Bdcrtgb RcnrcrrdfvnbIt is not existent - even the Victorious Ones do not see it.
It is not nonexistent - it is the basis of all samsara and nirvana.
This is not a contradiction, but the middle path of unity.
May the ultimate nature of phenomena, limitless mind beyond extremes, be realised.
~
I love these lines. But what is "the ultimate nature of phenomena"? Is  there an essence is Buddhism? If emptiness is not a thing, but the way  things are, what are they made of?
6 people like this. (
Wednesday, September 10, 2014 at 7:56am)
Bdcrtgb Rcnrcrrdfvnb"Appearance is mind and emptiness is mind. " In this line of the same text, what does it mean to say emptiness is mind?
(
Wednesday, September 10, 2014 at 8:04am)
Kyle DixonI'm  not sure what term is translated as "Ultimate nature of phenomena" in  that quote (it is a common one I've seen attributed to a few individuals  such as Jigme Lingpa), but in general the ultimate nature of phenomena  is that they are non-arisen i.e. empty. 
The  essence of things is usually emptiness, however that is like saying  "things are empty in essence", "the essential nature of X is that it is  empty", it does not mean emptiness is an 'essence' in the sense of  something substantiated. 
Conditioned  'things' are the result of confusion, when seen for what they are they  are known to be unreal. So they are not made of anything per se, since  ultimately they cannot be found when sought. A 'thing' as such is a  nominal designation, a mere inference, useful as a convention, but  ultimately the object that the convention infers is unfindable.
7 liked this (
Wednesday, September 10, 2014 at 8:08am)
Bdcrtgb RcnrcrrdfvnbMay this simple secret, this ultimate essence of phenomena, 
     which is the basis of everything, be realised.
May the unconfused genuine self-nature be known by self-nature itself.
~
These  2 lines too seem to point to an essence, a clear light, or primordial  mind. A kind of vedantic pure consciousness. It's this thing that has  been itching a lot lately. I come from an Advaita background, where  awareness is the ultimate essence of all appearances. But I feel pulled  to the buddhist view of emptiness of all things, even consciousness. But  I can't see how can pure consciousness itself be dependently  originated...
(
Wednesday, September 10, 2014 at 8:16am)
Kyle DixonNot  a Vedantic type consciousness, because Vedanta posits an uncaused.  existent, transpersonal, ontological consciousness that subsumes  everything. 
Those lines do point to an essence or primordial mind, however just as your original quote states, it is  nothing truly established as existent or non-existent. The mind is  luminous and cognizant, but it is also empty and non-arisen... when we  are ignorant of its emptiness we reify the luminous cognizance into a  personal reference point which is relating to conditioned objects  (objects that can exist or not-exist). 
'Consciousness'  [skt. vijñāna, tib. rnam shes] in the context of the buddhadharma  usually refers specifically to that species dualistic cognition, i.e. a  subject relating to objects. Therefore consciousness is considered to be  an afflictive cognition since it is influenced by ignorance [skt.  avidyā, tib. ma rig pa]. 
The  opposite of consciousness is 'wisdom' [skt. jñāna, tib. ye shes]. When  one recognizes their nature as being empty and free from extremes, then  that 'consciousness' is no longer a deluded cognition that is cognizing  conditioned objects, it instead directly and experientially knows the  emptiness of those objects. That is why the quote says "may the  unconfused genuine self-nature be known by self-nature itself". 
This  is not pointing to a truly established cognition though, especially  since that wisdom entails a collapse of the ignorance that mistakes  itself as an abiding reference point in relation to objects. The wisdom  knows its own nature, as empty; which is the "unconfused genuine  self-nature". For instance in the same way consciousness knows a chair,  wisdom knows the non-arising of that chair. But this is still just a  conventional description, it is not pointing to something real or  something established. This does not mean that everything is subsumed  into awareness, it simply means that there is a genuine knowledge of  one's nature.
