Posted months ago:
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Chinese:
你现在的心是什么?
John Tan向一位朋友发出了两个有力的公案——值得深思。
1)在没有任何思维的情况下,告诉我你现在的心是什么?
2)在不使用任何词语或语言的情况下,你现在如何体验“我”?
(在禅宗传统中,我们也有:“当你不思善不思恶时,那个时候,什么是你的本来面目?”(六祖慧能),“父母未生前的本来面目是什么?”)
一个类似的公案引导我在2010年2月初次顿悟。
...........................
有人回答:“无心”
我们的那位朋友对John Tan说了类似的话,结果被“敲了一下”。
“John Tan:在没有任何思维的情况下,告诉我你现在的心是什么?
朋友:空的。空洞的。
John Tan:敲你的头……哈哈。
在不使用任何词语或语言的情况下,你现在如何体验‘我’?
朋友:……关于个性、习惯、观点的某些东西……
John Tan:如果没有思维,怎么会有习惯、观点和个性?你走到哪里,怎么能错过它?日日夜夜,无论何时何地,那里都有‘你’!你怎么能将‘你’与‘你自己’分离?”
English:
What is your very Mind right now?
John Tan sent two potent koans to a friend—good for contemplation.
- Without thoughts, tell me what is your very mind right now?
- Without using any words or language, how do you experience ‘I’ right now?
(In the Zen tradition, we also have, "When you're not thinking of anything good and anything bad, at that moment, what is your original face?" (Sixth Patriarch Hui-Neng), "What is the original face before your parents were born?")
A similar koan led to my initial sudden awakening in February 2010.
...........................
Someone replied, “No mind"
That friend of ours told John Tan something similar and got 'smacked'.
"John Tan: Without any thought, tell me what is your very mind now?
Friend: Void. Hollow.
John Tan: Smack your head... lol.
Without using any words or language, how do you experience 'I' right now'?
Friend: ....something about personality, habits, opinions...
John Tan: If there is no thoughts, how can there be habits, opinions and personality? Everywhere you go, how can you miss it? Day in and day out, wherever and whenever there is, there 'you' are! How can 'you' distance yourself from 'yourself'?"
Chinese:
John Tan更多的分享:“大手印、大圆满、禅宗,无论什么传统,如何能让你与你自己分离?那么,你是谁?”
自我探究被称为直接之道是有原因的:
“不要关联、不要推理、不要思考。认证‘你’自己,不需要这些。不需要从老师、书籍、大手印、大圆满、禅宗,甚至佛陀那里获得,任何来自外在的都是知识。来自你自己内在最深处的,是你自己的智慧。
不需要寻找任何答案。最终,这是你自己的本质和本性。要从推理、演绎和关联的心跃入最直接和最即时的认证,心必须完全停止,回到任何人为造作形成之前的地方。如果这个‘直接性’的‘眼’没有打开,一切都只是知识,而打开这个直接感知的眼,是无道之道的开始。好了,聊天够多了,已经有太多话语了。不要动摇,继续前行。旅途愉快!”
……
“R先生,我已经对你非常直接了,这只是一个关于你现在的心是什么的问题,别无其他。没有比这更直接的道路了。
我已经告诉你,放下所有思维、所有教义,甚至大圆满、大手印、禅宗,只是问‘你现在的心是什么?’这不是直接告诉你,不浪费时间和言语吗?我也告诉你,任何来自外在的都是知识,把这些都放在一边。智慧直接来自你自己。但是你却给我复制粘贴了所有的文本、对话、禅宗、大手印、大圆满、中观,我已经告诉你要放在一边。
你问我有什么建议。还是一样。不要追求体验和知识,你已经阅读和知道得够多了,所以回归简单。你的责任不是知道更多,而是消除所有这些,回到直接品味的简单性。否则你将不得不再浪费几年或几十年,回到最简单、基本和直接的东西。
从这种简单和直接性中,你然后允许你的本性通过在所有时刻和所有状态中,不断地认证它,在不同的条件下展现其广度和深度。
所以,除非你放下一切,回到纯净、简单的基础,否则在修行上没有真正的进展。直到你明白简单的宝藏,并从那里重新开始,每向前一步都是退步。”——John Tan,2020年
English:
More by John Tan: "Mahamudra, Dzogchen, Zen, whatever tradition, how are they able to deny you from yourself? So who are You?"
Self-Enquiry is called a direct path for a reason:
“Don’t relate, don’t infer, don’t think. Authenticating ‘You’ yourself requires nothing of that. Not from teachers, books, Mahamudra, Dzogchen, Zen or even Buddha, whatever comes from outside is knowledge. What that comes from the innermost depth of your own beingness, is the wisdom of you yourself.
There is no need to look for any answers. Ultimately, it is your own essence and nature. To leap from the inferencing, deducting and relating mind into the most direct and immediate authentication, the mind must cease completely and right back into the place before any formation of artificialities. If this ‘eye’ of immediacy isn’t open, everything is merely knowledge and opening this eye of direct perception is the beginning of the path that is pathless. Ok enough of chats and there have been too much words. Don’t sway and walk on. Happy journey!’
…
“Mr. R, I have been very direct to you and it is just a simple question of what is your mind right now and nothing else. There is no other path more straightforward than that.
I have told you to put aside all thoughts, all teachings, even Dzogchen, Mahamudra, Zen and just [asked] ‘what is your mind right now?’. Isn’t that telling you straight to the point, not wasting time and words? I have also told you whatever comes from external is knowledge, put all those aside. Wisdom comes from within yourself directly. But you have cut and pasted me all the texts, conversations, Zen, Mahamudra, Dzogchen, Madhyamaka that I have told you to put aside.
You asked me what is my advice. Still the same. Don’t go after experiences and knowledge, you have read and known enough, so return back to simplicity. Your duty is not to know more, but to eliminate all these and [get] back to the simplicity of the direct taste. Otherwise you will have to waste a few more years or decades to return back to what is most simple, basic and direct.
And from this simplicity and directness, you then allow your nature to reveal the breadth and depth through constantly authenticating it in all moments and all states through engagement in different conditions.
So unless you drop everything and [get] back into a clean, pure, basic simplicity, there is no real progress in practice. Until you understand the treasure of simplicity and start back from there, every step forward is a retrogress.“ – John Tan, 2020
Chinese:
标签:我是感、光明、自我探究
John Tan在2009年曾在Dharma Overground写道:
“嗨,加里,
在这个论坛上似乎有两组修行者,一组采用渐进法,另一组采用直接之道。我在这里比较新,所以可能有误。
我的看法是,你正在采用渐进的方法,但你在直接之道中体验到了一些非常重要的东西,那就是‘观察者’。正如肯尼斯所说,‘你在这里发现了一些非常重要的东西,加里。这个修行会让你解脱。’但肯尼斯所说的,需要你觉醒到这个‘我’。它需要你有那种‘啊哈!’的领悟。觉醒到这个‘我’,精神之路就会变得清晰;它只是这个‘我’的展开。
另一方面,Yabaxoule所描述的是渐进的方法,因此淡化了‘我是’。你必须评估自己的状况,如果你选择直接之道,你不能淡化这个‘我’;相反,你必须完全、彻底地体验整个‘你’作为‘存在’。我们本然的空性将在直接之道的修行者面对非迹可寻、无中心、无努力的非二元觉知时显现。
也许对你有所帮助的是,两种方法在何处相遇。
觉醒到‘观察者’的同时,将‘打开’‘直接性的眼’;也就是说,它是能够直接穿透离散思维和感官,直接感知、感觉、知觉所感知的东西。这是一种直接的知晓。你必须深刻地意识到这种‘无需中介的直接’的感知——太直接了,以至于没有主客体的间隙,太短暂了,以至于没有时间,太简单了,以至于没有思维。它是能够通过‘成为’‘声音’来看到整个‘声音’的‘眼’。在做内观时也需要同样的‘眼’,即‘赤裸’。无论是非二元还是内观,都需要打开这个‘直接性的眼’。”
English:
Labels: I AMness, Luminosity, Self Enquiry
John Tan wrote in Dharma Overground back in 2009,
“Hi Gary,
It appears that there are two groups of practitioners in this forum, one adopting the gradual approach and the other, the direct path. I am quite new here so I may be wrong.
My take is that you are adopting a gradual approach yet you are experiencing something very significant in the direct path, that is, the ‘Watcher’. As what Kenneth said, “You're onto something very big here, Gary. This practice will set you free.” But what Kenneth said would require you to be awaken to this ‘I’. It requires you to have the ‘eureka!’ sort of realization. Awaken to this ‘I’, the path of spirituality becomes clear; it is simply the unfolding of this ‘I’.
On the other hand, what that is described by Yabaxoule is a gradual approach and therefore there is downplaying of the ‘I AM’. You have to gauge your own conditions, if you choose the direct path, you cannot downplay this ‘I’; contrary, you must fully and completely experience the whole of ‘YOU’ as ‘Existence’. Emptiness nature of our pristine nature will step in for the direct path practitioners when they come face to face to the ‘traceless’, ‘centerless’ and ‘effortless’ nature of non-dual awareness.
Perhaps a little on where the two approaches meet will be of help to you.
Awakening to the ‘Watcher’ will at the same time ‘open’ the ‘eye of immediacy’; that is, it is the capacity to immediately penetrate discursive thoughts and sense, feel, perceive without intermediary the perceived. It is a kind of direct knowing. You must be deeply aware of this “direct without intermediary” sort of perception—too direct to have subject-object gap, too short to have time, too simple to have thoughts. It is the ‘eye’ that can see the whole of ‘sound’ by being ‘sound’. It is the same ‘eye’ that is required when doing vipassana, that is, being ‘bare’. Be it non-dual or vipassana, both require the opening of this 'eye of immediacy'.”
Chinese:
——-
在2009年,John Tan写道:
“嗨,德昌,
你所描述的很好,可以被认为是内观禅修,但你必须清楚这样练习的主要目标是什么。具有讽刺意味的是,真正的目的只有在生起无我见解之后才变得明显。我从你的描述中收集到的,并不是关于无我或现象的空性,而是更倾向于觉知的练习。所以,最好从理解觉知究竟是什么开始。你提到的所有修行方法都会导致一种非概念化的体验。你可以有声音、味道的非概念化体验……等等……但更重要的是,在我看来,你应该从直接、非概念地体验觉知开始(首次领略我们光明的本质)。一旦你‘品尝’到觉知是什么,你就可以考虑‘扩展’这种赤裸的觉知,并逐渐从觉知的角度理解‘提升和扩展’是什么意思。
接下来,虽然你在An Eternal Now的论坛上听到和看到‘非二元、无我和缘起’(你最近买的Toni Packer的书是关于非二元和无我的),但一开始‘二元’并没有什么错。即使在直接、非概念地体验觉知之后,我们的观点仍将继续是二元的;所以不要认为二元是坏的,尽管它阻碍了彻底的解脱体验。
Dharma Dan给出的评论非常有见地,但最近我意识到,直接首次领略我们光明的本质是很重要的,然后再进入这样的理解。有时过早地理解某些东西会让自己无法实现,因为它变成了概念。一旦形成了概念性的理解,即使是有资格的导师也会发现很难引导修行者达到实际的‘领悟’,因为修行者将概念性的理解误认为是领悟。
祝好,
约翰”
English:
In 2009, John Tan wrote:
"Hi Teck Cheong,
What you described is fine and it can be considered vipassana meditation too but you must be clear what is the main objective of practicing that way. Ironically, the real purpose only becomes obvious after the arising insight of anatta. What I gathered so far from your descriptions are not so much about anatta or empty nature of phenomena but are rather drawn towards Awareness practice. So it will be good to start from understanding what Awareness truly is. All the method of practices that you mentioned will lead to a quality of experience that is non-conceptual. You can have non-conceptual experience of sound, taste...etc...but more importantly in my opinion, you should start from having a direct, non-conceptual experience of Awareness (first glimpse of our luminous essence). Once you have a ‘taste’ of what Awareness is, you can then think of ‘expanding’ this bare awareness and gradually understand what does ‘heightening and expanding’ mean from the perspective of Awareness.
