceptual elaboration, without definite knowing, then they have reached something profound. But non-conceptuality by itself is not anatta. It is not emptiness. It is not the realization of dependent origination. It can even become another subtle trap.

In that article, John Tan rejects the idea that “don’t know mind” is itself wisdom. He calls that a disease rather than wisdom when it is mistaken for realization. What “don’t know” may point to is non-conceptual functioning, but without investigation and stable insight, one cannot distinguish non-conceptual functioning from genuine realization. One can release concepts temporarily and still fail to see through self, agent, essence, subject-object structure, or svabhāva.

This is exactly the problem with making “who really knows?” sound profound. Someone can be very uncertain and still be completely trapped in ignorance. Someone can say “I don’t know” all day and still reify awareness, self, world, body, mind, consciousness, existence, non-existence, and experience. “I don’t know” is not a magic solvent for svabhāva-view.

John Tan also says that freeing oneself from reified constructs is a whole new world of practice, and that understanding constructs and reification is crucial to understanding grasping. That is the point. The issue is not merely “I am identified with this view.” The issue is the whole movement of construction and reification, including bodily, energetic, mental, and perceptual formations. To see that requires insight and investigation, not vague not-knowing.

Indeterminacy is ma-rigpa (ignorance), not rigpa (knowledge)

Mipham Rinpoche is very clear on this distinction. In “A Lamp to Dispel Darkness,” he describes an indeterminate state in which there is no clear insight of vipaśyanā that discerns precisely. That indeterminate state is ma-rigpa — ignorance, non-recognition, unknowing — not rigpa. It is an ordinary state within ālaya. By contrast, recognition of the nature of mind involves clear certainty. The wisdom that recognizes its own nature clears away confusion and gives confident certainty.

Not-knowing is not wisdom

This directly refutes the glorification of “who really knows?” If “who really knows?” means ordinary humility about conceptual claims, fine. But if it is being presented as the heart of wisdom, it is wrong. In Dzogchen terms, the indeterminate “don’t know” state is ma-rigpa, ignorance, not rigpa. In Madhyamaka terms, the issue is not whether one refuses or accepts assertions; reification is not overcome by a posture of refusal. Reification is overcome only when prajñā penetrates it. In early Buddhist terms, the Buddha’s freedom from speculative views is grounded in seeing the aggregates arise and cease, not in indecision.

Tsoknyi Rinpoche also emphasizes certainty. In the AtR article “Absolute Certainty,” he is quoted as saying that when rigpa is truly recognized, certainty becomes built-in and automatic. The qualities of empty essence, cognizant nature, and unconfined capacity become obvious. One really knows. Again, this is not egoic dogmatism. It is recognition. It is certainty intrinsic to the realization itself.

So the real distinction is not:

The real distinction is:

This must be understood very clearly.

The examples given — “I’m an atheist,” “I’m pro-life,” “I know this for sure” — mostly concern psychological identity and social-political belief formation. Fine, that can illustrate attachment to views at a coarse level. But it does not adequately explain cognitive obscuration in the Mahāyāna sense. Cognitive obscuration is not exhausted by saying, “Do not identify with your ideology.” The bodhisattva path is not merely ideological flexibility. It is the exhaustion of the appearance of inherently existing phenomena.

Someone could be very flexible ideologically and still be cognitively obscured. Someone could say, “I only describe seemings, I never assert anything absolutely,” and still reify the seeming, the describer, the consciousness, the standpoint, the phenomenological field, or the lens. Conversely, someone can state with precision that phenomena are empty of svabhāva, or that svabhāva is untenable, without clinging to an inherently existing view. The issue is not whether language is used. The issue is whether language is reified.

Buddhist practice does not end in being unable to say anything. It ends in the freedom to use concepts without being bound by them. Thoughts are not the problem. In the 2025 article, I said practice is not about suppressing thoughts, because thoughts themselves are not wrong. The problem is view-confusion. If there is no view-clinging, thoughts can be used naturally, freely, and unobstructedly. That is very different from anti-conceptualism.

This is why the disease of non-conceptuality is so dangerous. It mistakes the absence of thought for insight. It mistakes conceptual quiet for wisdom. It mistakes not making claims for the abandonment of views. It mistakes the blankness or openness of mind for the realization of anatta and emptiness. But the Dharma requires seeing. It requires investigation. It requires correct view. It requires direct realization.

If one simply relaxes into “not knowing,” the root of self-view can remain intact. The subject can remain intact. The subtle witness can remain intact. Awareness can remain reified. The world can remain reified. The view that “all views are just lenses” can itself become a hidden metaphysical position. The person may sound humble while remaining completely bound by ignorance.

What “viewless view” actually means

This is why “viewless view” must be understood correctly. It is not “I have no view because all views are merely lenses.” It is not “I will describe everything as a seeming and avoid certainty.” It is not “the truth cannot be known, so let us remain open.” That is not the viewless view of emptiness.

The viewless view means that right view has done its work so thoroughly that the extremes are pacified. Through insight into dependent origination and emptiness, one sees that phenomena are not inherently existent. Because they are dependently arisen, they are empty. Because they are empty, they can appear and function. Because they appear and function dependently, they are not nothing. This is the union of emptiness and dependent origination.