5 liked this (
Wednesday, September 10, 2014 at 10:04am)
Kyle DixonIt  is important to understand the concept of 'conventional truth' in  Buddhism, because you may ask why these texts are stating that there is a  'self-nature' and a 'basis' and so on, why would they be doing this if  these things are in fact unestablished and ultimately unreal? It is because the ultimate truth of things is  their non-arising or emptiness, and what are those 'things' that are  ultimately empty? They are conventions which are mistaken to be real  things. So these alleged conventional objects are precisely what are  realized to be unreal, and this means that we can relate to conventions  freely because they are never pointing to anything actually 'real' or  established. All conventions are simply useful nominal designations,  tools for communication. The problem arises when we mistake these  conventions to be something more than just a convention. 
Conventions  are reliable as long as they are not subjected to keen investigation.  That is how 'convention' is defined per buddhism, a correct convention  [tathyasaṃvṛti] is, according to Śāntarakṣita; "something can be tacitly  accepted as long as it is not critically investigated, that is  characterized by arising and decay, and that has causal effectivity." So  the validity of a convention is measured by its efficacy, if it appears  to function correctly, then it can be accepted as a correct convention  prior to its investigation. In the wake of investigating any convention  it will fail, since conventions cannot withstand proper scrutiny. 
So  there is no problem stating that there is a 'self-nature', because when  that convention is subjected to scrutiny that self-nature would be  ultimately unfindable. Yet the term "self-nature" is a conventional  designation that is pointing to the capacity of 'wisdom' mentioned  above, which is completely free from the extremes of existence,  non-existence, both and neither. 
For instance, Longchenpa discusses that nature here:
"Mind  itself [i.e., the nature of mind: tib. sems nyid] - naturally occurring  timeless awareness [i.e., self-originated primordial wisdom: tib. rang  byung ye shes] - has no substance or characteristics. Since it is empty  yet lucid and free of elaboration, it cannot be conceived of as 'this'  or 'that'. Although it can be illustrated by a metaphor - 'It is like  space' - if one reflects on space as the metaphor, it proves to have no  color, no shape, or anything about it that is identifiable. Therefore,  if the metaphor being used does not refer to some 'thing', then the  underlying meaning that it illustrates - mind itself, pure by nature -  is not something that has ever existed in the slightest."
8 liked this (
Wednesday, September 10, 2014 at 10:14am)
Bdcrtgb RcnrcrrdfvnbIn  buddhism how is reality seen? I mean, in the approach I come from  (Krishnamenon's direct path - Rupert Spira, Greg Goode, etc.), visually  speaking, for example, objects are known to be just colors. "Color" is  just another name for seeing (meaning, the presence of color). Then seeing is just a form of awareness.
Object >> Color >> Seeing >> Awareness;
Object >> Sound >> Hearing >> Awareness;
Etc.
So  this approach has its basis in what they call Direct Experience. All  that is experienced is colors, sounds, etc - no physical objects are  given. Then not even colors or sounds, just the knowing of them, etc. So  in the end reality becomes just pure experiencing, without a solid  substance or reality, except for awareness, which is not physical nor  possessing any characteristic whatsoever. 
In  this view, one could say that the objects are empty because they depend  on the colors/sensations/etc., which depend on seeing/sensing/etc.,  which depend on awareness.
How  does buddhism arrive at the view of emptiness? A car is empty because  it is made of several parts, lacking inherent existence - there is no  "car-ness" is the object conventionally named as car. There are only  wheels, metal, plastic, rubber, etc. And in each of these, there are  other components, etc., all the way down to molecules and atoms and  particles and...(?)...
But  this is the conventional view (atoms, etc.). None of this (atoms,  particles, etc.) is given in direct experience. In direct experience,  there is only colors, sounds, etc. Does buddhism believe in atoms and  particles that are not given in direct experience?
For  instance, the emptiness of an object rests in its being dependent on  causes, right? But a cause is not verified in experience. An apple is  supposedly dependent on many factors, but many of those are not present  in experience - the sun, the rain, the soil, the farmer, etc. Where do  all those abide as we experience the apple?
(
Thursday, September 11, 2014 at 8:45am)
Kyle DixonAlleged  objects being broken down into constituent factors such as color, shape  etc., in the context of Buddhism is an example of exploring how things  originate dependently, i.e., dependent origination [pratītyasamutpāda]. 