Next, although you hear and see ‘non-dual, anatta and dependent origination’ all over the place in An Eternal Now’s forum (the recent Toni Packer’s books you bought are about non-dual and anatta), there is nothing wrong being ‘dualistic’ for a start. Even after direct non-conceptual experience of Awareness, our view will still continue to be dualistic; so do not have the idea that being dualistic is bad although it prevents thorough experience of liberation.
The comment given by Dharma Dan is very insightful but of late, I realized that it is important to have a first glimpse of our luminous essence directly before proceeding into such understanding. Sometimes understanding something too early will deny oneself from actual realization as it becomes conceptual. Once the conceptual understanding is formed, even qualified masters will find it difficult to lead the practitioner to the actual ‘realization’ as a practitioner mistakes conceptual understanding for realization.
Rgds,
John"
Chinese:
安杰罗写道:
用于第一次觉醒的探究
引导第一次觉醒的探究是一件有趣的事情。我们想知道“如何”精确地进行这种探究,这是完全可以理解的。问题是,通过描述某种技术,它并不能被完全传达。实际上,这是找到放下和意图相遇的甜蜜点。我将在这里描述一种方法,但重要的是要记住,最终,你(作为你认为的自己)没有能力让自己觉醒。只有生命本身有这种力量。所以,当我们将自己投入某种探究或修行时,必须保持开放。我们必须保持对神秘和可能性的门户开放。我们必须认识到,不断地断定“这不是,这也不是……”只是心智的活动。这些都是思维。如果我们相信任何一个思维,那么我们就会相信下一个,如此下去。然而,如果我们认识到,“哦,那种怀疑只是现在升起的一个思维”,那么我们就有机会认识到那个思维会自行消退……然而,“我”作为那个觉知到那个思维的,仍然在这里!我们现在可以对思维之间的这个间隙感到好奇:当没有思维存在时,这种纯粹的“我”的感觉是什么,这种纯粹的觉知的感觉,纯粹的存在的感觉?这种能够照耀并照亮一个思维(就像它每天成千上万次所做的),而当没有思维时仍然照耀的光是什么?它是自我照耀的。是什么注意到思维的存在,在思维之前、期间和之后都处于清醒和觉知状态,并且不被任何思维以任何方式改变?请理解,当你问这些问题时,你并不是在寻找一个思维的答案,答案就是体验本身。
当我们开始允许注意力放松到这种更广阔的视角中时,我们开始将自己从思维中解放出来。我们开始凭感觉、本能来认识无拘无束的意识的本质。这就是进入的方式。
起初,我们可能断定这个间隙、这个无思维的意识是无趣的、不重要的。它感觉相当中性,而繁忙的心智对中性没有办法,所以我们可能倾向于再次故意引发思维。如果我们认识到“无趣、不重要、没有价值”都是思维,并简单地回到这种流动的意识中,它将开始扩展。但我们不需要去思考扩展或等待它。只要我们与之同在,它会自然而然地这样做。如果你愿意识别每一个思维和心中的图像,并将其视为这样,并让你的注意力警觉但放松地融入与“我”的感觉连续的思维的“物质”中,一切都会自行解决。只要愿意暂停评判。愿意放弃结论。愿意放下所有对自己进展的监控,因为这些都是思维。对纯粹的体验保持开放。只需一次又一次地回到这个没有对象的意识之处,或纯粹的“我是”之感。如果你愿意这样做,它将以我见过的任何人都无法解释的方式向你展示自己,但它比真实更真实。
旅途愉快。”
English:
Angelo wrote:
Inquiry for First Awakening
The inquiry that leads to first awakening is a funny thing. We want to know “how” precisely to do that inquiry, which is completely understandable. The thing is that it’s not wholly conveyable by describing a certain technique. Really it’s a matter of finding that sweet spot where surrender and intention meet. I will describe an approach here, but it’s important to keep in mind that in the end, you don’t have the power (as what you take yourself to be) to wake yourself up. Only Life has that power. So as we give ourselves to a certain inquiry or practice it’s imperative that we remain open. We have to keep the portals open to mystery, and possibility. We have to recognize that the constant concluding that “no this isn’t it, no this isn’t it either...” is simply the activity of the mind. Those are thoughts. If we believe a single thought then we will believe the next one and on and on. If however we recognize that, “oh that doubt is simply a thought arising now,” then we have the opportunity to recognize that that thought will subside on its own... and yet “I” as the knower of that thought am still here! We can now become fascinated with what is here once that thought (or any thought) subsides. What is in this gap between thoughts? What is this pure sense of I, pure sense of knowing, pure sense of Being? What is this light that can shine on and illuminate a thought (as it does thousands of times per day), and yet still shines when no thought is present. It is self illuminating. What is the nature of the one that notices thoughts, is awake and aware before, during, and after a thought, and is not altered in any way by any thought? Please understand that when you ask these questions you are not looking for a thought answer, the answer is the experience itself.
When we start to allow our attention to relax into this wider perspective we start to unbind ourselves from thought. We begin to recognize the nature of unbound consciousness by feel, by instinct. This is the way in.
At first we may conclude that this gap, this thoughtless consciousness is uninteresting, unimportant. It feels quite neutral, and the busy mind can’t do anything with neutral so we might be inclined to purposely engage thoughts again. If we recognize that “not interesting, not important, not valuable” are all thoughts and simply return to this fluid consciousness, it will start to expand. But there is no need to think about expansion or watch for it. It will do this naturally if we stay with it. If you are willing to recognize every thought and image in the mind as such, and keep your attention alert but relaxed into the “stuff” of thought that is continuous with the sense of I, it will all take care of itself. Just be willing to suspend judgement. Be willing to forego conclusions. Be willing to let go of all monitoring of your progress, because these are all thoughts. Be open to the pure experience. Just return again and again to this place of consciousness with no object or pure sense of I Am. If you are willing to do this it will teach itself to you in a way that neither I nor anyone I’ve ever seen can explain, but it is more real than real.
Happy Travels."
Posted as a response to a thread in Dharma Overground. https://www.dharmaoverground.org/discussion/-/message_boards/message/33490124
1. The Kālakārāma-sutta and Agencylessness in the Pāli Canon
a. Overview of the Kālakārāma-sutta
- Source:
Aṅguttara-nikāya (Connected Discourses), specifically A.N. 4.24. - Context:
The Kālakārāma-sutta addresses misconceptions about agency, perception, and the self. It emphasizes the absence of a permanent agent behind sensory experiences and cognitive processes, aligning with the core Buddhist doctrine of anattā (non-self).
b. Original Pāli Passage and Translation
Original Passage:
"Iti kho bhikkhave Tathāgato daṭṭhā [diṭṭhā in Burmese MSS] daṭṭhabbaṁ diṭṭhaṁ na maññati adiṭṭhāṁ na maññati daṭṭhabbaṁ na maññati daṭṭhāraṁ na maññati, sutvā sotabbaṁ sutaṁ na maññati asutaṁ na maññati sotabbaṁ na maññati sotāraṁ na maññati, mutvā motabbaṁ mutam [sic] na maññati amutaṁ na maññati mottabaṁ [sic] na maññati motāraṁ na maññati, viññātvā viññātabbaṁ viññātaṁ na maññati aviññātaṁ na maññati viññātabbaṁ na maññati viññātāraṁ na maññati."
Translation:
"Thus, O monks, the Tathāgata, having seen whatever is to be seen, does not conceive of what is seen; he does not conceive of what has not been seen; he does not conceive of that which must yet be seen; he does not conceive of anyone who sees. Having heard whatever is to be heard, he does not conceive of what is heard; he does not conceive of what has not been heard; he does not conceive of that which must yet be heard; he does not conceive of anyone who hears. Having felt whatever is to be felt, he does not conceive of what is felt; he does not conceive of what has not been felt; he does not conceive of that which must yet be felt; he does not conceive of anyone who feels. Having understood whatever is to be understood, he does not conceive of what is understood; he does not conceive of what has not been understood; he does not conceive of that which must yet be understood; he does not conceive of anyone who understands."
c. Key Pāli Terms in the Passage
The Kālakārāma-sutta systematically negates the conception of various agents involved in sensory and cognitive processes. The specific Pāli terms used for "anyone who feels," "anyone who hears," etc., are as follows:
English Phrase | Pāli Term | Breakdown | Translation |
---|---|---|---|
Anyone who sees | daṭṭhāraṁ | daṭṭha- (seen) + -āraṁ (agent suffix) | "one who sees" |
Anyone who hears | sotāraṁ | sota- (heard) + -āraṁ (agent suffix) | "one who hears" |
Anyone who feels | motāraṁ | mota- (felt) + -āraṁ (agent suffix) | "one who feels" |
Anyone who understands | viññātāraṁ | viññāta- (understood) + -āraṁ (agent suffix) | "one who understands" |
Understanding the Suffix "-āraṁ"
- Function:
The suffix -āraṁ in Pāli denotes an agent or doer related to the root verb. When attached to the root of a verb, it transforms the word to signify "one who performs" the action.