Nāgārjuna’s famous formulation is that what is dependently arisen is emptiness, dependently designated, and the middle way. That is not indecision. It is the exact point: dependent arising avoids non-existence; emptiness avoids inherent existence. The two are not separate. This is why the realization of emptiness is not nihilism, and dependent origination is not substantialism. Together, they destroy the extremes.

Which views are pacified?

Therefore, when one says, “The viewless view overcomes all views,” one must ask: what views? The answer is not “any statement whatsoever.” The answer is the views of inherency: existence, non-existence, both, neither; self, other, source, essence, real characteristics, real subject, real object, real consciousness, real matter, real nothingness. Those are the views that are pacified.

When Malcolm says “all views” are summarized as substantial existence and non-existence, this is exactly the point. The “all” in “abandoning all views” is not a license for lazy anti-intellectualism. It refers to the entire structure of extreme views based on svabhāva. The abandonment of views means the abandonment of inherent views, not the abandonment of prajñā, right view, reasoning, direct knowledge, or the valid conventionality of dependent arising.

This is also why the Buddha’s silence on certain speculative questions should not be misread. The Buddha refused to answer questions that were wrongly framed and did not lead to liberation. That does not mean the Buddha lacked knowledge. It means the question itself was rooted in a reified framework. The Buddha was not avoiding truth; he was refusing to feed delusion.

MN 72 illustrates this perfectly. Vacchagotta wants to pin the Tathāgata down through metaphysical categories. The Buddha refuses the categories because they do not apply once the aggregates, I-making, mine-making, and conceit have been seen through. This is not skepticism. It is freedom from the basis of the question.

So the correct critique of dogmatism is not “certainty is the giveaway.” The correct critique is: does this certainty reify self, phenomena, view, knower, known, or truth? If yes, it is bondage. If no, and if it is the direct certainty of emptiness and dependent origination, then it is wisdom.

What is valid in the reader’s concern — and where it goes wrong

The valid point here is that ownership of views can be an afflictive problem. Yes, views can become identity. Yes, people can contract around opinions and use them to reinforce “I” and “mine.” But that does not define cognitive obscuration in the Buddhist sense. Cognitive obscuration is subtler than identity-clinging. It is the entire mode by which phenomena appear as inherently established. It is not solved by becoming less certain. It is solved by realizing emptiness.

The valid point is also that concepts can close the mind when they are reified. But concepts as such are not the obstruction. Concepts can also liberate when used as right view. Madhyamaka uses reasoning. Nāgārjuna uses analysis. Candrakīrti uses arguments. The Buddha teaches dependent origination. John Tan repeatedly emphasizes insight and investigation. The problem is not concept. The problem is reification.

The valid point is that views must be pacified. But the Buddhist meaning of pacifying views is much more radical and precise than becoming epistemically loose, cautious, or uncertain. Views are pacified by realizing emptiness and non-arising. They are pacified by seeing that the supposed entity to be affirmed or denied cannot be found. They are pacified when the basis for existence and non-existence collapses. They are not pacified by vague openness. They are pacified by prajñā.

This is why I reject the framing strongly. It is not merely incomplete; it leads in the wrong direction. It encourages people to mistake uncertainty for wisdom, neutrality for the middle way, lack of assertion for freedom from views, and non-conceptual openness for realization. That is precisely the kind of error the “Disease of Non-Conceptuality” article warns about.

A better formulation

A better formulation would be this:

Afflictive obscurations involve clinging to self and mine: my body, my fear, my status, my ideology, my mother, my pain, my practice, my view. Cognitive obscurations are deeper: they involve the appearance and reification of self, phenomena, characteristics, subject-object structure, existence, non-existence, and svabhāva. View-attachment is one expression of this, but not the whole of it.

Right view is necessary because it exposes and deconstructs those reifications. It is not merely one neutral lens. It is a liberating medicine. It shows that there is no inherently existing self, no inherently existing phenomena, no independent root source, no real subject behind experience, no real object standing apart from experience, no essence in awareness, and no substantial existence or non-existence.

The viewless view is not the absence of knowledge. It is not agnosticism. It is not neutrality. It is not conceptual paralysis. It is not “I don’t know.” It is the exhaustion of extreme views through the realization of emptiness. When the basis for existence and non-existence is seen to be unfounded, views collapse naturally. That collapse is not ignorance; it is wisdom.

The Buddha is free from speculative views because he has seen. Nāgārjuna has no thesis concerning svabhāva as defined by his opponents because svabhāva is untenable, not because he is clueless. Madhyamaka abandons all views by pacifying the extremes of inherent existence and non-existence, not by refusing right view. John Tan rejects “without view” when it becomes not-knowing, because seeing through self involves insight and wisdom. Kyle Dixon rejects the idea that no-view means refusing concepts or taking neutrality as the point, because pacification of views is directly related to realizing emptiness. Mipham identifies the indeterminate “don’t know” state lacking vipaśyanā as ma-rigpa (ignorance), and distinguishes it from rigpa (knowledge) with decisive certainty in the nature of mind.