However when these appearances  are treated as ultimately being awareness in traditions like Śrī  Atmananda's, this sets up a unilateral dependency where awareness is  treated as an irreducible principle. This is due to the nature of those  paths, but the Buddhist system does not uphold a view of that nature. 
For  example if X is dependent upon awareness, awareness would also be  dependent upon X. Because both are dependent, neither can stand alone,  they are both conditional principles and for that reason they are not  something which has an independent, autonomous nature.
Not  only that, but Buddhism states that because things only originate in  dependence upon what defines them, they do not originate at all. For to  legitimately originate and have existence, a 'thing' or capacity would  have to manifest without cause and be unconditioned. However since such a  thing cannot be found, there ultimately is no origination.
But  every separate principle is essentially the implication of every other  principle. When we search for an object as a 'thing' in itself apart  from color, size, dimension, sensory cognition, location, texture,  awareness, etc., we cannot find that object. Said object also cannot be  found within those appearances. But this also goes for each of those  appearances themselves, including awareness.
This  view also leads to a lack of solid substance or reality, or any type of  substance or reality apart from the nominal designation 'reality'.
Deconstructing  things down to molecules and atoms is one way to approach emptiness  however I personally do not like that approach because molecules and  atoms are not things we can directly cognize without an instrument. It  is better to work with one's direct cognition.
The  most effective way to view 'cause' is as ignorance [avidyā]. When  things arise due to causes they arise due to misconception. Like taking a  mirage to be a real oasis, the oasis arises as a result of a cause,  that cause is ignorance regarding its true nature as being devoid of any  substance or reality. When we finally recognize that the oasis is a  mirage, the misconception of an oasis is immediately liberated. And it  is directly known that there never was an actual oasis from the very  beginning. All things are like that. They appear due to the cause of  ignorance and abide as long as the conditions of ignorance remain, when  ignorance is dispelled, said object is known to be non-arisen.
For example, Nāgārjuna states:
"When the perfect vidyā sees
That things come from ignorance as condition,
Nothing will then be objectified,
Either in terms of arising or destruction...
...Since the Buddhas have stated
That the world is conditioned by ignorance,
Why is it not reasonable [to assert]
That this world is [a result of] conceptualization?
Since it comes to an end
When ignorance ceases;
Why does it not become clear then
That it was conjured by ignorance?"
6 liked this (
Thursday, September 11, 2014 at 9:26am)
Kinkok SinI  think it is akin to what is called a field of force in science.  You  can't see the field, but you can see the impact of the field.  So the  ultimate could be a field of force of consciousness.  You cannot see  that field but you can experience the impact  of that field in the form of awareness.  Starting with basic or raw  awareness, consciousness can evolved (initiated by an initial  misknowledge of duality) into what we now experience as ordinary  consciousness.  This is how I see it.  I could be wrong, so take it with  whatever dosage of salt you consider necessary for yourself.
(
Thursday, September 11, 2014 at 10:28am)
Viorica Doina Neacsu1 liked this (
Friday, September 12, 2014 at 12:32am)
Bdcrtgb RcnrcrrdfvnbThanks Kyle, for your insights in this and other posts.
The  thing is that in the direct path approach right from the beginning  "things" are seen as not existing. Even subtler objects like color or  shapes are seen as nothing more than pure awareness or experience. Experience, right from the beginning is known to be undivided, seamless, whole.
In  such a context, I find it hard to explore emptiness, because in a way  there are no things to be empty or not empty. One could say that things  are empty because they depend on experience or on being known, but in  doing so, one creates a division (experience vs objects in experience /  knowing vs. objects known) that is not given in direct experience.
Another  way would be to see that objects are empty because they are no where to  be found when not being experienced - so they don't inherently exist.  But if they are not being experienced, they are neither existent nor  non-existent, so talking about their emptiness is moot.