Detailed Breakdown of Terms
- daṭṭhāraṁ (one who sees)
- daṭṭha-: Seen
- -āraṁ: Agent/doer suffix
- Meaning: "one who sees"
- sotāraṁ (one who hears)
- sota-: Heard
- -āraṁ: Agent/doer suffix
- Meaning: "one who hears"
- motāraṁ (one who feels)
- mota-: Felt
- -āraṁ: Agent/doer suffix
- Meaning: "one who feels"
- viññātāraṁ (one who understands)
- viññāta-: Understood
- -āraṁ: Agent/doer suffix
- Meaning: "one who understands"
d. Interpretation and Implications
- No Conception of the Perceiver:
The Tathāgata (the Buddha) does not attribute sensory experiences or understanding to a permanent seer or agent. This aligns with the doctrine of anattā, emphasizing that what we perceive arises from interdependent conditions without a fixed self. - No Agent Behind Perception:
By denying the conception of an independent seer, the sutta underscores that perception and consciousness are processes devoid of a permanent agent. - Avoidance of Duality:
The sutta discourages dualistic thinking where a distinct "I" is separated from actions and perceptions, fostering a non-dual understanding of experience.
e. Integration with Broader Buddhist Concepts
- Dependent Origination (Pratītya-samutpāda):
All phenomena arise dependent on conditions and cease when those conditions cease. This interdependent nature negates the need for a permanent agent behind actions. - Five Aggregates (Khandhas):
The self is analyzed into five aggregates: form, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness. None of these aggregates constitute a permanent self.
f. Practical Implications in Buddhist Practicei. Mindfulness and Insight (Vipassanā)
- Observation of Processes:
Through mindfulness, practitioners observe how thoughts, sensations, and actions arise and cease without a permanent agent. This direct observation fosters insights into the impermanent and non-self nature of phenomena. - Dissolution of Attachment:
Recognizing the absence of a permanent self leads to the reduction of attachments and aversions, which are the root causes of suffering (dukkha).
ii. Reduction of Suffering (Dukkha)
- Understanding Impermanence:
Grasping anattā helps practitioners understand the transient nature of experiences, thereby reducing the clinging that leads to suffering. - Path to Liberation (Nibbāna):
By eliminating the illusion of a permanent self, one moves closer to nibbāna, the cessation of suffering.
g. Conclusion of Kālakārāma-sutta
Analysis
The Kālakārāma-sutta serves as a profound illustration of the anattā doctrine by negating the conception of a permanent agent behind sensory and cognitive processes. By employing specific Pāli terms—daṭṭhāraṁ, sotāraṁ, motāraṁ, and viññātāraṁ—the sutta emphasizes that actions and perceptions arise dependently without a fixed self, aligning with the core Buddhist teachings on non-self and dependent origination.
2. Conceptual Attachment of Agent to Action
a. Phrase Analysis
Phrase:
"yaṁ maññati taṁ mantar"
Breakdown:
- yaṁ: "that which"
- maññati: "he thinks" or "he believes"
- taṁ: "that"
- mantar: "thinker"
Translation:
"He considers that to be the thinker."
Source:
This analysis is derived from Michael Everson's paper, "Some Remarks on Conceptualization and Transcendent Experience in the Theravāda Tradition," available at Evertype.
b. InterpretationThis phrase metaphorically represents how individuals conceptually attach a self or agent to their actions and thoughts. By considering an action as performed by a "thinker," one reinforces the illusion of a permanent self (attā), which contradicts the Buddhist understanding of anattā (non-self).
Everson elaborates:
"It is the conceptual attachment of agent to action (yaṁ maññati taṁ mantar), resulting from the initial separation of agent from action, which the Buddha attacks in the Kālakārāma-sutta"
This identification with the act of thinking exemplifies the common human tendency to attribute actions and experiences to a stable, enduring self, thereby perpetuating attachments and aversions that lead to suffering.
3. Nagarjuna and Madhyamaka
Philosophy: Agency and Agencylessness
a. Introduction to Nagarjuna and Madhyamaka
- Who is Nagarjuna?
Nagarjuna (circa 150–250 CE) is one of the most influential Buddhist philosophers, renowned for founding the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. His seminal work, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way), systematically deconstructs inherent existence and emphasizes the concept of śūnyatā (emptiness). - What is Madhyamaka?
Madhyamaka is a philosophical approach that navigates between the extremes of eternalism (belief in an eternal self) and nihilism (denial of all existence). It posits that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence (svabhāva) and arise dependently (pratītya-samutpāda).
b. Core Concepts: Agency and Agencylessness in Madhyamakai. Agency in Buddhist Philosophy
- Definition:
Agency refers to the capacity of individuals (agents) to act, make choices, and initiate actions. - In Earlier Teachings:
Particularly in Theravāda Buddhism, agency is discussed in terms of kāraka (doer) and karma (action).
ii. Agencylessness (Anākāra)
- Definition:
Agencylessness refers to the absence of a permanent, independent agent behind actions and processes. - Alignment with Śūnyatā:
In Madhyamaka, agencylessness aligns with śūnyatā, emphasizing that actions arise dependently without an inherent doer.
c. Specific Terms Used in Madhyamaka
Sanskrit Term | Pāli Equivalent | Translation | Role in Agency/Agencylessness |
---|---|---|---|
Kartā | Kāraka | Agent/Doer | Represents the conventional notion of an agent, deconstructed in Madhyamaka. |
Śūnyatā | Suññatā | Emptiness | Emphasizes the lack of inherent existence, including agency. |
Pratītya-samutpāda | Pratītya-samutpāda | Dependent Origination | Explains the interdependent arising of actions without a permanent agent. |
Anātman | Anattā | Non-Self | Denies a permanent self, supporting the concept of agencylessness. |
i. Kartā (कर्ता) – The Agent/Doer
- Meaning:
"Agent" or "doer" responsible for actions. - Usage in Madhyamaka:
Nagarjuna employs kartā to discuss the conventional notion of an agent but ultimately denies its inherent existence.
ii. Śūnyatā (शून्यता) – Emptiness
- Meaning:
"Emptiness" signifies the absence of inherent existence in all phenomena. - Role in Agencylessness:
Śūnyatā underpins the Madhyamaka assertion that there is no permanent agent behind actions; instead, actions arise dependently.
iii. Pratītya-samutpāda (प्रत्ययसमुत्पाद) – Dependent Origination
- Meaning:
"Dependent origination" describes the interdependent nature of all phenomena. - Implications for Agency:
Actions and experiences arise through a web of conditions without necessitating a permanent agent.
iv. Anātman (अनात्मन्) – Non-Self
- Meaning:
"Non-self" denotes the absence of an enduring, unchanging self. - Relation to Agencylessness:
Anātman complements śūnyatā by denying a permanent self that acts as an agent.
d. Madhyamaka's Approach to Agency and Agencylessness
i. Deconstruction of Inherent Agency
- Nagarjuna's Argument:
The notion of an inherent agent (kartā) is a conceptual construct without true existence. - Emphasis on Dependent Processes:
Madhyamaka emphasizes that actions are processes arising from dependent conditions, not orchestrated by a permanent "doer."
ii. Emphasis on Relational Agency
- Relational and Context-Dependent:
Instead of positing a permanent doer, Madhyamaka views agency as relational and context-dependent. - No Need for a Singular Agent:
Actions result from interdependent factors, eliminating the necessity for a singular, enduring agent.
iii. The Middle Way: Avoiding Dualism
- Navigating Between Extremes:
Madhyamaka rejects both eternalism (a permanent self as the agent) and nihilism (denial of any functional agency). - Dependent and Empty Nature:
It posits that while agency is conventionally acknowledged, it lacks inherent existence and is devoid of a permanent self.
e. Interpretation of Agencylessness in Madhyamaka
- No Inherent Agent:
Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy systematically deconstructs the inherent existence of agents, asserting that what we consider as an "agent" is merely a convenient label for interdependent processes. - Dependent Origination:
Actions and phenomena arise dependently, without an inherent doer, aligning with the broader Buddhist teachings on anattā (non-self).
f. Practical Implications in Madhyamaka
i. Emptiness (Śūnyatā)
- Understanding Emptiness:
Recognizing the emptiness of all phenomena, including the notion of agency, helps transcend dualistic perceptions and attachments.
ii. Middle Way Philosophy
- Avoiding Extremes:
Madhyamaka's Middle Way approach avoids the extremes of eternalism and nihilism, promoting a balanced understanding of reality as empty yet functionally interdependent.
g. Conclusion of Madhyamaka Analysis
Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy offers a profound examination of agency and agencylessness, fundamentally challenging the notion of a permanent agent behind actions. By employing terms like kartā (agent) and emphasizing śūnyatā (emptiness) and pratītya-samutpāda (dependent origination), Madhyamaka articulates a vision of reality where actions arise dependently without an inherent doer. This perspective aligns with the broader Buddhist teachings on anattā (non-self), fostering a deeper understanding that leads to the reduction of suffering and the pursuit of nibbāna (liberation).
4. Comparative Insights and Integration
While the Kālakārāma-sutta and Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy emerge from different textual traditions (Theravāda and Mahayāna, respectively), they converge on the critical Buddhist doctrines of anattā (non-self) and pratītya-samutpāda (dependent origination). Both traditions emphasize the absence of a permanent self or agent behind actions, albeit through distinct terminologies and philosophical frameworks.
a. Shared Foundations
- Anattā (Non-Self):
Central to both the Pāli Canon and Madhyamaka, it denies the existence of a permanent, unchanging self. - Dependent Origination (Pratītya-samutpāda):
Both traditions uphold the principle that all phenomena arise dependently, negating the need for an inherent agent.
b. Distinct Philosophical Approaches
- Terminological Differences:
The Pāli Canon employs Pāli terms like kāraka and suññatā, while Madhyamaka uses Sanskrit terms like kartā and śūnyatā. - Philosophical Depth and Scope:
Madhyamaka delves deeper into the philosophical implications of śūnyatā, extending the concept to all phenomena, including relational aspects like agency. In contrast, the Pāli Canon maintains a practical approach, focusing on doctrinal teachings to guide practitioners toward liberation.
c. Practical Applications
Both traditions utilize these doctrines to guide practitioners in their path toward nibbāna (liberation):
- Theravāda (Pāli Canon):
Emphasizes mindfulness and insight practices to realize anattā, thereby reducing attachments and suffering. - Madhyamaka (Nagarjuna):
Encourages a profound philosophical understanding of śūnyatā to transcend dualistic perceptions and realize the emptiness of all phenomena, including agency.
5. Summary of Key Terms Related to Agency and Agencylessness
a. Kālakārāma-sutta (Pāli Canon)
Pāli Term | Translation | Role in Concept of Agent/No-Agent |
---|---|---|
daṭṭhāraṁ | One who sees | Represents the perceiver; the sutta negates the conception of a permanent seer. |
sotāraṁ | One who hears | Represents the hearer; the sutta negates the conception of a permanent hearer. |
motāraṁ | One who feels | Represents the feeler; the sutta negates the conception of a permanent feeler. |
viññātāraṁ | One who understands | Represents the understander; the sutta negates the conception of a permanent understander. |
b. Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka Philosophy
Sanskrit Term | Pāli Equivalent | Translation | Role in Agency/Agencylessness |
---|---|---|---|
Kartā | Kāraka | Agent/Doer | Represents the conventional notion of an agent, deconstructed in Madhyamaka. |
Śūnyatā | Suññatā | Emptiness | Emphasizes the lack of inherent existence, including agency. |
Pratītya-samutpāda | Pratītya-samutpāda | Dependent Origination | Explains the interdependent arising of actions without a permanent agent. |
Anātman | Anattā | Non-Self | Denies a permanent self, supporting the concept of agencylessness. |
6. Conclusion
Understanding the Buddhist concepts of agency and agencylessness is pivotal for comprehending the path to liberation (nibbāna). Both the Kālakārāma-sutta of the Pāli Canon and Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka philosophy articulate the absence of a permanent self or agent behind actions and experiences, albeit through different terminologies and philosophical lenses.
