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John Tan commented "This article is very well written and yogacara never really explicitly said that mind is ultimate. This idea privileging mind as ultimate over the relative phenomena was a later development."
Kyle Dixon sent me:
This from Mipham posted today seemed pretty good
He says ultimate mind is an epistemic realization and not something reified
Madhyamaka, Cittamātra, and the true intent of Maitreya and Asaṅga self.Buddhism
Submitted 21 hours ago by nyanasagaramahayana
It is not existent nor nonexistent, not the same nor different;
Not produced nor destroyed, it will not diminish
Nor increase; it cannot be purified
Yet becomes perfectly pure—these are the characteristics of the ultimate.
Ornament of the Scriptures of the Great Vehicle, Maitreya, recited to Asaṅga
Mipham Comments:
According to the Mādhyamikas, it is not that all the phenomena that appear through the power of dependent arising are not existent on the relative, conventional level, nor that they are existent on the ultimate level; nor even that they are both existent and nonexistent. On the ultimate level, nonexistence is the true nature of phenomena that exist conventionally. So, apart from simply being distinguished by name, these two do not, in fact, exist as two distinct entities: they are like fire and its heat, or molasses and its sweetness. Could there, then, be a third possibility—that thatness is something that is neither existent on the relative level nor nonexistent on the ultimate level? No. There is no valid means of cognition that provides a proof for a third alternative that is neither a phenomenon nor an empty true nature. Such a third possibility could never be the intrinsic or true nature of conventional phenomena. The Mādhyamikas thus assert freedom from the four extremes (existence, nonexistence, both, and neither), freedom from all conceptual elaboration, the inseparability of the two truths—the inseparability of phenomena and their true nature—which has to be realized personally. This true nature free from conceptual elaboration is always the same in being devoid of production, destruction, diminution, and expansion. It has not as much as an atom’s worth of the characteristics of dualistic phenomena such as purity and impurity.
Now, the Cittamātra approach speaks of all phenomena being nothing other than simply the appearances of the mind, and it asserts that only the clear and aware consciousness of the dependent reality, the basis of perception, exists substantially. If the Cittamātrins’ final standpoint is the assertion that this consciousness is only a substantially existent entity inasmuch as it is the cause for all conventional phenomena appearing, and that apart from this assertion they are not claiming that it exists substantially as a truly existing entity in ultimate truth, then they are not at all in contradiction with the Mādhyamika tradition. On the other hand, if they were to assert that it is truly existent in ultimate truth, they would be contradicting the Mādhyamika approach. It seems, therefore, that it is just this particular point that needs to be examined as a source of contention (or otherwise) for the Mādhyamikas.
In the cycle of teachings of Maitreya and the writings of the great charioteer Asaṅga, whose thinking is one and the same, it is taught that individuals on the level of earnest aspiration first understand that all phenomena are simply the mind. Subsequently they have the experience that there is no object to be apprehended in the mind. Then, at the stage of the supreme mundane level on the path of joining, they realize that because there is no object, neither is there a subject, and immediately after that, they attain the first level with the direct realization of the truth of ultimate reality devoid of the duality of subject and object. As for things being only the mind, the source of the dualistic perception of things appearing as environment, sense objects, and a body is the consciousness of the ground of all, which is accepted as existing substantially on the conventional level but is taught as being like a magical illusion and so on since it appears in a variety of ways while not existing dualistically. For this reason, because this tradition realizes, perfectly correctly, that the nondual consciousness is devoid of any truly existing entities and of characteristics, the ultimate intentions of the charioteers of Madhyamaka and Cittamātra should be considered as being in agreement.
Why, then, do the Mādhyamika masters refute the Cittamātra tenet system? Because self-styled proponents of the Cittamātra tenets, when speaking of mind-only, say that there are no external objects but that the mind exists substantially—like a rope that is devoid of snakeness, but not devoid of ropeness. Having failed to understand that such statements are asserted from the conventional point of view, they believe the nondual consciousness to be truly existent on the ultimate level. It is this tenet that the Mādhyamikas repudiate. But, they say, we do not refute the thinking of Ārya Asaṅga, who correctly realized the mind-only path taught by the Buddha.
Because of the mind, the phenomena of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa arise; if there were no mind, there would be no saṃsāra and no nirvāṇa. How? It is by the power of the mind that defilements create karma, subsequently producing the process of defilement that is saṃsāra. And it is with the mind that one gives rise to the wisdom of the realization of no-self and to compassion, practices the Mahāyāna path, and thereby achieves buddhahood, whose nature is the five kinds of gnosis, the transformation of the eight consciousnesses, and the ground of all. It is with the mind, too, that the listeners and solitary realizers realize the no-self of the individual and attain nirvāṇa, beyond the suffering of grasping at existence. So the roots of defilement and purity depend on the mind. Anyone who is a Buddhist has to accept this.
So, if this so-called “self-illuminating nondual consciousness” asserted by the Cittamātrins is understood to be a consciousness that is the ultimate of all dualistic consciousnesses, and it is merely that its subject and object are inexpressible, and if such a consciousness is understood to be truly existent and not intrinsically empty, then it is something that has to be refuted. If, on the other hand, that consciousness is understood to be unborn from the very beginning (i.e. empty), to be directly experienced by reflexive awareness, and to be self-illuminating gnosis without subject or object, it is something to be established. Both the Madhyamaka and Mantrayāna have to accept this. If there were no reflexively aware gnosis, or mind of clear light, it would be impossible for there to be a mind that realizes the truth of the ultimate reality on the path of learning; and at the time of the path of no more learning, the nirvāṇa without residue, the Buddha would have no omniscient gnosis. And in that case there would be no difference between the Buddha’s nirvāṇa and the nirvāṇa of the lower vehicles, which is like the extinction of a lamp, so how could one talk about the Buddha’s bodies (kāyas), different kinds of gnosis, and inexhaustible activities?
To sum up, thatness, which is the actual condition of all phenomena, is the completely unbiased union of appearance and emptiness, to be realized personally. If one realizes that it never changes in any situation, whether in the ground, path, or result, one will be saved from the abyss of unwholesome, extremist views.
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