In the context of this type of non-dual perception, where only undivided experience is seen, how is the emptiness understood? (
Friday, September 12, 2014 at 8:28pm)
Kyle DixonAs  you seem to know already, the direct path approach is simply a  different path and view. In terms of the direct path, which is a  teaching of Advaita Vedanta, things are seen to lack existence because  they are in fact an undifferentiated pure consciousness  [purusha], which is transpersonal, truly existent and unconditioned.  Which means that consciousness is as you said: an "undivided, seamless,  whole."
In  such a context it would indeed be hard to explore emptiness, because  that context contradicts emptiness by nature. According to Advaita,  there may be no so-called 'relative' things to be empty or not-empty,  but there is a truly existent purusha instead, which by Advaita's  standards; is definitely not-empty.
In  terms of Vedanta, 'things' are not empty but are unreal because they  belong to prakṛti, and prakṛti is māyā. Only cit is real, which is the  purusha or pure consciousness i.e. brahman. So things do not even depend  upon experience or 'being known', because ultimately there is only a  single undifferentiated, existent pure consciousness. 
In  the buddhadharma, things are empty not only because they depend upon  being experienced or known, but for other reasons too. The apparent  division is not a problem, because as I attempted to explain above with  'convention', these alleged divisions are simply conventional in nature,  and are ultimately empty. This however does not mean there is a single  undivided whole, for that would simply be another thing to be empty. The  ultimate truth in the buddhadharma is simply the fact that the 'things'  which are inferred by convention are ultimately unfindable. The  realization is epistemic and not ontological like Adviata. The  buddhadharma is not saying we cannot find these things because they are  actually this undivided pure consciousness, it is saying we cannot find  these things at all. They appear, yet are unreal and so they have never  arisen in the first place. 
As  for the idea that "objects are empty because they are no where to be  found when not being experienced - so they don't inherently exist", by  the standards of the buddhadharma this would actually fail to overcome  inherent existence because Advaita would state that these alleged  objects are actually the single undivided purusha which does inherently  exist. 
Talking  about the emptiness of said objects would be moot in the context of  Advaita, because those objects are simply māyā and the only thing that  exists is purusha, so objects are not being experienced either way (as  there is only pure consciousness). In the context of the buddhadharma,  said objects are ultimately unfindable whether they are allegedly being  experienced or not, so the duality of 'experienced objects' versus  'unexperienced objects' is also inapplicable (yet because said division  between experienced and unexperienced objects is merely conventional, in  terms of the buddhadharma; one would be free to say there are  experienced and unexperienced objects due to the fact that this is  ultimately untrue, for ultimately everything is empty and lacks inherent  existence). 
As  for your last question: "In the context of this type of non-dual  perception, where only undivided experience is seen, how is the  emptiness understood?"
In  that context emptiness is not understood (and is not meant to be),  because that single undivided experience is held to be inherently  existent.
5 liked this (
Saturday, September 13, 2014 at 6:59am)
Viorica Doina Neacsu“Therefore it is said that whoever makes a philosophical view out of emptiness is indeed lost.”  Nagarjuna
3 liked this (
Saturday, September 13, 2014 at 7:24am)
Bdcrtgb RcnrcrrdfvnbKyle,
>>>>>  The ultimate truth in the buddhadharma is simply the fact that the  'things' which are inferred by convention are ultimately unfindable. The  realization is epistemic and not ontological like  Adviata.<<<<<<
I  can see how things are unfindable through the conventional route of  "molecules, atoms & particles". There is just empty space in the  end. But through direct experience, where there is merely colors or  perception or experience, how are things unfindable? Experience seems  pretty obvious and irreducible. But I'm open and willing to see through  the apparent inherency of it (deep sleep seems to be a good example of  experience's emptiness...).
Or  one could say that experience is empty because it depends on causes,  like there being any perception or activity of any kind to appear as  experience. Experience of nothingness is no experience at all, so  experience depends on somethingness to appear.
And could you explain the ontological and the epistemic stuff? Philosophy is not my forte!