- Kālakārāma-sutta (Theravāda/Pāli Canon):
Utilizes specific Pāli terms—daṭṭhāraṁ, sotāraṁ, motāraṁ, and viññātāraṁ—to negate the conception of permanent agents in sensory and cognitive processes, reinforcing the anattā doctrine. - Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka (Mahayāna/Sanskrit):
Employs Sanskrit terms—kartā, śūnyatā, pratītya-samutpāda, and anātman—to delve deeper into the emptiness (śūnyatā) of all phenomena, including agency, thereby offering a more philosophically expansive exploration of agencylessness.
By integrating insights from both traditions, practitioners can cultivate a profound understanding of the impermanent, interdependent, and non-self nature of existence, paving the way for the reduction of suffering and the attainment of true liberation.
7. References
- Everson, Michael. Some Remarks on Conceptualization and Transcendent Experience in the Theravāda Tradition, with Two Notes on Translation. 1988. Available at: Evertype
- Aṅguttara-nikāya. 1888. Aṅguttara-nikāya. Vol. 2. Edited by Richard Morris. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. 6 vols. (1885-1910).
- Majjhima-nikāya. 1888. Majjhima-nikāya. Vol. 1. Edited by V. Trenckner. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. 4 vols. (1888-1925).
- Nagarjuna. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way).
- Rhys Davids, T. W., and William Stede, eds. 1979. The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English Dictionary. London: Pali Text Society. [Reprint of 1925 ed.]
- Ñāṇananda. 1974. The Magic of the Mind: An Exposition of the Kālakārāma-sutta. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society.
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https://www.awakeningtoreality.com/2014/07/some-remarks-on-conceptualization-and_14.html
Some Remarks on Conceptualization and Transcendent Experience
Soh
Also see: No Self, No Doer, Conditionality
Thusness commented: "It is a good article... ...In the article there is no obsession or singling out clarity as independent and existing by itself. "Being" here is understood within/from the context of anatta, process, verb, no locus and without agent. His term of "being" is not to single out from the ever dynamics of appearance but rather understood from the standpoint of non-action. Would be better if there is integration of total exertion (dependent origination) into it; makes the article more complete."
http://www.evertype.com/misc/vitakka.html
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Some remarks on conceptualization and transcendent experience in the Theravāda tradition, with two notes on translationMichael EversonThis paper, written originally in 1988, was an excursion into theology -- or perhaps “noetology”. It was an attempt at commentary proper, rather than at disinterested analysis. It is a basic tenet of Buddhism that suffering arises from false notions of self. Individuals perceive themselves as separate entities, autonomous yet dependent on their world, experiencing change and continuity. The uniqueness of each moment of existence is distorted by the filter of a self which categorizes and interprets those moments, judging them good or bad and fighting a useless battle to keep the good and shun the bad. The nexus for the introduction of false notions of self into experience is the point at which experience is conceptualized. Enlightened consciousness results when these false notions are no longer imposed upon the perceptual process. It cannot be said that the Buddhist description of conceptualization is without its difficulties. Indeed, a Buddhist description ofanything is much entangled in relationships: just as any event in the world depends on a nigh infinite series of causes, and engenders a nigh infinite series of effects, so does a light shone on any facet of Buddhist epistemology shine and reflect off of each other facet. It is difficult to pluck one string of the sitar without causing the sympathetic strings into resonance as well. Still, conceptualization, and its relation to conditioned and enlightened consciousness, is central to Buddhism -- both to its taxonomy of the problem of existence and to its soteriology. An investigation of that relation will suggest a reëvaluation of notions of action and being. Buddhism might be described as a kind of cure to the disease of dukkha, of ‘suffering’ or ‘unsatisfactoriness’. Existence (bhava) is an ongoing process of becoming, manifest in its constituents (aṅga). The natural (or ideal) condition for the mind is a calm flow (bhavaṅga-sota), through which (around which, in which) the constituents of becoming interact harmoniously in an “experiential stream” of what is as it is. Nyanatiloka remarks that bhavṣaṅga-sota is explained in the Abhidhamma commentaries as the foundation or condition (kaṁraṇa) of existence (bhava), as the sine qua non of life, having the nature of a process, lit. a flux or stream (sota). [Nyanatiloka 1980:38] Conceptualization impedes the harmonious flow of bhavaṅga-sota. It is a process for ordering stimuli to consciousness, convenient for interaction with the world, but, apparently, not essential once the world has been investigated. Bondage to concepts is considered to be an inevitable consequence of the process of conceptualization because of the fiction of the self, and that bondage to concepts leads to expectation and denial, the causes of dukkha. A review of the process leading up to conceptualization will be helpful here. The immediate precursors to conceptualization have been classified as a purely impersonal, causal process. In the Madhupiṇḍika-sutta, the venerable Kaccaṁna sums up his understanding of the Buddha’s teaching:
Conceptualization arises from perception. “Yaṁ sañjānāti taṁ vitakketi” ‘What one perceives, one reflects on’. This is indicative of the insidious nature of the ego to take the original subjective experience and “objectivize” it. Though each object, contact, and sensation be unique, the ego takes them only in relation to itself and its past, present, and future experience and needs. The concepts (vitakkā) which arise through perception tend toward proliferation, for the ego becomes attached to them. Conceptions become preconceptions, and the whole scheme is filled with error. The Buddha was concerned about the detrimental nature of attachment to speculative views of existence and of the Transcendent. The problem is not whether or not the views themselves have validity, for it is clear that they do, depending on, and with respect to, the particular point of view. “The fact that existence is a relative concept is often overlooked by the worldling.” [Ñāṇananda 1974:20] It is axiomatic that the frog knows what the tadpole cannot; but the question here is whether or not the tadpole’s point of view is wise, and the Buddhist approach would be to say that no point of view is worthwhile unless it is a view which encompasses reality as it is. That view is impersonal. From the Sutta-nipāta:
It should be noted that both E. M. Hare [Sutta-nipāta 1944:134] and Hammalava Saddhatissa [Sutta-nipāta 1985:107] have mistranslated mantā asmi as ‘all the thoughts “I am”’ and ‘all thought of “I am”’ respectively. A better reading would have mantā <mantar ‘thinker’ (< Sanskrit *mantṛ) and take the deictic ’ti as setting off the phrase mantā asmi as translated above. (Cf. Neumann’s translation “Ich bin’s, der denkt”, ‘I am the one who thinks’. [Sutta-nipāta 1911:299]) The Commentary to the Sutta-nipāta, however, explains this phrase by mantāya:
Here the dative mantāya would also prove difficult for Hare and Saddhatissa’s readings, where we should expect *manā asmi (formanāya asmi) ‘of the thought “I am”, since we have mano ‘thought’ opposed to mantā ‘wisdom’, as I think the Commentary has it, or even manta (< Sanskrit mantra) ‘charm, doctrine, Holy Scripture’. [Cf. Childers 1875:238-39, and Rhys Davids & Stede 1979:520-22] In any case, I find the present suggested reading more in keeping with the spirit and the sense of the intent of the text, and with the goals of the tradition generally.[2] It is the conceptual attachment of agent to action (yaṁ maññati taṁ mantar), resulting from the initial separation of agent from action, which the Buddha attacks in the Kālakārāma-sutta, not whether or not there exists a thinker at all. It is true that identification with (or even the ‘real’ existence of) the personal ego is denied elsewhere by the Buddha: ...sutavato ariyasāvakassa avijjā pahīyati vijjā uppajjati. Tassa avijjāvirāgā vijjuppādā “Asmī” ti pi ’ssa na hoti, “Ayam aham asmī” ti pi ’ssa na hoti, “Bhavissanti, na bhavissanti, rūpī, arūpī, saññī, asaññī, n’eva saññī nāsaññī bhavissan”
Yet there is no suggestion that a universal (albeit Vedāntist) ontological interpretation of aham asmi ‘I am’ would be rejected, though such a rejection could be inferred, I think, in the readings of Hare and Saddhatissa. J. G. Jennings has remarked that “[t]he an-attadoctrine so strongly emphasized by [Gotama] declares the transience of individuality, yet insists upon an ultimate or fundamental unity”. [1974:571] While the Pāli commentarial tradition would doubtless reject a Vedāntist claim of an essential unity to Reality, I see no reason to think that a radically non-attached, Liberated notion of “I am” is instrinsically inconsistent with Buddhist teachings. Pure being is neither conceived nor attached, It just Is, and if there is for “me” only “being”, then, it seems, “I am”.[3] The conceptual attachment of agent to action results from an initial (erroneous) separation of agent from action. The source of the delusion standing in the way of Liberation (papañcasaṁkhā) is the personal notion “I am a thinker” (mantā asmi). Mindfulness is the method by which one learns the process of letting go (vinaya); that process begins with the elimination of attachment to the things perceived (pleasure, pain, desire, dislike) and culminates in the elimination of attachment to the identification with the notion that there is in fact a perceiver apart from the perception. This process of detachment from ego is admittedly difficult to describe, and it may be fruitless to attempt to do so. What may be more fruitful is to investigate the effects precipitated by that process. By and large, they derive from a fundamental revision of the process leading up to conceptualization, and from the removal of the causes leading to conceptual proliferation and egoistic “ownership” of experience. The Sutta-nipātadescribes the one who has managed this: “Sa sabbadhammesu visenibhūto, yaṁ kiñci diṭṭhaṁ va sutaṁ mutaṁ vā, sa pannabhāro muni vippayutto na kappiyo nūparato na patthiyo” ti Bhagavā ti.
