Soh

The Taiwanese friend said:

I wrote this article solely to ask you both to confirm whether my understanding of dependent arising is correct. I'm concerned that I might have misunderstood the real meaning of dependent origination once more. Thank you both again, by the way. I really don't want to disrupt your lives, so please take your time and respond whenever it's convenient for you.

Recognizing that phenomena lack an inherent core or essence merely deconstructs them. Yet, viewing emptiness through the lens of dependent arising helps us reconstruct our cognitive orientation. First, we dismantle the notion of intrinsic existence. Then, we utilize the understanding of dependent arising and mere conventional designation to replace the view that causes and effects exist in and of themselves. In this way, without undermining conventional truth, we can simultaneously discern dependent arising and emptiness—or, from within conventional truth, gain insight into emptiness.

The relationality of dependently arisen phenomena means that a sound relies on other sounds to manifest, and a tactile sensation relies on other tactile sensations; every phenomenon appears through relativity or relationality. This relativity does not refer to one intrinsically existent phenomenon being relative to another intrinsically existent phenomenon—such as intrinsically existent black standing in contrast to intrinsically existent white. Rather, relativity here means that “black” is merely a nominal designation imputed in dependence on white, and “white” is likewise a nominal designation imputed in dependence on black.

Let me offer another example of dependent arising: the bark of a dog relies on the dog, on vibrating air (sound waves), on my ear faculty, and on consciousness. The bark does not truly arise from these conditions; it is a mere conventional designation established in dependence on conditions that, at the level of conventional truth, function causally. Those conditions, in turn, depend on the bark: if they could not bring the bark about, they would not be conditions for the bark and thus would not be functional. Therefore, there are no inherently existent causes and no inherently existent effects.

If every phenomenon can appear only in dependence upon conditions, the characteristics that emerge at the moment of manifestation are not ultimately real characteristics. These characteristics are not inherent to the phenomena themselves; there are no absolutely real characteristics—only characteristics posited through conventional agreement. A phenomenon cannot appear apart from its conditions; no phenomenon exists independently, nor does any phenomenon exist ultimately. Dependent arising and emptiness are the nature of all experience; realizing this renders every experience dream-like and illusory.

Where I live, the temperature sometimes reaches nearly 40°C, so while I work, I often feel very hot. As I allow my insight into dependent arising and emptiness to permeate the six sense bases, I find that it fundamentally changes the way I perceive phenomena and, to some extent, lessens bodily discomfort. Since the feeling of discomfort is dependently arisen rather than intrinsically existent, it is like an illusion. The crucial point is to completely uproot the tendency to reify phenomena; only when this tendency is utterly eliminated can we fully engage with the conventional world without being troubled by events or things within it. Having recognized that phenomena lack essence, we must then explore deeply how phenomena appear. Ultimately, we will see that phenomena manifest through dependency, relationality, conditions, and conventional designations. From this perspective of dependent arising, I have also begun to contemplate the interpenetrating nature of all dharmas.

I have discovered that only by realizing the full import of dependent arising can one truly understand the indivisibility of appearance and emptiness. Formerly, I regarded emptiness as a tool for dismantling the intrinsic nature of things, which led me to see that phenomena are unborn. Now, however, emptiness enables me to recognize that the properties of things are not possessed from their own side; thus, I understand that although phenomena lack inherent existence, they nevertheless appear through dependent origination.

When I am under the sway of karmic predispositions, I take the objects I perceive to have actually arisen on the strength of conditions. When, even briefly, I am free of those karmic tendencies, I know that the scene before my eyes does not exist as a real entity; it is only posited through dependent imputation. This experience carries with it a sense of the unreality of things, and it occurs without any analytical deconstruction. These two modes of cognition reveal a striking contrast.


John Tan said:

It is not easy to understand dependent arising and emptiness, but in general, I can say a practitioner will undergo several phases of understanding (including me). I can't say which is the correct view; I can only tell him what I think.

The most common understanding is a materialistic and realist view that phenomena are dependent on a host of conditions for them to arise. They see fundamental "things" in interactions, from which new phenomena are produced and cease.

The second is the non-Gelug (Nyingma, Kagyu, and Sakya schools) view. Things don't exist; they are reified conventions mistaken as "real." They are functional and valid conventionally but are empty conventions. Purged of the conventional is the ultimate, free from all elaborations, spontaneously present, and primordially free.

Third is the Gelug view of seeing through inherent existence and allowing conventional reality to function validly without denying it. Tsongkhapa initially accepted freedom from all elaborations, but later he thought it was incomplete after his dreams (if I remember correctly). He realized the key lies in the emptiness of "inherent existence" via dependent arising. But his way is too analytical, complex, and lacks a direct taste of spontaneous presence.

For me, I see Tsongkhapa brought out the key insight, and in my opinion, he is correct to emphasize that emptiness and dependent arising must go hand in hand, but a practitioner must be able to relate such an insight to spontaneous presence. In other words, dependent arising and emptiness must be integrated and point back to spontaneous presence, and spontaneous presence should be understood from a non-substantialist, dependent, and relational perspective (in contrast to a substantialist view).

Emptiness is not just about saying, "Oh, all these phenomena are just names; they don't have real existence." This leads to the question I always ask: why "dependent" arising and dependent designations? If it is just about mistaking reified constructs and conventions, then there is no need to teach about dependencies at all, or the sevenfold reasonings. Just the emptiness of the conventional would suffice.

The key does, in fact, point to the intimate relationship between dependent arising and emptiness. Much like the video I sent you about Carlo Rovelli's understanding, which is the key insight, though he is somewhat of a realist. Send him the video and see whether he understands.


It is really not easy to open up our minds and see emptiness via dependent arising because our entire framework is, by default, inherent and dualistic; unpacking it requires a lot of time.

If you hear the sound of a bell being struck, we ask: does it come from the stick, the bell, air vibration, the ear, the eardrum, or even the mind? It does not reside in any single one, nor all of them. Why? Why must it be asked this way?

If we ask, "Is coldness an inherent characteristic of ice, and heat an inherent property of fire?" what sort of problems is our mind facing? Can we understand our own problem of analysis and what we are missing?

Don't be too quick to answer anything. Understand what a phenomenon is; don't just say it is a "convention" and that, other than the convention, it does not exist. See how we have been mistaken, see what experience is like, and see what mistakes we have made in relation to our experience. For example, when we say "fire," what do we mean? When we say "heat," what do we mean? What do all these phenomena involve?

From these questions, we then look at cause and effect issues, object and property issues, past and future issues, and subject and object issues, etc., much like how Nagarjuna asked in his MMK (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā).

We must understand it is not just about freedom from all elaborations. We taste the natural state, primordially free and luminous. Although it is important to have this direct authentication, it has to be realized from a non-substantialist view resting on dependencies and emptiness.


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