~
>>>>>The  buddhadharma is not saying we cannot find these things because they are  actually this undivided pure consciousness, it is saying we cannot find  these things at all. They appear, yet are unreal and so they have never  arisen in the first place.<<<<<<
Ok,  this is serious stuff, imo. A car is not found as a car, but there is  some experience, rather then nothing. Something appears, like you said -  be it colors, knowing, perception, experiencing, etc... They appear,  but are unreal - in the sense that they are not what they claim to be,  right? A car is not a "car", it's a bunch of other stuff (its several  pieces and components) or at least something else (a perception or  experience). But the appearance is made of something right? The image of  the Eiffel tower in my head is not made of metal, because it is not the  Eiffel tower, but just an image. But as an image, it is made of "mental  stuff" or consciousness (conventionally or neurologically speaking).  What are things made of then? Or does Buddhism refuse to assume such  explicit ontological positions? How come you're saying they've never  arisen at all? What is it that exists as "this" right now?
I'm not disagreeing with you. On the contrary, I'm truly hungry for that depth of understanding.
~
>>>>>  In that context emptiness is not understood (and is not meant to be),  because that single undivided experience is held to be inherently  existent.<<<<<<
This  was probably asked above already, but how then can the emptiness  insight be brought into this perspective? How can one pierce through the  aparent inherency of experience or pure awareness? How can awareness,  devoid of characteristics, be caused by something else?
Soh seems to have come from the Awareness teachings, but later moved through to the emptiness view. How can this be done?
Thank you! (
Saturday, September 13, 2014 at 9:56am)
Bdcrtgb Rcnrcrrdfvnb"If you would free yourself of the sufferings
of samsara, you must learn the direct way to become a
Buddha. This way is no other than the realization of your own Mind.
Now what is this Mind? It is the true nature of all sentient beings, that
which existed before our parents were born and hence before our
own birth, and which presently exists, unchangeable and eternal."
This  was taken from the Three Pillars of Zen. What was Bassui talking about  here? Was he pointing to the realization of I Am or One Mind? Was he  falling victim to the view of inherency?
(
Saturday, September 13, 2014 at 10:11am)
Kyle DixonBdcrtgb Rcnrcrrdfvnb you wrote:
"I  can see how things are unfindable through the conventional route of  'molecules, atoms & particles'. There is just empty space in the  end. But through direct experience, where there is merely colors or  perception or experience,  how are things unfindable? Experience seems pretty obvious and  irreducible. But I'm open and willing to see through the apparent  inherency of it (deep sleep seems to be a good example of experience's  emptiness...)."
You'll  probably have to step away from approaching 'experience' or 'direct  experience' as a reductive unity or a thing-in-itself. Doing so will  probably mean you'd have to let go of the idea of a single consciousness  or awareness that is cognizing phenomena as well. In Buddhism there is  no single central consciousness that everything is appearing to, but  instead many different consciousnesses (six to eight depending on the  system). There is an eye consciousness which perceives shape, color and  so on, and a olfactory consciousness which cognizes various aromas etc. 
For  example: the point of the "eye-consciousness" [cakṣurvijñāna] (and the  other seven consciousnesses) is to propose a conventional model (for the  purposes of upāya) in order to allow the aspirant a means to pierce the  seeming inherency of consciousness in general. The eight-consciousness  model (for example) is not a statement (or proposition) of ontological  truth, when these models are presented they are not meant to say there  is truly eight consciousnesses, those consciousnesses are conventional  designations which are implemented as a skillful means. And that  exclusively conventional nature is characteristically implied due to the  fact that the buddhadharma contends that inherency (in general) is a  figment of deluded cognition which is completely unreal. Therefore the  label "eye consciousness" is a term which is implemented so that the  visual faculty and all of its implied constitutional characteristics can  be compartmentalized into a single grouping for the purposes of  analysis or expeditious delineation (eye-consciousness accounting for  (i) sensory organ [eye], (ii) sensory cognition [seeing] and (iii)  sensory objects [sights]). 