What is the character of the impersonal viewpoint? In the Kālakārāma-sutta, transcendent experience is characterized quite comprehensively: Iti kho bhikkhave Tathāgato daṭṭhā [diṭṭhā
Daṭṭhā daṭṭhabban
What is there, then? Just seeing, hearing, feeling, or understanding. There is no agent, no patient, no recipient, no locus: only the verb, the process, or rather, the proceeding. To be enlightened is not to be or to do any thing: it is only being, or doing. This is admittedly circular, and it is proverbial to any student of mysticism--and certainly recognized by the Buddhist tradition itself--that little can besaid which can give any real sense of what goes on in transformed consciousness. Buddhism offers nonetheless its own kind of description, always tending toward the practical, toward the causes which will bring about the Liberation itself: that is, toward the empiric. The path to Liberation is twofold: moving away from deluded action, and moving toward wise action. It is all the more significant for its corollary that the entire process [of cause and effect] could be made to cease progressively by applying the proper means. Negatively put, the spiritual endeavor to end all suffering, is a process of ‘starving’ the conditions of their respective ‘nutriments’ (āhārā), as indicated by the latter half of the formula of Dependent Arising. However, there are enough instances in the Pāli Canon to show that it is quite legitimate to conceive this receding process too, positively as a progress in terms of wholesome mental states. [Ñāṇananda 1974:46-47] The eradication of conceptualization and the cultivation of a dispassionate, impersonal observation is the key to Liberation. “Ever-becoming and ever-ceasing-to-be are endless action.... Ceaseless action is the Universe.” [Merrell-Wolff 1973:247] Since the being embodied must be a part of such action, his hope must be to loose himself from the bounds of causal action: he must seek Liberation. Perhaps it is not so ironic that in order to do so, he must realize that there is nothing but action; for then he is, so says the Buddha, free.Notes[1] I prefer here the reading of papañca as ‘obstruction’ or ‘hinderance’ to the commonly met with ‘obsession’. Here I follow Rhys Davies’ suggestion that papañca is at least semantically related to *papadya ‘what is in front of the feet’, where he compares Latinimpedimentum (though Sanskrit prapadya should give Pāli papajja). [Rhys Davies 1979:412] An obsession is an obstruction, but not all obstructions are obsessions. Cf. also above, in the passage taken from the Madhupiṇḍika-sutta, where papañceti is taken in its sense as derived from Sanskrit prapañcayati ‘to describe at length’, from prapañca ‘diversity’. Back to text. [2] Robert Buswell has pointed out to me that Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda has arrived at the same conclusion. [Ñāṇananda 1971:31] Back to text. [3] Without really trying to second-guess the Tathāgata, the argument here is simply that he might recognize a distinction in the semantics of aham asmi with respect to his own description of the Enlightenment, and that of the Vedāntists. (He would almost certainly reject the use of such metaphor for paedagogical purposes, however.) Jennings is right to point out that the Vedāntist schools and their concepts of, for example, māyā, contributed to the Buddha’s own teachings. [Jennings 1974:cix-cx] Certainly, it can be said that useful comparison can be made between the Buddhist and Vedāntist traditions if such semantic differences are reconciled. Fundamental unities are realized in the Buddhist tradition at least insofar as the alienation of attāand anattā are concerned (Cf. the remarks on bhavaṅga-sota above.). Back to text.ReferencesAṅguttara-nikāya. 1888. Aṅguttara-nikāya. Vol. 2. Edited by Richard Morris. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. 6 vols. (1885-1910). Aṅguttara-nikāya. 1933. The book of the Gradual Sayings. Vol. 2: The book of the Fours. Translated by F.L. Woodward. London: Oxford University Press for the Pali Text Society. Buddhaghosa. 1936. Manorathapūraṇī: commentary on the Aṅguttara-nikāya. Vol. 3. Edited by Hermann Kopp. London: Oxford University Press for the Pali Text Society. 5 vols. (1924-1956). Childers, Robert Cæsar. 1875. A dictionary of the Pali language. London: Trübner & Co. Jennings, J. G. 1974. The Vedāntic Buddhism of the Buddha: a collection of historical texts translated [and edited] from the original Pāli. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. [Reprint of 1947 ed.] Majjhima-nikāya.. 1888. Majjhima-nikāya. Vol. 1. Edited by V. Trenckner. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. 4 vols. (1888-1925). Mayrhofer, Manfred. 1951. Handbuch des Pāli, mit Texten und Glossar: eine Einführung in das sprachwissenschaftliche Studium des Mittelindischen. 1. Teil: Grammatik. Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag. Merrell-Wolff, Franklin. 1973 The philosophy of consciousness-without-an-object: reflections on the nature of transcendental consciousness. New York: Julian Press. Ñāṇananda. 1971. Concept and reality in early Buddhist thought. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society. Ñāṇananda. 1974. The magic of the mind: an exposition of the Kālakārāma-sutta. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society. Nyanatiloka. 1980. Buddhist dictionary: manual of Buddhist terms and doctrines. 4th edition, revised by Nyanaponika. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society. Paramatthajotikā. 1917. Sutta-nipāta commentary: being Paramatthajotikā II. Vol. 2. Edited by Helmer Smith. London: Humphrey Milford for the Pali Text Society. 3 vols. (1916-1917). Rhys Davies, T. W., and William Stede, eds. 1979. The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English dictionary. London: Pali Text Society. [Reprint of 1925 ed.] Saṁyutta-nikāya. 1890. Saṁyutta-nikāya. Edited by Leon Feer. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. 3 vols. (1888-1890). Sutta-nipāta. 1911. Die Reden Gotamo Buddhos aus der Sammlung der Bruchstücke Suttanipāto des Pāli-Kanons. Translated by Karl Eugen Neumann. München: R. Piper & Co. Sutta-nipāta. 1913. Sutta-nipāta. Edited by Dines Andersen and Helmer Smith. London: Henry Frowde for the Pali Text Society. Sutta-nipāta. 1944. Woven cadences of early Buddhists. Translated by E. M. Hare. London: Humphrey Milford for the Pali Text Society. Sutta-nipāta. 1985. The Sutta-nipāta. Translated by Hammalava Saddhatissa. London: Curzon Press. |
HTML Michael Everson, Evertype, Cnoc na Sceiche, Leac an Anfa, Cathair na Mart, Co. Mhaigh Eo, 2002-10-20Copyright © 1993-2006 Evertype. All Rights Reserved |
Labels: Action, Anatta, Buddha, Michael Everson, Non Dual, Proliferation 0 comments | |
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Great Resource of Buddha's Teachings
Soh
Also see:
The Meaning of Nirvana
The Deathless in Buddhadharma?
What is Nirvana?
Update: The site has been taken down. But a copy of it is available on Box.com or Scribd here: https://app.box.com/s/nxby5606lbaei9oudiz6xsyrdasacqph / https://www.scribd.com/document/274168728/Measureless-Mind
When I discovered the site Measureless Mind, I thought, wow, what a great resource of Buddha's teachings! It is a very valuable resource for all practitioners. Very well formatted, well presented, all-rounded, well commented resource of Buddha's original teachings in the Pali canon by Geoff (online nick: jnana in dharmawheel, or nana in dhammawheel). Like Loppon Namdrol/Malcolm who I often quoted from, Geoff (whose practice background is more of Mahamudra and Theravada) is also a very knowledgeable Buddhist scholar-practitioner and I often read his posts with much interest.
I sent Thusness two of the many articles (I spent time to read the entire website from beginning to end and highly recommend others to do so) and Thusness also commented, "Both the articles are very well written. Put in the blog." and "that site is a great resource."
http://measurelessmind.ca/anattasanna.html
The Recognition of Selflessness (Anattasaññā)
Look at the world and see its emptiness Mogharāja, always mindful,
Eliminating the view of self, one goes beyond death.
One who views the world this way is not seen by the king of death.
— Sutta Nipāta 5.15, Mogharājamāṇavapucchā
The contemplation of selflessness is given in AN 10.60 Girimānanda Sutta:
Now what, Ānanda, is the recognition of selflessness? Here, Ānanda, a monk, gone to the wilderness, to the root of a tree, or to an empty place, discriminates thus: ‘The eye is not-self, forms are not-self; the ear is not-self, sounds are not-self; the nose is not-self, odors are not-self; the tongue is not-self, flavors are not-self; the body is not-self, tactual objects are not-self; the mind is not-self, phenomena are not-self.’ Thus he abides contemplating selflessness with regard to the six internal and external sensory spheres. This, Ānanda, is called the recognition of selflessness.
In practice, we need to be able to recognize this absence of self in our immediate experience: When seeing, there is the coming together of visible form, the eye, and visual consciousness. When hearing, there is the coming together of sound, the ear, and auditory consciousness. When touching, there is the coming together of tactual sensation, the body, and tactile consciousness. When thinking, there is the thought, the mind, and mental consciousness. These processes arise simply through ‘contact.’ When a sense faculty and a sensory object make contact, the corresponding sensory consciousness arises. This entire process occurs through specific conditionality (idappaccayatā). There is no independent, fully autonomous agent or self controlling any of this.
An independent, autonomous self would, by definition, be:
- permanent
- satisfactory
- not prone to dis-ease
- fully self-determining (be in complete autonomous control of itself)
Thus, what is being negated is a permanent, satisfactory self which is not prone to old age, sickness, and death. As SN 22.59 Pañcavaggiya Sutta (abridged) states:
Monks, form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, and consciousness are not-self. Were form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, or consciousness self, then this form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, and consciousness would not lead to dis-ease.
This criterion of dis-ease is the context for the following statement that:
None can have it of form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, or consciousness: ‘Let my form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, or consciousness be thus, let my form, feeling, recognition, fabrications, or consciousness be not thus.’
By engaging in sustained, dedicated contemplation we find only impermanent processes, conditionally arisen, and not fully self-determining. First we clearly see that all conditioned phenomena of body and mind are impermanent. Next we come to see that whatever is impermanent is unsatisfactory in that it can provide no lasting happiness. Then we realize that all impermanent, unsatisfactory phenomena of body and mind are not-self — they can’t be the basis for a self, which by definition would be permanent and (one would hope) satisfactory. This relationship between the recognition of impermanence, the recognition of unsatisfactoriness, and the recognition of selflessness is illustrated in the following diagram.
With the recognition of selflessness there is an emptying out of both the “subject” and “object” aspects of experience. We come to understand that “I-making” and “mine-making” with regard to the mind and body as well as all external representations is deluded. When the recognition of selflessness is fully developed there is no longer any reification of substantial referents to be experienced in relation to subjective grasping. Whatever is seen is merely the seen (diṭṭhamatta). Whatever is heard or sensed is merely the heard (sutamatta) and merely the sensed (mutamatta). Whatever is known is merely the known (viññātamatta). This is explained in Ud 1.10 Bāhiya Sutta:
‘The seen will be merely the seen, the heard will be merely the heard, the sensed will be merely the sensed, the known will be merely the known.’ This is how you should train, Bāhiya.
When, Bāhiya, for you the seen will be merely the seen, the heard will be merely the heard, the sensed will be merely the sensed, the known will be merely the known, then Bāhiya, you will not be that. When, Bāhiya, you are not that, then Bāhiya, you will not be there. When, Bāhiya, you are not there, then Bāhiya, you will be neither here nor beyond nor between-the-two. Just this is the end of unsatisfactoriness.
When there is no self to be found one’s experience becomes very simple, direct, and uncluttered. When seeing, there is the coming together of visible form, the eye, and visual consciousness, that’s all. There is no separate “seer.” The seer is entirely dependent upon the seen. There can be no seer independent of the seen. There is no separate, independent subject or self.
This is also the case for the sensory object. The “seen” is entirely dependent upon the eye faculty and visual consciousness. There can be no object seen independent of the eye faculty and cognition. This is the case for all possible sensory objects. There is no separate, independent sensory object.
The same holds true for sensory consciousness as well. “Seeing” is entirely dependent upon the eye and visible form. There can be no seeing independent of the eye and cognition. This is the case for all possible sensory cognitions. There is no separate, independent sensory consciousness.
It’s important to understand this experientially. Let’s take the straightforward empirical experience of you looking at this screen right now as an example. Conventionally speaking, you could describe the experience as “I see the computer screen.” Another way of describing this is that there’s a “seer” who “sees” the “seen.” But look at the screen: are there really three independent and separate parts to your experience? Or are “seer,” “sees,” and “seen,” just three conceptual labels applied to this experience in which the three parts are entirely interdependent?
The “seer,” “seen,” and “seeing” are all empty and insubstantial. The eye faculty, visible form, and visual consciousness are all interdependent aspects of the same experience. You can’t peel one away and still have a sensory experience — there is no separation. AN 4.24 Kāḷakārāma Sutta:
Thus, monks, the Tathāgata does not conceive an [object] seen when seeing what is to be seen. He does not conceive an unseen. He does not conceive a to-be-seen. He does not conceive a seer.