So  in terms of 'direct experience' as such; the eight-consciousnesses  [aṣṭavijñāna] is one example of a conventional model that is meant to be  a tangible and empirical guideline for said experience. In applying a  provisional model of this nature, and taking into consideration that  nothing ultimately has inherent existence, we undoubtably already run  into an issue as to how we are now choosing to define 'direct  experience'. Is that experience singular? Are there eight different  direct experiences corresponding to the eight different consciousnesses?  If so, is there a hierarchy as to which experience is more valid or  superior in comparison to the others? And so on. In this way we find  that even the idea of 'experience' or 'direct experience' as such is  really a "broad conceptual generalization" as Greg Goode once put it.  How can we define such a notion, and what would the criteria be for that  definition?
It's  perfectly okay to use 'experience' as a conventional designation, but  once we believe that said conventional experience transcends being a  mere inference then problems begin to arise. 
Conventionally  we can say that appearances manifest ceaselessly, however the  buddhadharma is not concerned with the fact that appearances manifest,  but rather with how said appearances are related to, or are known. This  is what it means for emptiness to be an epistemology rather than an  ontology. Buddhism isn't trying to establish an ontological X, because  ultimately, how is an ontological existent any different than an  identity? If 'things' have an ontological status, then they exist, if  they exist then they have an essence, to have an essence is to have  something that X truly 'is', and that would be no different than having  an identity, or a self. So buddhism objects to the idea that there is a  global reductive X (be it consciousness or experience) because said X  would be no different than an identity. Buddhism as a soteriological  methodology is interested in freeing sentient beings from the mistaken  notion of a fixed essential identity, and stating that there is an  ultimate ontological X that we truly are (instead of being the so-called  individual self we take ourselves to be) is simply trading one identity  for another. 
Therefore  buddhism is epistemic because to realize emptiness is to know (or  cognize) phenomena correctly. Presently, as afflicted sentient beings we  relate to phenomena through invalid cognitions which perceive truly  existent objects, persons, places, time, space etc. We mistakenly  believe that there are things which have arisen, abide in time and can  cease (or are born, live and die), and this causes suffering because we  then grasp at phenomena. We cherish and cling to things or people, we  suffer when those things are lost or destroyed, or when those we love  leave or pass away. However this is all due to misunderstanding  phenomena. When we know phenomena correctly, then we recognize that they  have been in a state of perfection since beginningless time (or this is  at least how Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna define this principle). Upon  realizing that phenomena are non-arisen [empty] we directly know that  they have never arisen, have never abided, and have never ceased at any  point. Not only that but principles such as time, space, distance,  coming, going, here, there, subject, object, presence, absence,  dimension, life, death, consciousness, body, mind, senses, perception,  etc., are all liberated. For someone who has a complete and unobstructed  wisdom-knowledge of emptiness, such notions can be related to  conventionally, but they know that those concepts do not refer to  anything real. 
"Like  a dream, an illusion, [or] seeing two moons: Thus have You seen the  world, as a creation not created as real. Like a son who is born,  established, and dies in a dream, the world, You have said, is not  really born, does not endure, and is not destroyed."
- Acintyastavaḥ
3 liked this (
Sunday, September 14, 2014 at 8:09am)
Kyle DixonBdcrtgb Rcnrcrrdfvnb you wrote:
"Ok,  this is serious stuff, imo. A car is not found as a car, but there is  some experience, rather then nothing. Something appears, like you said -  be it colors, knowing, perception, experiencing, etc... They appear,  but are unreal - in the sense that they are not what they claim to be,  right? A car is not a 'car', it's a bunch of other stuff (its several  pieces and components) or at least something else (a perception or  experience)."
Reducing  something like a car to other pieces or components can be one form of  emptiness analysis, however ultimately this can still potentially lend  to the idea of an essence or a substance (so one would have to be  mindful not to make that error). If we are saying that a car is truly  made of other things, then we are not overcoming the perception of there  actually being a true 'something' that the car is made of. The actual  point is to effectively realize that there is no car to be found  anywhere, within or apart from the aggregates which apparently  constitute a car. Even in principle these notions carry certain  implications which lend to the unreality of car; for if said aggregates  no longer serve to construct a car, then what is maintaining a  relationship between said aggregates in general? If there is no essence  that those aggregates are serving to constitute, then there is nothing  ultimately tethering one aggregate to another. If nothing is holding  them together then we begin to lose structure and continuity, for what  is maintaining the perception of said aggregates having a valid  extension in time, or in space? Or how are we defining space or time  themselves? Do they not themselves depend on the perception of an  appearance which is manifesting as a single 'thing' in consecutive  instances? So these are examples of questions and implications that  arise due to investigating a given appearance. The car cannot be reduced  to its aggregates because that would then give credence to the  inherency of the aggregates themselves. The aggregates are also  fallible, and never arise, abide or cease, they do not create anything,  and possess no validity in and of themselves. 
Overall  though, in the example of a car the point is to attempt and find the  'car' in itself, or perhaps to find the 'self' in itself if we are  relating to our own experience. We mistake these things to have a true  inherent essence, and become deluded into believing that they actually  exist (or that they can lack existence). The idea is to fail in finding  that 'core' or 'essence' which makes a thing that 'thing', because when  we fail to find that essence, we have the potential to realize that  there never has been a thing in the first place, the 'thing' was only  ever a misconception. And this goes for 'experience' too, for example if  you experience something troubling in a dream, and are under the  influence of that dream, then you have no discernment to say "this isn't  real, this is just a dream" and so the apparent events that unfold in  the dream can seem to effect you. You may be upset, or scared, or even  very happy. But when you wake up that experience is immediately known to  have been unreal, and so the emotions related to said dream events are  immediately liberated. Realizing emptiness is like that, except one  wakes up to this so-called waking experience and realizes it to be  equally unreal. The point isn't whether appearances manifest, but how  they are known. If you are lucid in a dream you simply know that  everything that appears is an unreal display, nothing being created or  destroyed, nothing coming or going, nothing actually 'there'... yet  illusory appearance manifests. Likewise if you realize the non-arising  of appearances then you simply know that everything that appears is an  unreal display, nothing being created or destroyed, nothing coming or  going, nothing actually 'there'... yet illusory appearance manifests.
3 liked this (
Sunday, September 14, 2014 at 8:51am)
Bdcrtgb Rcnrcrrdfvnb>>>>>If  you are lucid in a dream you simply know that everything that appears  is an unreal display, nothing being created or destroyed, nothing coming  or going, nothing actually 'there'<<<<<<
There is nothing actually there as it appears to be. But something  was experienced in the dream - colors, thoughts, emotions. What are  those made of? I realize that if you say "they are ultimately made of  X", then that will be an essence that escapes the seal of impermanence  or emptiness. 
But  I'm having a hard time in seeing things as being made of nothing at  all. I was comfortable with Advaita, because things were still  transitory appearances - empty of being separate, objective or anything  at all by themselves -, but ultimately there was a substance at their  root - awareness itself, which is a void, but not non-existent.
Now here things are really shaky right now. Can't seem to even know how to inquire or investigate stuff...
(
Sunday, September 14, 2014 at 9:12am)
अष्टावक्र शान्तिBdcrtgb Rcnrcrrdfvnb ,you still have the conventional side of the Two Truths. Conventional attainments, releases,... (
Sunday, September 14, 2014 at 9:46am)
Bdcrtgb RcnrcrrdfvnbWhat do you mean, अष्टावक्र शान्ति?
(
Sunday, September 14, 2014 at 10:12am)
अष्टावक्र शान्तिIf you put emphasis on only one aspect of the two truths(ultimate truth) you go into nihilism!
"Of  course, this Buddhist division of truths sounds dualistic. But it is  not dualistic, because the two truths are identical. That is, the  ultimate truth is that the conventional truth is the only truth there  is." - Emptiness and Joyful Freedom - Greg Good, Tomas Sander
2 liked this (
Sunday, September 14, 2014 at 10:33am)
Kyle DixonBdcrtgb Rcnrcrrdfvnb,  Different systems give different explanations as to why appearance  known in direct perception [pratyakṣa] manifests, each explanation  ultimately corresponding to the nature of their praxis and methods. None  of those systems state that  appearances are "ultimately made of X" though. They may conventionally  state they are made of any number of things; mind, traces, causes,  energy, wisdom - but to state that phenomena is truly 'made' is to say  said phenomena has an essence [svabhāva]. Phenomena do not have svabhāva  because if they did indeed have an essence they would be fixed,  undynamic and unable to appear, so they are not 'made'. Appearances are  essenceless and free from extremes, ultimately never arising, abiding or  ceasing.