He does not conceive an [object] heard when hearing what is to be heard. He does not conceive an unheard. He does not conceive a to-be-heard. He does not conceive a hearer.
He does not conceive an [object] sensed when sensing what is to be sensed. He does not conceive an unsensed. He does not conceive a to-be-sensed. He does not conceive a senser.
He does not conceive an [object] known when knowing what is to be known. He does not conceive an unknown. He does not conceive a to-be-known. He does not conceive a knower.
Sensory consciousness can’t be isolated as separate and independent. Nor can any of these other interdependent phenomena. Even the designations that we apply to these various phenomena are entirely conventional, dependent designations. But this doesn’t mean that we should now interpret our experience as being some sort of cosmic oneness or unity consciousness or whatever one may want to call it. That's just another empty, dependent label isn’t it? The whole point of this analysis is to see the emptiness of all referents, and thereby stop constructing and defining a “self.”
The purpose of correctly engaging in the contemplation of selflessness is stated in AN 7.49 Dutiyasaññā Sutta:
‘The recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, monks, when developed and cultivated, is of great fruit and benefit; it merges with the death-free, has the death-free as its end.’ Thus it was said. In reference to what was it said?
Monks, when a monk’s mind frequently remains acquainted with the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, his mind is rid of “I-making” and “mine-making” with regard to this conscious body and externally with regard to all representations, and has transcended conceit, is at peace, and is well liberated.
If, monks, when a monk’s mind frequently remains acquainted with the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, his mind is not rid of “I-making” and “mine-making” with regard to this conscious body and externally with regard to all representations, and has not transcended conceit, is not at peace, and is not well liberated, then he should know, ‘I have not developed the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, there is no stepwise distinction in me, I have not obtained the strength of development.’ In that way he is fully aware there. But if, monks, when a monk’s mind frequently remains acquainted with the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, his mind is rid of “I-making” and “mine-making” with regard to this conscious body and externally with regard to all representations, and has transcended conceit, is at peace, and is well liberated, then he should know, ‘I have developed the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, there is stepwise distinction in me, I have obtained the strength of development.’ In that way he is fully aware there.
‘The recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, monks, when developed and cultivated, is of great fruit and benefit; it merges with the death-free, has the death-free as its end.’ Thus it was said. And in reference to this it was said.
Here we get to the heart of the matter, which is one of the most subtle aspects of the Buddhadhamma. Simply stated: when ignorance ceases, belief in self simultaneously ceases. And when there is no self to be found, then there is no self to die or take birth. This right here is “death-free.” And it is precisely this that the Buddha is declaring when he says to Mogharāja:
Look at the world and see its emptiness Mogharāja, always mindful,
Eliminating the view of self, one goes beyond death.
One who views the world this way is not seen by the king of death.
When one completely abandons the underlying tendencies which give rise to mistaken apprehensions of a self — any and all notions of “I am” — then there is no self to die. This stilling of the “currents of conceiving” over one’s imagined self, and the resulting peace that is empty of birth, aging, and death, is straightforwardly presented in MN 140 Dhātuvibhaṅga Sutta:
‘He has been stilled where the currents of conceiving do not flow. And when the currents of conceiving do not flow, he is said to be a sage at peace.’ Thus was it said. With reference to what was it said?
Monk, “I am” is a conceiving. “I am this” is a conceiving. “I shall be” is a conceiving. “I shall not be” ... “I shall be possessed of form” ... “I shall be formless” ... “I shall be percipient” ... “I shall be non-percipient” ... “I shall be neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient” is a conceiving. Conceiving is a disease, conceiving is a cancer, conceiving is an arrow. By going beyond all conceiving, monk, he is said to be a sage at peace.
Furthermore, a sage at peace is not born, does not age, does not die. He is unagitated, and is free from longing. He has nothing whereby he would be born. Not being born, how could he age? Not aging, how could he die? Not dying, how could he be agitated? Not being agitated, for what will he long?
So it was in reference to this that it was said, ‘He has been stilled where the currents of conceiving do not flow. And when the currents of conceiving do not flow, he is said to be a sage at peace.’
Truly, “a sage at peace is not born, does not age, does not die.” In this way, when ignorance ceases, the entire complex of conditioned arising bound up with dissatisfaction also ceases. When all traces of “I-making” and “mine-making” are abandoned through the fully integrated threefold training of ethical conduct, meditation, and discernment, just this is dispassion (virāga). Just this is cessation (nirodha). Just this is extinguishment (nibbāna). Just this is without outflows (anāsava). Just this is not-born (ajāta), not-become (abhūta), not-made (akata), not-fabricated (asaṅkhata), endless (ananta), indestructible (apalokita), and yes, death-free (amata). It is freedom (mutti).
The Recognition of Selflessness and the Seven Factors of Awakening (Satta Bojjhaṅgā)Sustained, dedicated practice of the recognition of selflessness will gradually create the optimal conditions for the arising of all seven factors of awakening. SN 46.73 Anatta Sutta (abridged):
Here monks, a monk develops the awakening factor of mindfulness accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of dhamma-investigation accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of energy accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of joy accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of tranquility accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of meditative composure accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of equanimity accompanied by the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go.
It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that it is of great fruit and benefit. It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that one of two fruits is to be expected: either final gnosis in this very life or, if there is a residue of clinging, the state of nonreturning. It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that it leads to great good. It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that it leads to great security from bondage. It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that it leads to a great sense of urgency. It is in this way that the recognition of selflessness in what is unsatisfactory is developed and cultivated so that it leads to dwelling in great comfort.
http://measurelessmind.ca/nirodhasanna.html
The Recognition of Cessation (Nirodhasaññā)
For whom there is neither a far shore,
Nor a near shore, nor both,
Who is free from distress, without ties,
Him I call a brāhmaṇa.
— Dhammapada 385
When the recognition of dispassion is fully developed and realized, and with no self to be found, nothing to be identified with, one realizes the gnosis and vision of liberation (vimuttiñāṇadassana). This is non-referential inner peace (ajjhattasanti). This is the full recognition of cessation. AN 10.60 Girimānanda Sutta:
Now what, Ānanda, is the recognition of cessation? Here, Ānanda, a monk, gone to the wilderness, to the root of a tree, or to an empty place, discriminates thus: ‘This is peace, this is excellent, that is: the calming of all fabrications, the release of all acquisitions, the elimination of craving, cessation, nibbāna.’ This, Ānanda, is called the recognition of cessation.
This is the complete absence of agitation (calita natthi). Ud 8.4 Nibbāna Sutta:
There being no agitation, there is tranquility. There being tranquility, there is no inclination. There being no inclination, there is no coming or going. There being no coming or going, there is no passing away or arising. There being no passing away or arising, there is neither a here nor a beyond nor a between-the-two. Just this is the end of unsatisfactoriness.
This is the calming of all specific fabrication and volitional intention. MN 140 Dhātuvibhaṅga Sutta:
One does not form any specific fabrication or volitional intention towards either existence or non-existence. Not forming any specific fabrication or volitional intention towards either existence or non-existence, he does not cling to anything in this world. Not clinging, he is not excited. Unexcited, he personally attains complete nibbāna. He discerns that, ‘Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, done is what had to be done, there is nothing further here.’
This is the freedom of absence which is revealed through the complete recognition of selflessness. Ud 1.10 Bāhiya Sutta:
‘The seen will be merely the seen, the heard will be merely the heard, the sensed will be merely the sensed, the known will be merely the known.’ This is how you should train, Bāhiya.
When, Bāhiya, for you the seen will be merely the seen, the heard will be merely the heard, the sensed will be merely the sensed, the known will be merely the known, then Bāhiya, you will not be that. When, Bāhiya, you are not that, then Bāhiya, you will not be there. When, Bāhiya, you are not there, then Bāhiya, you will be neither here nor beyond nor between-the-two. Just this is the end of unsatisfactoriness.
This is noble liberation which is the elimination of craving and clinging. MN 106 Āneñjasappāya Sutta:
This is death-free, namely, the liberation of mind through not clinging.
This is the effortless clarity of consciousness which is non-abiding and not established (appatiṭṭha viññāṇa). SN 22.53 Upaya Sutta:
When that consciousness is not established, not increasing, not concocting, it is liberated. Being liberated, it is steady. Being steady, it is content. Being content, he is not excited. Unexcited, he personally attains complete nibbāna. He discerns that, ‘Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, done is what had to be done, there is nothing further here.’
There is no more seeking of any kind. There is no more personal agenda. There is no identifying with any phenomena or turning anything into a fixed reference point. There is no “here” nor “beyond” nor “between-the-two.”
The awakened mind is measureless (appamāṇacetasa), free from any sort of measuring (pamāṇa). In evocative terms, an awakened one is deep (gambhīra), boundless (appameyya), and fathomless (duppariyogāḷha). Utterly free from any reference to specifically fabricated consciousness (viññāṇasaṅkhayavimutta). “Gone” (atthaṅgata), the measureless mind is untraceable (ananuvejja) even here and now. It doesn’t abide in the head, or in the body, or anywhere else for that matter. It doesn’t have size or shape. It’s not an object or a subject.
Just as the sky is formless and non-illustrative, the measureless mind is non-illustrative and non-indicative (anidassana). This effortless clarity is unmediated by any specific fabrication or volitional intention. It is unaffected knowing: The seen is merely the seen (diṭṭhamatta). The heard is merely the heard (sutamatta). The sensed is merely the sensed (mutamatta). The known is merely the known (viññātamatta). But there is no you there. Of course, this liberating gnosis and vision can’t adequately be pointed out or indicated by words alone. It is to be individually experienced (paccatta veditabba).
The Recognition of Cessation and the Seven Factors of Awakening (Satta Bojjhaṅgā)Sustained, dedicated practice of the recognition of cessation will gradually create the optimal conditions for the arising of all seven factors of awakening. SN 46.76 Nirodha Sutta (abridged):
Here monks, a monk develops the awakening factor of mindfulness accompanied by the recognition of cessation, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of dhamma-investigation accompanied by the recognition of cessation, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of energy accompanied by the recognition of cessation, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of joy accompanied by the recognition of cessation, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of tranquility accompanied by the recognition of cessation, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of meditative composure accompanied by the recognition of cessation, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops the awakening factor of equanimity accompanied by the recognition of cessation, dependent upon seclusion, dispassion, and cessation, resulting in letting go.
It is in this way that the recognition of cessation is developed and cultivated so that it is of great fruit and benefit. It is in this way that the recognition of cessation is developed and cultivated so that one of two fruits is to be expected: either final gnosis in this very life or, if there is a residue of clinging, the state of nonreturning. It is in this way that the recognition of cessation is developed and cultivated so that it leads to great good. It is in this way that the recognition of cessation is developed and cultivated so that it leads to great security from bondage. It is in this way that the recognition of cessation is developed and cultivated so that it leads to a great sense of urgency. It is in this way that the recognition of cessation is developed and cultivated so that it leads to dwelling in great comfort.