These systems are soteriological in nature, and so the most important thing is a correct cognition of said appearances.
Overall  though, why do they need to be made of something? And what would stop  that description from being more fodder for the mind to grasp at? The  idea is to ultimately remove notions of essence and substantiality. 2 liked this (
Sunday, September 14, 2014 at 10:26am)
Kyle DixonEven  in a system like Dzogchen, which does give an explanation on how  something like color arises, the varying capacities and principles  involved are ultimately nothing more than literary devices.
(
Sunday, September 14, 2014 at 10:41am)
Kyle DixonAN 4.24 Kāḷakārāma Sūtra:
Thus,  monks, the Tathāgata does not conceive an [object] seen when seeing  what is to be seen. He does not conceive an unseen. He does not conceive  a to-be-seen. He does not conceive a seer. 
He  does not conceive an [object] heard when hearing what is to be heard.  He does not conceive an unheard. He does not conceive a to-be-heard. He  does not conceive a hearer. 
He  does not conceive an [object] sensed when sensing what is to be sensed.  He does not conceive an unsensed. He does not conceive a to-be-sensed.  He does not conceive a senser. 
He  does not conceive an [object] known when knowing what is to be known.  He does not conceive an unknown. He does not conceive a to-be-known. He  does not conceive a knower.
1 liked this (
Sunday, September 14, 2014 at 10:56am)
Bdcrtgb Rcnrcrrdfvnb>>>>>>the  Tathāgata does not conceive an [object] seen when seeing what is to be  seen. He does not conceive an unseen. He does not conceive a to-be-seen.  He does not conceive a seer. <<<<<<
This means there is only seeing, not a seen nor a seer? Not anything unseen nor yet to be seen? This makes sense to me.
But  how can this seeing be understood as being empty? Seeing seems to be  going on continuously and unobstructedly. It seems to be the nature of  experience itself, thus reality's essential nature.
(
Sunday, September 14, 2014 at 11:07am)
Kyle DixonWell,  not 'just' seeing because that would be a reductionist view. Buddhism  avoids reducing everything to one thing. Seer, seeing, seen are  technically all purified through realizing emptiness. It is called  threefold purity.
For instance there is another  Sūtra where Śākyamuni is addressing Bāhiya and he states "in the seeing  just the seen", so these are really just pointers and aren't meant to  be absolute statements. 
In describing the same type of insight Tulku Urgyen Rinpoche said; "Seeing no thing is the supreme sight."
So it isn't as it there is 'just seeing' or 'just seen'.
Maybe try reading chapter 3 of Nāgārjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika.
2 liked this (
Sunday, September 14, 2014 at 12:50pm)
Soh4 liked this (
Sunday, September 14, 2014 at 1:02pm)
SohBahiya  Sutta is not 'only seeing' but 'in the seen only the seen' with 'no you  in terms of that'. There's a difference. Seeing can still be a subtle  subjective reference point.
4 liked this (
Sunday, September 14, 2014 at 1:05pm)
SohThe  point of Bahiya Sutta is to realize there is absolutely no seer nor  seeing behind/within/in-between/besides seen/heard/cognized. Then anatta  is realized. But that is just the beginning.
4 liked this (
Sunday, September 14, 2014 at 1:10pm)
Viorica Doina NeacsuBeautiful and very clear article, Soh. :)I  thought i will not read all your article thinking that is long and i  have no time.... but your right words, right speech, right view didn't  let me to go away.... so much clarity ....with each paragraph your words  became a soft and kind energy.... wisdom... true delight...  Thank you  so much!  3 liked this (
Sunday, September 14, 2014 at 8:25pm)
See original post