Labels: Anatta, Buddha, Dropping, Theravada |
Soh Wei Yu, modified 17 Hours ago at 12/30/24 11:44 AM
Created 17 Hours ago at 12/30/24 11:41 AM
RE: Are there traditional terms for what Daniel says about Agencylessness.
Posts: 78Join Date: 2/13/21 Recent Postshttps://www.awakeningtoreality.com/2021/07/anatta-is-dharma-seal-or-truth-that-is.html
Anatta is a Dharma Seal or Truth that is Always Already So, Anatta is Not a State
Soh
Wrote in 2018:
"If someone talks about an experience he/she had and then lost it, that's not (the true, deep) awakening... As many teachers put it, it's the great samadhi without entry and exit.
John Tan: There is no entry and exit. Especially for no-self. Why is there no entry and exit?
Me (Soh): Anatta (no-self) is always so, not a stage to attain. So it's about realisation and shift of perception.
John Tan: Yes (thumbs up)
As John also used to say to someone else, "Insight that 'anatta' is a seal and not a stage must arise to further progress into the 'effortless' mode. That is, anatta is the ground of all experiences and has always been so, no I. In seeing, always only seen, in hearing always only sound and in thinking, always only thoughts. No effort required and never was there an 'I'.""
Also:
Differentiate Wisdom from Art
Replying to someone in Rinzai Zen discussion group, John Tan wrote recently:
“I think we have to differentiate wisdom from an art or a state of mind.
In Master Sheng Yen’s death poem,
Busy with nothing till old. (无事忙中老)
In emptiness, there is weeping and laughing. (空里有哭笑)
Originally there never was any 'I'. (本来没有我)
Thus life and death can be cast aside. (生死皆可抛)
This "Originally there never was any 'I'" is wisdom and the dharma seal of anatta. It is neither an art like an artist in zone where self is dissolved into the flow of action nor is it a state to be achieved in the case of the taoist "坐忘" (sit and forget) -- a state of no-mind.
For example in cooking, there is no self that cooks, only the activity of cooking. The hands moves, the utensils act, the water boils, the potatoes peel and the universe sings together in the act of cooking. Whether one appears clumsy or smooth in act of cooking doesn't matter and when the dishes r out, they may still taste horrible; still there never was any "I" in any moment of the activity. There is no entry or exit point in the wisdom of anatta.”
Labels: Anatta, Zen Master Sheng-yen 1 comments | |
Soh wrote in 2007 based on what John Tan wrote:
First I do not see Anatta as merely a freeing from personality sort of experience as you mentioned; I see it as that a self/agent, a doer, a thinker, a watcher, etc, cannot be found apart from the moment to moment flow of manifestation or as its commonly expressed as ‘the observer is the observed’; there is no self apart from arising and passing. A very important point here is that Anatta/No-Self is a Dharma Seal, it is the nature of Reality all the time -- and not merely as a state free from personality, ego or the ‘small self’ or a stage to attain. This means that it does not depend on the level of achievement of a practitioner to experience anatta but Reality has always been Anatta and what is important here is the intuitive insight into it as the nature, characteristic, of phenomenon (dharma seal).
To put further emphasis on the importance of this point, I would like to borrow from the Bahiya Sutta (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/ud/ud.1.10.irel.html) that ‘in the seeing, there is just the seen, no seer’, ‘in the hearing, there is just the heard, no hearer’ as an illustration. When a person says that I have gone beyond the experiences from ‘I hear sound’ to a stage of ‘becoming sound’, he is mistaken. When it is taken to be a stage, it is illusory. For in actual case, there is and always is only sound when hearing; never was there a hearer to begin with. Nothing attained for it is always so. This is the seal of no-self. Therefore to a non dualist, the practice is in understanding the illusionary views of the sense of self and the split. Before the awakening of prajna wisdom, there will always be an unknowing attempt to maintain a purest state of 'presence'. This purest presence is the 'how' of a dualistic mind -- its dualistic attempt to provide a solution due to its lack of clarity of the spontaneous nature of the unconditioned. It is critical to note here that both the doubts/confusions/searches and the solutions that are created for these doubts/confusions/searches actually derive from the same cause -- our karmic propensities of ever seeing things dualistically.
John Tan adds: "This is the seal of no-self and can be realized and experienced in all moments; not just a mere concept."
Labels: Anatta |
excerpt from https://www.awakeningtoreality.com/2023/11/no-agent-but-there-is-choosing.html
"
Zen Master Thich Nhat Hanh:
"When we say it's raining, we mean that raining is taking place. You don't need someone up above to perform the raining. It's not that there is the rain, and there is the one who causes the rain to fall. In fact, when you say the rain is falling, it's very funny, because if it weren't falling, it wouldn't be rain. In our way of speaking, we're used to having a subject and a verb. That's why we need the word "it" when we say, "it rains." "It" is the subject, the one who makes the rain possible. But, looking deeply, we don't need a "rainer," we just need the rain. Raining and the rain are the same. The formations of birds and the birds are the same -- there's no "self," no boss involved.
There's a mental formation called vitarka, "initial thought." When we use the verb "to think" in English, we need a subject of the verb: I think, you think, he thinks. But, really, you don't need a subject for a thought to be produced. Thinking without a thinker -- it's absolutely possible. To think is to think about something. To perceive is to perceive something. The perceiver and the perceived object that is perceived are one.
When Descartes said, "I think, therefore I am," his point was that if I think, there must be an "I" for thinking to be possible. When he made the declaration "I think," he believed that he could demonstrate that the "I" exists. We have the strong habit or believing in a self. But, observing very deeply, we can see that a thought does not need a thinker to be possible. There is no thinker behind the thinking -- there is just the thinking; that's enough.
Now, if Mr. Descartes were here, we might ask him, "Monsieur Descartes, you say, 'You think, therefore you are.' But what are you? You are your thinking. Thinking -- that's enough. Thinking manifests without the need of a self behind it."
Thinking without a thinker. Feeling without a feeler. What is our anger without our 'self'? This is the object of our meditation. All the fifty-one mental formations take place and manifest without a self behind them arranging for this to appear, and then for that to appear. Our mind consciousness is in the habit of basing itself on the idea of self, on manas. But we can meditate to be more aware of our store consciousness, where we keep the seeds of all those mental formations that are not currently manifesting in our mind.
When we meditate, we practice looking deeply in order to bring light and clarity into our way of seeing things. When the vision of no-self is obtained, our delusion is removed. This is what we call transformation. In the Buddhist tradition, transformation is possible with deep understanding. The moment the vision of no-self is there, manas, the elusive notion of 'I am,' disintegrates, and we find ourselves enjoying, in this very moment, freedom and happiness."
......
"When we say I know the wind is blowing, we don't think that there is something blowing something else. "Wind' goes with 'blowing'. If there is no blowing, there is no wind. It is the same with knowing. Mind is the knower; the knower is mind. We are talking about knowing in relation to the wind. 'To know' is to know something. Knowing is inseparable from the wind. Wind and knowing are one. We can say, 'Wind,' and that is enough. The presence of wind indicates the presence of knowing, and the presence of the action of blowing'."
"..The most universal verb is the verb 'to be'': I am, you are, the mountain is, a river is. The verb 'to be' does not express the dynamic living state of the universe. To express that we must say 'become.' These two verbs can also be used as nouns: 'being", "becoming". But being what? Becoming what? 'Becoming' means 'evolving ceaselessly', and is as universal as the verb "to be." It is not possible to express the "being" of a phenomenon and its "becoming" as if the two were independent. In the case of wind, blowing is the being and the becoming...."
"In any phenomena, whether psychological, physiological, or physical, there is dynamic movement, life. We can say that this movement, this life, is the universal manifestation, the most commonly recognized action of knowing. We must not regard 'knowing' as something from the outside which comes to breathe life into the universe. It is the life of the universe itself. The dance and the dancer are one."
——
Alan watts expressed well too: “From "The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are" by Alan Watts:
As soon as one sees that separate things are fictitious, it becomes obvious that nonexistent things cannot “perform” actions. The difficulty is that most languages are arranged so that actions (verbs) have to be set in motion by things (nouns), and we forget that rules of grammar are not necessarily rules, or patterns, of nature. This, which is nothing more than a convention of grammar, is also responsible for (or, better, “goeswith”) absurd puzzles as to how spirit governs matter, or mind moves body. How can a noun, which is by definition not action, lead to action?
Scientists would be less embarrassed if they used a language, on the model of Amerindian Nootka, consisting of verbs and adverbs, and leaving off nouns and adjectives. If we can speak of a house as housing, a mat as matting, or of a couch as seating, why can't we think of people as “peopling,” of brains as “braining,” or of an ant as an “anting?” Thus in the Nootka language a church is “housing religiously,” a shop is “housing tradingly,” and a home is “housing homely.” Yet we are habituated to ask, “Who or what is housing? Who peoples? What is it that ants?” Yet isn't it obvious that when we say, “The lightning flashed,” the flashing is the same as the lightning, and that it would be enough to say, “There was lightning”? Everything labeled with a noun is demonstrably a process or action, but language is full of spooks, like the “it” in “It is raining,” which are the supposed causes, of action.
Does it really explain running to say that “A man is running”? On the contrary, the only explanation would be a description of the field or situation in which “a manning goeswith running” as distinct from one in which “a manning goeswith sitting.” (I am not recommending this primitive and clumsy form of verb language for general and normal use. We should have to contrive something much more elegant.) Furthermore, running is not something other than myself, which I (the organism) do. For the organism is sometimes a running process, sometimes a standing process, sometimes a sleeping process, and so on, and in each instance the “cause” of the behavior is the situation as a whole, the organism/environment. Indeed, it would be best to drop the idea of causality and use instead the idea of relativity.
For it is still inexact to say that an organism “responds” or “reacts” to a given situation by running or standing, or whatever. This is still the language of Newtonian billiards. It is easier to think of situations as moving patterns, like organisms themselves. Thus, to go back to the cat (or catting), a situation with pointed ears and whiskers at one end does not have a tail at the other as a response or reaction to the whiskers, or the claws, or the fur. As the Chinese say, the various features of a situation “arise mutually” or imply one another as back implies front, and as chickens imply eggs—and vice versa. They exist in relation to each other like the poles of the magnet, only more complexly patterned.
Moreover, as the egg/chicken relation suggests, not all the features of a total situation have to appear at the same time. The existence of a man implies parents, even though they may be long since dead, and the birth of an organism implies its death. Wouldn't it be as farfetched to call birth the cause of death as to call the cat's head the cause of the tail? Lifting the neck of a bottle implies lifting the bottom as well, for the “two parts” come up at the same time. If I pick up an accordion by one end, the other will follow a little later, but the principle is the same. Total situations are, therefore, patterns in time as much as patterns in space.
And, right now is the moment to say that I am not trying to smuggle in the “total situation” as a new disguise for the old “things” which were supposed to explain behavior or action. The total situation or field is always open-ended, for
Little fields have big fields
Upon their backs to bite 'em,
And big fields have bigger fields
And so ad infinitum.
We can never, never describe all the features of the total situation, not only because every situation is infinitely complex, but also because the total situation is the universe. Fortunately, we do not have to describe any situation exhaustively, because some of its features appear to be much more important than others for understanding the behavior of the various organisms within it. We never get more than a sketch of the situation, yet this is enough to show that actions (or processes) must be understood, or explained, in terms of situations just as words must be understood in the context of sentences, paragraphs, chapters, books, libraries, and … life itself.
To sum up: just as no thing or organism exists on its own, it does not act on its own. Furthermore, every organism is a process: thus the organism is not other than its actions. To put it clumsily: it is what it does. More precisely, the organism, including its behavior, is a process which is to be understood only in relation to the larger and longer process of its environment. For what we mean by “understanding” or “comprehension” is seeing how parts fit into a whole, and then realizing that they don't compose the whole, as one assembles a jigsaw puzzle, but that the whole is a pattern, a complex wiggliness, which has no separate parts. Parts are fictions of language, of the calculus of looking at the world through a net which seems to chop it up into bits. Parts exist only for purposes of figuring and describing, and as we figure the world out we become confused if we do not remember this all the time.”
John tan replied “He is so gifted in expressing anatta and his insights, so clear.”"
Jim Smith, modified 16 Hours ago at 12/30/24 12:50 PM
Created 16 Hours ago at 12/30/24 12:50 PM
RE: Are there traditional terms for what Daniel says about Agencylessness.
Posts: 1822Join Date: 1/17/15 Recent PostsSoh Wei Yu, modified 1 Hour ago at 12/31/24 4:18 AM
Created 1 Hour ago at 12/31/24 4:18 AM
RE: Are there traditional terms for what Daniel says about Agencylessness.
Posts: 78Join Date: 2/13/21 Recent Postspartial quotations from https://www.awakeningtoreality.com/2020/06/choosing.html
Also, an enlightening conversation recently (thankfully with permission from Arcaya Malcolm to share this) in Arcaya Malcolm's facebook group:
"[Participant 1]
June 14 at 2:40 PM
I came across a passage in a book I'm reading which brings up how Nagarjuna often bases arguments on unstated and unproven premises and manipulates ambiguities in language to justify his arguments leading to criticisms of sophistry. How do later authors address this if they do at all?
One example from chap 3 of the MMK with the following 3 arguments:
"Vision cannot in anyway see itself. Now if it cannot see itself, how can it see other things?
"The example of fire is not adequate to establish vision. These have been refuted with the analysis of movement, past, future, and present" - refers to the refutation from chap 2
"When no vision occurs there is nothing to be called visions. How then can it be said: vision sees?"
The book brings up the following critcism respectively:
This is based on the assumption for objects to have certain functions it needs to apply the function to itself but this is not justified. A counter example being lamps illuminate themselves and others.
The argument from chap 2 depends on natural functions (movement, burning of fire, seeing of the eye, etc.) being predicated on the moment of time which it takes place, and when the non obtaining of time is established it leads to the non happening of the function. This is not justified.
Here Nagarjuna jumps from how seeing only occurs with a sense object to the occlusion the eye faculty can't see. The author distinguishes between "seeing independent of condition" and "seeing dependent of condition" so Nagarjuna really only negates the first one. And that negating the first is close to pointless since no one asserts seeing occurs irrespective of condition. The second is left alone.
6[...] and 5 others
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[Participant 2] What book is this from?
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[Participant 1] Madhyamaka in China, the author was giving some background on Nagarjuna.
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Malcolm Smith
Malcolm Smith Lamps do not illuminate themselves. Candrakirti shows this.
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Malcolm Smith
Malcolm Smith Nāgārjuna is addressing the realist proposition, "the six senses perceive their objects because those sense and their objects intrinsically exist ." It is not his unstated premise, that is the purvapakṣa, the premise of the opponent. The opponent, in verse 1 of this chapter asserts the essential existence of the six āyatanas. The opponent is arguing that perception occurs because the objects of perception actually exist.
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Malcolm Smith
Malcolm Smith [Participant 1] "The argument from chap 2 depends on natural functions (movement, burning of fire, seeing of the eye, etc.) being predicated on the moment of time which it takes place, and when the non obtaining of time is established it leads to the non happening of the function. This is not justified."
Why?
Nāgārjuna shows two things in chapter two, one, he says that if there is a moving mover, this separates the agent from the action, and either the mover is not necessary or the moving is not necessary. It is redundant.
In common language we oftren saying things like "There is a burning fire." But since that is what a fire is (burning) there is no separate agent which is doing the burning, fire is burning.
On the other hand, when an action is not performed, no agent of that action can be said to exist. This is why he says "apart from something which has moved and has not moved, there is no moving mover." There is no mover with moving, etc.
This can be applied to all present tense gerundial agentive constructions, such as I am walking to town, the fire is burning, etc.
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[Participant 3] Malcolm Smith these are not agentive constructions, they are unaccusative (cf. "byed med") verbs, so of course no separate agent can be established. So what?
The example of the fire and the eye are likewise not convincing, because they just happen to describe natural functions, but this is not all that unaccusative verbs do. When you say "the cat falls down", you cannot say that "falling down" is what a cat "is", the same way you can with fire burning.
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Malcolm Smith
Malcolm Smith [Participant 3] the point is aimed at the notion that there has to be a falling faller, a seeing seer, etc. it is fine to say there is a falling cat, but stupid to say the cat is a falling faller. The argument is aimed at that sort of naive premise.
For example, if eyes could see forms by nature, they should be able to forms in absence of an object of form, and so on.
But if the sight of forms cannot be found in the eyes, and not in the object, nor the eye consciousness, then none of them are sufficient to explain the act of seeing. Because of this, statements like the eyes are seers is just a convention, but isn’t really factual.
And it still applies in this way, apart from what has been seen and not been seen, there is no present seeing.
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Malcolm Smith
Malcolm Smith Any people make the mistake of thinking that nag has an obligation to do more than just deconstruct the purpaksa.
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[Participant 1] Malcolm Smith thank you, definitely clears it up
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Soh Wei Yu
Soh Wei Yu Malcolm Smith What is purpaksa?
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Malcolm Smith
Malcolm Smith purva means "prior", pakṣa" means postion
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Malcolm SmithActive Now
Malcolm Smith meaning, "the opponent's position."
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Malcolm Smith Purvapaksa
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- From his facebook group Ask the Ācārya https://www.facebook.com/groups/387338435166650/
Description
Who this group is for: people who wish to ask Ācārya Malcolm Smith questions about Dharma etc., and to converse with like-minded people. Being admitted to this group carries a commitment not to share content outside of the group.
Who this group is not for: People with pseudonyms; people who think one can practice Dzogchen, Mahāmudra, etc. without a guru; people who think psychedelics are useful on the Buddhist path; people who think they can mix Buddhadharma with nonbuddhist paths, etc.
Also, more by Malcolm:
[10:51 PM, 10/17/2019] Soh Wei Yu: malcolm (Arcaya Malcolm Smith) wrote:
https://dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=77&t=30365&p=479718&hilit=AGENT#p479718
There is no typing typer, no learning learner, no digesting digester, thinking tinker, or driving driver.
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No, a falling faller does not make any sense. As Nāgārjuna would put it, apart from snow that has fallen or has not fallen, presently there is no falling.
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It is best if you consult the investigation into movement in the MMK, chapter two. This is where it is shown that agents are mere conventions. If one claims there is agent with agency, one is claiming the agent and the agency are separate. But if you claim that agency is merely a characteristic of an agent, when agent does not exercise agency, it isn't an agent since an agent that is not exercising agency is in fact a non-agent. Therefore, rather than agency being dependent on an agent, an agent is predicated upon exercising agency. For example, take movement. If there is an agent there has to be a moving mover. But there is no mover when there is no moving. Apart from moving, how could there be a mover? But when there is moving, there isn't a mover which is separate from moving. Even movement itself cannot be ascertained until there has been a movement. When there is no movement, there is no agent of movement. When there is moving, there is no agent of moving that can be ascertained to be separate from the moving. And since even moving cannot be ascertained without there either having been movement or not, moving itself cannot be established. Since moving cannot be established, a moving mover cannot be established. If a moving mover cannot be established, an agent cannot be established.
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Hi Wayfarer:
The key to understanding everything is the term "dependent designation." We don't question the statement "I am going to town." In this there are three appearances, for convenience's sake, a person, a road, and a destination.
A person is designated on the basis of the aggregates, but there is no person in the aggregates, in one of the aggregates, or separate from the aggregates. Agreed? A road is designated in dependence on its parts, agreed? A town s designated upon its parts. Agreed?
If you agree to this, then you should have no problem with the following teaching of the Buddha in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra:
This body arises from various conditions, but lacks a self. This body is like the earth, lacking an agent. This body is like water, lacking a self. This body is like fire, lacking a living being. This body is like the wind, lacking a person. This body is like space, lacking a nature. This body is the place of the four elements, but is not real. This body that is not a self nor pertains to a self is empty.
In other words, when it comes to the conventional use of language, Buddha never rejected statements like "When I was a so and so in a past life, I did so and so, and served such and such a Buddha." Etc. But when it comes to what one can discern on analysis, if there is no person, no self, etc., that exists as more than a mere designation, the fact that agents cannot be discerned on analysis should cause no one any concern. It is merely a question of distinguishing between conventional use of language versus the insight into the nature of phenomena that results from ultimate analysis.
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[11:36 PM, 10/17/2019] John Tan: Yes should put in blog together with Alan watt article about language causing confusion.
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From other threads:
https://dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=39&t=26272&p=401986&hilit=agent#p401986
There is no "experiencer" since there is no agent. There is merely experience, and all experience is empty.
https://dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=102&t=24265&start=540
Why should there be someone upon whom karma ripens? To paraphrase the Visuddhimagga, there is no agent of karma, nor is there a person to experience its ripening, there is merely a flow of dharmas.
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There are no agents. There are only actions. This is covered in the refutation of moving movers in chapter two of the MMK.
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https://dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=116&t=26495&p=406369&hilit=agent#p406369
The point is that there is no point to eternalism if there is no eternal agent or object.
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https://dharmawheel.net/viewtopic.php?f=52&t=16306&p=277352&hilit=mover+movement+agent#p277352
Things have no natures, conventionally or otherwise. Look, we can say water is wet, but actually, there no water that possesses a wet nature. Water is wet, that is all. There is no wetness apart from water and not water apart from wetness. If you say a given thing has a separate nature, you are making the exact mistaken Nāgārajuna points out in the analysis of movement, i.e., it is senseless to say there is a "moving mover." Your arguments are exactly the same, you are basically saying there is an "existing existence."
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This is precisely because of the above point I referenced. Nagārjuna clearly shows that characteristics/natures are untenable.
Candrakīrti points out that the possessor does not exist at all, but for the mere purpose of discourse, we allow conventionally the idea that there is a possessor of parts even though no possessor of parts exists. This mistake that we indulge in can act as an agent, for example a car, we can use it as such, but it is empty of being a car — an agent is as empty of being an agent as its actions are empty of being actions.
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